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PRESENT RELIGION.





PRESENT RELIGION:

AS

**A FAITH OWNING FELLOWSHIP WITH
THOUGHT.**

BY

SARA S. HENNELL,

AUTHOR OF "THOUGHTS IN AID OF FAITH," ETC.

PART II.—SECOND DIVISION:

PRACTICAL EFFECT.

LONDON:

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PART II.—SECOND DIVISION.

**THE EFFECT OF PRESENT RELIGION, ON ITS
PRACTICAL SIDE.**

**FIRST SUB-DIVISION.—THE PRACTICAL EFFECT WHICH
IS INTEGRAL, AND WHICH REGARDS THE MAINTEN-
ANCE OF A RELIGIOUS BASIS TO MORALITY.**

**SECOND SUB-DIVISION. — THE PRACTICAL EFFECT
WHICH APPEARS IN DETAIL, AND WHICH REGARDS
THE ACTUAL WORKING OF MORAL PRINCIPLE BASED
SPECIFICALLY IN RELIGION.**

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PRACTICAL SIDE.

FIRST SUB-DIVISION.—THE PRACTICAL EFFECT WHICH
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TENANCE OF A RELIGIOUS BASIS TO MORALITY.





CHAPTER I.

THE RELIGIOUS PROMISE CONTAINED IN THE ACTUAL SIGNS OF TRANSITION IN THE MODE OF FAITH.

“Yet once again I shake the heavens and the earth; I shake all nations, saith the Lord of Hosts!”— This is the old Hebrew image by which prophetic insight made announcement to that people of the forthcoming of Christianity into the world, at the time when the great advent remained still “a little while”, though but “a little while”, in advance of experience; and when, therefore, what alone was being felt by mankind, at the pending moment, was the anticipatory tremor of Christianity’s expecting. It was the striking into expression, in its one echoing phrase, of the whole feeling which the prophet knew by religious instinct to be that of the whole then religious world. And yet, true as it might be then,—true as necessarily we feel it must have been,—can we listen to it now, as its sound reaches ourselves, across the long centuries that have intervened, without starting into the apprehension that it might have been first uttered for ourselves! Can we hinder that our ears tingle, and our hearts leap, as if with immediate cer-

tainty that our own case was that which was indeed in the prophet's thought!

I have now shown how fully, for my own part, I believe that the real season is truly come round to ourselves, in the circling course of large spiritual eventuation, when indeed just as much is become due, in the very rule of things, an approaching advent of Christianity's Successor, as in Haggai's time was due Christianity. Let me say then, for myself, I cannot, in so believing, imagine that there could now, more than then, be phrased into language a more thorough embodying of the whole fact, as to either case, than here in this image is conveyed. And in saying this, let me explain at once, I mean expressly on account of what in it is its grand anthropomorphism.

Is my point in this obvious?—It should be, if my doctrine is understood.—In my believing in the parallelness of the present age, as to religious state, to the state previous to Christianity, I am farther claiming to discern, in the on-coming Form of Religion, the distinctive characteristic of its demanding of intellect evermore to adopt solely and expressly the use of symbolism in religion's service, with entire admission of the practice: doing henceforth with full consciousness what heretofore it has done by mere instinct only. And the gathering of religious import from the historic course of religion is eminently the case where the true method of religious thought needs be followed. Can I otherwise then than see in this example of prophetic utterance the most keen of illustrations to my own purpose?—I seize on the phrase gladly, I acknowledge, as what seems to me an availing text to indeed the whole matter yet before me, having regard to the describing of new Religion. Or, at all events, as that whose discussing and

converting into my own sense, may help me in the best possible way into my now called-for track of thought.

Nay, there is even more that now concerns me in the prophetic phrase than its illustrative vindication of anthropomorphism. When I think of a new Religion being at hand, most truly I acknowledge to myself that this does imply a *Form*, newly enfolding Religion's essence. That Religion should be henceforth *without* form, through having cast off its past one, would be only the same thing in my idea as its returning into the vagueness of chaos,—such as primarily it lay in, before in any way the Spirit of God had moved over it. Christianity was alone what it was through its possessed Form; and the Religion now due to succeed Christianity—that which here on my own account, while I own it still future in reality, I assume as being “present” to me, because of my thinking to possess in myself a witness to its signs of coming:—this Religion I am looking on to would, as much as Christianity, not have aught to be discerned by, aught to give to feeling its forewarning by, if itself were uninvolved in an outer Form. I cannot think, for my own part, of a Religion that should really be spiritual, *unless* in its being embodied materially, in what solely means an assorted organization.—But, this being the case, I spring eagerly to the fact which the stirring phrase now in question exemplifies, of the “ritual” power of Art to minister to the needed kind of Formation. No one doubts that the effect which it has on us, as we listen to it, is dependent in part on its character of common Poetry; nor does any one either doubt that the common essence of all Poetry when it rises to its greatest height is but the same with the highest mode of Philosophy. Even in its humblest kind of usage all Poetry that is rightly such does alone act on us by rendering into ab-

abstract images the diffused facts of emotive life, which, endued with this common garb, and thus alone, have access to universal human feeling : and the utmost height of Philosophy means nothing but the same generalization. And yet Poetry has this in itself also of great difference, which, if loss on the one hand is eminently of gain on the other, that it serves as its own stimulus to attention. It rouses up the ear to its own message ; and forces listeners to itself whom the pure voice of Philosophy would never reach : as we can never be more vividly made aware than exactly in the present case. If it were possible for Philosophy to condense import as to an occurring era in development like that the prophet characterizes, in as few words as he has done,—which however seems *not* possible,—still it could never have sounded to us, we feel certain, as does actually this appeal, coming to us with its trumpet note of warning, as if directly from ancient Haggai to ourselves, seeming as lifting his inspired voice in our very presence.—And this vehemence of presentation brings before me, I would say, the suggestion of what Art may be empowered to do, and must actually be called on to do, of enforcing similarly *all* the great abstract ideas which Religion evermore must supply.

And I mean, Art of all kinds that are actually capable of following, as they ought, in the track of Theology, in becoming rightly symbolic. In the present case, indeed, it is the fact with myself that it has not been by Poetry alone that the prophet's words have been revived in my memory, but thus as borne out by a rightly-ministering fellow-art. They have come to me under the double-dye of symbolism which has been gained in their modern setting in our own Handel's "Messiah": that happily so familiar modern setting, where the original inspiration

of the prophet-Poet has answeringly been met by the same kind of inspiration in one who is the true Priest of Music : the true musical generalist, who indeed stands unique as such, in the high abstractness, or religiousness, of his sense-appeal. It was in listening to this heightened version, and in thinking of it besides in connection with the whole rest of the dramatic flow of harmonies comprised in the great musical epic, that the line of thought formed itself which now I am desiring to set forth,—and which I wish to be as a *prelude* to what shall follow, in its very serving, let me say, to range this on the new key I have occasion for ; the key different as it needs be from that in which hitherto my thought has run.—For the affording of this, however, I must quote more explicitly my adopted text ; and especially I must do this in the mode of Handel's combination which may help my readers' memory in the case to be, I hope, in the same state of vividness as my own : this same manner of combining words by different hands, and more still of different times, being besides what is the manifest source, in the "Messiah", of its character of philosophy. I wish to have my text taken, not alone as being Poetry, but as Poetry steeped in Music. All Art that is true Art must thence, of necessity, embody general truth ; and to say this is but saying the same thing, in my idea, as that all Art needs minister to Theology.—And herein farther is also shewn, as I am exactly about to argue, the ever-enduring need that there exists, to soundest thought, of that highest mode of Poetry which is Theologic use of Anthropomorphism.

" Thus saith the Lord of Hosts : Yet once, a little while, and I will shake the heavens and the earth, the sea and the dry land. And I will shake all nations, and the desire of

all nations shall come. (Hag. II. 6, 7.) The Lord, whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple, even the messenger of the covenant, whom ye delight in; behold, he shall come, saith the Lord of Hosts. But who may abide the day of his coming: and who shall stand when he appeareth? For he is like a refiner's fire." (Mal. III. 1, 2.)

I am going to mar all the beauty of this, all the emotive power of it, by taking the sense to pieces, and trying to show it in a modern light!—Not, however, in that mode of the greatest barbarism of all, which is the following, and which I will eschew to begin with. Namely, that which should suppose that my own imposed meaning lay really with the first speaker. I wish clearly to be understood upon this point.

I admit entirely that what here was had in view, by the sudden coming of the Lord, was the kind of revelation, at that time anticipated by Hebrews, which should so far be immediate as to occur through an accredited representer of Jehovah, dealing round his insignia of Divine power: one who should truly be all visibly human, and yet none the less authorized to carry on and reinforce the special covenant with his people which that people had delight in: although opening besides, as was now called for, a small court in the Lord's house of established worship, in its outer precincts, to such well-inclined Gentiles as seemed ready to hasten into it. I admit this on the full historic terms that I also admit, farther, that the real circumstance happened later, of the expected messenger's arriving in a truly human Messiah, who, however, while he answered the pre-existing hope, yet answered it in terms that were indeed higher than any prophet had had it in him to fore-imagine. Namely, in the at-first disappointing coming of the kingly Jesus of Nazareth: of him whose overt lowliness of aspect was

however to become merged, for future ages, in the one kind of sovereignty which alone, in being moral, has the nature of being permanent :—in the manifesting of the Man who of all others was the true Man of his own time, as to the point of representing religious needs, even such as are of all times and places,—of him who, as characterized with this human fitness, was proved afterwards to have possessed the seated destiny of being to mankind the transmitter of Hebrew hopes into the ideal and moral ground where all could take share in them: the reflectional Christ-King which following ages demanded, though his seeing in such light was a thing so far forward in prophetic times that no faintest pre-vision of it was then reached. Nay, I am claiming expressly that this actual historic course, both in events and the mental power of comprehending them, in regard to the growing notion of Christhood,—passing since from application to the real Jesus, Son of Mary, to become applied to the figured Son of proper Deity, as himself of Divine nature,—has only in the fact of this actuality been able now to ripen at last, at this present moment, into the occasion for a new “shaking” of its elements which I predicate has arrived. It is *because* I believe only that the prophets spoke for their own time, and for their actual state of thought, that I feel them evolutionally to have spoken likewise so especially as I infer for ourselves. This local kind of trueness is the very thing, as I have to say, that affords me my own mode of interpreting them. Namely, as yielding the very heart of evolutionary truth.

This mode of interpretation does indeed import my own taking up their very thought on evolutionary terms :—while it is the fact which it is to myself, that only by the use of anthropomorphism can I do this, though in

this way I can do it. My method, I have to state, consists in this : that the whole of Religion's historic progress I take to have had for permanent result the one matter of the production, and continual advance, of what is now known as religious *Principle* :—*Principle* which, precisely in being such, has naturally been furnished as all other abstract matters have been, by the accumulated effect on mental nature of heterogeneous experience, drawn out of material of concrete life ; but which farther as *religious* kind of Principle means specially what is such effect under character of generalized emotion. If accordingly, therefore, I would grasp the whole course in my mental view, I must enter into the very depth of its spirit, as regarding it from my own inmost depths. And this means, from my consciousness of possessed *Mind* : of that, namely, which I am aware of as the best ultimate result of evolution. I do obtain this grasp, I believe, by means of the poetic figuring that all whole evolution, in its own spirit, has been constantly serving to create *Mind* : or, in other words, has shown a bearing on what alone is proper Humanism. And when, in fact, I do seek the required view by this figure's aid, I do merely find in reality, that I am positing my own thought in the high state of mental consciousness than which nothing less can be fitting to the object. For as it is in the sole looking on evolution from the point of *Mind* that I alone find to gain generalism : so, I feel that the assumed post needs expressly be notified. And the symbolism does this. In the very adopting of Anthropomorphism, I repeat, I believe that I take up really the full posture of thought which is that ordered to religion. The asserted *humanness* of God, when taken as I take it, is still adequate in itself, I believe, to clench that which is a just stand on religious ground.

But the symbolism moreover does that which religion as much demands, of the showing how component details in historic courses include more than by themselves is conveyed, even to the skilfullest analysis. What "the Lord" of evolution means to me is indeed henceforth "God" in the strictest sense, as to science and physics as well as poetry, just as truly, I claim, as was to Haggai his own thought of Jehovah. I mean by it the integral acting Energy which, however all unknown to us, is ever present to our best sense of things as their One Source.

Nor is this all that I claim as unison with the prophets' thought ; but I have gained from my own usage of symbolic method, in this work, what vindicates especially their attributing to Jehovah in their own times such portentous "shaking up" of mental circumstance as now, in our own case, appears a "crisis" in mental growth even surpassing their own now-appearing but partial revolution. Just as clearly as in their "Lord of Hosts" I see but the Commander of evolution, so, in the warned rousing up of new conditions, I see but the event which all nature seems to show me, through her whole plan of evolution, as being as certain to ensue upon growth, in due time, as growth itself is in general secured to happen in due course. And by this I speak of what I have been tracing as to the character of the Ruling Principle of development, in accordance always with what in history is testified to *have* been religion's course. Unless this Ruling Principle had been what it is thus attested for,—as the controller of our Affective Relationism in domestic forms,—the peculiar fact of needed "crises" occurring would want reason for itself, such as our directed faculties can gather ; but being of this kind, I conceive that our purely human reason has, even as such, the true right to argue that such "crises" were necessary.

—If indeed our human progress in religion had had nothing of concrete reference in it, but had purely been abstract,—as if, for instance, the “God” that upheld it were none but a worshipped image of abstract Love, or abstract Power,—the course of advance might well have been in one even flow, *not* implying any occasion of catastrophe. But “God” being what He is, and what men have found Him out for, as divided into a knot of affective imports even specially conflictive, the existing source of such occasions seems proved.

The essential fruit of Christianity, as seen from the purely mental point of view, being thence forced to appear only in the light of ideas thus historically wrought out,—ideas about Providence, and about our future destiny and redemption from effects of sin,—the one kind of ideas which here dominates over all is the idea of Brotherhood. It is not the mere ripening of general Love that is the means of bringing grace to mankind, but the engendering peculiarly of this specific mode of Love. Such engendering, however, was inevitably the involved casting in disorder of previous notions about Parentage and Filiage, to the extent that now has grown into what even is reversal of the first arrangement. And what should cause convulsion in human beinghood, if not what so intimately concerns it!

When I apply this express point to my text, I read into it in fact the immense mass of implication which at present has been made attached, in utter difference from a religious way, to the notion of Fraternity: that political implication which, however, *was* to ancient Hebrews of the very essence of religion. And thus I find instant force in the prophet’s saying that not only was it “the heavens,” but “the earth,” that the Lord must “shake:” not only the proper sphere of religion, but

that which was of worldly occupation. And yet more plainly is made appreciable the leading threat that the convulsion should specifically affect "*nations*."—Does the idea of Fraternity, at the present day, do less than affect nations, as nations!—But in Hebrew times, the religious constituting of nations, as such, was that which made Brotherhood, of religious sort, only attributable, as whether or not, to a Fraternity of nations. A pure Polytheism in religion was alone that where a proper concert of fellow States, and of the gods representing these, was possible; while, as to Hebrews, this was forbidden to seem desirable by the indispensableness of their own God's sole dominion. The hostility amid nations was thus only to be softened on the express terms that their seers boldly proclaimed: of all the gods of all the nations that were Gentiles bowing down to the sole yoke of Jehovah. And yet not by the means of ordinary warfare: *in* which inexperienced Israel knew its weakness, and *of* which it had the wisdom to see the ineffectualness: whence the loftiness of the new tone that sounded forth. Jehovah until then had been mainly the Man of War, mighty in battle, who as such should crush the circle of his surrounding enemies. But even though still as the Lord of Hosts, he was now to provide victory through the hands of a Prince of Peace, who should wonderfully show his mightiness but in supporting the right Government of his people. He should give a real Father to his time, who should be such in being also a very Child, as in relation to old notions. And still is herein signified, none the less, a much fiercer kind of battling initiated than the coarser sort departed from.

The real idea of Political Brotherhood, I believe, could never have been developed save through the religious one taught by Christians, and through this having

subsequently, as now, been diminished from this into its proper sphere. But its beginning source, nevertheless, was produced in its true station of politics, if the fact be a true one which I take to belong to religion's history, of religion's solely being national in the first instance :— as the prophets' words confirm its having been. The first effect of religious change must obviously to them have affected nations, just because all existing struggle amid nations, both as struggle with one another and of kings with their own subjects, bore relation to local gods and local despots that were treated like gods, who fought always for themselves, both as despots and deities, in whatever was the field of their fighting. And the real remedying of this evil could therefore only lie in the producing of the Christ-King who certainly was such on the true principle of *representing* his subject people, one and all, and in all that was vital to them. The King who was universal in dominion both destroyed inter-warfare of nations, and turned all mode of warfare against the inward enemy of souls, diabolic Satan, prince of Sin. But the saving principle he worked by was that which was only spiritual Brotherhood : that which could not arrive, abstractly, till after the breaking down of the barrier between Israelism and Gentilism.—And here, besides, was involved the putting down of a fellow-evil with war, which indeed is its inevitable accompanier, as belonging to its condition of barbarity : state of Slavery. As long as kings were as virtual gods to their subjects, were the latter, more or less, always slaves, every one. True freedom of condition could only first come when a Princeship of Peace was established, and when the government that was laid on the Prince's shoulder was that of a true *Law* that should go forth to govern nations by, instructing the several souls that nations were made up of.

And if we think what should go with such matter as this, the beginning work of crushing out both Slavery and War, we may farther also realize such state of convulsion as the prophet hints at in saying that, not only "heaven and earth" but "the sea and the dry land", were what should be affected by it. How is it with ourselves? Is it not plainly the case that in political revolution coming on, with large change of moral sort as its basis, the very depth of this is shown, as philosophically it needs be, in the material lowness it extends to? The central energy of progress, though in itself uncomprehendedly spiritual, needs yet widen itself around, as in radiating diminution of intensity, till the barest realm of physics responds to it. Do we not actually see, in regard to that abolishing of War and Slavery which not yet is accomplished, in spite of the helping agency of Christianity, that as the work advances, the effect is in changing the whole physical appurtenance of social life? In real literalness is to-day what was once swords and spears, or slave-shacklebolts, turned to pruning-hooks and ploughshares, if not rather into printers' type and electric wires. And what was once borne over oceans as naval armaments, is now newly framed—at least in part,—into conveyance of peaceful soldiers of commerce or of cosmopolitan science. Geographical boundaries are at the mercy of intersecting railroads; and the sea must yield its bed to be bored through:—because only of an abstract principle's advancing, having in it to bear practically on life. And most signally is there change that is material in the orderings of the abodes of life which are either private temples, of domestic culture, or those generalized ones which are as houses of the Lord:—accordingly as, indeed, to the ancient Hebrew it was mainly in His own sanctuary that

the Lord's witness was pre-appointed to have its manifesting brought about.

In the Lord's coming into his temple (by his approved messenger) I thus include for comprehended such change in very plan of material structure as testified, either privately to the declining of Slavery, or generally to the passing of Hebrew worship from the mode that suited temples to that which required churches and cathedrals. I regard however certainly with more insistence, as here intended, such structural changes as touched the institutions themselves of the mode of practice concerned. It was the form of temple-worship, as such,—to speak now only of this,—which mainly yielded to the effect of the descending Presence. It was the whole of the mentally-concrete embodiment of religious thought and religious feeling for which temple-worship had yet availed that gave way; and the new coming of Jehovah into his house was no other, in its chief consequence, than the springing into new life of the whole previous constitution of religious formalism. It signified a new character imparted to the whole frame-work of before-time ceremonial:—such as did in the first instance appear, as so notably it did, in the changing of Hebrew sacrifice of brute animals into the one mystic substitute for these which was that of the ideal Lamb of the Christian Pass-over. And what farther of the same change may not similarly befall, in just sequence to this, in the future practice of ritualism now looked for, only following out duly the mere process of a refining of Symbolic Art?

And notably must be added into account the cleansing of the whole instituting of Priesthood:—while what should be meant by this, in addition to the renewing of forms of worship, as an occasion of convulsion and shaking up, needs little to be more than referred to.

“*The Lord shall come suddenly into His temple, by the ministry of the covenant ye delight in.*”——Into this, then, I read my own belief that the abstract principle of Brotherhood was now, for the first time in human history, enabled to make its start, as to the initial stage of the conception, alone yet due to it, which as such had an adapted nidus prepared for it in the heart of the existing form of temple-ritualism—this being penetrated as it was with the conviction of the real sanctifier of the temple being the given *Law* of Jehovah, as a *Law of Righteousness*, resident within its sanctuary. And in this, indeed, was the coming made supremely to answer to “*the desire of all nations!*”——since a moral law of righteousness is the only leveller of the state of human beings to its requirement of intrinsic commonness. The Lord’s coming should hence have its first sign in special lowliness. If He shook the moral world, far and wide, with trepidation for the approaching magnitude of his sway, yet He should come with the kind of glory about him which the lowliest owner of a human heart might be illumined by. And thus did it happen truly, later, in right mythic course, that the angelic voice which proclaimed Jesus’s birth, singing up from the top of heaven to tell of the new Saviour that was arisen that should be for *all peoples*, was addressed but to watching shepherds, though also, on the other hand, there were kings, star-directed, led on to have their part in the announced epiphany. Kings and shepherds together had the need of being made brothers with one another, by the real moral of the event. “Hills” of pride need be lowered, moral “valleys” of humiliation filled up. And the kind of glory that should come in this way, not to lighten Israel only, but even the gross darkness of benighted Gentiles, should centre on the chosen fact of a simple Birth taking place: a Birth

whose very poverty of outer adjuncts was however made up for by utmost sanctity of inward circumstance. In the manger of Bethlehem was brought forth the "first child" of Religion's bearing which she could pride herself in owning: the germ-notion of a Holy Family.—I do not suppose the prophets thought of this;—but I do suppose that we, in looking back, may carry on their thought in this manner. I do indeed suppose that *their* real idea of the approaching revelation of God, approved in the event, is duly ripened out and preserved while it thus is made to point to the mere instituting of this particular conception. The idea of a Holy Family-life for men, I suppose to have been coming on through all previous time, though before the Christian epoch *un-*manifested. And I believe that its being manifested in Christianity was sufficient *cause* for Christianity's existence—by the very fact of its desirability for "all nations." I am ready, for my own part, to echo "Hallelujahs" on its account!

That this manifesting of the idea of "Holy Birth" should have stood as the acknowledged sign of the Lord's coming into His temple and re-animating the whole substance of religion, truly vindicates to me both the actual track of its progress shown in history, and the prophets' glowing language respecting it. For this bearing of religion's course on the select point of the sanctifying of the idea of Birth, is what plainly should have served to effect the required change in religion's character from diffused import that was national into that which is duly personal. The making "holy" of the idea of Birth was indeed the incarnation of the true principle of Individualism: namely, of this as borne out by the divine birthright implied of a one common relation of all men towards God. It was the consecrating into equalized

religious import the mental beinghood of every subject of human birth : being thus the virtual levelling, in religious view, of whatever in lesser way are the standing distinctions of men which make otherwise the constant hindrance to their holding in state of Brotherhood. And truly was it therefore what was said of it, as being the typical setting up for mankind of that sign of the "Son of Man," the mystic heir of duly-spiritualized humanity, which as such could no other than make tremble before it gods and despots together, on their false thrones of polytheism and tyrannic kingship.—Nor less was this end carried out, but specifically was it effected, by the very depth, and quasi-lowness, of the entire implication of the common circumstance of Birth : not originally "crying out" for human notice, but the rather creeping on to its results far beneath the outer surface of events : the actual terms of Birth-condition being indeed what sink down to that centre-point of circumstance, that nucleus of all existent plan in nature, which signifies the close contact arranged for there of the two parted worlds of mind and matter. The enkindling into Life of every single human being is indeed what is ministered to by the whole united energies which in separateness are either physical or spiritual. The fact does indeed "correlate" in character with the massed act of Governance of all nature. The institution of human Birth is indeed the correspondent-in-little to the whole sovereign sway of Evolution, which does, as here said, command equally the heaven and earth of thought-material. It is that whose coming rightly to be understood, and rightly to be *cultivated* or *worshipped* by mankind, shows well as giving purpose to the entire sweep of history, the entire roll of eventuation.

But the developing of Religious Principle in this way, by a stirring movement at the deepest centre of thought :

action, meant eminently in the prophets' time, as it means now again in heightened measure in our own, closely-personal experience. Even in their loftiest anthropomorphism, the prophets could not realize their own vision of hastening crisis without sinking their words to the true human pitch, whose tone is in fact now what itself mainly points their whole prophecy. While they hurled their denunciation abroad that indeed the time of terror should come, resting this on the sole strength of their belief in One sway over whole nature, marching on to its end with the full army of nature's forces attending, and clearing on for it a path as with resistless flame :—
“Behold, the time of manifesting shall come ; it shall come, saith the Lord of Hosts :”—still, they turned on their own hearts to bemoan, “*But who—who may abide the day of His coming ? Who may stand when He appear-eth ?*” The whole matter of the apparition of present Deity, the prophets knew, with right instinct, could only really touch individual human souls and human hearts. And true as this was then, under the initial mode of crisis, abundantly more true is it now !

According to this interpreting, the effect of the first crisis meant chiefly the altering of religious notions which affected government of peoples. But the change now imagined due, as in consequence of Christianity's finished work, means expressly the new moulding of what is personal belief of religious kind : that is, of the mode of principle which needs furnish the government of our own selves. For such I claim as the real fact of the case. As Religion throughout is now taken as the finding of general principle in nature's government, so all forms of subordinate belief I take for but involved modes of principle joined on to what is primary. The whole scheme of Christianity I find to bear wholly—whatever be the

outward show and mythologic garb of the various doctrines concerned,—on the one matter of the kind of principle to which indeed is Birth the point of nucleus; and this most truly when the aspect becomes that of obtained victory over Death, which is correlate to Birth, and which enforces to itself besides as much a specialty of regard under another point of view, as Birth here claims leadership in “prophetic” view. And while the essence of Religion may and must, by this plan, remain firm, whatever be outer changes undergone in forms of doctrine attached; still, the uprooting of the kind of form which *this* kind of doctrine supposes, *ought* to involve in its act of critical occurrence little less than entire moral subversion of all that makes personal well-being. The act of change befalling such kind of doctrine *ought* to come with all the signs of sudden night to the mind—of sudden whirlwind and storm breaking over the mental heaven,—which indeed every personal believer in Religion must encounter for himself, when it comes, on his own account. “*Who may abide*” this deepened mode of now trying the Lord’s people?—It is not a mere matter come in question of the re-organizing of state-churches and ecclesiasticism, though this is indeed latently being effected;—it is not the mere purifying of the sons of Levi that is concerned, though this is more and more being brought about;—it is not the mere ritualism of old worship that is breaking up, to make way for a new ritualism of purer kind, though this is taking place day by day:—but the real thing at issue is the changing of what stands to us, every one, as our source of immediate guidance and moral sustenance.

What was born, not at Bethlehem, but in the myth of Bethlehem, to become incarnate in the acting life of the world, had its destiny even there to become finally,

though after long trial and humiliation,—after being vilified and wounded and crucified again and again by endured doctrinal and ecclesiastical abuses: being yet believed on, notwithstanding, at the world's heart,—raised up into its true glory of divine character. But the very realizing of this apotheosis into "principle" implies the same trial repeated, as transferred from the historic stage into the field of each believer's own consciousness. And this proceeds as much from the host of the Lord of Hosts as did the first occurrence.

We all of us must stand, in whatever way we may, the present trial: *this* coming of the Lord which means, above all, a very searching of our individual heart of faith, a dividing of the very marrow of immediate belief, with the two-edged sword of sharpened intellect. The event *must* have course, since the Lord of Evolution has commanded it. And the appeal as to who of us may abide it is therefore urgent as it is for each one of us. The Ruling Power in nature is bringing the thing to pass, and whoever cannot face it must be swept aside by it, if not crushed beneath it.*—It is well, I conceive, to impress the great fact on ourselves by all whatever of ancient symbolism we can take home. And truly I make claim, on my own behalf, that the power of taking up the old expression, and the full method, of Religious Art, here as elsewhere, does serve me with what is needful defence as to what I here virtually assume of my own dealing with the crisis.

It is indeed the whole purport of this work to proffer sign, for myself, that I *have* so been able to abide the

* "Upon that stone"—that rolling mass of gathering conviction—*whoever shall fall, shall be broken.*" And the most willing disposition may stumble. "But on whomsoever it shall fall, standing obstinately to resist it, "it will grind him to powder." Luke xx. 18.

trial of my own faith that the telling of my own manner of undergoing it should be helpful to fellow-strivers. And is it not enough of such sign that indeed I can now say, as I do, that I still maintain fast what surely is the essence of Religious trust, in the idea of a Divine Rule throughout nature? This I do firmly trust in, *as* Religion's essence; and believe it as secure of endurance, whatever the coming changes to Religion's form, as if it had anew the "thus saith the Lord" of a prophet's utterance to proclaim the fact. The very circumstance now present to me, that the change come to my own faith does assert itself as in harmony with old prophecy, *is* actually, as I have said, a renewal of the prophetic utterance in my own heart.

The storm of mental change which I have been passing through, in common with the multitudes around me, though uprooting my whole first-held belief *except* for this utmost foundation, has *not* dispersed this, I wish to testify, because I have been enabled to meet it tranquilly. I have been empowered to stand firm, because, lest Faith should fail, I have steadied myself to clasp it by calling in the aid of quiet Thought. — And this calmness of mental posture is also, now, what suffers me to see, in the passing tempest overhead, that which truly prophets *would* have seen, living at the present day: the Lord's form amid the whirlwind of events:—the Lord's form riding by on the whirlwind's wing, directing it and softening it to new issues. I can look through the breaking clouds, and see amid the melting darkness the rising of a new day-star of Hope—the rising of a new day-spring of religious Faith.

And this is simply through my learning to recognize that all Religion's history from the first *has* meant but the developing of IDEAS. Why *should* it not purely be

admitted that these *are* what divinely guide mankind, and raise them above all that is degrading? Surely all our experience has made known, both that Ideas do govern mankind, and that also they do therein save and redeem us from all that has nature to debase us.

THE PLAN OF THE PRESENT VOLUME.

The object of this remaining volume is to show what appears to me to be actually the nascent form of this coming Religion: this *future* Religion which, on account of my trust in it, I count as *present*. The pending crisis, of such kind as now supposed, being passed through, even immediate signs of organic renovation ought to exist; and I believe that in reality these are to be seen springing forth, if we but heed indications aright.

I must therefore, even in regard to desirableness, not farther pursue the track I am stopping short upon, which else might well tempt me to continue it, of exploring as to how all the doctrines of Christianity do indeed yield the ministry I assign to them. For it is only the vaguest essence of the subject that can serve me; while in details this evades handling. The anthropomorphism of ancient prophecying was truly, I am convinced, but the casting beforehand of what is now to us the Philosophy of History: only rendered in that manner of rather singing it than speaking of it, which alone in fact suits with its high sphere of import. But this limits proper treatment to what is integral: for the very reason that this sphere is precisely moral, much more than intellectual,—much more what needs vaguely be *felt*, in its whole bearing, than definitely understood. And this forms, in very truth, the essential basis to what now I have in view.

If anthropomorphism *is* in place in the higher spheres of Philosophy,—and thence with exclusiveness where the

sphere is the very highest,—this is explained by the now alleged circumstance that the symbolism is here resolvable into “principle.” For principle of all kinds *is* the fruit more of feeling than intellect. It lies out of the direct action of Science, which deals simply with what outwardly *is*, and not with what in Pre-science it is supposed *must be* ;—while principle ever the more comes to operate, none the less, the more is the ground studied what is inward, and therefore moral. And principle that is allowed for as moral is thence eminently characteristic in its kind. But, this seen, I conceive we have before us the true natural relation which Morality needs hold to Religion, when both of these come to the true character which work of differentiation, and this alone, has in it to bring about.—When Science goes beyond itself, and all desirably so, in respect of the just limits to be given to it, *by* venturing precisely to say “thus and thus *must* come to pass,” as assuredly does it sink, or rather rise, into practice of anthropomorphism as is ever the case with Religion: since the very notion, or rather *fiction*, of “Law,” which Science has its only strength in, is nothing without the image behind it of the Law-giver which religious symbolism is the author of. But, this allowed, clearly more is the same notion of Law what Religion must specifically furnish in its own express realm of what is personal and introspectional concern:—while here is the whole purport of Morality.

Morality is a moral Law, furnished duly with an introspectionally-admitted sanction and authority to it, such as actually does mean nothing else than the very universalness of moral force which, as such, must no otherwise than respond to the Power of every sort abiding in and regulating the entire course of evolution and eventuation. It is that highest kind of Law under the

action of which even the self-impulse of individuals becomes ordered into a very part of the whole action of development: so that Rule, divinely exercised throughout, is here organized to our sense of it by being rendered of peculiarity more intensely though more subtly appreciable:—as now being Rule that only acts by the secondary instrumentation of conscious human agency: human nature under Moral Law being no other than the same thing with Divine Rule applied to human eventuation. All consciousness respecting this could however only come by the very gathering of the sense of Rule into the image of Sovereign Unity which anthropomorphism of old fixed for mankind. The breaking on prophetic sense, as prophetic language attests the having happened, that all sway over nature was in One hand, was, I am satisfied, the true natural and true necessary foundation to all whatever that is now coming to be verified about the “correlated” composition of moral energy, with all other energetic force at work in nature: while the very manner of the first perception also struck the right chord which alone could, in reality, maintain the same insight in its true force.

By my own plunging into symbolism I believe then to have gained what I may at once state as the plan I find it needful now to adopt.—I consider that I have now realized the point in Philosophy of History which is this: that at the time when Christianity was initiated there was likewise, and therein, set on foot in the mental practice of idealizing a permanent division, differentiating successfully the two modes of this produced into spiritual and secular;—while I also consider settled as an attendant fact, that such dividing and differencing is but the constant manner of progress of all kinds: proved as such by its clearing up all the previous confusion

and mutual thwarting of purpose which before prevented either of the mingled lines of development from being really what it stood for, and thus enfeebling and retarding both. And the clearing out of the way of this hindrance I see therefore as naturally the means to my special point of the ripening of what at first was crude anthropomorphism into such as involves the engendered nature of principle. But in having come to this, I desire to go on with trying the same effect of clearing up in regard to that improving of *Morality* which precisely I have the need now to establish, in character of the very test which I admit to be alone adequate for the verifying of my now-adopted faith. And this means the differencing of *Morality*, on its own ground: which allows me besides—or, as additional benefit relating to my own occasion,—to limit rightfully my own working of the test in accordance with my own circumstanced position. If principles of *Religion* were first rightly laid out by being definitely cleared away from principles that are Sociologic; so, principles of *Morality*, I argue, can only truly be made clear by being requisitely sorted, also dually and in fact sexually, according to their necessarily-caused difference of relation to respectively *Sociology* and *Religion*, which are to them indeed as mingled parents, though with difference as to each of proportionate relational importance (see I. 463). But principles of *Morality* that are secular and masculine, I may hence, for my own part, leave mainly aside; while to principles of *Morality* that are religious, and therefore femininely adapted to a woman's special handling, I may give my whole attention. And the doing of this is really the only means, on my own part, of substantiating *Morality's* division, as my sense of *Religion's* self imposes need on me of doing. I mean, of

giving to the division the due weight of importance I seek for : eminently more great than what hitherto has been given by writers who have been men, when these have also spoken as to separating in some degree "religious" from "moral" principles. I desire a real class-separation ; and one, *not*, in this case, between Morality and Religion, but between Moral principles that are *specifically* secular, and Moral principles that are *specifically* religious :—a real class-separation, as between things that have indeed, to some extent, a several and independent foundation. My aim in the present volume is then laid in accordance. I propose finally to proffer signs of an arising form of Morality, distinctively and improvedly Religious ; but before this to offer proof that the new basis of peculiarity demanded, on an independent religious footing, is not likely to be found wanting, but is even already becoming manifest to moral vision.

This formal division imparted to Morality I do believe actually the very sign which classification must lay hold of, as betokening the taking place of the express crisis to which, in its immense importance, both prophets and scientific evolutionists may be credited with having lent their several witness. For, according to my whole track of conception, the bettering of Morality which I take to be involved in the division—and this expressly as including the bettering simultaneously of Religion,—has import in precisely the identifying of Religion's practical effect, except where this is purely Individualistic and thence purely Religious, with Morality that has character of being Domestic. And that means, with Morality that concerns such practice of human life as needs being ranged under *not* the kind of rule which is law of *Nation*, but under such as is law of *Family*. Such admitted understanding as this I do actually conceive

may be the means of turning full on the previous course of Religion's history the true current of progress; and with even the flashing suddenness in the benefit thus produced which the idea of crisis implies. And this on the two accounts,—always united even while separate,—of religious conduct of domestic life, in itself brought about; and of the ministry of such conduct in the ripening of Individualism to its proper character of religiousness. By this twofold result,—all involved as I believe it to be in the religious sanctifying of the idea of Birth,—Religion's self, I conceive, must no less than be "born again" for human good.

For the working of this moral test, however, an effort of integration is needful of the gravest kind. I have already explained as to the matter of this volume, that it is meant to depict my Religion, in Religion's rightful character of an "emotive influence," now in its proper *practical effect*, as in the volume preceding I have shown its *intellectual effect*. And I have also said, from the beginning, that in turning first into what I felt was the "alien direction," in regard to my subject, of merely "*thinking about*" it, instead of duly resting in the *inner feeling* of it, I hoped always to come back to the fitting mental position, raised only to a higher stage than before through the fruit of my divergence (I. 36). And the bringing of Religion back to "*inner feeling*," on such terms, I consider is the same with its now reducing to what is "practical influence," this being taken as "moral principle." But the very power of the appropriating of gained fruit—the very means of now *owning*, in this way, my aid from thought—depends solely on my ability to make it integral with in fact *all* besides that I believe in. No more can any principle be realized than Religion of any form could be realized, except by its producing

to universalness ; nor at all can human faculty assimilate it, except in recognition of its universalness. And therefore my present task is under burden of the requirement to show, in the first place, how actually the new ideas I have gained, as my fruit from Developmentalism, have the nature to blend fully and integrally, as well as sequentially, with knowledge of religious sort else maintained. That is, I am forced necessarily to aim, however vaguely, towards that which may have the character of a "scheme"—a religious scheme of things universal. I cannot in any way obtain the "moral basis" I desire, except in first giving to my new ideas this mode of presentment.

And accordingly my adopted method is this. I am arranging my remaining matter in two sub-divisions, of which this first has to paint my Religion as yielding a rightful basis to Moral Principle, and that to follow has to show my Religion as an immediately-acting influence on Moral Personalism : while of the two chapters which together with this present one will complete the sub-division in hand, the first will be my effort of integration, and the second the deriving thence of the moral basis in question.

But this needs the completing, as to technical expression, of my still suspended form of the actual definition of Religion. Entirely to fill up this, as I have said, is but the same as to complete my whole work ; but as to mere verbal form, I am now prepared to add all that seems necessary to my first statement. And this addition must turn actually on what I now desire to explain as to the nature of those gained fruits I have just alluded to ; while the mode of definition I have adopted is but what has had point to itself in allowing for the divergence I have been carrying out.

I began with saying, (I. 34-5,) that for the clearing of my subject, by adequately differentiating the large mass of considerations involved in it, a four-fold arrangement seemed called for, in place of the one single definition alone needful to orthodoxy. And in this I had view to giving weight of peculiarity to that varying of mental posture in the mind that had to deal with Religion's subject, which in fact my own mode of investigating it has exemplified; while otherwise I attended also, as was needful, to the varying aspects of my subject in itself. These latter I called severally the Outer and Inner sides of Religion; and the former I called similarly the Inner and Outer modes of apprehension—choosing rather this uniform naming, than recurring to what are ordinarily adopted in such need as the terms of "Subjective" and "Objective," often as it seems to me much abused. And to three of these occasions of definition I added formulas on the spot: leaving only to be filled in that fourth one whose affording must precisely depend on the matter of my then future investigation. I will now, then, go over the three first anew, and add likewise the fourth now prepared for.

In the *first* of these fractional definitions I sought to retain the full force of the earliest and simplest aspect of Religion which addresses merely subjective or intuitional impression; and this I called an Inner sense of "Divine guardianship and sympathy."—Such sense I found resting with myself, in no way broken up by my abandonment of supernatural Christianity; although it was here rendered vague to the utmost, save that also I retained from Christianity the symbol for Deity of Divine Fatherhood. But this symbol, purely, as such, needed henceforth its vindication on new grounds, to be only found by far-searching mental effort, bearing always on

the object of their finding. And I believe I may say that such *has* been the aim always present, in equally the analysis of my ancestral belief, which has occupied my first volume; and in the attempt at reconstruction of intellectual sort, which has occupied my second.

My *second* definition has the aim to supply to this impulse for the *sense* of Religion a correspondent *idea*. But on the scheme of developmentalism at this stage of its framing, is only to be found that diffused kind of Godhead which entirely falls short of any semblance of Fatherhood. I could but yet realize the conviction that what now counts as consciousness of Deity is only as of what acts "within ourselves, as a part of a general force":—the evolutionsal idea of Deity having, as such, nought that points with expressness to the *particularized* influence which is implied in our claiming is as "sympathy." Under this view, in fact, the "sympathy" that *is* signified is such only as is rendered, by implication, by our own thought to Deity. There is exercised the endeavour to take up, by the force of still dominating subjectivity, what is Deity's own position amid nature: by which kind of mental effort alone can really be conceived of such thing as should be "a general force." And this is rightly the meaning, I conceive, of causing our inner selfism to reflect within itself what at least is the true surface of an Intellectual Religion. It is the uniting of the idea of Deity with the indispensable recognition of the Oneness of the composition of whole nature as to which also I have assuredly not failed.

But the *third* definition entirely deepens this reflection, by localizing and centralizing it where the effect is due. What Religion here consists in I suppose to be precisely "the abstract fact of the human acquisition of the faculty known as the human Soul." For, at this station I

assume that thought has become turned into objective: or, abstracted from purely personal images ;—and that hence Deity, on its own account, is lost sight of ; while only is held in view the effect of the Divine Image on the thought that has been contemplating it. The human Soul I have come to know as no longer a real entity, any more than I take Deity to be : it is no other than the obtained apprehension of spiritual Individuation : the effect on our entire mass of human faculties and experiences which signifies their being brought under form of Integration. And the event of this—which is the most important of all occurrences of mental growth !—I have learned to see as only following, in due order, on thought's trying to comprehend, although vainly, that illimitable Integration of whole nature, or rather of the moving energy of whole nature, which constitutes the God of evolutionism. God stands to this view as the aggregate of all existent vital energies. His beinghood is the acting *life* of nature. And the human Soul, which thought *may* comprehend, I suppose but to answer to the same character ; though necessarily with the oppositeness involved. I suppose that the Soul was alone caused, or first produced into existence, by the effect of thought's striving towards Deity ; while *thus* having been derived out of Deity, it is truly no longer what it seemed to be, an infused portion of the very substance of the Divine nature, but the special contrary to this. I now see it but as correlate to, and by no means as being uniform with, what is Deity. It is to me that which is not possible in any other way than oppositely to answer to, and correspond with, the measureless Integration of Deity : on account indeed of that which now seems to be assured to me as the actual manner of the Soul's derivation. Namely, this : that it has come to us, as Individuation,

by the very means of our mental nature having constantly been hedged in with limitations.

The tracing of this work of elaboration, regarded as carried on by the hand of nature, has likewise been the occupation of my foregoing search into both history and psychology. My very seeking to gain *idea* of Deity in the manner of the second aspect I have described, turned me actually in the first place away from Deity, and centred my attention but on Selfhood; and my third obtained aspect was as kindred to atheistic, as my second was akin to pantheistic, though the admitted partialness of view precisely kept the similarity from being identity. The physical elaboration of the human consciousness of Individuation I see but as the obverse side to the always retained aspect I hold as primary, which implies the Soul's leaning on an innately or hereditarily supported impulse towards Deity. And this subjective foundation I have never lost sight of, but have always carried onward towards the final desired stage of definition: as to which I have seemed therefore continually more and more to gain insight. I laid ground for it already in my First Part: in the last chapter of which I drew together all that then I had collected, from out of my retrospective analysis, in the actual form of a kind of re-constructive scheme: whence now, for the completing of my purposed effort, I have before me but to add into the same stock of results whatever fruits I have since realized.

My *fourth* and still-wanting definition must express, just as much the religious point of relation towards Deity on the Soul's part, as did that which was exclusively subjective. That is, it must signify the *sense* of Deity, opposedly to the *idea*. And yet it must do this in full harmony with the quasi-pantheism and quasi-atheism of the two mid-aspects.—But even at first I already pre-

dicated of this last form a turn that admits allowance as to both. I laid down my suggestion that *sense* to ensue finally, as religious, must be that which has its object in what stands to the conscious Soul as "the entire remainder of Universal Existence." This exceptioned idea of God may however be pantheized with sufficiency, and this in just balance with its apparent atheism, by only our remembering the infinite minuteness of the correlative factor alone personal. And I do indeed believe that relation as towards God may be real on this assorted plan : even in its thus taking all actual personality in the case for *our's* only, and not God's. I believe that our conscious Soul, as the centre of our immediate mind-system, or as it were our mental earth, may as well as ever gravitate sunward, just as also our physical earth might, notwithstanding that our answering heaven-centre be proved, as to our actual means of proof, to be indeed but a dazzling cloud-image. And this I do rest my faith in, just because of God's image now coming into the character of Moral Principle.—In this latest of the four modes of Religion, the new Inner side produced to mental habit I suppose to answer rightly to my objective and psychologic results, as well as also to my preserved frame of subjectivity, by precisely the strengthened practice now engendered for the Soul of taking the *moral* attitude towards God, which is *not* the same thing with the *passive* leaning on God which the first mode implies. It is that which makes Religion first consciously *active*, instead of merely passive. (See I. 510.) And this truly seems the heightening of Religion that is required: a real strengthening of soul-energy, in place of what otherwise must happen to our Self-principle, of the mere enervating of it which appears actually the involved tendency of Religion while wanting in this necessary supplement.

When Religion is thus estimated, diversely and combinedly, and only then, I consider that its definition is completed. It must mean, all in one, let me repeat, these four separate things :—a vague sense of Divine guardianship and sympathy ;—an idea of prevailing Deity, filling nature ;—a spiritual self-consciousness of correlation with Divine beinghood ;—and a sense of enforced moral relation towards all that Divine beinghood represents. And I believe, and am here endeavouring to make out proof, that the Religion of the future, as Developmentalism, has its destiny to be made good in that character by precisely in due course assimilating to itself, with full thoroughness, as here is done but with a very small fraction, the *whole* fruits to be ever gained of the kinds pointed to : either, specially, as to a generalizing philosophy, or to a scientifically-material psychology, or as to that which is religiously-moral principle. Developmentalism meaning this, and nothing less than this, I believe will be really the heightened sequent to Supernaturalism which it ought to be.

And this I say while fully seeing how actually is set aside, and as if ignored, a main point of what hitherto has been held the very essence of Religion. Even as to the simple creed into which Religion was reduced at the hands of the great Kant, as affording belief in God, in Virtue, and Immortality, the last is left out, or dispersed into at all events a new character : while this very dispersion means undergone change in the other two. The very leaving out of express faith in Immortality is indeed, as concerns the world abroad, the main source of all the tumult which is that of the pending season of transition. But I adhere, for my own part, strenuously to the first point ; and to this as inclusive naturally of the second. Whatever be incurred change in Religion,

I agree always with orthodoxy that Religion must have reference to alone that which stands to us as "God,"—to this exclusively, and to no possible other object ;—and moreover, I agree in this, that the instant this relation is departed from, so also is the real force of Religion destroyed as to its connection with Virtue. In holding to this central image, the DIVINE IDEA, I am convinced that we may keep all requisite attendant notions also duly in their place ; and that truly on all these, as on this, the only consequence of development brought to bear on them will be none other ever than precisely an ideal refining, *not* such as destroys, but such as only intensifies.—*I know that a Redeemer liveth*, for me and for the world. *Though worms* have it given them to *destroy this body*, yet still I hold belief that *even in my flesh*, or actual organized capacity, I have power to *see God* ; and to see Him *standing on this earth* still as the Redeemer, who must be such for earth even to the earth's utmost *latter day*.



CHAPTER II.

THE POWER WHICH IS BELIEVED TO LIE IN DEVELOPMENTALISM OF SUPPLYING TO A NEW FORM OF RELIGIOUS ITS NEEDFUL "SCHEME."

1. THE demand I have to meet, at my present station of abandonment of supernaturalism, is that of treating whole nature as being under the slow process of Development, instead of as the instaneous fruit of miraculous Creation. But I have to meet it, moreover, not simply, but with an implicated admission on my own part, that the view of nature aimed at must as much as ever bear the character of a *scheme*, in the full sense of the word: on the very account of the demanded integrality of treatment.—I will then begin with an explanation of the meaning I attach to this admission: which is indeed of the importance, that it represents actually my whole notion of the progression in religionism I lay claim to.

2. By the word "scheme" I mean thoroughly its settled import of "*plan*" established; while for a scheme that should be "religious," I consequently mean, as ever, that which signifies "Divine purpose," having rule throughout nature. But then, by my own method of symbolism I may here intend, and I now state that I do

alone intend, that which actually my own mental faculty so paints to itself, as by that which appears mental necessity. By Divine "plan and design" I mean but that which would have been such if indeed a real *man* like ourselves had been in the Creator's place. I go nothing at all farther than this. But this involves the express power of progression in the case which belongs always to an arriving consciousness of self-exerted faculty. For when "plan" is now recognized, of the kind that is still accounted "Divine," it is but as treating Deity for that which is no more than intermediate to the actual source of the idea in our mind itself.—And the attending circumstance is this, which also I count progression, that the "plan" henceforth falls on alone what in nature stands as nature's *arrangement*:—leaving all that has been proved to be inaccessible to our comprehension, of so-called "intrinsicness," as much set in reverence aside as is also the intrinsic nature of Divine Beinghood.

3. What I mean now by Deity is become—through its emerging from what is literal personality, and taking but the personality that is symbolic, or allotted consciously by us to it,—of necessity but a matter of *attributes*,* instead of what is intrinsic. The one attribute, however, which the assertion of a "scheme" in nature implies, is, I argue, what suffices in itself to justify the thought of Deity being associated with it. And that is, the attribute of *universalness* of action, combined with the universalness in the mode of this which we call *uniformity*: both the one and the other—the universalness as to Space and the universalness as to Time—

* I retain, as to it, the adjective, or adjectives, while I reject the till-now accepted noun. And is not this what true grammar fully vindicates, by its showing of a natural precedence of the former over the latter in the real practice of word-making?

being also counted as under influence of *Growth*, which in itself means Divine Energy. God is to me now but the thought-centralized principle which, as such, has been gained to us by our exercising of mental judgment on phenomena of development seen for uniform. God is to me only God through His proving to be *One God*. But if farther, as to this action of mental judgment on our own part, is added-in effect of "consciousness" on our exercise of the faculty, I argue that a circle of true reasoning is produced which is perfect to the purpose. Its discerning, however, lies with a wide tract of accepted generalizations, both mental and scientific, which can scarcely be even hinted at once, but which I do now intend to cast hints about in precisely the present showing of my own "scheme." All history of Philosophy, from the first, has borne its witness, let me call to mind, to the indispensable connection that exists—if indeed it be not real identity,—between what is known as Theology, and, on the one hand Psychology and on the other a fully-mentalized Cosmogony.

4. And, as to the latter expression, I still point to universalness-with-uniformity. A scientific view of nature, merely such, I consider is not requisitely cosmic, in the needed sense which in religion is requisite. It is only integrality of view, expressly such, which can really bring our consciousness to sense of "God" as the World-principle that is correlate to our Ego-principle. The reasoned circle I contemplate includes specially, though science has but barely yet admitted,—if even this may be asserted,—that our actual consciousness of Self-hood is the traced consequence of whole development, working up to it, even from the lowest basis in what stands as the realm of physics. But I wish to meet this moreover, in what is to follow, by the same integrality

of view as to mental operation in itself, with that which the formed *mind* in us comes to apply around it, in cosmic survey. My intended "scheme," namely, will regard mind, in its own action of cosmic sort, as specifically carrying out cosmic action. And this rests with its having the character I have claimed, in my preceding investigation, of the one common practice in nature of the movement of *Balance*. To gain the power of seeing Deity, or a common Ruling Principle, in nature, I conceive that the mind comes to a single focus of thought impressions, really poised on nothing else than Equilibrium, as surely as material planets did the same thing. And this truly, with the very circumstance involved of polar opposites attached to the formed centre, which, precisely as in the case of these, is the empowering to it of vitally-preserved movement.

5. The cosmos of Developmentalism is indeed a world of "movement":—not that in which creative power, as having done in one act its whole work, must seem as thenceforth *resting* itself, save for the personally-arbitrary interventions which our thought cannot do less than interpose for it; but that in which prime energy displays itself ever in full action: making nature as if in itself all alive in what it shows as its productions. Unit lives of local beings now appear as but effects of constant motion kept up, on peculiarly concentrated terms which are therein also liable to a winding up; and the Life of whole nature, where indeed is existent, though only there, what must be known as stability, is still but the made-up sum of general changes passed through, where occurring changes are perpetual. There is here a notion, I contend, which is "dynamic" to the full, and as of right; while the former one of local fixity of condition was only such as was self-defeatingly "static." And it

implies the full basis to cosmic theory which, as already I have described it, gives the clear mode of formalizing which is this: that Motion be ever treated, in specific cosmic view, as itself the cosmic "substance" to be regarded, while that which is its opposite as Matter be only treated as the constant moulder of Motion (II. 205). But if to this I add farther the condition, that Motion be ever held but as capable and ever tending to develop itself into character of E-motion; while also I take the notion of Balance as that which is ever sovereign over movement universal: I urge that my cosmic basis is made to include even what answers psychologically to the cosmic notion just expressed of Divine "stability." Namely, as that of a formed "idea" with polar opposites attached.

6. For E-motion, sprung from lower-ordered Motion, is on cosmic understanding, strictly such, but the natural substratum to the real opposite to what is generally called "emotion," which has the name of intellectual "subjectivity." And "subjectivity" in reality, I contend, is but in itself a mental sort of Motion, equilibratingly-furnished, which for only the excess of movement concerned is what it is to us: while what this is, is indeed an apparent fixity, as such capable of correlation with Divine stability (II. 181). But in regard to Psychology I have here the means of attending fairly, besides, to what exclusive Cosmogony but ignores; and thus of doing needful justice to the immense importance to us practically of the felt difference between Emotion and bare Motion. And this I intend here to mark therefore, on my own part, by division of the following kind, in the explanation I am about to give of the concerned scheme I am as yet only preparing for. Assuming, as I do, a general uniformity of thought-arrangement, in regard to cosmic Motion, as my prevailing ground, I propose to divide this into the

two several aspects, adapted to proper intellect and to proper feeling, which may therein represent, with sufficient suitableness, both the actual two sides to what is called "subjectivity," and the kinds of Motion thence implicated. And this will stand, under my adoption of anthropomorphism, as the parting of the general notion of Deity into the symbolled characters of "Creator" and "Father." When intellect is in chief concerned, so also, I consider, is the kind of Motion brought in question what is characterized but as such as is Motion barely : or, that in which really, for the omitting of what is ultimate in its nature, Motion is rendered all but hidden under Matter. But when feeling, of religious kind, is in question,—having always, as I allow, the right to be what is first in importance,—then is Motion at once recognized in its full character. Nor as to either of these positions do I want the select circumstance in actual nature which in itself justifies to me both the one and the other symbol.

7. When now I look around on all nature with what is cosmic intention,—or, with such as tends naturally to bring my own thought in the end to feel, by the very force of its own revolving, its own pivot of revolution,—what I do thus gain sight of is the one fact, always mainly impressive to me, that I am myself, both as thinker and feeler, but the *product* of what in nature surrounds me. I mean, of this as evolutionally estimated. I see myself as evolutionally the pure *result* of environment. And exactly this specialized fact, I assure myself, is what *may* be expressed in symbol as either a found "Creator" or "Father" to us ; while the intrinsic meaning of evolution, at the same time, is that which supports fully the required "Divineness" involved. It would not be thus if any single action of environment—any partial event or merely local circumstance—were

in question, as having compassed the production of human beings. If it were but this, I could see in it no more than a mere accident in the state of things, and the reverse to what I can figure as a "plan." But I find actually that what has acted in the producing of me has been fully the entire mass of outer nature, working on towards the effect through a course of past ages whose depth of antecedence is incalculable; and of this, with reflected promise just as deep towards the future. Every part of diffused Space, every portion of by-gone Time, and of the latter as bearing inference of continuance, has helped to the rendering me what I am. And the very sense thus occasioned of Abstract Space and Abstract Time being concerned with me, as a self-known Individuated Being, I consider to be indeed my true justifying for the "plan" which as such my thought accepts, which shows Divine Beinghood in the double light of two relations which expressly are those to mean effect of Individuation arrived to us. Nor is there wanting in this the true element of all religiousness, from the very mystery of what is here pointed to:—through precisely the claimed point which is herein psychologic, that in all of our imaging, in the ever-enduring universe around us, a Not-me both Creative and Fatherly, we rest always our thought-lever on what is constantly true *miracle* to us, as our conscious Self-faculty of Self-inspection.

8. But the two aspects I thus separate Deity into, in response to our own divided mind-nature, while taken as under principle of Balance for their effect, supply, I consider, really the very turn of Theism to what else would be relatively Pantheism, which I have allowed for in my definition, as suitable to the main character of religion. And this I may best explain by what indeed is common practice in our daily speech.—It is natural to

us, and habitual, in our ordinary state of feeling to call ourselves, occasionally, the "creatures of circumstance." And this is really what only wants an exalting into sufficient earnestness of intention, and sufficient abstractness of reference, to amount to the present finding of ourselves a "result of environment":—the concerned earnestness and abstractness meaning chiefly the keeping strictly to the idea of "circumstance" as apart from that of mere "circumstances" which is apt to be mixed up with it, and which, being so, is immediate degradation to its purport. But my own expression, in my own idea of it, in fact has another answer to it, in what also is common speech, which my actual mode of Theism, in its two-fold dividing, makes more specially the response that is appropriate: my actual mode of Theism being, as it is, that which recognizes God not any longer by his essence, but by exclusively his attributes, formed as such by our experience. The attributes of Creatorship and Fatherhood, namely, are to me in my present view what in fact I can no better describe than by saying, in familiar terms, that they are proved to me, evolutionally, to have been "the *making* of me." And this is owing to the comprised part of my actual scheme which signifies a particularity of matter rested on, to give the special thread of "design" a scheme requires: a selected *point* out of nature's whole ordering, also extendible into an evolutionary *line*, which is gained to my own thought by expressly the thought-habit, specific to my adopted method, of casting *average* on presented considerations, the doing of which is dependent on thought-balancing.

9. In the later of my two departments of scheme-laying, I shall accordingly have to show—as far as the barest hinting may be called "showing,"—how the making of us into what we are is indeed due, as to the

part of us most concerned in religion which is *emotively* so, to the existent fact found in nature that Fatherhood, in general sense, is what does with selectness, or with speciality of Divineness, hold rule there. And before this, as leading on to this, I shall aim to collect proof as to the object which is the rather an *intellectual* one, of explaining rationally how our standing towards nature as its "result," does substantiate in reality a Creatorship present there, even as acting for the producing of our actual Souls. The peculiarity of point which I believe given by my own train of thought to this matter of our being as nature's "result," appears to me to make up all that such kind of scheme can demand.

10. I believe indeed that a Principle of Balance takes up rightly the very station, of required fulcrum to our whole view of the universe, which hitherto has been held by the attributed Personality of Deity ;—and that it does this because, discernibly to the subtle thought which belongs to cosmic scheming, this same Principle of Balance, carried on from end to end of the devised scheme, accounts to us for precisely what gives to us our own actual sense of Personality, attached to our own Ego-ship. This is the general doctrine I aim to prove. And it is certainly as much psychologic and introspective, as it is cosmic and objective.

11. But there is first, before scheming may be entered on, other primal matter to be dealt with separately, in view to the mental station to be then held, which besides being introspective must be *moral*. Namely, such as shall determine, for myself individually, the real character which of right, to my present mode of reason and of feeling, should be that which I may account a "religious" scheme :—such as shall sufficiently settle for myself, how much or how little of what has hitherto seemed "reli-

gious" ought still to attach to the preserved term: this settlement being indeed what is yet for the most part, in the world around, from the pending state of transition, only un-settled and under controversy. And I will therefore now proceed to work out my own argument of this kind.

THE NEW KIND OF SCHEME-CONDITIONS NOW CALLED FOR.

12. The prevailing difficulty which arouses argument under the change now undergoing by religion, (of passing from Supernaturalism to Developmentalism,) is the moral one which is at once stated by the ordinary anthropomorphic expression, that it imports but the kind of Providence found in nature which is *general*, instead of the former kind which was *particular*. What I now have to do, therefore, as needful to the conditioning of my intended scheme, amounts to this: I have to show the kind of turn to both the difficulty and the means of answering it, which may even at foundation be shown attached to my accepted principle of Balance. And I refer especially to such action of this principle as indeed my own mode of the defining of Religion responds to, as touching separate sway in ourselves of our moral and intellectual natures.

13. I grant, on my own part, that if what is "Providence" in nature be *simply* converted into "general," my own sense of religious quality in the kind of scheming concerned is but nullified. And this belongs to my whole objection to what is known as Positivism. But the principle I now substitute for that of Positivism, and which I account of as that of Mental Sexhood, giving the means of continual comparison between the aspects of common nature which affect severally our two sides of mental beinghood: this principle, I say, does actually,

when united with a base notion as to law of Balance, bring the contrast of the "general" and the "particular," when concerned with cosmic scheming, to in fact but a balance between these of which the variation respects severally a stronger kind of adaptation to need that is intellectual in us, or to such as is moral. For the very meaning of "Sex," as I treat it, is specifically this assortment of our ideas of constitution by regard to *predominance* in two sorts, such as must in regard to balance give alternate weight of leaning on either side: whether in whole personality we take "Sex" to mean prevailing character of feeling in Women, as opposed to prevailing intellect in Men; or whether, in ever-lessening divisions of mind-nature, we see the same circumstance branching out. A respective *predominance* in these two sorts, I take in fact, as I am about to show, for the very *cause* of mental balancing having action in us. And this opens to me a mode of scheming, even as to what is personal and "particular" to us, which at all events has the promise in its favour of whatever is the known advantage found as incident to Sexhood in its common sense. I mean, while there is added to the above the point also now assumed, that the mind's method of ascertaining what is "predominance" is precisely the sole effort of mind-revolving, for the sake of gaining duly the required *average* of presented circumstances.

14. It is a settled recognition of comparative physiologists that with ripening of the Sexhood which is corporeal does also arrive into the whole constitution of organism organic refinement. And hence has my whole impulse towards the carrying of the Sex-character into the sphere of mind been involved into the idea of mental progress in refinement. As Men and Women are made better and higher integral beings by having sex-opposites

in one another, so, I imagine, are severally heightened the intellectual and moral sides of human mind. But the same thing should hold good of those integral creations of mind which are our general Ideas; and eminently of the supreme one of these: whence an *à-priori* force is given to the actual history of our thought of God, as needing to have been that which it is here taken for. Namely, an image at first clothed in coarse human associations which, however, in still bearing on the true end of religion, have only needed to become gradually eliminated, in the manner of all our general abstractions, to leave finally the idea of God in the degree of abstract purity which the moral import attached to it admits of, and this especially as requiring action of balance.

15. I am now supposing, let me repeat, that what made under orthodoxy an attribute that seemed proper to Deity in that of God's own "personalness," is now visible for but the cause of the producing in ourselves what is "personalness" of our own, introspectively perceptible to us:—the first being the gross or mythologic beginning of what finally is of the common nature of ideally-obtained knowledge; and thus the consummating into this being identical with progressive refinement. But moreover, I suppose that the effect in question is brought about by an action of really duplicating the Divine image, to suit the respective foci in our mind-nature which, under a balancing estimate of their two opposing tendencies of predominance, stand as intellect and emotion:—just as physically we see as well as we do by having two separate eyes, and as in art we improve our pictures by stereoscopy. The differencing of the Divine image in this way, I conceive, is the bringing of the real "principle" concerned in it—and this by the very force of our mind's stretching towards it, *in thought*.

revolution,—into a degree of adaptedness to our actual need which is exactly and solely the thing only we have reason to expect from it. I imagine that it is well for us to think necessarily of Deity under the common requirement of art which is that of art-equivocalness. Namely, as allowed for in my own definition, by thinking of God as meaning, interchangeably,—according to the shifting need of the moment,—either the omnipresent Energy of Evolution, bearing *on* the human Soul, or the impression itself formed *within* there, either as *sense* or as *idea*. The one means, Evolving-Nature; the other means, Improving-Self: and both are really the same thing, while, none the less, it may be the best for us, as I believe it is, whenever we think deliberately, to think of the two separately. And herein is confirmed, surely, the value of the naïve agency of anthropomorphism, whose plasticity befits exactly the needed doubleness of mental posturing that is involved. When we use in our constant talking the immensely-signifying pronoun which stands for Self—the little word of “I,” which indeed I am here arguing to have the very foci to its actual usage, which the foci found in Deity correspond with,—we never pause to ask if we mean by it the Self in us that thinks, or the Self that loves; while yet we make ourselves to all purpose understood. (See II. ch. ii.)

16. And let me say now distinctly in regard to anthropomorphism, that I mean to use it freely henceforth as applied to Deity, whenever my feeling leads to it, without any farther kind of explanation; and this, even as falling under the equivocation I point to. The more thoroughly in fact we *un-personalize* Deity, the greater becomes our need of *personifying* Him.—Let me explain also clearly that by the “Soul” I mean, accordingly, but what is similarly the anthropomorphic for the

"I." It would be simply false art, or bad taste in language, to blend in correlation two terms, as to nature's Ego and our own, of which the one should be in poetry and the other in prose.—And again, as to the word "Mind:" in explanation that is two-fold. Of this let it be understood that I shall here keep it to simple prose, and mean by it what is always and strictly proper "human mind," *not* related to Deity save as commonly and indeed specially being the issue from a Divine Source: since in here treating of what is "mind" as being specifically but the fruit of slow development, to apply the word even figuratively to Deity would be clear absurdity. But on the other hand must be made known that I shall stretch the common meaning into what indeed is not such, from the need that I feel imperative to give to it an opposite sort of correlate. I require to mean by "human mind" the whole spiritual part of us, including feeling as much as intellect, which has but this to define it that it is psychic and not physical. I can find no other general term which can express this, and therefore I must force "mind" to the usage. I must correlate Mind here with human Body, just as otherwise Mind is correlate with general Matter.

17. This assorted apprehension being laid down, then, as in so far "condition" to my scheme, I may now proceed from it to the completing mode of conditionment I have indicated. My object becomes that of showing how, in my own judgment, the sole matter of adhering to this apprehension, and reasoning from it, will enable us to deal feasibly and sufficiently—however far from entirely and perfectly,—with the universally-felt difficulties that belong to religion's subject. No controversy hitherto, so far as I am aware, has been grounded on this stipulated foundation; but I imagine

that I can justify, notwithstanding, what is actually my own conviction of security in resting on it.

18. I start on my endeavour with the clear space made out for the subject, which is the seeing that the only thing looked for is the relative adaptation of the scheme I seek to actual personal requirement in two modes. All object of theologic speculation, and also of speculation that is cosmic, is now moulded into the one simple demand of finding in nature a comprehensible cause for own own mental development:—a “cause,” namely, that shall be as much more than a mere “means,” and as *near* to being primal, as our actual faculties enable us to conceive of. *Real* knowledge is alone concerned, just as much when religious effort turns outwardly on cosmic interpretation, as when otherwise it turns inwardly on sole mental improvement: just as much when it regards idealized Deity, as when it inspects the imaged Soul in ourselves. And this, I feel, is what ought to give content to the special side of our conscious Selfhood that is intellectual. It is the character, or prevailing tone, of *genuineness* imparted to fruit of mentalism, which I feel to transcend, as indeed I believe it needs to transcend, the un-religious character of mere *seeminglyness* which I find alone proffered under what is secular philosophy. The sense of such “genuineness” and “reality” as this, I in fact take as what truly represents the whole satisfying of intellect in the case, to the degree needful to my own conditioning.

19. But the need which is companion to this—and which indeed is, from the nature of the case, fundamental to not only its own side of the matter but also to this side,—is the emotive demand which rises up to us at once when we approach religion as a general subject. The recognition is here instant to almost everyone, and I

acknowledge that it is so to myself, that a true religious scheme can alone prove itself such, with what is adequate satisfaction to our full nature, by its shewing us Divine Rule for *beneficent*. I agree entirely, for my own part, with the common feeling that belongs to orthodoxy, that no possible religion can be rightly such except only in its certifying to us that just as surely as God reigns, and is *one* God, God is *good*. My instinct of reason has told me surely that God is only God to my perception in the fact of His being One God ; and no less does my instinct that is emotive assure me that He cannot to myself be God, either, except in His being testified for Good.—To sink at all in this demand on Religion, by forcing a new meaning into the sacred name, is a subversive re-modelling of actual language, which, I own, would go against me in regard to my every rational predilection:*—as being indeed, in my view, what would force back Religion into wholly its pre-status of mere fetichism.

20. But also, as a very part of this position, I make demand on the strength of instinct, that the only way

* I wish here particularly to refer to those ideas about "*Nature*" which are now given to the world in what is, unhappily for us, but the posthumous work of Mr. Mill, so entitled. The lamented death of this great man, let me note on my own account, occurred almost directly after I had set in print the note in which I speak of him at II. 441 ; while this subsequent promulgation of his religious views has made to me only plainer than before the difference in my own station I there plead for. I wish to raise now my urgent protest that where this deeply-feeling philosopher most has suffered, as he has done, under Religion, the mere differentiating of his position, with due consciousness of purpose, if he had come to see the need of this, would have served him to dispel the whole torment. In regard to the term of "*nature*," Mr. Mill has himself most instructively shown the variation of implication concerned ; and hence there seems already in his mode of thought pointed to as desirable the present plan of divided-definition, which indeed seems as suitable to the term of "*nature*" as to that of "*religion*." But the applying of this plan to the term of "*God*,"—the separating of this duly

of the right proving of God's goodness shall be allowed to be only that which shows it in the affording of Hap-

into its objective and subjective imports, with the required leaning maintained as to the rightful dominance in this case of the latter, for thought that is religious, though the requirement would be opposite for science,—would, I believe, and am about in the text to contend, preserve duly the sacred name from all the kind of implication that in this work is so painfully set forth; and in doing this defend requisitely also the actual state of religious feeling concerned.—And let me illustrate this at once, on the great saying of the author elsewhere, which has justly become so common in allusion; that if a being like the God of orthodoxy could sentence him to hell for denying such being's goodness, to hell he would go (*Ex. of Hamilton's Philosophy*, p. 103). These words are to me, in my own position,—however I may admire them in Mr. Mill's sense—but a simple misuse of language: shown for such by indeed the impossibleness of the conveyed proposition. God could not be God to Mr. Mill, I insist, if the latter thought Him capable of acting thus. They are to me a mere barbarous prosaism, out of place on the occasion to the degree of falseness: the real demand of the occasion being alone, as I believe, for the vague poetry of symbolism, whose plastic adaptableness, above alluded to, would have been really the true means, and indeed the only means, of here ministering to what is *real mental accuracy*.

And here I may best insert a somewhat similar kind of reference, which it is also of great interest to me to make, on the special account of that same part of my own previous writing which contained the note mentioned, having respect to Mr. Mill. I said, at II. 440, that I knew of no woman besides myself who had actually afforded such specimen of an attempt to philosophize independently of men as my own work does afford; but I have since become aware that there appeared even in May, 1873, a paper in *Fraser's Magazine*, (followed by a supplement the month after,) which, however hasty it appears in its composition, is still of the kind intended, and which also calls amply for consideration on my own ground, as proceeding from a woman so illustrious in what is specially a woman's sphere of merit as is its writer, who is Miss Florence Nightingale:—the paper having for its title the modest heading, which is yet expressive of its real quest into religious philosophy, of "*A Note of Interrogation*." The interest of this paper to myself, I wish to say, was caused even more than by its contents, by my immediately feeling how truly it answered both to my own expressed notion about the action of female thought so employed, and to my own statement of the experience involved. I owned, on the quoted page, that I worked as

piness. Here again is an association laid out which, for myself, I cannot otherwise than adhere to. And by this, as is manifest, I come into full front with the point which is that of reigning difficulty: the need of reconciling the alleged "goodness" and required "happiness" with the actual state of things and its abounding mass of evil. The resource is however open to me, always, of giving to the idea of "happiness," in some degree, the modified interpretation which in this case need have

having previously "revolted from the teaching of, this sort had from men." And Miss Nightingale's writing is precisely an enforced utterance of the same "revolt," even expressed as with a kind of indignation. My impression of it is as of exactly an impulsive cry, impatiently addressed to the whole body of religionists and philosophers; and for what, but for precisely their having failed to do that which I, on my own part, find it natural for women only to do, in respect of philosophy! She complains of that body for precisely a *piece-meal* treatment of their subject; while I, for myself, contend, that to judge on a full *average* of perceived circumstances is to women a thing of instinct.—And she might have invoked answer to her complaint even more than from any other of his class, from Mr. Mill himself, if his "*Essays on Religion*" had then been published, and he able still to furnish it:—not an answer in logic of *his* sort, but in the logic which she exhibits as *her* sort, and which as such he would have been the first to do justice to. I mean, the logic of reducing evidence of religious theory to exclusive *practice* in religion. If Miss Nightingale demands to know of God that He is "good," she turns vehemently away from verbal argument, and bids us prove if He is not so by giving "character" to our own social operations in conformity with what is *His* revealed "character:"—that is, not in piece-meal conformity to any local theologic theory, but in whole obedience to a general law of doing good, with full accompaniment of enlightened intelligence. And in fact, however actually Miss Nightingale's own form of conviction may differ, as it appears to do, from mine,—as to especially the great leading ideas of Divine personality and continued Selfhood after Death,—her summing of the whole subject is none other than mine in this volume. Like her, I take "character of Deity" for the only furnisher of religious trust, though I do but suppose it to imply the averaged guiding rule over nature, seen actually here in action;—but I am wholly at one with her in finding that Religion's rightful evidence is its power of promoting "moral science."

nothing to offend. And this accordingly is the mode of argument I am about to enter on.

21. *Ought* it not to be so,—already, and still on instinct, I ask myself,—that under a cosmic apprehension so changed as is now the case, the notion of what is “happiness” should vary in accordance, in an altogether different manner, and to an altogether different degree, from the manner and degree in which well it may happen to our ideas either of Deity or of goodness to vary? —And as to the keeping, notwithstanding, of the old term, it seems to me indeed that the retention is even involved in the change in question, as being now specially enforced; even with allowance made for what is now a common feeling about the word. I refer to common seeking at present for some higher-pitched term, such as “blessedness,” to take the place of that of “happiness”: which endeavour is occasioned chiefly by the *unstable-ness* which the latter represents;—while to this objection my own answer is prepared, on the exactly reverse ground of maintaining that this import is alone appropriate. And the reasons I have to give for this opinion,—being as they are both physical and metaphysical,—will appear in what follows, as I go on now to state my proposed dealing with the whole point.

22. I see it to have been natural that in the orthodox handling of the difficulty with existing evil, under view of Deity as a Person, resource should have been had as it has been: namely, to the treatment which should but aim to prove as good the ordered *rule* in creation, to which evil may thence stand but as *exception*;—while, to account for this exception I find that it was also natural to make theory that God’s own original purpose in creation was thwarted by His unconforming creature: however true now it may be, that this theory at the present

day has but ended in having wrought out its own inherent connotation. All the logic of orthodoxy, as to the aim to maintain the goodness of Deity, has been burdened all along with the huge labour of the endeavour to ignore both the actual amount and the actual sources of existent misery in the world; and has thence availed itself, as on compulsion, of the offered device of throwing all of required *cause* in the case on the supposed need of human punishment, to be inflicted for the pure sake of Divine justice,—whence a “sin” in accordance was made out. And the action of human thought in this enforced explanation of outer fact, however contrary to adequate, is thus rightfully representative of primal effort at the tracing out of Providence.—But now, for ourselves, the increased knowledge of actual things, as well as also the increased sensitiveness of moral judgment, has surely made no longer admissible this prime dogmatic subterfuge for a doctrinal hypothesis. And the consequence to this I believe to be, that we are now prepared for the great change which is even that of reversing at its very basis the first proposition of striving reason, by exactly making out of the former “exception” the now-accepted “rule.” I mean, at all events, as to the *past* state of things. This reversal, I say again, I find mentally “natural,” in its turn to the point of view of Developmentalism; and no less do I find it that which indeed to my own judgment seems to bring to striving reason an immense relief; in the task-work it has all along been growing up to, of interpreting for itself outer nature.

23. The idea of a “Fall” is put an end to by Developmentalism, as to outward occurrence, by the simple fact that here the assumed principle is made alone that of continuous improvement going on, both outwardly and inwardly in respect of us; though, on the other hand,

there is nothing here against, but everything in favour of the recognition, that to actual modern sense the discerned state of the primæval world brings indeed the true sinking of what was natural prepossession respecting it, which is an actual "Fall" to it in regard to thought. And this, for the very reason that the early state of things, developmentally estimated, does indeed but present what in this view is the assured spectacle of abounding evil, scarcely mitigated. Namely, in nothing more than the priority to organization then inevitable:—since, to this point of view, the whole idea of "evil" is restricted to the mere import of this priority. But with this new understanding, the case for moral judgment, of the kind that is to be formed upon balance, becomes at once easy in itself and easy as a thing of progress. In taking chaos as full evil to begin with,—even softened as it is now into pregnant æther and floating atoms,—we can only see in the threads of opening life and the traces of dawning order, there springing, what are but starting exceptions to the matter of general rule. And we can but see them moreover as therein what are palpably beneficent in their purport. This beginning however being made, we are at once upon the track of associating thenceafter, and ever in an increasing degree, all progress in evolution, merely as such, with an attendant progress in attributable beneficence, always referable to that final Rule or Ruler in creation, which, in itself being exceptionless, lies beyond the "rule" measurable by ourselves which is therein liable most expressly to exceptions. The idea of "God," namely, as the Supporter of evolution, is exhibited to our thought, as precisely what is, and alone can be, made manifest to our reason as being attached to the central mode, or central *line*, of beneficence affecting us, which is to our reason thus identified

with a course of advancing order and organization. He is made to us essentially and invariably the *vanquisher* of evil, instead of being as hitherto its *inflictor*:—the “vanquisher” who if indeed He only conquers by degrees, which progress implies, still to averaged mental judgment retains uniformly the aspect of being such: which is the advantage I limit myself to asking for.

24. But the advantage is not single. It includes this which, though it be, as may be said, but a matter of allotted terms, is none the less of such kind that where morality is in question it must be esteemed the very highest and most intrinsic: namely, the advantage that no longer is human thought made to feel itself obliged, as in mere self-consistency, to *pretend* to see over-ruling good where really are no signs of good visible to it.

25. The postulate I desire for myself is the following: that whatever in the course of things does now approve itself for good, either immediately or in tendency, in the highest and best possible sense of what is good,—that, and that only, shall stand for the real manifesting of God. This duly being insisted on at starting, and thus only, can we really, I believe, deal fairly with the subject of evil; just because only thus do we take up the position required of us—if sympathy with Deity—needful to imbue us with the true reconciled sense of actual things, which again is the only means of right insight into these.—For we are thus furnished with safe ground for the proper figure in the case, that the required point of promoting human Happiness, in its coinciding with the whole work of development, is identified with the general *aim* which has rule in development. The saying that “God is good,” is in fact mainly reduced into an affirming of the essential character of develop-

ment as implying constant progress. It is reduced really into an intuitional truism.

26. But then, as to the future fitness of the term of "happiness," the difficulty here occurs that, however easy it be thus to involve it in the form of a mere principle,—following the plan of taking Deity as such,—yet happiness is after all without meaning except under personal application: or, taken as affecting the experience of specifically individual human beings. I grant that to see it in this light provided for in nature, by the direct aim still in question, is not easy; and I believe that it can only so be seen by a resort, in the mode now adopted, to a due parting out of the definition of happiness,—with the pursuing besides of a very subtle consideration, in regard to what is nature's inmost action. The divided definition needs specially make clear, here again, the distinction (as indeed proper to this whole class of terms,) of the different kind of mental object that is engaged on, accordingly as is present either the *idea* or the *sense* of the matter dealt with; while the need is involved of marking preference of the respective phases. And of "happiness" we may say at once that specifically it is that of which the "sense" must be remembered dominant; while no less must it be thought of as always capable of being sublimated for thought into an abstract image, amenable to an objective treatment. I mean, as representing what is still but individual experience, notwithstanding its being treated in mass.—And this ordering of the subject, moreover, combinedly with the view of nature I contemplate, has in its favour the enabled return I have spoken of to the original apprehension of happiness: which indeed is laid up in the etymology of the term.

27. "Happiness" is so called as meaning that which

happens to us in effect of occurring circumstances. And this obviously coincides generally with the present taking of our whole personal nature but as ever the result of environment; although here is included the peculiarity of a special reference to *contingent* character in the effect. But the latter, again, I conceive to belong only, after all, to what really, however subtle, is the efficient universal way of nature. I allude to what here I have been inferring—as in chiefly II. 241-7, and 408-414,*—as to the rise to us of all kinds of sentient faculty only through there arriving to be impressed on us alternately-presented states of contrast: these now however being made to include that integral kind of contrast which the fact of progress in itself brings about, but which precisely in being integral I imagine to cause impression of the new sort which we account of as being *pleasurable*. I imagine that this new-coming mode of impression is on the one hand but the natural effect of an intermittent presentation of states of contrast to the subject, which now affects the subject by variation that acts in whole; and that, on the other hand, the innovation of what is *pleasurableness*

* In the first of these passages, I have traced to effects of Contrast, when organically maintained, all successive powers of Sentience, proceeding up to Consciousness, and even springing from the very rise of Life itself: in supposing always as the acting cause a certain vibrating experience of the subject between newly-gained faculty of this sort and the lower state already furnished. In the second referred-to passage, I have traced the very sense of our Identity, which is the animating principle of our Selfism, again but to a similar vibration: having supposed its seat in our very centre of Consciousness, as between what I count of as two sexual varieties of human state, bound together in each separate individual. Every realized kind of self-perception, from the lowest up to this very highest kind, I have exclusively referred to the supposed fact of the new on-coming faculty working ever as by gushes of effort, superinduced on what was previously-ordered function, in regulated intermittence which, as such, causes vivified result to ensue, in regard to perception of state of Contrast.

in the matter is naturally coincident with an arriving *sense* as to the contrast in action. And this primal supposition has moreover the advantage of even implying in itself a clear scale of increase in regard to what is pleasurable sensation, as showing it in fact a part of general progress. All increase of happiness is shown as naturally united with increase of faculty ; while the latter is the very meaning of evolution to the beings with whom Sentiency is in question. And the increase in Sentiency, with the increase in pleasurableness attached to it, is as much referable to the final and highest possible kinds of Happiness as it is to the lowest sources of Pleasure.*

28. The root-notion in the case is the level one of simple *well-being* : by which I understand, as under rule of evolutionism, no other than “*a condition of congruity between the sentient nature of the subject and the state of outer things.*” For, the law being there fixed that the perfectness of all beinghood, as such, is the co-ordinate adjustment of its inner relations with those that lie about it in environment ; it follows certainly that what is *felt* as “*well-being*” must import sense-impression of the same fact.—But then, in starting from this basis, and allowing for the growth of sentiency as above, the view of Happiness now appears in the full generic light of being a true “*function*” of sentient life, just as rightly as is sentiency itself such. And this is tantamount, at once, to its being that which in reason *ought* not to be thought imparted in the way that old orthodoxy assumes: namely, as bestowed personally, in the mode of a Divine gift ;—but on the contrary, as what comes normally in attendance on an advancing state of beinghood, and con-

* The terms of “*Pleasure*” and “*Pain*” I conceive to have their natural defining in our need to give expression to what is local or personal application of the generic import of “*Happiness.*”

sequently with accompanying conditions such as otherwise have become implicated in beinghood. Generic Happiness is now the averaged state of self-complacency in existence which truly is of kind that lower animals may incipiently possess, though with us only is its genus rightly made out by the needful adding of the human quality of consciousness. I would define it precisely as "*appreciated well-being*." But none the less do I regard as its essential point the matter of its ever trembling on the balance, between presence and extinction. Here, I find, is the proper "making" of its character. And it is this, I believe, as but part of the common fact of instability which pervades nature:—since, in addition to its own intermittence of constitution, it is inevitably also subject to the common perturbing source of what is "evil," which is that of the inequality at foundation of the lots of universal unit-beings.—The meaning of it, as a constant function of humanity, is indeed rather that of a *capacity* for Happiness, than that of even a possible possession of its experience.

29. Again however in this we must surely recognize the sign of "good" really afforded to us, when we bid ourselves reflect, as we need to do, how specifically such state of circumstance befits a world which is to us only in fact a scene of Struggle:—while to know of our world that it is this, and continually with a stronger kind of conviction, is assuredly what evolutionism enforces. Every stage of development is but a realized equilibrium hung on balance, attained through successful struggling in the assorting of modes of motion. And if so, how ought stages in well-being to have place, except as also the consequence of life-struggle?—Let it be granted only, that an integral state of Happiness is what actually fits man to his life's course, laid out for him in nature,

and again, I say, the truism appears, in regard to prevailing "goodness," which is self-sufficient. It is proved good for man to fight out his Happiness, having resident capacity for this, even though he be always subject to fail,—and even to fail through no fault of his own.

30. And though truly we are wont to think of Happiness as alone genuine when we can account it as *stable*—or, free from the *apprehension*, or "appreciated danger," of its loss, which even more than actual suffering is the interruption of content:—I believe that still does the paradox hold, that the finer the kind of Happiness concerned, and the more elevated its matter, the more is the sensation of it evanescent,—as, also, the keener must have been the strife that produced it. If ever actually common Happiness mounts up, as on this plan it may do, to become that which we would rather call "Blessedness," it is but as being the rapture of a moment that indeed comes by rarest of "haps:"—though also, none the less, the one single gleam of it enjoyed may be of the nature to leave behind it a life-time of serenity reflecting it.

31. Nor does paradox in the case finish here:—as *ought* it not to be, with an organically-integrated idea of Happiness, that it *should* be made up of contradictions?—However it be the fact, that Happiness is not such unless appreciated, it is notably also true that to turn direct notice upon it, destroys it. A qualification is again needful, to this effect: that its sense alone can be duly realized when life-action is employed wholesomely, in the way that exclusively *is* wholesome, on the real objects of life,—the affective kind of such objects being always, as to this, held in prominence, from the very fact that with these is chiefly Happiness concerned. The true earning of life-enjoyment, as a thing of struggle, is the actual gain of what is struggled for ; with the addition to this,

also perfectly natural, of what all along in right exercise of function is labour's payment of itself, as enjoyment of the very exercise on its own account. If our being's "end and aim" were indeed to ourselves made the conscious pursuit of our own Happiness, most naturally *ought* it to turn out, in its whole nature,—as we know it to prove partially,—a mere shadow that eludes us.

32. And thus I come fully to my own point, as by exactly the help of Pope's well-known apostrophe. I accept entirely the letter of the assertion,—I consent thoroughly as to Happiness that it is "our being's end and aim,"—but only so in reference to what in nature is nature's own Divine design. I recognize human Happiness to have been truly led up to and promoted, throughout evolution, on exactly the same terms as Sentiency and Consciousness. And this reduction of the subject, it seems to me, is all, as to proof of the "goodness" displayed in "Divine design," which religious theorizing need insist on. It gives at all events *safe* ground for moral reasoning:—nor, I think, is it possible to see that this present understanding about Happiness is anything which follows only after struggle, and is more acceptable to real moral intuition than what has shown it hitherto, as under the influence and consequence of Divine favour and

33. The determination I arrive at, as to the conditionment of my intended Happiness, may be summed up as follows. It is that the needful proof of Divine Happiness is simply its concern with the simple fact that attends naturally all exercise of function in us, that is only such as is as a matter of appreciation, or (as being the

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ing consciousness of Selfhood ;—while the force of this latter qualifying, all important as it is, I conceive to be already shown (though waiting the real evidence to this effect not yet come into consideration,) for specifically connected with the fact of human life being a state of Struggle, and altogether under influence accordingly of the *contingencies* belonging to such state. —I have no claim, as I admit, to fill up my own ground, as to anything that seems wanting in it, with the appropriated assumption of orthodoxy, treated there as specifically afforded on revelation, to meet the weakness existing on its own part as to a cosmic reading of the actual working of Providence : namely, the hypothesis of prolonged life after Death, which indeed is to myself rendered morally *un-safe* to reason upon, through its lack of natural evidence.—But, in granting this, I still consent to allow myself satisfied, *as to* ground for such reasoning on *as may* be safe, that the above conclusion is thus far supported to me.

34. And, for immediate direction to my purpose, this conclusion has moreover the following means of adaptation to the separated two modes of required proof, whose distinguishing into such is an express part of that purpose. —The general idea of Happiness now laid down does indeed bear so mainly, by my own recognition, on the not sphere of the affections, that the formula of “demand ful, evidence of Divine Goodness in a shown provision for realizedness” befits thoroughly the emotive side of requirement that “The kind of Happiness made in this way *character-life*,—the *namely*, is here obviously adequate :—while I to this, held the prevailing reference thus implied to an these is chiefly *ate* is but that which is always rightful of life-enjoyment *purpose*.—But still as to intellect there gain of what is *st*uch degree of deficiency left remaining,

for what is just recognition, as makes eminently desirable a formula having separate terms to it—separate, though related. And such related terminology seems in fact here afforded—when indeed I bring also to bear on the object the general nature of my whole actual results.

35. If we think *why* it is that Happiness, in its general sense, seems to offer proper test of Divine Goodness, we find sufficient reason, assuredly, in its forming what is obviously the only common element in which human action, for progress and success, imaginably can be carried on. It is the "atmosphere" for life-conduct to be prosecuted alone healthfully under.—Is, however, the action special to intellect—as at least *one*, if not *the* one, of the modes of life-conduct known as highest,—not also to be seen both as needing, and as imaginably possessing, an "atmosphere" of the same kind of its own: or, such as is made appropriate to itself, by an actual branching of the main import in the case, into such as is rightly differenced for the need of intellect? I answer, yes. I conceive that there is indeed furnished by nature such branch to the main fact, or main circumstance of Happiness; and that it consists in our empowered sense of *Truth*.—I mean, of Truth-in-the-abstract. Not of Truth, as to particular instances of felt Truth; but of that which is so far raised above the cases in detail which are but those of the application of its import, that it may well, under comparativism, be called by the name of "absolute Truth:"—"absolute," in no vainly metaphysic sense, but in the light of express psychologic principle, though still betokening in the purest way a full religious and authoritative implication. I am thinking of the wholly general sense of Truth, which in fact alone enables us, by its tacit strength in the background of thought-action, to believe really in any mentally-projected fact,

or reasoned-out occurrence, as such. And this background is most certainly, if we consider it, but the same with what of right is in question as to the idea of Happiness. It refers always to the same general faith produced for us in the entire regulation of nature: ready as much for being appealed to by reason, as on the other hand it affords power of religious trust—and, as I believe, of the *only* genuine kind of this,—in the way of showing how all particular aspiration towards good can only rest, after all, on the common “character for beneficence” found in nature. The two things are but parts of one another. They are but answering phases of the central matter of existent Oneness throughout nature, which equally yields its fulcrum to our trust when the case is of personal joys and hopes, and when it becomes that of the successful issue of our working usage of intellect. In both is required present a sure relying on the proved *habit* of nature: in that which has been hitherto found, in all human experience, so faithfully persistent for such, that its failing to remain such is beyond our power of doubt. To believe that anything at all is certain, or that anything at all is *true*, needs also our believing that the entirely-averaged course of things universal—which is the same thing as nature’s *habit*,—has ministered to the immediate case of desired trustworthiness. And the same integral conviction is in demand to make *safe* to us any item in life-conduct.—But an “empowered sense of Truth” that is allied with this integral kind of trust, is surely of the very nature of an engendered *function* which I imagine to have established as to Happiness:—and especially from the intuitiveness, that goes necessarily with the religiousness and authoritativeness thus attributing it. For indeed the sense of Truth, when thus generalized, is but manifestly the same conscious appre-

ciation of the value and the validity of intellect, which Happiness has been found to be in regard to the common action of exerted personality, or selfhood. And both attach to the same point of "congruity obtained with outer nature." Sense of Truth is, in fact, the proper Happiness of the intellect. It is the intellect's distinctive atmosphere of content, under which alone thought can really thrive, just as truly as is Happiness-in-general the only sustenance of the thriving action of entire beinghood.—And truly also it is that which fills the character of coming only as by "haps;" while, again, it thus obtains the rich consequence seen already as appended to that very circumstance. One single instance of attained belief of the having realized actual Truth, and of this as fruit of having previously been struggled for,—though it may come, and as appears though it only can come, at the choicest of moments, and only then as by surprise,—is yet surely what may serve, as to intellect, in the same way that especial emotive Happiness, or otherwise a specific moral "Blessedness," has already been adjudged to serve. Namely, as diffusing reflectively a calm and steadying sustainment to the whole frame of working thought.

36. And hence I gain the final point to my present argument which, besides, is no less a most helpful suggestion in view to the systematic effort to follow. A scheme that should be of the kind thus decided on, by the double formula adopted,—and that herein should enable us, as just signified, to make it a very part of our belief in God to believe also both in Truth and in Happiness,—must itself, I contend, in so far as at all it be made good, be a crowning demonstration of Divine Goodness at work in nature, precisely as representing "intended" human faculty. But the actual mode of

this proposition, enforced as this is by the course of reasoning pursued,—namely, as allowing of degrees in the accomplishing of such scheme,—is the equivalent to a vindication of the utter slightness of my own power of this kind, and the utter smallness of my collected store of evidence, on which nevertheless I assume myself entitled to proceed. It makes claim on my behalf, in reality, for what amounts to the same thing as that heretofore meant by *faith standing in religion* right in place where otherwise needs be always nothing less than a fully verified intellectual perception. It claims, to come back to my own terms, that if faith be only *integrally* satisfied with its furnished stock of evidence,—or feels itself free from the fatal gaps which are those of any consciously allowed exceptions,—the scheme come to may by force of self-consistency, on whatever feeble substance diffused, still answer to the character of its occasion.

THE ACTUAL SCHEME I FIND AFFORDED IN NATURE, AS TO ITS
PROOF OF DIVINE CREATORSHIP.

37. I require a self-consistent principle, found ruling whole nature, my recognizing of which shall give to me the sense of Truth.—And I require this under claim, for myself, that all the several conclusions antecedently come to in this work have tended in the direction of such principle: giving right to me to hold expressly, if not solely, now in view the integrating aim in itself,—or, power of rightly clenching all together,—while now I seek from them a common stock of belief. I see clearly, at the present point, that it is not mere *addition* that can make “principle.” I see that it is but *multiplying* of ideas into one another, new ones into old ones, that can bring integration.—But I have also provided ready the actual form for my integrating principle to

assume. And that is, the adopted hypothesis, seen for yet wanting in confirmation, which asserts of our whole faculty of conscious Mind, that it is provably the *result of environment*. In proportion as this is brought to proof, so also, I consider, will be genuinely designed the intellectual aspect of Religion. And thus, what precisely is now before me to be done is, I consider, to collect specially the kind of evidence that does, of peculiarity, give support to this culminating proposition.

38. I must however still, as to those main lines of my foregoing speculations which it is my object to draw together, afford this much of recapitulation. In the first place, —I must call to mind,—the re-constructive scheme I have begun upon (Part I. ch. V.) turns wholly on the perfecting, by means of external limitations, of the consciousness in human beings of their own Selfhood: thus laying *here* the true *index* to human progress universal. But my leading notion has not ended in this way; since, through all my subsequent exploring I have tended constantly to recognize, with ever-increasing force, that the full kind of external limitation coercive on Selfhood is alone that of Sexhood: of Sexhood, which is the circumstance of outward things which of all others Science marks to us as being favourite with nature, and which hence we may well think of as charged with her special *aim* in development. And thus what before had been “index” to whole progress, both mental and *un*-mental, or *præ*-mental, I have come to see as the produced compound effect of no longer Individuation merely such, but Individuation rendered subject to Sex.—Also, this effect I have found reason to explain to myself, by two related theories:—the one, that all action of human mentalism bears actually such division into classes as responds rightly to the idea of Sexhood, in representing

the main sexual characteristic of affording alone *agreement* by the special force of *opposition*: the class having ready names as Science and Religion;—the other, that Mind itself, when introspectively weighed, bears equally the correspondent division, into two-fold compartments which may count severally, as to preponderant constitution, for Intellectual and Emotive. By the alternate action of these two sides of the Mind on outward facts, in the two ways of Religion and Science, I theorize that outward facts have been gradually enforcing all along—and have now arrived to do so centrally and culminantly,—the integral stamp upon Mind which shall expressly carry there the point of nature's favour which Sex is known to be. The Mind that is possessed of *Sexed-Individuation*, and only that which is so, I conceive able to deal rightly with nature, upon a general understanding; however true also it be, and because of its being true, that generalism turned on nature means specifically but the one-sided action of Introspection: seeing that the coming here to point must, as ever, be alone prepared for by obtained balance, out of impressions the reverse of introspective and those actually so. For I admit fully that thought's dealing with general nature means always the casting over this of Mind-character, and hence the reading of nature wholly by the light of possessed Mind, in whatever actual stage it is may be;—and in admitting this, how is it possible to doubt, that the main thing bearing sway in outward nature must have means of its special mental elucidation?

39. But in all this, besides,—as I must also again repeat,—there has constantly seemed afforded to myself, as an attending experience, the very feeling, in state of progress, which now I am directly placing before me, as the assumed test of my adopted principle's religiousness:

—the express sense of Truth. For what hitherto I have continually delighted in, as, eminently, a consequence of my own method that has seemed to me an effect of proper Art—namely, as the two-sided kind of satisfaction imparted to my ideation of nature by my consciousness of two-sided operation, which therein answers truly to the effect of solidity and reality given to objects by stereoscopic aid to vision :—this compound effect, I say, is of the very nature of the sense as to general Truth, to which itself I now seek to give integration ; though needing for this end the peculiarity of schemed quality which only now I feel in reach of being obtained.—And in what way do I so feel it?—It is this which I have exactly to explain.—I do feel the quality attainable, I have to answer, through precisely the one only farther matter which I have need to specify ; and that is, the actual substance of my own method of symbolism. The thread of argument which I have now to produce, as the uniting bond I am seeking for, is in fact but the applying of that method, with requisite explanation, to the leading points I have just stated, while holding also in view the just referred-to experience. And this will instantly appear while I enter, as I will now do, on the very operation.

40. In the very manner of my stating my present object,—by representing it as that of giving requisite “self-consistency of principle” to my affirmed hypothesis, by its substantiating with a sufficiency of integrating evidence,—I conceive that I supply defence for what otherwise would be wholly weakness in my process, as to the resting, as I am about to do mainly, on the kind of evidence which it lies with reason to make good, in place of detail observation :—that is, on the ground which in common logic stands as mere *a-priori* ; though for

myself I perceive that I must dispute the expression. I cannot, without ignoring my own stated experience, admit that my present footing is otherwise than *posterior* to a requisite preparation. And the very meaning of the "self-consistency" now aimed at does surely carry inference as to the logical character that I would claim, instead of this established *à-priori* one. Namely, of "reasoning by symbol, and therefore integrally," instead of by heaped-up instances of observed fact: while none the less drawing wholly on outer nature for supporting proof. —By my own notion, however, all true scheming-out of nature's plan must *itself* obey that plan, already proved as such *in* outer things, by its own rendering, as it were, astronomic: by which I mean, that it must educe itself in no other way than that prime one by which planet-worlds were produced, according to the reasoned law of astronomy. Schemed ideas about nature, and no less schemed-out "principle" as to these, must not rightly, I imagine, be drawn from fixed premises of reasoning,—which I take to be the "tree-mode" of logic,—but must primarily evolve their own form: though always in just sequence to formed pattern. Both ideas and principles of religious class, I imagine, must as truly gain birth as planets show to reason to have done, by sole effect of their own *rounding out*. And here is really the express force I desire to give to my own basis of principle, when I name it that of Balance. The process I have just referred to, of the two separate sides of Mind obtaining sense of valid fact through alternate weight given to opposite outward aspects of nature, represents to me indeed the revolving motion of thought which should naturally be made such by undergoing two opposed currents of motive impulse,—enforced always by a "projectile" supplied by the common force of evolution. But

the very coming into the habit of revolution in this way should also naturally be the settling into focus of thought-particles, which at once brings the import both of rounded form and of state of Balance : the two being indeed, as to thought, but one and the same image. And I am here thinking, most essentially, of not one only kind of revolution, but of the two that in astronomy are shown together, as being respectively axial and orbital. I imagine that for our gaining of "ideas," the image of self-rotation suffices ; while for "principle" there needs always that traversing of the whole circuit of the mental heaven, and setting of each "ideal" thus at view at every point of the mental compass, which alone answers to the annual journey which we attribute, metaphysically, to our sun's progress through the zodiac of our conceptions. Ideation passes on, as I imagine, into the practical formation of religious principle by never really rotating upon itself, as phenomenally it seems to do, but by spirally advancing ever on its proper circuit, which at all events is more near to a true circle, if not absolutely such :—a circle which without harm we may treat as being a true one :—and just as, by its own act of self-rotating, all imperfect as it is, I conceive that "solid" notions are deposited (and metaphysically thence projected upwards on mental space), so I similarly conceive that the thought-substance of principle solidifies : or, actually gains a balanced ability of what is virtually self-sustainment.

41. I have indeed used very lately this symbol, when in speaking of the union which philosophy makes needful for Theology with both Psychology and Cosmogony, I have argued that if but "consciousness" of the uniting process were added in, "a circle of true reasoning" would be produced, perfect to the occasion : referring

actually for explanation to the present place (see paragraph 3). To amalgamate really the issues of these different sorts, is surely what is exactly here provided for. Namely, in the very practice suggested of looking duly on the whole subject on all sides, and under every kind of mental proclivity ;—of winding spirally onward to the final mark of obtained posture for mental judgment, not too fast for right power of assimilation,* but yet in no case losing ground once secured ;—of so precisely bearing the inward impulse in the matter, as that truly the “dip of axis” to the mind, represented by its dominating inclination, may enable thought justly to steer itself amid the inviting images presented, such as Science places naturally to the *north* of us, and Religion places *south*, † and which have form under severally the “materialism” which is rightful to the one, and the “spiritualism” that is rightful to the other. The reasoned circle of metaphysics must always be a “*great circle.*” Even as to mere axial rotation, the fixed solar ideal that makes “day” to us, only does this by an allowed-for journey just as circularly complete as is the annual:—so that the very thought of the sun’s fixture proceeds really from the ever rolling-onward phenomena. And a reasoned circle thus thought-integrated must surely have the character now in question, of being that which gives reason to itself. It must actually, I conceive, be indeed self-sustaining in the very manner that

* I have in fact classified, in the foregoing, the actual movement of circulation which in organisms is the very means of “assimilation,” as but uniform with “revolution” in effect.

† Let me ask remembrance that I have before given the importance I here imply to the point of “dip of axis,” as above that of rotation in itself: which latter, as I do not forget, respects specially *east* and *west*, and not “*north* and *south*,” as to the direction of the occasioned phenomena. See II, 305-6. The dip of axis I even take in the above for the actual source of regulation, if not even of primal causation, to mere general rotation.

intuition is so: wherever, and of whatever kind, *intuition* becomes known to us for such.

42. I believe truly that under the image here considered I am but pointing to what really is nothing less than the actual growth of *intuition*; and this precisely from the real naturalness and simplicity of what here may well seem but the reverse, from the very feebleness of my ability to do justice to the immense subject. The idea of thought being a "revolving" of matters over in our mind, is already printed upon language; but if once, in addition, the parallel with planet-law is adopted, all the consequences fit so thoroughly, I submit, to the mental circumstance involved, that it *must* become presently but immediate to mental habit to take them up. And immediateness of apprehension is but one with *intuition*. It seems to me inevitable that the present intricacy attached to the figure—when once recognized as but expressing the common matter of how the varying inclination (or "dip of axis") belonging to each several disposition, at its various recurring seasons of predilection, determines constantly the working posture of balanced judgment,—must so necessarily dissolve away, very quickly, as that verbal expression also must be enabled to be speedily dispensed with: after which, the effect only of *intuition* must remain.—But I grant that one thing, *not* common, is here involved: namely, the assumption of developmentalism, paradoxical as it is, that exercise of function creates organism. I am now supposing essentially, that the springing foci to metaphysical attention which form to us the "celestial landmarks" of ideals and principles,—religious sun by day, and scientific thought star-images by night,—are themselves, by their attracting force, the very cause to our mind's rounding itself out, and hence gaining its

real power of self-balance. Our judgment comes to us, I imagine, only by this very turning ourselves about, to see on all sides the world of fact that environs us. — Let me pass, then, to what may now be my full ground. Let me take up duly into my argument that other matter which, as premised, this very explanation must be shown to hold suspended within itself (par. 39).

43. The “great circle” I now aim towards for the reasoned integration of my scheme, means truly the same effect, as to its nature, with that which hitherto I have expressed by reference to stereoscopy; although now, by fully resting on the rightful symbol, which is that of nature as opposed to that of art, I conceive that I come first to the real ground of religiousness, and with this to the only sufficient reach of sense of Truth. All along, I consider, I might have formulated such “circle” to some extent, just by showing, as I think I always might have done, a virtually-true meeting between the two ends of the argument comprised in the tracks of thought I have recapitulated. Namely, in the two representative conceptions, that, on the one hand, nature’s aim is found centered upon Sexhood; and that, on the other, our mental instrument for dealing rightly with nature, by the means characteristic of human intellect, is alone competent to this, to full extent, when Mind itself consciously is made subject to Sex. Here, I say, appears always to have lain ready the true circular condition: only wanting in the practical rounding out to clear circumference, and the practical establishment of centre, which sufficient comprehensiveness alone supplies. But this very remaining want I conceive to lie really, as to its satisfying, with what naturally comes precisely, and comes only, with realized integration. The very effect of the notion’s filling to sufficiency, and thence gaining

its ability of self-sustainment, I conceive to bring at once, and with the suddenness ever proper to integration, the impression which completion signifies, and which here must be the same with a full religiousness. And this effect, as presented to myself, coincides actually, as I will now show, with the very matter of old orthodox religion to which I am now binding myself: that of God's bearing character of our "Creator."

44. I consider, as to orthodoxy, that whatever in it is with genuineness "religious," is represented to intellect by the one matter of the high quality it assigns to Mind, under its integral symbol of "the Soul." The Mind there was ennobled on inherent terms, as springing by direct nature out of Deity: it was treated as an immediate emanation out of God. And therefore I allow that, at first sight, the evolutional producement I believe in is degrading in this respect. The Soul, as a mere result of environment which here is under character of being physical, seems shorn of all that makes its proper glory. Nor is there really in evolutionism, so far as I can see, aught to hinder this consequence, and fill the important void, save precisely the mode of spiritual perception I advocate. Namely, that of still seeing throughout nature what answers to a human *aim*, though alone attributal for Divine. But this mode of attribution, I conceive, does indeed cause evasion of materialism to such degree as, by the help of my division in definition, leaves balance of directly opposite kind for standing ground:—since, when once the lower stages of evolution, counted physical, are linked by the idea of "*aim*" to all higher ones, these latter take lead and give character to all: whence the "Not-Me" of environment, parted temporarily from the correlated "Me," still mentally restores to the latter its own share of account-

able Divinity. And this effect includes eminently a taking up, with full rational explanation besides, of the very sign which in ancient symbolism, anterior to Christian, was attached to the act of placing human beinghood in the relation in question towards God. The actual Hebrew way of showing this relation for the human creature with the Creator turned precisely on the "dominion" given to it over lower creatures; and if we allow that the Divine Giver of this may be as if in one breath, as plastic symbolism permits, the entire Ruler over nature and the somewhat exceptioned image which the correlating with human Selfhood implies, the same point of "dominion" is what utter materialism, under guidance of evolutionism, does nothing else than support and show reason for.—But farther, the conveyance of this dominion was expressed in Bible terms by implication with a point which above all I make claim here to appropriate, though materialism seems to have nothing to do with it. The grand old poetry of Genesis runs thus:—"*And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion—male and female,—over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.*"—And this connection of the two things, of dominion and Divine likeness, is precisely the actual vehicle of religion I now seize on, to vindicate my new form of religion, on this its intellectual side. I claim, that the plan I am now devising for symbolism—as precisely enabling *Mind* to appear also as become "male and female,"*—is a real means of showing *Mind*, as the true

* I have planned—let me recall,—that the religious or generalistic mind-method, now attempted to be carried out, is a feminine respondent to scientific, in this way. I imagine that, as to the general repetition in *Mind* of Nature, under the condition I attach of oscillation, this lies in the former case between the extreme kinds of the natural process, while in the latter it lies between the mean kinds; so that to religion belongs

representer of human beinghood, framed divinely in imitation of the inferrible whole design of Creative Nature.

45. For the present idea goes much beyond what seems commonly to belong to the apt phrase, that "our Mind forms the mirror to nature." It exceeds this, I believe, both by the depth of my intention as to the matter reflected, in respecting the order and regulation of this, in place of its mere surface presentation ; and by my own taking into the reflective ground the whole range of nature subject to rule even up to what is actual position. I treat Mind, as it is special to evolutionism to treat it, as only one, while the highest, of the continuous serial fruits of evolution ; and this, while Mind's nature, at its actual stage, is rendered so far separate from precedents that thought necessarily correlates it distinctively with these, in taking the latter as but charactered *Body*: since all mental development short only of what is consciously present, is evolutionally materialized to thought by involution with advancing structure of *Body*. But this involved correlation, again, as I conceive, has a new power of ennobling my own

the alternation of child-like Anthropomorphism with what I designate "Astromorphism" ; while to science is appropriate alone a change between what I call severally "Dendromorphism" and "Chelonomorphism." And as to the suitability of the new terms thus proposed, and their likelihood of being ever generally adopted, I may surely argue thus. The tree-type is already, manifestly, for cultured persons universally, at the actual stage of having been rendered intuitional ; and the low-animate type I make companion to this may well be said, if general signs be considered, to have made its start to become so, for at least the class of cultured persons whose dealing is in evolutionism, and especially in evolutionary sociology :—why then should not also the astronomic type, for at least the new class of cultured persons which is now becoming such amongst *women*, assume its eminently more fundamental position ? —why should not, *through* the means of this, the whole series be filled up into what obviously is no more than its just completeness ?

view, both beyond that of the above phrase and of the common doctrine of evolutionism, by precisely its preserving free the other and religious sort of correlation which here, as in orthodoxy, respects solely the Mind's likeness to creating Deity. I imagine that this likeness or stamped image of the Creator upon Mind, respects precisely that epitomizing there of all lower creative processes which, by subjective observation, we must find to imply the effect I have described : of a repetition here made of, in especial, the two great classes of such processes which we must count severally as astronomic and physiologic. But this very idea signifies, in essence, the same point of "dominion" given to Man as a mental being which in the Bible is his seal of dignity drawn from God :—since, how should Mind otherwise gain "rule" over nature than by means of its really holding within itself, as we have long credited it with doing, an effective *key* to nature's hidden proceedings?—while also, how should otherwise this "*key*" be interpreted, to reason's satisfying, save exactly by the Mind's possession of that likeness in itself to the whole plan of *rule* in Mind's environment, which, however in itself counting as "physical," still expresses, for religion, the whole manner of the sway of Creative Deity?—By evolutionized religion we must surely understand that God's government of whole nature means His bringing it under organization ever henceforth on the same plan as at first;—but the very power that, by experience, we find to betoken mental organization, as our ability of "interpreting" nature, and hence of truly "governing" it also, in our own secondary way, ought as surely to be that which bears specifically symboling by our assuming God's image : while this modern conversion of the old symbol is surely, farther, what on the one hand, shows deeper

“mirroring” than mere secular poetry suggests, and on the other, even surpasses the former poetry of religion in bearing with it true means of explanation.

46. I suppose that by direct evolutionary exposition, the growth of Mind needs be this:—that the precedent stages to what finally becomes Mind ripen onward, in perpetual correlation with those of mere bodily growth, for the concerned beings, till at last the lengthened stock of mental faculty as if doubles back on itself, through precisely the obtained power of “reflection;” while this critical ability, being attained, first conveys to the whole stock what henceforth is the true character of Mind. But, since this character brings of right “dominion” over nature—by the express means of the conversance with things physical which the process is made up of, and which detail intellect and detail reasoning must ever after be occupied in still maintaining:—so, I suppose, does the characterizing quality of “reflection,”—and eminently, as produced critically into the sexed nature of religious introspectionalism,—contain naturally the means of dispensing, on occasion, with the immediate reference to the physical correlation which indeed signifies “subjection” to these, for reason’s authorizing: and *thus* condition Mind’s “dominion.” For the true “circular” view of nature, once realized, means exactly the obtained nucleus of the entire or Divine import of nature which dispenses with other proof than precisely the new correlation with Mind’s Selfhood; and thus, as I imagine, becomes virtually what amounts to the religious nature, in respect of the points this includes of self-sustainedness, of intuitionism, and of instinctively-felt authority,—and, let me add, the power of anthropomorphic grasp upon nature.—So long as Mind’s growth is but thought of as under progress, I grant that its

dependence on material nourishing seems degrading, to the religious consciousness. But this surely is at once cancelled in effect, when it is once seen that all this fostering of mental nature was but really a ministering to the human power of in the end, and in the main, holding mastery over its very maintainer !

47. Here then, I consider, is the general form of my scheme made complete. It is brought into the just self-integration which, as such, now enables me to place it indeed directly, as all along I have done virtually or incipiently, under the appeal which I rely on to the also-integral sense of Truth. If in any slightest point I had ever varied from subjection to the appeal, I know well that on the present trial my reasoned circle would have denied itself. That it has not done so, therefore, in so far as I have the power of discerning, is to me the very sign of *reality*, both in my effort and in the fruit of it, which is the whole meaning I am attaching to what is Truth. It is to me, I confess, as an actual revelation, this which forms into my present view of nature. It is to me a religious notion in itself, and one moreover that succeeds lawfully to the sanctified revelation of the Bible, that the very matter of Environment, even as physically charactered, does, by force of mingled spiritualism and materialism exerted by us upon it, exhibit to us anew the very dogma of Genesis, of God's making Man in His own image. The new cosmic understanding of Developmentalism does only, as I receive it, fill out for me with wonderful increase the prime religious theory :—the change, truly, being only such as to an identically-asserted fact adds reasonable explanation of the manner of the fact's accomplishment. But that which yields the explanation—the materialism that in the first instance takes but coldly to pieces the first theory,—itself fur-

nishes, I now recognize, such very kind of *realism* in the re-produced one as even rises on its own account into religiousness. By the metaphysics of orthodoxy the outward world of Environment was a mere phenomenon—a mere seemingness and unreality ;—but on present terms, it is instinct with the identical life of our own souls. We can doubt in no way more of the existence of the external world than we can doubt of our thinking-principle's existence. For a Divine link of *causation* unites them :—a Divine link of *causation* which means all, to the utmost, which the idea of Divine Creation has ever signified—all, namely, both of ultimate inconceivability, and yet of manifested universalness and of figurable beneficence, which the idea of God has from the first been bound up with. Do we allow of our own Thought that it is real?—our own Thought is now shown for but the stamped repetition of that which is known to us as having rule throughout the universe, and there manifested as the common matter of our experience. The God that is no longer a Person is made *real* to us, I conceive,—and with a “reality” beyond any that He ever could have had under that primitive limitation,—by exactly His now being to us as essentially connected with the material condition formed for us, as the lowest matter of our perception is so connected. The “Thought of God” which is imaged on us, as precisely having shown itself through the layers of created beinghood which, after first being in-several world- and plant-like, have come thence to be the abodes of life-sentient, and those finally of the very “thought” that, as being human, is alone indeed the “thought” we know as rightly such : this imaged “Thought of God,” I say, is yet as true to the correcting of experience, and *thus* of being a thing of sound belief to us, as is anything that daily life

renders such. Because God is now a "Thought," and no more than this, He is what we have the means of being sure about, felt wanting before, which belong to reasoning effort in general. And more even than this, by my own terms. He is present to us by the solid means of the *enjoyment* we have in Him,—as precisely the sense of Divine Truth.—What of it, we may now ask ourselves, if the Truth we come to *be* but relative—but relative, as we know it to be, to our actual power of entertaining it?—So is that which forms Happiness of all kinds only relative to the same ability: while who of us would think of doubting on that account whether Happiness is genuine? And if Truth, as I contend, is but our special intellect's mode of Happiness, so is then its own case already answered. Truth, *as* Truth, if it only comes to be enjoyed,—as it only can when reason's dealing with it is justified,—is therein already shown to be divinely its *own* evidence.

48. On this integrated notion, accordingly, I have now to work, as to that which is my entire stated purpose. I have to aim, namely, to attach to this outline of a religious scheme an adapted plan of proper doctrinal substance. This outline as it yet stands, by the sole support of its own inward testing, needs for practical utility—nay, even for its own necessary strengthening, by the very law of its own nature,—some portion, however small, of the outward kind of evidence which is realistic in a more ordinary sense. And to myself this counter-support is indeed so ready, in the matter of my own previous elaboration, that it seems to me but immediate to attempt in regard to this the special task which is the needful step to its now presenting in this light:

the task of bringing it into the intrinsic form—or rather into the mere suggestion of the intrinsic form—which the demand presupposes for it.

49. The evidence to the now formulated hypothesis must be obviously what is evidence in kind. That is, it must still have the nature of being integral, or abstract, even while limited to only portions of the entire subject which the prime theory has respect to. I have been speaking of the *whole* nature of Mind as being subject to Environment;—but if truly this prime notion be genuine, it must hold contained within it the consequence that the particular departments of Mind which, at all events, we know as principal ones, answer also respectively, and proportionately, to the general theory. This, I say, is perceptible *à priori*, the very instant the main theory is established. But, indeed, to meet this demand I make claim, that all the analysing of religion I have here worked at has led me onward to this very end, in so far as this: that, as to at all events the emotive side of Mind, I have believed to find in all genuine religious dogmas already held but an express fitness to represent, evermore, certain provinces of mental nature, as such;—while, even as to intellect, I have done so much as belongs to my very aim, in itself, to set forth what may stand as “religious method” of Mind. I am now in fact conscious, that the prime notion I now rest on as intuitional is yet that which I have been tending towards all along; so that if only I can make out a kind of ordered connection for the whole with this notion, the plan of substantiation will be supplied. And as to what may satisfy emotive feeling in this respect—my dealing with which will follow presently,—I believe that this may be effected easily. But I am aware that it is not so as to intellect:—here precisely being the ground of danger to

myself which I have intimated beforehand my sense of its being ; and as to which, in regard to my at all entering on it, I have therefore urged already the defence for myself which indeed I depend on as sufficient. And that is, that my so venturing is the only means of my scheme's having its indispensable self-consistency.

50. The matter called for by intellect is obviously what concerns a new treatment of Psychology:— a treatment differing essentially from any that should belong rightfully to either of the two methods that have yet had lead in this study, as to either orthodox metaphysics, or scientific experimentalism. For I need precisely to begin, upon assumption, with what the latter merely holds in final view ; and though the former is in process here parallel to me, yet the assumption I take up is not identical with its own, but only that which I believe to be sequential to this.—It is an *integral* Psychology that is in question; which as such should have the power of duly supplementing the scientific, where the scientific, by its own character, *ought* to fail.—And to excuse my now proffering my feeble effort towards this, I fall back on the instinctive claim of my very basis, that the supplement *ought* to be forthcoming.

51. It is at once clear, as even determined by my hypothesis, that the integral arrangement I need to make of mental faculties must be that furnished by tree-law:— however it be, none the less, that mental faculties must have rise, primarily, through astronomic law. For, although by evolutionism first origin is always taken as of common kind with abiding creative maintenance ; yet, as in nature physiologic action follows duly after astronomic, in fulfilment of the creative plan which is universal, so a parallel sequence must, in present view, be that

which is in requirement for a true mental classification:—just because only in this way can the stamping of nature's image upon Mind be in detail conceived of. And this very connecting of the two natural processes appears truly to be that in which the *causative* character I believe in is produced: namely, of the kind which becomes visible, or has the right of becoming so, when once the prime integral interpretation of Mind is borne out by application in detail,—or at least in the semi-detail mode of this, which is such by having reference to leading groups of mental effects. I have therefore now to turn my own method on the deeper ground than any yet I have tried it upon, which goes so far as even to touch on the matter of direct explanation, of the kind dependent on analogy. I have now to do, not as heretofore with the modes of *action* of different parts or different habits of Mind,* but with no less than the real circumstantial impulse that has rule in these.

52. The type I have to lay on Psychology, then, must have at all events this main character : it must show the entire number of mental faculties, both intellectual and emotive, as ranged upon *one stock* ; but on a stock that is yet *in two branches*, both branches of which are by their nature empowered for that farther and full parting out which may fitly represent the grouping of those faculties that is become instituted. For it is alone in this

* Let me refer to my attempt to typify the whole life of human Knowledge, II. 857-67, 397 ; and, on the other hand, to my urged objections to the "un-treelike" framing of Comte's series of the Sciences, 343, 353, 501. Also, to the less formal bending to the tree-type of the massed ideas of Humanity, 378 ; of the growth of the Reasoning faculty, 470 ; of the general progress of Art, 484 ; and of the Family, 581. I have indeed made it my direct proposition, that "Whenever Development is in question, as applied by our thought to things actual or mental indifferently, the Tree-Symbol is in place," 838.

uniform basis to all, as I imagine, that the real linking of what is organism with what fails of being such may become traceable.—The first point is therefore necessarily to determine what must stand, severally as to intellect and emotion, for possessing the *stock*-character;—while, at the same time, there must be affixed to this the two stations of express crisis in stock's developing. And for this again I have made provision. I require now only firmly to hold in view what I have fixed on as the true *index* to Mind's progress: and that is, the character which as a final one is that of Mind's *Sexed-Individuation*.—Let me now say, then, that in the attaining of this character, when it first did so, Mind reached the very point of its prime crisis: which however was in no way a putting stop to, but only exactly a conditioning of, the true ramifying supposed.

53. The realizing of *Sexed-Individuation*, I suppose the very juncture of development which implies record made upon the stock of the tree-effort, acting however at the leaf-tips, which imports the doubling back of development's course, before single, now upon itself: seeing in this, as I do, but the special fact which, under the name of acquired power of *Reflection*, is, I believe, never otherwise than admitted for the bestower upon Mind of its really characterizing ability. But I unite with Reflection, besides, to make up the full meaning of my own term, the farther matter of *Self-consciousness*. Self-consciousness, in its ordinary implication, I take to be no more than just the ultimate effect of Reflection; while my own term of "*Sexed-Individuation*" expresses for me, again, but that which on the former is a necessary variation,—and which is so, just because I hold belief that only by the means of the effects of Sex, have human beings ever come to possess Consciousness.—But here

exactly is concerned the mental branching which I theorize for the acting "cause" of the crisis. And the need is thus at once that of farther laying down a respective *stock*-character to each one of the divided lines of stem.

54. In regard, then, to the little-intricate emotive branch. Here plainly the *stock*-character must be that of general *Love*,—that of the vague kind of unapplied feeling which, as such, may be understood to comprehend within itself all the varying kinds of Love-in-particular which make up what we are now aware of as our full affective life;—while besides this, as I propose, it may well be taken farther to mean, culminantly, that high reflective modifying of Love which means abstract human Sympathy: namely, as precisely in effect of the prime crisis. For the real force of this crisis I attribute wholly to the encounter here made, directly and integrally, between the progressing lines of the two sorts,—the full gaining of the respective influences from one another which indeed have all along, though but partially, been the chief agency of progress. Love, come to the reflective crisis, I suppose to become, as to a portion of it,—a portion no longer taken up by the occasions of particular affections,—the again diffused sentiment which however is, as such, on an altogether higher stage of development than the rude impulse at basis.—But this uniform arrangement, if made, is moreover, I claim, at once capable of adaptation to an idea the most common, and one fully here adopted, which has the requisite *causal* bearing I predicate. Namely, the assumption that Love's inmost nature bears relation to effect of *Chemistry*. *Love* essentially means *Attraction*, from its lowest to its very highest manifestation:—though not the *Attraction* that we think of as implying gravitating at distance; but only that which has effect at close contact:—a something

clearly distinct from what signifies mechanical moving power.—And thus I come directly to my point. This being so, why then, I now ask, is it otherwise than conceivable,—why is it other than in a high degree natural,—that the primitive base of Love should be indeed but a gathered imprint from the chemical simple practice of atoms? Why should it not be even instantly assumed, that the integral attractiveness of proper beings for one another is but the integration, with the signal consequence always following on this, of a “new species” of developed Chemistry?

55. And as to intellect. The difficulty which is here obviously subsisting, still lies, as I imagine, with but this same integrative miracle: to which, however, I conceive, that the very affixing it in junction with the allowed-for crises which are those of tree-progress, does lend to some extent analogic explanation. And accordingly I now urge, with full theoretic purpose, what I have stated as to the Mind’s habit of seizing *contrasts* presented to it. I contend, namely, that the mental faculty of instituting *Comparison* of impressed images, is in the very place of foundation to all subsequent faculties which here must answer to the foundation of all emotion;—and I submit that its taking finally the character I have assigned, of conscious Sexed-Individuation, is rightfully explained, as with just *cause* shown for it, by alone the supposed juncture of integration: of integration occurring as now supposed, by encounter with fellow-ripened emotion. For the appreciation of this encounter, brought home by Reflection, is, by the inference here wrought out, nothing else, as to intellect, than the result of the new working together of the henceforth varied fashions of intellect which are severally but little and largely influenced by emo-

tion,—particularism and religious generalism : *—which result is the same obviously with but an abstract operation of Comparison. Just as Love after its crisis becomes Sympathy, so, I infer, does particularizing Comparison become raised into Comparison that is general : while, in regard to both cases, I imagine that the lower previous growth—or, as it were, leafage of the mental branches,—is now raised by the reflective consequence of the event into what truly is its first *human* character. Namely thus, as to intellect:—all the faculties first springing from Comparison, as chiefly Observation and Attention and Reasoning and Judgment and Imagination, appear to have incipient existence while development has not passed the brutish stage ; but still, only after the Reflective crisis has occurred, as it first does for man, do these faculties become that for which now we account them, in so naming them. Observation is derived rightly out of simple Comparison, only by means of that conscious direction given to it which is supplied by Selfhood ; while the enhanced degree of complication and fineness thus given to the application of Comparison, involves direct effort of Attention. And again, Reasoning itself I suppose but an heightened turning of Attention, with a highly-abstract Observation, on occurring differences : in being assisted besides by that ability of determinative preference as to these which is the basis of Judgment ;—while Imagination has its change in but the simple addition of gained consciousness.—And here does the figure's purpose in fact wind up itself : since it is only for the seeing how the tree-course of development does betoken in itself this consequence of a

* I refer here to my constant point that all full action of Mind is an alternation between Science, having its basis in details, and Religion which from the first is solely general.

special crisis, with the consequences of this also involved, that the image as to mental faculties avails. Tree-law thus applied, states thoroughly, but exclusively, that while all partial elements of Mind were primarily, indeed, the *source* of what finally is no other than Mind's integrally consummated *basis*; yet this latter, once deposited, is thenceforth the re-actional instrument for the exalting of these actual producers, and of bringing these relatively also to their own integration.—But this quitting of the figure—as, in regard to direct usage, I must accordingly now quit it,—makes room for the larger ground I have spoken of, as being in need to be included in consideration. I have yet to furnish what here must answer to “Chemistry,” as the sign of nature's impress; and the finding of this will here require all that purely general survey of nature, the effect of which in that case was supplied as almost ready upon instinct.

56. I must turn to what I have previously seemed to gather, in regard to the natural action of intellect, while discussing what indeed now comes in question, as the mode of symbolism antecedent, by its reference, to the tree-mode:—the star-mode. (II. ch. IV.) I mean, the analogy I have seized on between thought-operation and *volarization*: in taking this besides as joined naturally with the power of affording *axis* to planets (p. 294),—which again I have united subsequently with the affording to trees also of what is relatively as *axis* to themselves: the *stock* which, still farther, is repeated as to animals in *backbone*. For this matter of “polarization,” I submit, does point us to what in physical nature, as being either Electricity or Mechanic-motion, or rather both, may here stand as the stamp required. Only, to adapt it to the mental quality of “Comparison” there needs this, which is but simple: to count of “polarization”

as being the same with *Electric Vibration*.—Let me once affix *this* to mental nature as its medium of relation to physicism, and it seems to me the course is indeed straight, *up* to the very ground of Consciousness, and reaching *down* to the very sphere of primal atoms. *Vibration* begins in æther; it but enhances and inter-ramifies itself in reaching on to the very substance of the Soul-principle.

57. All the import of the tree-figure is in this use of it in fact centered on but the crisis which is initial; and which hence forms the seat of the all-significant transition made by nature from the single domain of physicism into that which means *physicism with psychism conjoined*. And by resting thought solely upon *motion* in the case—the motion of *Vibration*,—as that whose differencing and accumulating, with effect of integration added in, may represent fully all that follows whatsoever of the phenomena of organism, we do indeed meet, I believe, the whole plan which by physicists is assumed answered to, in our own highest mode of organism, by the Vibratory Nerve-system: it being eminently there recognized that what belongs to the nerve-basis of special or partial sensism does really, just like the incipient faculties I have been speaking of, need the culminating effect of re-action, proceeding from the common integration, to give proper or brain quality to the nerve-system. This view also meets perfectly the notion of needed contrasts in experience, to give validity to experience: from the alternation that must now be raised between the partial effects of sensism, still under their first process of creation—of creation that always *is* under process,—and the effects that have been integrally consummated: which stage of semi-integral oscillation is but the natural leading-step to the oscilla-

tion I suppose finally established under **Sex-character**.— But let me be allowed—under the actual imperfection of my knowledge as to what *is* in general become authorized physics,—to present my existing notion more fully on its own account. The integral oscillation I account sexual (as between Science and Religion), is that where the developed and fully-ramified kind of motion which is Electric-vibration, as being mainly and distinctively employed for special sensism and extraspection, comes at last into a state of balance with the similarly-developed mode of vibration which is mainly Chemical and affective and introspective : the variation between specialism and integralism, which by degrees had been progressing in effect, now completing itself by even including a direct reference to emotionalism, as to what must be of alternating predominance. And in all cases of attained equilibrium, so far as concerns organism, the effect is surely ever of this exact nature, that the vibratory motion so reduced, or rather so led up to, is henceforth but the kind of oscillation that indeed is hung firmly upon balance. I imagine—and is it not lawful so to do?—that the actually-varying characters of all modes of general motion are rendered such by the sole quality of the oscillations concerned, *as* beginning from oscillation that is ætherial, and ending with the mental kind now in question : while the source of the variation, though residing chiefly in the involved amount of complication, resides also pervadingly in the circumstance of the oscillation's being more or less different from an *equal* mode of vibrating. That is, in the two sides of the balance being unassortedly weighted. A really *equal* Vibration, it would seem, must be that which would be constantly unchangeable : incapable of any modifying, and indeed of any accumulating. But two instances of oppositely-

weighted balance, ought therein assuredly to incline to come together, and hence run into the actual process of variation.—Nay, more, even *this* seems a closely attendant inference: that all along, the intrinsic meaning of organic beinghood is determined, in nature, by the very fact that the *un*-equality of the vibrations comprised, multitudinously complicated as they come to be, lays the subject, for this reason, under the issue of an abiding contrast with the comparative *levelness* of vibration that characterizes its inorganic environment. The virtual equality of the vibratory habit which is that of our mundane atmosphere, would seem to be in fact the very force that is ever tending to reduce into itself, and thus to dissipate abroad, the centered knots of energy that all organisms are; and in this to be indeed the very source of the Life-Struggle to all beings, which at the last must end always in a surrender to this very dispersion.—But then also, on the other hand, I see in this quasi-level movement what should naturally be the means, all-beneficent in its tendency, of *regulating* the whole state of organic being. I mean, as pertaining not only to surrounding atmosphere, but as attached farther, and much more deeply, to the very æther itself which fills space; and which does, as we are now taught, enter thoroughly into every part of organic framework. The having constantly to encounter and contend with this, in the home of beinghood where the latter reigns in its strength, ought surely to be the ever-blending action which should of right harmonize, and thus render capable of their true functions, as alone they can be rendered, the else-warring movements which all beinghood consists in.—And if this is true of æther-motion, how again is witnessed-to the regulating capacity to come at last, when the integrated modes of motion in-one,

attached to beinghood, arrive critically to take the nature of Sex :—or, of such as does mean with preciseness an oscillation of two whole sets of opposedly-weighted oscillations!— I imagine that this indeed bears the mark of a true system of Vibrations to be found in nature.—Let me however now return to what is here, more immediately than the integrating of my conception on this head, my express object. And that is, to the helpful consequence which I believe to follow, as to the notion in general of the natural “creation” of ourselves, from precisely the applying here of symbolic method on the present plan.

58. The result which I claim from this glance at a possible “system” of Vibrations, is but the called-for strengthening of what my paragraph began with, as to the effect of the tree-figure on the matter of Mind’s growth, of reducing here all specialty of significance to the import of, not the final, but only the initiating crisis concerned. It is constant philosophic practice in-general to dwell directly on *Consciousness*, as being necessarily the true standpoint for any seeking of religious knowledge. But for myself—the religious “knowledge” I seek being as much differenced from the fruit of what is intellection swayed properly by emotion, as it is from the knowledge-proper I count scientific,—I argue thus. Whatever may be of right *explanatory* (in the present limited sense) of Mind’s nature, must surely require seeking at the express medium point which, as such, lies as border both to the realm of organism and to that of organism’s antecedent. And this certainly must be the earliest form of Sentience, instead of the final form of developed Consciousness.—I do not say here, as it is said commonly, that it is *Life* which is the crucial innovation; because in subjective view Life is nothing except as Life

of Mind :—though indeed it may be true, and my plan goes entirely towards the showing it so, that Life of Mind, except as Life of Body at the same time, has never yet been made known to us. This however is the producing of a mere dualism into nature's plan, and of a kind that brings necessarily the astronomic figure into play, as counterpart to what is simple introspection :—with the very justifying of this result that belongs instantly to the actual parallel now furnished with planet-status, in that gain of possessed *freedom* which is Mind's essential attribute. A tree, namely, being that whose character depends on express *fixture* of root-condition, while planets have become charactered as free traversers of space : it follows even at once that introspectively-viewed Mind must, as such, abjure the kind of creative sequence which gives class to the tree-stage of development ; and take this, for the time, but as provisional to Mind's real beginning. And this means the same with a regard limited to the tree's sole foundation-point : the point which signifies specifically the tree's passing from cotyledonous rootlessness to the state where true leafage is answered to by proper rootage.—I will therefore here now concentrate my effort.

59. The rise of Sentience I assume truly to be so far from a single uniform event in evolution, that it consists, instead, in eminently a compound knot of evolved consequences : these being precisely bound together by in truth the very fact of their junction, and in this way giving occasion to the recurring miracle of integration to display itself. I assume Sentience to mean in-little, what Consciousness means later on an immensely larger scale. Converging lines of development which before had only the character of being physical, I suppose to turn now into the two-fold nature of combinedly physical and

psychical, just in fruit of their being knotted in together. And the lines that have this destiny attached to them I wish to assort as follows. The two that I have taken as representing to introspection the whole case—as those of diffused Chemistry, becoming personal Love, and of diffused Polar-vibration becoming intellectual Comparison,—I desire now to join, on the terms of but a level importance, with these. First, the developmental issue which concerns *bodily structure*: as bringing this, at the point* in question, out of that which was the mere vegetal plan into such as ever after, and more and more, has the distinctively animal plan of organic dualism; or, of two systems of organism which are respectively *outer and inner* blended thoroughly together:—so that, as I suppose, this latter plan really absorbs into itself the tree-plan in this way, that each one of the two systems bears separately a true likeness to the tree-character; while also it happens that in the fact of their uniting—and apparently by the very means of their uniting,—they return to take in the primal world-plan: multiplying the one into the other.—Secondly, the institution of *Sex*: prepared for also, as I have believed to discern, through not only tree-plan, but already through what was planetary regulation, notwithstanding its meaning now, as assumed, such only kind of involved *attraction* as but consists with organic elements.—Thirdly, the new ability of *Locomotion*, such as animals possess it: led on to in the same way by that which belonged to planets, even, it may be, as to the command over environment conveyed by it in respect of obtaining from this the needful sustenance, which is

* The “point” appearing such must, however, be allowed for as very different from such really. It must be credited to extend over probably a whole creative epoch:—comprehending a large section, indeed, cut out from what is linear evolution.

the obvious means of an enhanced organism.—And, finally, the power of *Will*: the explaining of my meaning as to which, as I shall presently explain it, will indeed include in statement my whole object.—All these several events in development, the transformations first noted and these four now added, I imagine to have coincided at the point concerned; and not this in the simple sense of coming together, but to have been actually brought about *as* transformations, in all the six cases, by precisely the occurring fact of the coincidence. I imagine that in the nature of things no one of them could have happened save precisely through the agency of all the rest. And, on the other hand, I believe farther that *in* this actual coincidence they do indeed intimate with sufficiency what is henceforth the acting plan of creation.

60. The change in bodily structure here made I imagine to be indeed, both the necessary concomitant of the effect I have described of unequally-poised vibrations, giving constant and ever-increasing advantage to *inner* organism over that which by its relations counts as *outer*, and thus finally over environment still more; and the capable agent, herein, in the demanded work of the instoring continually of outer motion, which is the recognized accompaniment of all organism:—while from this recognized fact springs, again, a most obvious suggestion as to the case with the crowning intellectual vibration, between Extraspection and Introspection. I suppose, truly, that by the time what is animal integration has arrived at its present stage of afforded brain-condition, the amount of motion that is imprisoned is so immense, that each solitary possessor of Mind really holds within himself, centered and condensed,—not indeed the actual presence (see II. 425), but—the valid effect, or representative, of a sum of motor energy, acting

serially, that if used up at once might well roll a planet round its orbit. This being so, however, how naturally does the mere fact of such engrossing of cosmic force seem to account for the Mind's attention being drawn to itself, in the mode of what now is Introspection: how inevitably should it have been brought to bear *inwardly*, even as for the commanding station in subordination to which it may treat all that lies around it *outwardly*!— But farther, in this ordered advantage—*as lying always on the inner side of a constitution that is yet outer as much as inner*,—seems also involved this consequence as to Locomotion, which again includes a reference most essential to initial Sexhood: namely, that all tending in the tree-type, in the mode proper to it, to give an increase of importance to fructification—or, all lengthening out of stem as if to reach at the foreign aid to this now known to be intrinsically desirable,—must therein and in so far have cut off vitalism from the tree-rootage. The very fact of an ordered balance being in question seems to prove this: seeing precisely that by tree-law the leafage which is to trees the provided source of maintenance to their tree-integrity, does seem to be alone such through an adapted supplementing by rootage. And the stretching away from external fixture should altogether have gone to the establishing of the inner principle of balance:—it should have altogether tended to give fulcrum to the integer in such mode of concentration to its own movement, as does rightly import the true kind of individuation here begun which the tree-plan in itself had no room for. Beginning Sex-hood and Locomotion together seem necessarily to have set on foot the first kind of regard to foreign integers, as such, which is the prime demanded step to the real coming to be an integer on self-account,—And, in

fine, there is here signified the very phantasm of *independence* of material earth which the Mind, when the Mind becomes aware of it, ever does and ever must take delight in and make the most of.

61. The sense of power of *Will* is indeed so entirely instinct with sense of *freedom*, that its associating with tree-existence is scarcely possible except through the strained figure of a tree's *choosing* its own soil to take root in. The seed cast from a tree *wills* not to thrive unless it falls within reach of fitting nourishment. But in fact, after all, surely here is truly marked the only character that is inherent to Will-power. By power of Will is to the last, surely, never to be understood rightly what is more than to *refuse* aught that is found *un-fitting*: it never surely means what of right, or in other way than figuratively, is *choice*. So at least I find it necessary, on my own part, exclusively to interpret the ability. And, by the aid of an assumed system of Vibrations, such as that I have been describing, it appears to me that this most signal of human functions, *when* constantly thus limited in its import, lies apt to an "explanation" that is immediate.—Let me turn to the simplest of all cases which is that of a plant-animal "selecting" food. Here the circumstance for the most part is an environment of water: the waves and currents of which bring sufficiently to the creature its due sustenance without any kind of effort of its own; and, ordinarily, not even in regard to the mere swallowing of it, which seems caused by the food's action on the organism. But this latter, while the rule, could not always happen; and its not doing so, *when* it does not,—on account, namely, of un-suiting quality of the presented food,—points accordingly to an inherent means of negating the external compulsion. This negating

function, then, I attribute solely to the condition supposed that of the dawning animal, of habitual oscillation of actions outer and inner, of which the latter is on average always dominant. I imagine; namely, that mere internal status has the power so to rest on itself, for a short space, as thence to let pass any inducement of the moment not desirable: the insistence on inward functions only rendering the habitual vibration temporarily one-sided to excess. And in this kind of check to outward movement, I recognize indeed what ever after appears to be power of Will, when Locomotion in the first place, and innumerable added faculties in succession, raise incessantly to the subject new modes of external inducement. Up to Will's highest stage of development I conceive it never other than this: *the ability to refuse yielding to an outward soliciting for a change in self-posture, or self-purpose: which posture or purpose is thus rendered self-determinative.* In any case where the appearance goes beyond this,—where Will seems indeed to *choose*, instead of merely to *refuse*,—I suppose it only happens that the external promptings which in reality give direction to movement fail in record by perception: so that Self gains the credit of it delusively. And the power simply to refuse, as thus explained,—meaning nothing but a holding momentarily firm to inward spending of the motor energy in hand, instead of giving way to spend it outwardly,—must ever gain naturally in strength, as the known power of Will does, just proportionately with organic advance. Namely, when the Will comes to stand for the aggregate impulse of an inner world of conflicting desires. To carry out Self-will to the last, seems always a mere setting of Self in the obdurate frame, whether for good or for ill, which as such lets Self go but as Self-nature drives it to go.

And in this sense, indeed, the Mind-power that is engaged makes up in passivity what it loses by its special newness of activity.—Here, however, I touch the point which in my notion is all-important, in regard to the “explanation” of Will; and which accordingly I must try to set forth with a fuller and most express indication. For it is in fact, as I imagine, within the very matter here touched on—the matter of mingled “passiveness” and “activeness,”—that, just as much as Will itself, comes in question the other miracle of nature which is that of universal Integration. I conceive, truly, that the two admitted miracles are in reality but one.

62. Certainly, the Integration of organic beings is but one with their produced Self-hood: while a *mental* Integration is but Selfhood reduced to consciousness;—and hence the prime starting of Selfhood, at the initial crisis I speak of, *ought* to be that of also the initiation of the faculty which, as that of Will, is notably the leading manifester of Self-consciousness.—And we must fully bear in mind how the state of circumstance organic beings are born into is a state of Struggle: a state where “activity,” as such, is triumphant or successful, and where “passiveness” succumbs.—But we must not fail to remember, at the same time, that the distinction now arising to organic beings, in this creative birth of theirs out of previous plant-existence, was in fact precisely that of true individuation being now possessed by them, in place of the rude step to this which lay in the plant’s kind of individuation: in which fact is contained also, as I suppose, the import of now-originated Sex. For a state of Struggle, to be such as that Will should have concern in it, could alone be of the kind in which integral beings, as rightly such, were engaged; but this in no way occurred while the mere impulse of Hunger,

or what tended to be such, was alone in force. Will implies resistance ; and as being the integral affection that it is, it implies also a resistance that is integral. And, apparently, this must have first arisen when the occasion came about for two kinds of produced beings to co-operate for an end which, though wholly different from what was answered to by Hunger, was yet that without which the self-maintenance which Hunger bore respect to must have failed, at this crisis, of any longer being evolutionally supported. Plants, namely, could not actually have been developed into a nature that had true individuation, unless really there had been a kind of contention set on foot for the boon's obtaining ; but this must have been set on foot when the needful object of duly limiting the being's status—or, of putting stop to that continuous re-production on the same stem which it is the plant's nature to carry on,—was made contingent on help forced from a rival plant. And, as to its being evolutionally successful that this process—the process of rounding out the existing being's own life,—should come to be thus shared in with an alien beinghood, we have before us immediate sign that is sufficient in what experience ever after has witnessed to, of the two characterized sex-natures ensuing. The plant-animal that succeeded in compelling a rival plant to relieve it of the task of nourishing its seed, had therein its full energy retained towards the ripening at last into all that the male character now involves in it ;—while the plant-animal that remained female, although as such it was worsted in respect of such qualities, yet retained the latent store of advantage of its own which proceeds from the not-rejecting, but the entire carrying out of, creative nature's first intention. The rich consequence thus prepared for, though not actually yet made good, but

only destined to be produced when mental quality of due consciousness shall arrive to be infused into Sexhood,—and thence into the appreciated meaning of what “activeness and passiveness” really are in regard to Mind: manly “activeness,” as mental conquest over nature, while female “passiveness” is but subjection, in no way to the rule of a fellow-creature, but only to the general sway to which nature’s whole self is also subject:—this rich consequence, I say, being allowed for as now in prospect, the evolutional success of Sexhood needs no farther proving. But beyond this, I conceive, there is also this result self-included: that the Life-Struggle which is general, is, precisely by its thus falling under the character which it lay with Sexhood to give to it, the source also of Will’s integrating into consciousness:—that is, by its own dividing into what are severally active and passive forms of Will-power. Will’s own integration into its actual nature, out of that which it was previously and primarily, I imagine to be as much due to this division, as mental beinghood in general owes its making into what it is to its actual lying between beings male and female.

63. For the manner of Will’s first showing in nature, before there had yet befallen it the crisis of transformation which raised it thence into its actual mentalness and miraculousness, I imagine to be indeed nothing else than what is instantly drawn out to our perception, when to those primæval times we apply our present sense of Life-Struggle in general, as evolutionally conditioned:—of Life-Struggle as the proper and sole means of evolution. Under this applied notion we require to look at planets, as the earliest of ordered beings in any sense, in the same light of a constant striving at individuation, or integration, that we judge of sentient organisms by. We

must credit these, as much as those, I conceive, with the purpose that is yet referrible to alone nature's Ruler, of consummating finally Individuation, both mental and bodily, by the means I assume as necessary of its Sex-qualifying. And what is by this light rendered clear, I see as follows.—I bear in mind, let me first observe, that what actually as to planets is the import of ordered beinghood, is their lying under the form of rule which we know of as being that of our own earth's "solar system:" the established group of sun and sun's satellites, and farther of the minor satellites to these which make the first minor suns, amid which our own earth holds medium rank:—in which system, accordingly, the "rule" that stands as such is that known as Gravitation. Here then what at once impresses me is the almost-sole importance of mere *magnitude*, in regard to the constituent globe-masses;—while, by evolutionism is enforced on me accompanyingly that "mere magnitude" comes by bare "accumulation." I catch the notion that all these now-assorted variously-sized orbs had previously been all striving in emulation just only to be in the end the largest-heaped:—that is, the fullest-fed with the nebulous world-substance which at first lay floating generally around them. I see mentally a number of forming vortices, aiming each to draw into itself a special current from the general revolving motion. And, for simpleness, I suppose first but a single pair of these rival whorls. Even for two, there ought naturally and as-if necessarily to exist a somewhat of the inequality of condition which is the basis of universal Struggle: one vortex or springing orb of the two must to some degree have advantage of position, as to an arising command over outer motion. Here, however, is the sole matter I am pursuing. In supposing, as I must, that the two

settled foci which are now in action were at first enough distant from one another to act without any kind of appreciable mutual interference, I see it to be yet obvious that a certain moment must have come, as the accumulation of mass and force was proceeding, when the special currents hence resulting would be entangled, or would at all events impinge on one another. And this entangling, or impinging, must have acted as a common check upon both of the two, however in expressly different ways:—since while it brought to the least forceful of the two masses the sure occasion of defeat as to the ending in place of “sun” to the other; it no less brought a modifying effect, with delay, into the attainment of this awaiting the pre-favoured one. That is, a whole set of relations sprang up, for both of the growing orbs, to give character to their respective strivings at Self-development. And what precisely is here implied but the very mark which is always that of Integration—the very mark of consummation which belongs intrinsically to every stage, as being such, of progressing Individuation?—The creation of a new set of relations that is entire and general, is necessarily, I infer, the same thing with a new species of beinghood produced.—And in regard to the creation also of Will, which I theorize to be here effected simultaneously, my object is at once answered by the very nature of the counter-qualities drawn out by the new relations, as turning always herein on mere “activeness and passiveness,” such relatively.—But this needs its direct tracing.

64. The advantage that seems necessarily to have been gained, for the whole body of rising planets concerned, when sun-and-satellite regulation was systematically produced for them, I conceive to be indeed proportionate to the very number that is comprised: that is, to the

more or fewer of amassing whorls that fall under the common planetary competition which I assume as the actual cause, or actual source, of a forming solar system (see II. 253). And throughout, therefore, I also conceive present the same modifying and retarding action of each one on the rival aims of all the rest which I have noted in regard to a single pair: the which action I find it needful to express, from the point of view here adopted, as *resistance*:—seeing that, evidently, the very treating of these as “rivals” pre-assumes of them, one and all, that they are none of them to be thought capable of being crushed by collision into a state of passiveness that should be absolute,—or swept totally into any vortex gaining mastery. But the nature of this “resistance,” when considered, I find that exactly which agrees with the action that I have defined to be that of Will. Namely, in being, as of right, a falling back on what is *inwardly* employed movement, of that which has been arrested from being *outward* movement. For the forceful mass that had been defeated as imagined, would, we know by all law of solar physics, in its very restricting from farther swelling of its own amassing vortex, turn instead to the due task of the mundane organizing of its actually-existent mass. Being checked in its operation of mechanics, it would turn to its needful planetary chemistry. And this means everything I contemplate. Just because the case is so, I contend that here already was there exercise of such kind of direct function, attached to even planetary individuality, as indeed wants but enhancement—and *the* kind of enhancement that is in question, of enlarged and deepened circumstantial conditions, raised as actually above those of planets,—to become at once of the proper nature of Volition. And this, precisely, through the fact of the *two* forms of Will, here already

prefigured. The vanquished planet that could take up with this resource—laid, I say, by a true “Providence,” to be open to it,—may assuredly be said to have *willed* not to suffer its own absorption into its neighbour’s vortex. It may well be said to have held its own, in the planet-struggle, with a noble planetary obstinacy, that indeed was a true beginning to a persistently-conditioned Self-integrity. And while this, as I consider, was the *passive* mode to be ever after, as here, that of dawning Will; the mode following upon this—which also obviously must in nature so have followed,—is that effort to *subdue* this resistance, by counter-exercise of the same function, which exactly gives to Will the form which stands as *active*:—the insistence on bearing down opposition that shows itself openly as such.—I do not think that ever, to the highest stage of its manifesting, the case of Will becomes different from this. I conceive that to the last Will means always either a refusal to be vanquished, or a refusal to be thwarted in the aim of being vanquisher: these two being but phases of one matter. Let us count the Will of planets as but physical; yet when once upon this stock the crisis of transformation should have had effect, in precisely sexualizing both Will and the construction of framed holders of Will, both as bodily and mental tenements, I believe it may well be seen that the first stock was the true parent to the mental fact that followed after. The mere impulse towards the accumulating of self-substance, which, after planet-state and tree-state have been passed through, comes to appear within the animal as Hunger, most legitimately develops in Mind-condition to the intellectual craving for pure knowledge. And the Sex-supported nature of Will, being of the integral kind it is, I conceive to be indeed witnessed to by Mind’s entire history, as bearing mark

of the same identity. I mean, as to the action of **Mind** carried out in repetition of nature's action, which **Mind's** history has shown to be entirely involved, religiously and anthropomorphically, with the one matter of the existent presence of **Will**.

65. For I take the intrinsic reading of this matter of mental history to be as follows. Whenever what **Will** opposes itself to is in reality *not* an integral rival, but only dead matter, or mere circumstance, I infer that the trick of mind which anthropomorphism involves is set at work, just in order to give **Will** its power to act. The rock that needs removing, the incident to be cancelled, is personalized for the occasion, but to enable **Will of Self** to start in action ;—while if actually the raised opponent be of the import that is integral as meaning entire **Matter**, or much more specially, entire **Circumstance**, religious implication is inevitable. That is, Pantheism in the first case, and with much finer symbolism, the sublime image of **Destiny** in the latter case, springs to give answer to the **Mind's** need. And this educing of **Will-energy**, I conceive, is the true and rightful effect of **Religion** :—ever having had such bearing from the first, and ever still being in need for the same office ; and the only harm that has ever lain with the “superstition” of it, being the gross un-perception of the actual symbolism. The only real meaning of **Will**—whether “actively” it thus sets itself, apparently, against nature as such, in common with what are truly *rival* beings ; or whether “passively” it takes common ground with nature, in outward suppression of the birthright action of rivalry :—the only meaning of **Will** I find to lie exactly as pertaining to state of rivalry ; while the true implication of **Religion** I place in owning this, and in duly submitting to this, as matter of the admitted **Divine Rule** of things.—And

the anthropomorphism is justified, at the same time, by the very kind of relation, all subtle as it is, that Will-power bears to Self-hood. *So* nearly, indeed, do the two seem no other than identical, that the mere fact of the religious correlation, *also* constant as the fruit of religion, seems to hold them apart. And yet the following is, even here, an apparent "explanation." When Will-power does actually gain its way, in subduing what opposes it, truly is its subject a holder, for the moment, of *Divine* function. The possessor of successful Will, for the moment, is an actual "God" to fellow-beings, in the anthropomorphic sense of Godhead. And it is only by renewed reference to what stands as such for *whole* nature, in the way that *whole* mentalism supposes, that the right momentary phenomenon is, as needful, dispersed.

66. What other than truly natural is it, in fact, that the concentrated knots of energy that human minds represent *should* actually have a real temporary command over outlying matters of development, such as truly are yet *free*, or yet *loose*, from the final binding sway of the solely integral rule of nature, which is that of settled organization?—For Will is, as I imagine, made *free* to us as it is, in our actual sense of freedom, but alone through its power to work on what *is* indeed free, in nature's own sense,—*as* wanting in organizing. And herein I conceive laid a related "explanation" of consummate kind:—such as falls on the very nature of the ultimate Ego-consciousness, and vindicates to sufficiency the Soul's instinct of its deriving out of Deity. Conscious Ego-ship, I now recognize, may have become such from precisely the vibrating difference affecting it through the opposedness of Will's two modes of action: the "passive" being effect of the engaged correlation of entire Self-hood with the entire action of ruling Deity; the "active" bearing

import that Self takes on it the place of Divine Rule, as indeed planting its own image, in the very way that God's image has been planted, by organization effected: namely, on the kind of material that is composed of living objects counting either as struggling rivals, or as members of the ordered body of such which, as the form of Society, is indeed the highest fruit which can come from work of human creation. The alternation thus produced I conceive the acting "cause" of Self-consciousness:—though only, as I bear in mind, as but filling to the full the effect I have already noted. That is: partly as to my belief that all mental creation of any kind is but a raising to the Mind of due instruments of rule over nature, in the mode of producing abstract *ideas* in pure copy of nature's framing of concrete *beings*;* and partly as to the agency I am now assigning to conscious Egoism, in its passive working, of a real creative rule, or organic effort of creation, produced by it, or through it,

* Let me here append a summary, or rationale, of my whole notion respecting Symbolism, pursued through this work.—Taking "Symbolism," as I do, to express the entire action of Mind, as consisting in the producing of what are "abstract ideas," I reason thus.—Mind is what it is by its command over outer nature, empowered to it by its possessed key to the general plan and construction of its environment. But this implies an homogeneity of method in Mind with the method of creation that rules in environment. Mind can exercise the key it possesses only in following the same *modus operandi* as what is followed generally through the sphere of physics lying beneath: seeing that the "abstract ideas" Mind creates for itself are but massed integrations of its results out of observation and experience. Hence, in general grouping, the mental forms obtained need be such as shall class socially as typical repetitions of modes of structure, and much more of modes of *action*, that in physics are astronomic, physiologic, semi-animate, and mental: each ascending class of which includes, by hypothesis, all effect of precedent constitution intermultiplied with what is reached to of new and higher kind. As to Mind, however, the case is necessarily, as resulting from the new character of *reflection*, that which follows

on the initial human faculties preceding it. I have lately said (par. 55,) that when Consciousness is once come, it raises first into rightful quality the lower stages of the ability of Comparison which is the intellect's pervading function ; but I wish now to add that the passive use of Will stands as means of this organizing control :—seeing that, for instance, when direct Observation and Experiment come in practice, force of Will is what is obviously at work ; while above all as to Judgment, the determined closing of the mind to farther reasoning here implied is the action I suppose special to Will. And as to the opposite or emotive branch of faculties I have in view to show a course strictly parallel. — If, however, this creative process be allowed for, what is plainer than that Selfhood, thus acting,—thus acting, in right obedience besides to the Whole Rule of things,—is indeed to be seen in place of its own Creator ! In regard to its own limited sphere, of existence and of influence, the Will that is attached to human Selfhood, it seems to me, is as wholly free, and as spontaneous in its action, when it *does* in this way carry on real work of evolution for nature, as is the entire rule of evolution in

reverse order to the physical. Mind *begins* with the *final* stage of development ; and thus *enters* on observation of outer nature under sole impression from the experience that is introspective. It makes its rudest efforts at creative imagery in the sole way of anthropomorphism : to which nature only came after due preparation of practice through planet-life, plant-life, and creeping-animal-life. Mind therefore has continually to go back, and to go deeper and deeper in its converse with nature, to gain duly the sound basis to Thought which nature in its prime course secured steadily from the first.—And this varied repetition of plan, necessitated by Mind's grade in development, has on this account, I conclude, all right to be thus, through the very contrariness exhibited, the real sign of the great demanded point in a truly natural Psychology, of proved Unity of Composition with Mind's counterpart in nature's physical and bodily framework.

itself:—the entire rule which in present view is the express signifier of Deity. By force of Will, when it is exerted lawfully, though only so, the Ego-soul of human beings appears proved what as much as ever we must think of as directly sprung from God: and this, just because Will's own nature repeats what especially evolutionism confirms as the proper attribute of God.

67. I am supposing always that behind nature's phenomena lies an Infinite Potentiality in respect of evolution:—or, as more carefully expressed, a Potentiality that to ourselves is indefinable as to limits. And are we really more able to define, and give limits to, the immediate capability that belongs to our possessed quality of Selfhood?—This, however, is a transcending of the proper ground of Psychology. And I will therefore now resume all this speculating on my selected central point, the rise of Sentience. As to this, it is clearly best, for a true arrangement of our thinking, that without looking onward to future possibility of development, we should look only to what already is effected:—so that, even as to Divine Power, we should only implicate thereby that which actually *has been* able to bring about what we see brought about. It is clearly best that, even in regard to what shows as "miracle" in mind's creating, as being traceable no otherwise than direct to Deity, we should think only of a common course of nature's *facts*: facts, truly, which are distinguished to us for *facts of experience*, while others are only *facts of observation*, but which to reason lie always, none the less, on a common track with the latter.

68. The "*sentio*" that I am regarding included equally, in its original potentiality, the final "*cogito*" that was to arrive for intellect, and the final power of conscious Love that holds the import of all ripened

emotion. And in being itself the wholly vaguest of nature's facts, in the present sense of being least capable of defining, it yet gains in this way, naturally, all the glory of being parent as it was to the mental facts ensuing from it, in both of the two lines of descent. — Here at once then is a reducing of its "miraculousness" of character to a wholly new and in one sense lower ground. Of every subsequent kind of sense-impression, whether as belonging to intellectual special-sensism, or to mere general "feeling" known as such, each at starting was as sudden in its arriving, and therein as accountable for "miracle," as was the original root-impression. And still it *is* so, whenever we turn thought fresh upon it. All the work of accumulation preceding, in which we see nothing of "miracle," merged at once on its separate integration into that which thought is forced so to paint. Of the pregnant first instance, accordingly, there is manifestly to be only adjudged that it is *the* special "miracle" in question: and this on the sole account of its ascending sequents in the same kind. For the real *birth* of Mind, I bear in memory, is nothing short of the full production of Consciousness. And when truly the same mental perspective is employed as I suppose in regard to Sentiency's production,—namely, as representing the whole effect of development so long as tree-plan was the highest showing of this:—when we look to the mental progress now in question under the necessary foreshortening of it caused by our position, this amalgamating of the serial fruits into one object does involve this prevailing notion with full pertinence. Birth of Mind, produced at once, is inevitably perfect miracle; and the more close our foreshortening is drawn, by the existing force of our subjectivity, so rightfully must our sense of miracle be the greater.—And, let

me note, this miraculizing of Mind's production is but in harmony with the old theologic notion of that of Body, as immediately out of dust of earth,—in place of what now appears true of its most gradual derivation, not from dust alone, but from also what are fragments of primal motion. The two kinds of production I see always at *pari passu* with one another.—Let me however all to this my present scheming about Will, and my relation to orthodoxy on the subject of creation seems to gain the very end I am now pursuing, of confirmation to the actual turn I desire to give to the Bible manner of infusing life—and with this, Soul,—into the prime dust. The true integrating of the sentient faculty into its means of becoming Consciousness at last, I find simply to lie in the inevitable transit out of passiveness into activeness of function, which universally means, as I believe, the infusion of Divine or Soul-character. That is, of Soul-character made such by precisely a likeness stamped on it of the ruling action of universal evolution.

69. Yes: I imagine that when the Mind has once realized Self-Consciousness, it has truly begun to throb with the only proper symptom of life which is that of a beating pulse. Just because the divided systems of special sensism and integralism now unite for interaction, I imagine that the true "Heart" begins to work within Mind, without whose constant pervading influence the mental "Brain" would be indeed a mere machine, and the whole substance of Mind still but mental protoplasm. And as Mind here but follows the law of Body, so, I suppose, did the latter only answer to the very plan of intrinsic guidance which is the balance-principle of solar systems. I imagine that the movement of pulsation within us, affecting Mind as well as Body, is a real repetition, set up within our own little cosmos, of the

systole and diastole that govern starry hosts : so that, ever as we think, and ever as we breathe, we are drawing into our very souls, as into our very frames, the habit of the kind of motion which was that of the earliest state of actual things : the motion that still *is* the life of space, and that, flowing thus into us, and through us, seems to have been the due feeding of our own life, and regulating of this, without which would beinghood have been impossible, just as much to ourselves at its topmost range, as to planets at its lowest range. Self-consciousness, I imagine, is the actual form of the result springing up for us from the cosmic fact, that we possess in ourselves that centre to converging tracks of motion, coming into it from all regions of Space, and bearing reference to all Time, which yet itself, for this very reason, is never motionless !—never other than pulsating, and therein vital.

70. And this notion about the nature of our “experience” appears to me indeed what is justly hung on balance, between opposing realism and idealism.—What of it, I still ask, if whole “experience” be but relative—a mere matter of our position in nature, and of our relations with fellow-portions of nature? I acknowledge that, by this notion, neither the essence of our own beinghood, nor the essence of any beinghood in God, as we are able to think of either, is proved for anything but a tried consequence from congruity existing between experience and circumstance. If Mind should disappear from this actual cosmos, so also, by this notion, must disappear at once God and our own Selfhood: since wherever Mind is not, neither can abide that which stands to us as God, nor, any more, can exist Truth in our sense of it, nor Happiness of any kind, in our feeling of it. Mind disappearing, all that Mind bestows on us must go with it. But what of that? The congruity as

it exists is a reality, if anything belonging to us is such. And the congruity serves us to live by.

THE ACTUAL SCHEME I FIND AFFORDED IN NATURE, AS TO ITS
PROOF OF DIVINE FATHERHOOD.

71. When we turn to the emotive side of mental growth, the image of our taking likeness from the Divine Ruling of outer nature retreats into the background ; and we stand in presence of an aspect of nature's facts that calls for a quite different representation. By my conception, it is now that precisely becomes necessary the reversed ideation, attached naturally to religious method, which gives in place of that image the kind that paints God in man's likeness :—the reversion, as I consider, being the normal consequence of the very turn to activeness of function in the Mind which the crisis of obtained Sentience exactly stands for.

72. The set of facts we come in face of are altogether comprised within the range of such relations as are mutual ones,—the relations of fellow-beings and fellow-strugglers in the fight with circumstance, that in the meantime, or in the course of that main contest, bear effect on one another. And the effect of this mutual action is so incomparably more creative than that following from mere circumstance, and so manifestly more indicative of Divine Rule, that its taking religious form is indeed at once explicable.

73. I have said that all the bearing of this work has been on the matter of this emotive view of nature. And the chief thing I have now to do is, accordingly, but to integrate the conceptions I have thus thought out, in a mode parallel to my preceding process with intellectual ones newly gained. That is, I must again bring my thinking into form of an ordered circle of reasoning,

inclusive of the whole general effect. In paragraph 43, I drew my circle in this wise. Having aim to show that the Rule in nature, as such, betokens right character of Divineness, I gathered up my proof to this effect into a figured meeting of these two lines of thought, assumed as representative of the whole matter :—the one, that the aim of nature is found centred on production of Sexhood ; the other that the Mind's consciousness of its own God-like command over nature, which is the proper starting-point to sense of Deity, depends on its very subjection to Sexhood, of mental kind. And this formula I considered to be so rightfully addressed to the assent of nothing short of intuition, that it wholly answered to my imposed demand of its being laid under appeal to general Truth. As to what then is now my demand, being that of lying under the different sort of appeal that concerns whole general Happiness, it is thus available to me at once, I consider,—as in effect of my before-gained conclusions,—no more than just to shift my first point to this new bearing. I have simply to turn my formula into an assertion, that nature's proved aim towards perfect Sexhood is that which meets without flaw the experienced need of human beings for an ever-increasing measure of Happiness.—And this outline of an emotive scheme, interpreted as I intend, does seem to myself what should meet a true emotional intuition.—I grant that *except* for the great inclusion I have in view, of all that legitimately makes Religion, the proposition is untenable, and has nought to give it power to hold together. But *with* this inclusive interpretation, I believe it may well be pleaded, as before the cultured heart of mankind.—My object, therefore, now is precisely to make clear this interpretation :—as combinedly concerned with historic observation and subjective experience, on the one hand ; and, on the other,

with the mingled psychologic and physiologic view of progress just traced on account of intellect. What I am seeking is an integral Philosophy of Emotion, comprehending a balanced estimate of the value of progressing Religious Forms, connected with a full reference to the evolving Forms, both of organism and of material circumstance, that are in nature always joined with growing Mind. Without Forms, either as to matter or spirit, I find nothing of reality present;—and herein I have called my new Religion as much a “doctrine of Forms,” as a “doctrine of Sexhood,” and as, otherwise, a doctrine of “Relationism”:—while, for this reason, I entitle my present object that of finding in nature’s Ruler a “Divine Father.”—To know God as pure Spirit, whose worshipping we must carry out by a surrendering of ourselves wholly to the quest of Truth, I accept as the perfect satisfying of mere intellect; but to know Him as the heart requires, needs, I feel, all the concrete kind of attributing His essence which actually past Religion has furnished.

74. Let us try to imagine to ourselves at first-hand what might be a plan of nature of the kind required: directed to the supplying of the truest kind of Happiness, and just therein ascribable to creative Deity. Let us imagine ourselves looking out on whole nature, wholly free from all orthodox prepossession, but with all our present feelings, known commonly as such, strong upon us. Can we really in this way come to any other kind of mental decision, about nature’s plan, and therein about God, than that course has been provided for the developing of our affections, and that *because* of this we must own that the rule has been for good, and has been Divine?—To find in nature what is “God,” implies

surely nothing else, in right reason, than an amount of wondrousness combined with beneficence supereminently greater than is otherwise representable, exhibited as having sway there:—or, centering upon itself universal tendencies.—And as to “wondrousness,” what can match with the production of Conscious Life?—as to “beneficence,” what can imaginably surpass the existing boon of human Love, distributed in the actual fashion?—The only point that is surely needful, for reason’s perfect contenting with this decision, is a due perception of the actual *unity* of the bearing here asserted.—But if this “unity” indeed lie where I predicate, in the one matter of bestowed Sexhood, allied with the concomitants I have noted, what more need be demanded?—By the scheme I am upon, Love, Life, and Consciousness are really but different phases of one another. And, for a principle of nature’s ever-progressing movement, or, for a true “creative aim,” what could possibly be revealed more exalted than exactly this junction expresses!—For, by “*Life*,” I mean now,—in this emotive and therefore practical aspect,—not the “Life” that makes the “miracle” of speculation, but the Life which is really living and dynamic; the “Life” that means human creatorship of its own destiny—or rather, human struggling for desired exercise of such creatorship.

75. And this concerns wholly what has been the actual doctrine of Forms which I regard for essential to my present notion of Religion. As Religious Forms, having respect to our affective relations, appear to me therein to have been, all along, the proper *educating* of our affective conduct of Life; so, with Sexhood, which is the source of these relations, I find naturally associated from the first that “rounding out” of personal state of being which implies Death (par. 60) :—while, farther, I

theorize that all actual intelligence in us, as being of the reflective nature of creative ideation, which is therein homogeneous with nature's own creative practice, requires similar limitation, and thus has its own need of *forms*, of its own kind :—whence as much, in the end, is the ensuing fruit laid in Consciousness, as it is in general Love. And in all this, as I believe, I still gain but a clenching and truly formative support to what has been from the first my special view about Religion, of its taking rise out of the circumstance of Death. I have here argued, to the full, that religious ideation but follows pattern of universal ideation ; but now, when I am uniting in scheme-plan the two influences in one, of the Sexhood that has given character to religious forms, and of Death that is inferred to have given rise to them at all, the whole notion comes indeed to effective definiteness. Death, before, I have treated fully as the working *motive* to religious ideation ; but it shows now, taken in junction with Sexhood, as having acted in the very first-spring of Mind—as having been, even with exclusive specialness, true creative conditioner to both intelligence and feeling.

76. Let us suppose that the fellow-strugglers for beinghood which had arrived at just short of the rise of Sentience, should there have stopped, as to any aid of new conditions ; and thus should have never come to what was more than the tree-kind of individuation :—can any natural process be conceived of which should have really led them onward developmentally towards Mind? Surely not. They could only have remained always, as they had begun, the merely plant-like creatures that had solely for incitement the one need of imbibing food,—with that indeed of keeping from being smothered down by neighbour plants. The growth of all, taken in mass, could only have been a tangle of

lengthened stems, and a common chaos of obstruction and monstrosity : while the decay that came on slowly from failing food, as it must do at last, would be only an infusion of constant rottenness, and in no way a helper to organic progress.—Or suppose that the sentient crisis having been passed which turned vegetal decay into proper animal Death, this however should have happened with only Will-power and Locomotion attending, and without Sexhood. What *now* could be the case but that the actual sort of savagery that sentient natures began with, having tendency to diminish constantly in its proportion with what was contrary to it, would have reigned uncounteracted and ever increasingly? The beings that lived but to pacify their hunger, and to make themselves room for the working of their own importunate machinery, must have betaken themselves solely, as actually at first they did chiefly, to the mere preying on one another. And in this indeed there might possibly have been a working impulse to life's preserving, in a demoniac kind of "pleasurableness;" though by no means of a kind to suggest "God" to our present apprehension.—But no: assuredly such fancying is a mere running riot of reason;—and no more could Will have come naturally without Sexhood, with the full complement of the fraction-elements of Sentience, than could any of these have had existence without the answering of the in-coming mode of Life by its counterpart condition of Death. And this true limitation to the *form* of beinghood, as the primest of the developed consequences drawn into us from environment, *ought* therefore, in essential union with Sexhood, to stand as the central matter of the general likeness which we inherit from physicism of nature's manner of Divine Rule.

77. It is in this way, but only in this way, that I

suppose the leading notion I have gained to retreat now to the background. For while evolving beings went on working out the force of Sexhood, in therein bestowing attributes on acknowledged Deity, it is the very point of my reasoning circle that they did this but in carrying on the one "purpose" of evolution, which the final ripeness of Sexhood, become mental and conscious, is the stamp of. And I will now glance in summary over the "history" of the working action I think of: which indeed stands as my present "proof" of reigning Deity. —Only, first I must truly lapse, on my own account, into a plain following of the settled method of religious orthodoxy, for due arranging of this very evidence.

78. My attributing of Deity, in terms of integral intention, has been that which gives the import of the Whole Rule of evolution. But the uniformity which attests the Divine Oneness of this Rule, *when* regarded in the present light of emotion, and as thence appealing mainly to expressly personal experience, denies itself naturally into a valid Trinity. And this, but because of the actual nature of those relations which have now to carry uniformly on this begun manner of the attributing of Deity.

79. I have dwelt fully in my first volume on the reasoned necessity to mental faculty of having given to past religion the mould that it has, from the relational condition—or rather, sequence of progressing conditions,—lying naturally on every owner of mind; while I have therein consented always to the need of treating "Fatherhood" as the one kind of relation to be regarded representative of the whole group of the relational creative influences, ever acting upon mind. And I have worked out the mental consequence that is due to the prime fact, all simple as to experience, that the same

being which begins life as a Child, turns afterwards into the Conjug, and thence into the Parent. But this uniting into *one* moulding influence what would otherwise have been three moulding influences, separate and conflicting, I must now with direct expressness hypothecate for nature's Trinity on the terms of evolution: namely, as a naturally-enforced parting of the mode of the Ruling *vis evolutionis* that was rendered due when once the mid-point of evolution's course, which throws physical creativeness to the background and the onus of creation on the interaction of created beings, had been transcended. To treat "Fatherhood" now, in what is thorough scheme-intention, save as meaning in the same breath, and precisely with the same force of intention, both Childhood and Spousehood, would be false to the whole principle now pursued, of thinking of general facts alone on "balance." It is this triple relation, three-in-one, which I conceive to have had delegated to it from the first, by nature's Rule, the commission of going on with what physical circumstance began upon, of the stamping on created beings, or rather on the elect human species of these, the proper likeness of the Divine "aim" of creation which it lies with Mind to exhibit.

80. Nor is this all; but, beyond this relational Trinity is another which true theory must take account of. The very *vis evolutionis* must be seen, in this aspect, to be no longer the sole principle of Progression, whose recognizing has sufficed hitherto, but Progression as only standing for an equal triad of principles really involved in the very meaning of Progression. Progression, surely, to the view of reason that fully casts itself on personal apprehension, cannot naturally exist in the universe save as answered to by a balancing opposite: seeing that, the amount of existing force in the universe being ever

the same, the increased drawing on this in any part of the universe, implied by Progression's acting there, necessitates in reason the diminishing of its supply in some other part. And hence the balance which already I have imagined, as lying between Development and Retrogression, seems the true static rendering of the cosmic basis :—which very rendering besides, as also I have conceived, is but another expression for what appears otherwise as an alternation between state of Wholeness and state of Part-distribution (II. 263). As to this latter mode of statement, however, there is manifestly involved the third element in the case which, by present hypothesis, is the very agency at work in what is Part-distribution. Namely, Sexhood. The Divine Principle that controls evolution must necessarily, I urge, take on itself the tri-une and religious form of standing thus : it must be in one "*the Force of Progression, the Force of Decadence, and the Principle of Sex.*"

81. For the two forms of tri-unity are little different. The metaphysic triad just asserted may still be seen to have stamped its prime likeness on the homely trinity of those domestic relations of which I now predicate that they have been the divine producers of all whatever in actual life that causes Happiness. Actual Life, as duly answered by Death, is to the individual in some sense a continual Progression ; but much the rather, at the same time, is it that on which really the three phases of ruling principle implied act separately. We grow up to mid-life, but only thus far, under the influence which is that definitely of Progression. We fall away from the mid-point under the influence of Decadence. We fill up our mid-life, and at the same time we raise up to us successors, under the influence of Sexhood. As growing beings in the first place ; as

declining beings in the second; and as, lastly, supplanting and supplanted beings, we make out our tethered course, with our Life always shadowed round by Death, and warmed genially by Sex:—while the form-limitation set upon us only answers in little, but therein with commensurate intensity, to the plan of partitioned spheres, and bounded energies, which reigns everywhere else throughout nature.

82. If it had *not* been as it is,—again I say,—that the first entering on life to each one of us had been out from the mid-life, or rather mid-lives, of a two-fold parent stock, certainly we should have wanted all that to our personal and mental status in life has given its actual impulse to what is 'mental Progression. The environment of parental tenderness has manifestly been the creative agency on our personal store of faculties which to a large extent, and apparently to the main extent, has impressed its own "result" there; and prepared us thence to receive adaptedly the more general result from the common atmosphere of social being which is to us throughout life our continuous creative environment. Without Parents, wrapping round with their own life the budding life of the Child, not only would mere physical sustenance have been so far off, and so hard to come by, for the latter, that it must, hence alone, have been kept down to the lowest character of animalism; but it would also have missed, as I have argued abundantly, the formative mould that alone could have cherished similarly the dawning life of the abstract function of ideation which makes the substance to all exercise of mind (L. ch. iv, secs. I, II). For, in regard to the mental "history" now in question, I see in the very nature of all theology or mythology that has "succeeded," and that hence has gained its stamp of being *true*, nothing

else but a very homage and attestation rendered up to the divineness of what is Parenthood's institution, in the actual human mode of being involved all along, not at birth alone but on to death, in effects of Sex. Namely, in the actual fact that all its symboling of the Divine Principle by the name which it has made its chosen one, of "Father," has still, by the very force of the contained involution, been on a footing of intrinsic abstractness. The true import which mythology selected from the first, and has adhered to ever since, has, I argue, been human, capable always, under evolution, of representing with advancing stages of adequacy, and more and more of just balance, the entire group of birth-produced and birth-producing relations. It has but witnessed, I conceive, to the actual ordinance of nature that organic beinghood, universally, is what at once is both generated and generative. It implies Parenthood gone before, and Parenthood carried after, every integer's own life; with Parenthood besides for the supplier of emotive substance to all individual occupation of life.

83. The actual process which I suppose, then, to have been that of the development of emotion—set parallel with that of intellect (par. 66),—I trace as follows. In my very recognizing of universal "law" as now stated, I claim primarily to have made the full intrinsic reference to Divine Rule which I admit demanded. And hence I infer thoroughly of the by-gone course of mythology that here actually has been the medium of creation to the affections, as supplying these precisely, in the very matter of the mythologic changes undergone, with moulding forms. All refining that has gone on of the mere "chemical" kind of Love that lay at basis, I infer to have consisted naturally—both for progress that was anterior to Selfhood and for that helped by re-action.

from this,—but in the differencing which is the common agency for improvement, in evolution ; while such differencing I believe afforded in the sole matter of the working power on the rude element at foundation which is that of the Death-and-Sex-caused relations, as in course of their own coming to rightful difference. The very presence of these relations as at all formed in group, I count the sign of the mere brutal state of beinghood being surpassed,—the state wanting in any conscious re-action,—and that of human regulation being furnished :—though, all onward from the primal starting of Sentience, I imagine preparation this way laid, in the increasing system of contrasts proceeding. All anterior to human origin, I suppose primal Sentience ever enhancing through impressions of presented contrasts assimilated ; but as yet of such only as were partial and addressed to special sensism. When, however, these came truly to be made integral, as human Selfhood and proper humanized Feeling imply, there was also made existent a starting mode of interhuman connection, supplied by the incipient grouping of birth-relations, which now indeed was a first answering, such as that I suppose demanded, to the long-before established bond of system which was that of sun-and-satellite regulation ;—while in this new-astronomic ordination I suppose it was that human Consciousness began, as on the course of advancing stages of completeness which Selfhood's history represents. And this beginning integrality I see especially as due to the new class of relations now begun upon, unknown to state of brutes,—Fraternal, lying cross-wise to the Parental,—which indeed can no way else come to bear than by means of state of Family, or of appropriate regulation, being in some manner furnished. All along, while proper Selfhood, not yet real-

ized, was but approached to, the extant fashion of relational circumstance, laid divinely about beinghood, was necessarily widening out into ever-spreading degrees of increased remoteness and of lessened intensity ; and was therein, as is evident, affecting variously the emotive basis : but this being done in expressly two-fold way seems direct cause for the condensing, at the same time, of the common influence acting there, and thus of the very differencing that is needful to both the actual relations and the feeling these address. And I theorize accordantly. In the very fact of its being, as it is, one-and-the-same integer that the multiplied and especially the diversified influences act upon, in being acted on also themselves by the encountered mental function of Comparison, I see reason for Selfhood's actual integration :—since the effort thus variously engaged should have led naturally to the effect of not partial and temporary but of fully-general and established impression which is here in question. The case implies that all the states of relation belong oppositely to Self and to the foreign Selves that are Self's integral environment ;—and for this very reason, then, should the integral Comparison come to act, which, in concerning what is constant Self-experience, never possible to be escaped from, should manifestly in the end have caused the common centering of all tracks of received impressions in what here is a furnished general impression. The meeting finally of all such tracks should inevitably, it would seem, bring to point in the end what must thence be of right to Introspection the true fulcrum of beinghood ; while therein, the more of variance and of distinctness in the tracks, so long as they are made subject to regulation, the more true must be the centre produced.—And how otherwise than thus could the effect of Self-attention have been fined to

the express import which is the need of Introspection!—how more naturally than by exactly such implication as this is, of Self with Self-associated but still alien integers, could the mingled usage of Observation and Experience, on which depends cognizance universal, have become assorted to the central oneness which as much integral intellect as integral emotion betokens!—Emotion's share in leading onward to Conscious Selfism is, I argue, hence as plain as the fellow-share of special sensism.—Yet more, however, does the fellowship seem conspicuous in the farther element concerned of what I attribute to mythologic agency. Namely, in the mode which appears the actual one of the needful sorting into order of the home-relations, for the differencing which is thus ultimately important; and especially of duly regulating the settlement by which the strictly domestic of these may stand in classed apartness from such as are but secondarily so, or, the rather, secular.

84. Do we not, in common habit, say of beings we regard as savages that "they have *no idea* of the real meaning of the domestic ties?"—No possible explanation, then, however elaborate, could better touch what I here have in view. The savages that *all* beings were at first, I wish to urge, could not *fill* the state of Family-life just because they yet wanted standard-notions that should enlighten them upon it. That is, save in cases that were felicitously exceptional. In the coarse kind of Kingdom-Family men began with, there was not means of their understanding, as they need to do, how the real character of the Father requires expressly the stooping down from the mere posture of authority into that of true sympathy with the Child;—how the real character of the Child only lies, and can possibly only lie, in the implication of a common levelness of Brotherhood between

the common offspring of Parents ;—how, above all, the proper nature of Fatherhood gains alone its valid dignity in being equally seconded by opposing dignity seen in Motherhood.—And what is this but saying that they had not yet felt the power of Christian dogmas !—But even here there was the formal setting forth, and the beginning regulation, to the affective triad of notions, which was wanting utterly in still earlier condition :—since brutish pre-family had the Mother alone in place of Parent ; while the semi-brutish tribe which went so far as to exalt solitarily the Father in such light, but made of him an idealized monstrosity.—Just because it was not the real case, as commonly is supposed, that the affections we call “ natural ” were implanted in human beinghood at the first, by the direct hand of Deity, whence state of Family sprang as product from these ; but because contrarily it was the out-standing conditions that, in the common mode of evolution, had to draw forth settled kinds of affective function by alone a tentative prior exercise of function :—just because of this newly-revealed circumstance, I believe, have the dogmas of religion had the place that they have had in mind’s history—furnished actually to them, because previously made ready for them. The rude and unassorted Family which was the ideal alone reached to by savages drew on itself from these, however, a starting moral attention. However far it was from as yet answering indeed to the truly divine “ law ” of generation—where Genitor and Genitrix and Generated share equally in the allowed import of generation,—it was that which did thus much that it stirred up affective Observation, and thus was an availing step in the matter. It was an availing first-step to the regulation for the savage practice of Family which might end in being “ natural ” in the true sense of being

legitimated by nature:—and this especially for its following up by what Christian mythology has furnished, in precisely its separating the worldly law of kingdoms from the centrally-divine law of Family.—But in Christian dogmas, moreover, is exactly shown the effect of conscious re-action which in special sensism has the character of Experiment, added on to Observation to fill up the true nature of Extraspection. The very activeness of mind-function which was engendered in these dogmas, and has been held in exercise on them constantly, is, I argue, but obviously the same sign of beginning mental integration, in regard to Introspection, which in proper intellect is familiar. The world's dogmatizing on religion, as I believe, has been solely the world's *experimenting* in formation of true domestic ideals, such as may indeed answer to Divine Rule.

85. In separating the formed notion of the Kingdom from what should be the formed notion of the Family, as Christianity did separate these, I imagine that the latter caused Brotherhood to be left alone as the guiding principle of religious sort in the first mode of regulative formation:—and this with right, from the intrinsic fact, that while Brotherhood may indeed be diffused naturally into integral Sympathy, which is the emotion befitting fellow-beings in common, all the other affective sentiments imply necessarily an immediate association. But even herein did Christian dogmatism, none the less, provide for what is secular thought the kind of image, including all in its reference, which for modern sociologic philosophy is in specific requirement. I mean, the indispensable ideal notion of *Race*. For not only did it embody the true "law" about Parenthood, in so far as this had then been made ready for, in the crude mode then in usage of direct personal exhibition as shown on

Deity ; but in the very image of the divinely-generated Son is supplied the mystic Christ which, surely, from its very standing as before God in the light of Representor of all mankind, *may* be taken by us now as the abstract notion of Race :—or, of mankind *as* regarded, in especial, under influence of the law of generation. In my own terms I would say, “the Divine Principle of generation brought about, eighteen centuries ago, the first consummated ability in human thought to entertain the proper feeling of abstract Sympathy whence alone men in general can be symbolled as being Brothers.”—There was much more however conjoined, of the same modern import, of the kind direct to religious use; and above all, in the common dogmas woven specially about that of the Divine Man, or New Adam, which has the qualifying of “Original Sin.” The true import of what is Birth-produced Sin is to present scientific thought that which signifies the inherited disposition to moral slackness of fulfilment of whatever is of divine requirement in human beings : the correcting of which native disposition by the strengthening of what is moral education is ever to us a problem as to how far it may actually be effected, and how far it must stand simply “atoned for” by the existing facts of the case in regard to Race. (See I. 371; 377; 391-3; 408.) And since Birth-produced Sin concerns naturally in chief part the right practice, or right cultus, of nature’s law of generation, in the whole bearing of this, so should plainly the extreme remedy of regulation fallen into by first Christians, of self-denying asceticism, have been still in its final tendency but a wholesome outbreak, needing now in some kind its repetition ;—while of such kind, of direct scientific aid to self-restraint, is surely the modern doctrine of Heredity, called notably in at the present day, as it is, to go on with what Christ-

ianity began upon, of rightly limiting the condition of Family ; and carrying on by an express questioning of nature that settlement of the matter of consanguinity and kindred points in regard to marriage, which ever since there has been a Church it has been assumed it was the Church's province to see to. The modern doctrine of Heredity, as a required supplement to what is personal self-restraint, is naturally, I conceive, in the same relation to the true principle of Family (not yet revealed in full), which, to the Christian moulding of Tri-une Deity, was borne by the atoning efficacy of a moral leaning upon Christ as to all defect that was actually not personal, but only outwardly or providentially inflicted.—And so, again, is the whole idea of New Birth, and of Grace needful to subdue Sin, but the notion of special crisis coming on, in mental progress, which I find so full of meaning to myself: namely, as precisely signifying the turn to consciousness and to activeness of function of what before was but passive growing-up to this.—On each and all of these points, then,—or rather in the common purpose, the common scheme-purpose, that runs through them,—I see the very effort engaged of Experiment made consciously with the involved subject, and of direct Will brought to bear on it, which the very crisis I thus infer, of afforded integration in respect to it, implies similarly to intellect on matters purely those of intellect. The present crisis in Religion, which is also and therein the special formative point in Mind's history, I describe to myself exactly as that of the former progress in Religion come to state of the implication with direct Will which I affirm as the proper evidence of integration universally. It is to me, as it were, the event bespeaking Christianity's becoming conscious of itself.—And for this very reason: that the

world's experimenting is, none the less, but the true work of individual mental beings, rightly stimulated to the work by their own needs. Through the whole series of mythic forms from the first I see nothing but this one two-fold object:—on the one hand, the settled "purpose" of creation towards a regulated mode of Parenthood; on the other, the immediate striving of mental faculties in the same direction.

86. And from this statement of process I may pass at once to a direct offering of the special test which I have marked as such, of the claimed improvement in my present Form of Religion over the orthodox one abandoned. Namely, that which needs to show it as conditioning a bettered, because rightly-differenced, Morality (p. 28). If the idea of Creation-by-miracle, which I now associate, as by rule of mind, with the rude times when a wilful Despot, as such, could be looked on as a presented Divine Father, were not really surpassed in moral consequence by the notion I see as ready to be substituted,—of what here I will call the miraculousness found special to Integration,—I have owned that the latter, in regard to scheme-character, would be proved a failure. But I may actually allege, as my sign to the contrary, the whole import of the mental track now designed: since in all that I here predicate of Integration I am but making a direct transit for Religion's subject into that which is exactly the prepared or divided province of Morality I have set in view. The deepened Will-power which I imagine necessarily involved in the integralizing of Self-beinghood into Consciousness, is indeed, on the religious side of it, the very instituting of a kind of Will-agency which, by its relative activeness in contrast to the proper passiveness characteristic of Religion, means exactly, I

conceive, the miracle of conversion of nature which follows ever on the crowning of accumulation of results by the actual integration of "new species" of existence, whether body or whether mind be in question. And by this I mean, in present point, the following actual change: that whereas under the notion of a merely personal Divine Parent human feeling was able only to lean passively on Deity, the very changing of the soul's Parent into a solely-spiritual conception of Parenthood engenders necessarily the *moral* attitude towards Deity which is expressly other than passive (p. 35): but which may still, and must thus, remain rightly side-by-side with the passive, when the latter is brought to the true point of appreciation in regard to the involved character of a true "Father." For the specifically religious posture of mind I suppose the kind of Will to be engaged, which holds personal desires of every sort that are in conflict with the Divine Ruling of circumstance in subjection, or in express denial to operate through what is temporary and illegitimate temptation to action; while, for the attitude that is religiously *moral*, I suppose an active effort to support Divine Rule, as in dealing with outer circumstance of the kind concerned, which is that of the soul's environment of relations with fellow-beings and fellow-strugglers. That is: it implies, one way, a conscious personal *resignation* to the figurable "Divine Will" ruling nature; it implies, the other way, an implicit carrying out of the divinely-integrated law of Parenthood. And these two most specifically, or most "femininely" religious modes of Will have their requisite respondents provided in the secular or sociologic modes of Will which respect severally the Life-struggle on-its-own-account as this varyingly is either properly interhuman, or only secondarily so, as turned directly on the conquest of mere

physical environment.—When the stock-disposition to Will, formed within us, may indeed thus be seen to have differentiated, I conceive that a proper status of Morality is itself integrated, to the point of really testifying to the very integration of Religion which I identify with Religion's coming to its own consciousness of itself.

87. There is also lying ready the very *word* which gives instant expression to all I thus point to ; including specially the subtle reference to Sex which is the dominant one:—a word, the springing up of which in the way it has actually sprung up, in the course of historic culture, and the actual consequence that has hence come to be attached to it of differencing in its employed import, might explain, if this could fully be traced out, even alone in itself the whole natural origination of Morality. The word "*Virtue*." In this curiously concentrate term—which is as changeable in its import as it is fixed: as arbitrary and conventional and adaptable to any newness of implication, as contrarily it is of specialty adapted to an application that is unvarying and unique,—is contained the express essence of the kind of qualifying of Selfhood which Morality has regard to. To produce "*Virtue*" in all its sorts may well be said to be the only object of Morality. The word virtually asserts that the *vires* which of the human subject makes the *vir*, is alone the kind of strength that is inherent to the being's integral Self-nature. And this exactly is what alone the force of Moral principle implies. But in this way, not only is there included the whole matter of the balanced or focussed character which any subject of *Virtue* is accredited with, even where the difference made out in the ego-focus respects but minor classes ranging under the name of *vir*, and symbolically but mere classes of abstract notions: but moreover and most specially is allusion furnished,

where also it has prevailingly been employed, as directed to Sex-distinction in general of human beings. And, so directed, the word's reference has surely but supported my attempt at the formal differencing of Will. For what has actually been the kind of Virtue made distinctive of Men, as a class, but exactly the active *Courage* which is the same with a forceful exercise of Will, carried out in the kind of conflict which is interhuman;—and what has actually been the kind of Virtue made distinctive of Women, as the counter-class, save exactly the Will-subjected carrying out of what belongs to the Divine ordinance of Parenthood?—The exercise of Virtue in these two modes, as sexually apportioned,—or, as made neither of them exclusive to its class, but only severally predominant,—represents, I contend, the whole sum of what belongs to Morality.

88. The Man's-virtue of Courage has obviously no right to the name unless motivated by an impulse wherein mingles some regard to his affections: at least as to general Sympathy, if not to what is personal emotive Selfhood. And the Woman's-virtue of the express culture of the only source of true affections which is state of Family, has obviously its own need of a helping Courage, such indeed as religiously is supplied by the motive which stands formally as regard to Race, though in reality it means, almost with exclusiveness, regard to offspring attached personally to Self. I recognize entirely that the *main* sphere of the former is sociologic; and that for the latter the *main* sphere is in the bringing of religious character into the Family—in the endeavour to make truly and consciously the working of the Self-affections that which acts for the general object of exalting Race.—Of the Domestic Morality, accordingly, which I am here bound especially to the treatment of, I claim that it possesses

fully the latent value of even that hardest part of Christian dogmatism which seems to hold light by "good works." I claim of this religious law of Virtue that it is but a modern fashion of saying over again, that even the highest moral practice of life that falls short of regard to "Christ," or of regard to Race, is after all but as to this "religious sin." To live "in Christ" now stands specially to me, as a Woman, as a holding myself subject to the law of Family, and to the whole circuit of the affections of Family, with constant sense abiding by me that I may thus do my part in work general or Divine;—just as contrarily I consider that for a Man so to live, he is specially bound over to the single representative matter of Brotherhood, to be generally and generously interpreted. The law of conduct that is for Men is well estimable for static, in every sense. The law proper for Women is never other than dynamic, with the strictest reference to the Divine purport of central energy.

89. By a regard to this result,—of the producing of a true Form of Religious Virtue,—and thus only, I believe there may be thought of as adduced fairly the full creative influence I am contemplating. I mean, the united two-fold influence of Death and Sex. In my first-attempted scheming in psychology, I broke off my collected formula with the recognition, that I was resting for it still on what alone was a mere "logical anticipation" of ground yet immature, in regard to its actual hold on conviction: the ground of reasoning which asserts that the whole meaning of Individual Life is bound up with the accepted meaning of Individual Death. (I. 503). But to my present view,—as the very effect of all the systematizing of the idea of Sex which has pervaded my intervening effort,—even the fact of such immaturity of

conviction is no impediment to the making up of an entire scheme, in its primal outline. I feel now that it suffices wholly to my scheme-purpose to leave the question of what belongs to futurity in regard to Life and Death, which ever naturally is wont at times to press on us, outside of consideration : even in openly surrendering myself to the dealing here with Death as being absolute. I confess to myself that by the terms which I have found strengthened to me more and more by my questioning, there is cut off proportionately all that hitherto has been taken wontedly for moral evidence of restored Selfhood after Death ;—but, none the less, I feel it open to my perception, with even increase of power in this, to see the constant possibility of some new revelation about nature which should bear on this actual point. And if this should come to pass, I allow fully to myself, that all the reasoning that goes to make my present scheme, even supposing it entirely valid to its actual stage of truth, would need a thorough re-arrangement from its foundation :—*or*, the accommodating to a new and a higher species of Religious Form. But,—with this proviso held in view,—I conceive that the conclusions I have deduced from a dealing with Death simply as it now appears, as a decisive ending to what also is decisively-apprehended Life, witness fully to their own worth. I allowed first, under the “anticipation” I thus explain, that the whole of our mind’s growth, both in intellect and feeling, has been naturally impelled on us by the fact of circumstance, existing there in reality, and which therefore we have been forced to deal with really and constitutionally, that Death is the actual bounder of Life. Death, as bounding Life, is assuredly of all realities the surest ! And yet not surer nor more real than Birth ! In taking then now, as I do, the two things together as facts of circumstance, to be

judged of in mere accordance with our actual knowledge respecting them; *and* in seeing how the two together work in concert on Morality:—I argue that I am furnished with scheme-principle that must necessarily be thus far sound, and safe, in a religious sense, for trust given to it. My scheme may hereafter be proved to have been only temporary; but for the present it is shown true to its own design.

90. The creative notion I am founding on supposes constantly a circling inwards of outwardly-obtained impressions. And in the primary effect of religion, where creative power took the aspect of a human Despot, I recognize a true beginning to what now I believe ripe to be adopted by human thought as a right centre and nucleus to religion, in especially the two modes I now state as its leading ones, specifically “feminine.” For of these, both the power of an abstract spirit of Resignation and the power of internal Self-restraint were led on to, I conceive, though by no means reached, in the coarse mode of regulation then established, for the interim. Under a God known as Despot,—and even on through the whole period of supernaturalism, while at all God is thought of as a Person,—no emotion of religious sort that I can now account as such had the means of appearing pure in its kind: because precisely of the feeble nature of the inducements to emotion that do alone act on the mind’s surface. These inducements, as I have here contended, could only in this stage of their action work mainly by the force of *fear*; while any *hope* of Divine succour to be obtained, and of Divine bounty to be enjoyed, was kept back to the mere character of a seeking for Divine *favour*: which is antipodal to the very essence of moral principle. And as much so, I believe, is intrinsically the aim attendant on belief in Divine

Personalism to change the primal *fear* in the case, instead of, as is natural, into *hope*, into *love*: love for the Divine Being, as such. For this is truly, I consider, the drawing off, or the attempt to draw off, from its only rightful operation, the very motive which stands as such to all the inwardness of action that Religious Virtue implies. But none the less, I conceive, did the final character demanded here precisely take its rise: as is shown generally and fully by the presented course of the theologic doctrine of Punishment. As long as resting on the notion of Divine Despotism, this doctrine gave for penalty to religious sin but the kind of suffering that in main character was external to the inner and real nature of mind. It announced such as bore in chief on mere bodily sensation:—except always for the very point which is involved in religion's nature, that it respected pain solely as pre-figured, or feared beforehand; and except also, most importantly, that it stood represented *in-integro* by the spiritual conception of Death,—of Death which, to primal savages, was indeed the mode of settled punishment alone extant. If, however, we now imagine the impressed regard to this general penalty deepened inward to its right station, which is that of the human heart or emotive centre, *by* effect of ever-circling life-experience, the result is surely instant that this regard is herein made to be intermingled with due motives of affection; and that also, for this reason, it is exempted from all the coarseness and mere bodiliness that were attached to the first kind of acting fear. And this, exactly from the weight-in-full now involved to be given to the idea of Death:—since this naturally implies, of the kind of sin supposed, that, for any failure in the religious object of the right conduct of Family, the penalty awaiting, in chief sort, is what indeed the immediate

sinner must by means of Death escape, while hence what he mainly must dread can be only such as spiritually affects him, and such as moves him by force of true human "love," though of reflective kind, for the offspring to himself born as if under sentence. And fear, raised to this character is assuredly what in no way is ignoble, or unworthy to be associated with Religion!—while, that it *should* act effectively as Self-restraint, is, I argue, at once natural in general theory, and consonant with whole experience as to what is even for habit the motive power of the affections for impelling effects even most painful to the Self-nature. I suppose but still a new miracle-of-Integration at work. For if the "love" that respects unborn descendants loses truly, as it does, the real nature of "love:" yet, by rule of this power of miracle, there is made even necessary to succeed the active phase of its first passive condition which is the moral sentiment in question. I mean, by the help of religion. Namely thus: the very "leaning on" external aid which as towards Deity supernaturalism encourages, has the nature in itself, by the present naturalism, to turn into the desire to *bestow* external aid on the special class of fellow-beings who are made by nature dependent on Self.

91. The Morality that stands as outcome of Christianity is indeed, I now recognize, well expressed, as to a little—"evangelic" fashion of it, by Dr. Paley, in the notable definition of "Virtue" with which he has associated it, to the common dissatisfaction of modern reasoners. Virtue *may* be said rightly, I admit, to be that which refers necessarily to an exhibited "will of God" for its proper rule, and to "everlasting happiness" for its ruling motive,*—if we allow duly for the want of

* Paley's words (in his *Moral Philosophy*, I. vii.) are these. "Virtue is, 'the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the

definiteness in any limit we can assign to the attached consequences of the rule's infringement. For the "will of God," as now accounted of, being of central direction on the perfecting of full Sexhood, mental and moral : so must also the ruling motive to its obeying be that of the transmitting to stock-of-Family a portioned beinghood that may be worth the taking up—worth the living out,—by the future "Selves" to us which, as to a certain fraction of the identity of ourselves to be presently to all appearance submerged, engendered offspring may all naturally be supposed to carry on, though with decreasing power.—But I admit likewise, with the orthodox, that the "gospel-truth" of the matter is still short of exposition. This lies always with an express reference to the very point here implied of what to personal sense is *providential injustice*: the sinner left to escape retribution, and the innocent made victim to it. "Imputed sin" and "vicariously-suffered punishment," which are to present moral instincts a clear offence, are ye mixed into the whole plan of existence whose interpreting is the problem forced upon us ; and the mode of their assorting to it which Christianity afforded, as the solution that human thought was first ready for, was only that, I believe, which the kind of conversion I have now in view, of passive principle into active, developmentally justifies. The imputed-sin and substitution which *are* normally a part of nature, we now see, are without voluntariness present on either side ; while the very meaning of the Christ is wrapt up in this. And if now it be the case, as I suppose it is, that the moral exercise

sake of everlasting happiness."—My own meaning for Virtue is that obviously which obliges me to exclude attention to the first clause. The word implies for me alone the intrinsic quality of our own beinghood which enables us to carry on with effect our enforced Struggle of Life.

of Self-restraint is, in reality, the true means of redemption that is laid out for us, by the full design of Providence, this does but still imply the adoption of Christ-character "for the sake of others," which, as just argued, is the ripened fruit of "leaning-on" such—just because the class of "others" here intended are those for whom, and for whom alone, as I contend, any "altruism" that is genuine can be awakened. (See II 511-22.)

92. For my aimed-at philosophy of emotion, accordingly, it is still an *idea*—a dogmatic idea,—that I find avail me.—When the notion of the Christ was first produced, I have believed to see how indeed it came, and may in reason well have come, to the apostle's mind on which it broke, with all the force of catastrophe which I have moulded my present principle to allow duly for. That is, of catastrophe of moral sort. The case which was that of Paul, as I conceive it, was that of new emergence from ancestral trust in the mere favouritism of a Deity who "loved" Israel, but who "hated" the outsiders to this His divine Family, and who hence pursued the latter with an "eternal" vengeance very different to His mere chastisement for Israel, reaching but to some third or some fourth generation, as by common ordinance of birth-conditions:—and thus the change that was brought about to his experience when was opened to him the new conception of an Israel that was unlimited in earthly sense, and only spiritually determined by observance of Jehovah's law of actual righteousness in heart and life, must evidently, as I infer, have come upon him with the crushing kind of apprehension of Sin, that could only thence cause him to receive with such rapture of welcome as he did the attendant opening to provided means of redemption that

was commensurate (I. 417—21). The idea of moral punishment, carried forward to the unknown world beyond the grave for an express personal undergoing of God's judgment on race-accumulated transgression, is that manifestly of wholly terror to the threatened subject : it is over-weighted, and all too obviously unjustly so, for any real moral efficacy ;— and hence necessarily the proper image of "salvation" to correspond must be that which appeared, as the sense of "Christ" did, directly furnished by Deity : furnished as in pure gift, and in no way what was capable of being earned.— And for ourselves, as I contend, the case is but become what is only still the same, however deepened and strengthened. We are again under an occurring moral catastrophe, having signs repeating those to first Christians, which also is again witnessed to by the need of a new special idea, representing a whole arrangement of our view of Providence, as changed for ourselves beyond that which was in power of reach to first Christians, not only by all that science has since revealed to us, but even by the very working of the Christian notion itself, through all the centuries that have since elapsed. The "repeated signs" I allege are those of, on the one hand, the sudden quenching of direct personal anticipation of "reward" to come ; and on the other, the demand of a moral care for posterity that is truly, except for empowered trust in ruling Deity, an infliction of what is terrifying responsibility, made chargeable on the enjoyment of present life. And in regard to the "new idea" herein called for, to give character to the moral status involved, no more does this either seem to fail. I find such afforded in the very principle I now imagine of *balance*, holding sovereignty over movement and over life universal, though but now first applied to the concerned.

moral conditions. The Christ-idea, from the first, I suppose to have been indeed but what was actually a balanced estimate of the human mind, for what was several individual relation to the lot providentially furnished to each, on *not* a severally-adapted but a common plan: having therefore the special reference to race-condition that but befitted the point-of-view assumed, to which alone dogmatism was yet competent, taking start from supposed "motives" of Deity;—while, as such, it was indeed a first-cast of general theory that evolving knowledge must be in essence ever bound to. And if the balance be now taken in full consciousness, this is surely, in itself, but the kind of newness of effort that *should* alone substantiate the first kind.

93. The Christ-idea, when it arose, was, on present terms, the simple springing of a new Thought, of wholly general kind, for which human powers were prepared, and for which indeed was there a *name* also ready:—a *name* so adapted, as that instantly there was felt that no other could express possibly so well the *saving* import it contained, as to that which men had previously felt at loss for, and had striven painfully in search of. The ready *name* came at once, as would seem, in the wonted manner of all appropriate terms, as the true fixing of the idea: the high and yet utterly vague character of which made it otherwise all incapable of mental handling. And here exactly then appears the "moulding" formative power which I attribute to religious dogmas in general, now in mode that is expressly representative, in regard to all. The actual essence of moral principle in the Christ-idea could alone naturally develop itself into its true function of direction over affective feeling, it is evident, by means of a right relation produced for it with the actual case of the general mass of affective impulses:

—not possible to be gained at once, whence the necessary long retention of the mere mysticism of the notion, which its first presenting involved of right; but such as only could experientially be elaborated, and *thus* fitted for the proper logical examination which moral principle implies. And this very elaboration is what I mean by the “moulding power of religious forms”:—just because it has provided *balance*, rightly such, to the natural differencing of the vague emotional basis which is the mode of growth to this. The primal anthropomorphic image held up constantly the evasive matter *needing* logical treatment, even while it as yet resisted this;—and it did this by the very force of its adapted *name*!—And even now, when it seems frankly no longer to evade, but expressly to surrender itself to examination, the fixed form is as much as ever what moral principle has need of, for its own furnishing with steady fulcrum. Namely thus. Surely, ever in true experience, the real finding of direction to the differenced modes of acting affection which make up the general whole of our emotionalism, does lie, by nature’s rule, in the fact of our being driven to make transit through, in turn, each and all of the existent kinds of subjugation to affection, either in person or by personal sympathy: the local vices that spring up to each partial state, being duly brought to correction by the whole course being gone through. It is thus, and thus only, that a just balance of emotive impulse seems brought about. But thus precisely does also, by present view, the Christian dogma express itself. Precisely the name of Christ, with all its historic bearings stamped on it, but notifies the same fact. For the very coming of the *Divine Son*, which the Christ was, into the position for human honour which was thus attained, is shown indeed as but the same with a true process of abolition

set on foot for the moral hindrance before prevailing, in the Hebrew trust in Divine favouritism, to the honouring of what should first by this means be a *Divine Father*;—while the involved sanctifying of the included station of Wife-and-Mother brought up hence, in preparation for a full rendering of moral homage, the tri-~~une~~ aspect of proper Godhead now affirmed: the Trinity of Divinely-regulating conditions which are those of the common law of Generation. Unless duly the three modes of human Love which are in-several Conjugal, Fraternal, and Filio-Parental, had come into their right differencing and *also* their equalizing in moral estimate, by no means, I conceive, could that law ever have influenced human conduct in the mode of regulation which in regard to that law we account as moral. But the Christ-idea, through precisely its historic working,—carried on ever since its revealing,—appears exactly to have done this. By means of it, just because, in Paul's language, we are made "*free*" from the previous bondage of moral Hebrewism, we are made capable of that actual moral liberty which means constantly a state of harmony with the universal "will of God," *or* rule of nature.

94. The idealized God of nature is to me indeed now but precisely, in a moral light, an imperative on mankind to give a truly balanced homage to the just-named three elements of affective life: these being taken for including, in the rightful manner of assortment, all that actually I refer to them. That is to say, the Divine Rule, reduced to form, is but a moral demand for the true cultus of the natural bond of Family. Just as truly as the idea of "God" in its integrity I see demanded for needful basis to any scientific scheme of nature, does the idea of "Christ" also integrally represent, with derived adequacy, the scheme-estimate that is needful

basis to any emotive sense of rule, *because* of its balanced nucleus of import on the very matter which is specific to state of Family. For the idea of "Race," which in this way I attach to that of "Christ," is none that deadens, but such as specially is of moral life to the concerned matter. It implies of the common Brotherhood of mankind that it represents, that those specially which are regarded by it are however what in common acceptation are instead Fathers and Children:—the latter, as such, being yet none the less, as I have already noted, real Brothers with one another before God, *as* respecting a common Parent to all (I. 269). And thus indeed it means a Brotherhood along the plane of Time, characteristically, instead of along the plane of mere Space: and is dynamic for mental influence in proportion:—with instant interpretableness to the effect. Antecedently to this dynamic sense of Race, the portion of the human Family that lived anteriorly to any present part, had eminently undue value attributed to them: whence in fact, as I have allowed for, all primitive superstition had its origin. But since Christhood has been realized, this is rendered impossible—in the very way that Paul himself has shown conviction of. It is not possible now that the having "Abraham" to our father can be thought availing to us, unless also we bring forth "works of Abraham:"—and "works of Abraham" in a religious sense, *must* mean truly the raising offspring to God who shall be such even more than the actual ancestor. Successors have continually, to the living stock of men, the attached promise of a new-proceeding "Messiah."—And what practically follows hence but precisely this: that while always in *religious* sense, we must say to ourselves with Job, "Shall we receive *good* at the hands of God," as the stored fruits of whole inherited evolution,

and not also the partial fruits of local "*evil?*"—we must say at the same time, by mere force of self-regard, "Shall we *receive* good, and not also *transmit* good?" —This, I argue, is the only reasonable way henceforth of accounting with Providence. And it means surely the proper stimulus to Religious Virtue:—just in constituting the escape from the partly-childish and partly-slavish ancestral claim, which Paul felt as he did, for his own part, to be indeed the moral value of his faith in Christ: the power of standing *free* before God, as come to the proper stature of a *man*.

95. Here, then, does my argument close for the second kind of appeal that I have laid my entire scheme under. In my thinking of God previously as *Creator* to us, I have believed to gain truly the abstract averaged idea, or rightly-weighted focus-point to the universal estimation of nature which, as such, may be felt by intellect as satisfying the general sense of Truth. And it seems to me indeed that I have no less, in what I now take as consequence from thence, made out equal satisfaction to sense of Happiness. God taken now as *Father*, in the express meaning of being such alone "*in Christ,*" is indeed that which, as I have said, now retreats on its own account to the mental background, leaving only for direct concern such respects as are interhuman: whence the kind of general notion in force, *as* the idea of the "*Christ,*" is that which breaks up Deity into an attribution made accordant with these respects. But what is this save exactly the counter kind of result to that which, in regard to claim of Happiness, I have already laid down? The very power in the human mind of enter-

taining the abstract notion of a "Christ" seems to me the express sign, that the experienced government of nature *may* be theorized in full for bearing straight on human Happiness.

96. The resulting notion of Providence is settled by this derived general idea into the true common-sense apprehension that to judge of our relation to Providence, as to that which is our allotted weal or woe, we must simply take all circumstances together; and this, of specialty as regarding our fate-controlling birth-condition. We are made to see specifically that in our station between ancestors and successors which gives us mainly our religious destination, we must exercise our judgment on Providence only as setting one thing against another, and thinking fairly but of the general effect. And is not obviously the idea of Christ, so employed, that which means a true reconciling with Providence?

97. But, besides this, the idea of Christ, as now interpreted, means directly the whole conditioning of what is to human beings in general the allotted share in the Life of Struggle that is universal, which responds exactly to my conclusion about Happiness, that it depends wholly on Self-action and Self-fighting-for. For this idea, even in meaning still, as it is held in common to do, the proper principle of Brotherhood, means yet just as much in counter-aspect, and in the aspect which is that I rather dwell on, the principle of the right exercise of Sex-condition. And so adjudged, what is that of which it mainly is exponent but indeed the whole mass of softening influence that has ever come into the state of Struggle, to make it what it has been in regard to Happiness! The conflict of fellow-strugglers, *without* Sex-condition, could never have been any other than internecine! But *with* this—and *with* this in whole purpose

of nature assented to, and by means of the Christ-idea now precisely revealed to us as so being,—it has been such as has but taught us the Emotive Truth, that just as much as we are always bound to exert rivalry, we are yet forced, and therein, to develope Love. And from this follows plainly all the impelled variousness of life-pursuit that life's enjoyment is found entirely to depend on. *Because* of the involved counter-existence for us, of Life-impulses that are opponent,—of attractive or parental ones warring constantly with the thwart repellent ones of fraternity,—have the life-courses been made open to us whose threading and filling out has been the furnishing of life's delight! *Because* of the crossed texture thus made necessary, has our wrought web of life become shot, as it has been, with all its actual rich brilliance of shaded colouring!



CHAPTER III.

THE DEFINITENESS OF CHARACTER WHICH APPEARS GIVEN
TO THE ACKNOWLEDGED BASIS OF ALL MORALITY, CON-
SISTING IN THE RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLE OF DUTY.

I believe that in the foregoing scheme I have indeed gained a basis to Religion that is in this way sure : that it draws out into prominence the leading points in the general aspect of nature, developmentally regarded, which are such as address naturally the religious sense in us. The track of such points, taken in series, I have treated as being that which shows to us the whole manner of the creating, or rather generating, of ourselves, by the Power having common sway throughout the universe ; and hence its recognizing in that light is to me indeed the same with a true finding of that relation to Deity for our own beinghood, of which constantly all frame-work of Religion is admitted to be no other than the expression.

From this "effort of integration" I may therefore pass to what I have pre-stated as my designed seconding of it, by an attempt to derive from it the farther kind of basis that is in question with me : the basis that must in sequence to this primary one be adapted to Morality (p. 30). I have yet said nothing, as may have been observed, of the producing of the ultimate sort of mentalism which is here concerned :—the sort which is no

more of peculiarity intellectual, than it is of speciality emotive ; but which the rather is the mental compound of either rational sentiment or affectively-directed reason. And thus obviously I have now to supplement the omission :—of which the occurrence indeed was necessary to my method. My scheme has borne wholly on the ordering of a subjective or metaphysical class-arrangement ; and classes, as such, must inevitably be held separate in their definings, however also it is the matter in demand, as now it is, to show a palpable connection throughout.

As a subjective classification,—to which, in its being such, the point of integralness is all-important, and the separating into feasible classes is complicated in proportion,—the arrangement I have come to has had this of advantage, felt such by me, that it has indeed reduced the classes of topics dealt with, seeming needful of such character, to apparently the smallest possible number. But very few of leading terms I have found suffice to express all of distinction that I have felt necessary. The one term of *Vibration*, by itself, has come to stand to me as full classifying signifier of in fact the working-action of whole nature, apprehended in the material mode of science. And as to what must answer to this in apprehension that is spiritual, where *Vibration* becomes known under reflection, I have found supplied force of indication for the two branches hence produced, in but naming one of these the working-function of oscillating *Comparison*, and the other the working-function of dually-assorted *Love*.—Moreover, it now even occurs to me, that by merely a little stretching of the force of the common term confined usually to one only of the admitted kinds of thought-agency,—indeed countable as the highest of such,—this again may comprise for me the

expression of my whole actual religious theory of mind's creation. I refer to the designation of "*Imagination*." At the mental department so named, as such, I have scarcely glanced in the foregoing : for the very reason that to myself the need here is taken up by the name of *Symbolism*, which is to me but one with intellection universal. But the former now may truly express for me, in addition to what "*Symbolism*" does, the eminent point of faith I have realized which unites our own practice of ideation *in-toto* with the assimilation of the Divine Image, creatively laid on us :—so that now what is human power of Imagination means to me but the same with the reflective or duly-active human working upon the type of God's imagery. I may define creative process as solely this : that what is figurable as being God's Imagination displayed in nature, differs only, but differs always, from man's, by being causatively allied with an instrumentation of materialistic Vibration which indeed culminates in the human kind ; and which does this by precisely the vibratory consequence ensuing *for* mentalism, that here the action of the Comparing-intellect has a vibratory counterpart in the action of two-sided Love. —And if now for what is come to be my occasion,—of adding on to this condensation of religious theory what may rightly be of respect that is ulterior to this, however justly connected with it, in sense of being evolved from it :—if, to mark the change of ground, there may truly be once more a signal term found sufficient in itself alone, I may surely take the precedents for confirmed, to the full need of the occasion. And this actually is what I plead, in regard to the appellation of "*Duty*." By adopting this recognized moral term to express solely in itself what I make the class-import of Morality, as apart from, but sequential to, Religion, I believe that I

have means to clench to its needful point all the systematizing I have given to Religion.

The object of this chapter is therefore simple.—I have shown already my design with Morality; both in regard to my intended treatment of the subject-matter represented, and to the integral class-assignment I contemplate, which indeed must raise standard to that treatment.—I have stated amply my conviction as to subjective classifying, that this must bend itself wholly to conformity with the one law of production that in outwardly-observed nature determines new species, or newly-evolved modes of integration: supposing, as I do, that the order of “Two-and-Three alternation” which these rules and affords class-marks to what is generalising physicism, enforces thence no way less a reflective course of “genealogy” for subjective Ideals, such as similarly are concerned with nature (II. 312-4). And thus I feel to have made good, so far as to what is prior hypothesis, the addition I project of Morality in a class-form to those two I have hitherto alone recognized: namely, Science and Religion. Although hitherto I have taken these, with believed right, for including *all* that mind can operate by; yet by attending to this law the very inserting of Morality between the two, on the same level of class-character, is approved to me as inherently justified. It is but the normal passage from dualism to triplicity which, *if* duly conditioned to restore on a new stage the first mode, is the true exhibition of nature’s plan of generation: while, in regard to this condition, I do at once provide it by precisely the new sexualizing of Morality on its own account. I only claim the class-character for Morality with view to its immediate parting, on a new mental stage of division, into Scientific and Religious Morality: so formulated just accordingly as

the new factor shows the nature, for estimate cast "personally" on it, to incline preferentially towards the character of either one or the other of its two generators. Developmental-Subjectivity, it seems to me, requires with imperativeness this conformity; while Developmental-Objectivity expressly yields assent to it.—If then it be the case, as I instinctively suppose it to be, that the idea of "Duty" in itself may form signal to the whole matter; and that it may depict, by precisely its own history, the process of the first and the process of the second evolving kind:—I have here the guiding clue that is sufficient. The demand upon me lies, it is evident, to show the Moral sense of Duty as real parallel in class-character to the intellectual ensign of the appreciation of Comparison, and to the emotive ensign of sense of Love:—while, besides, I must show of Duty, that it is of right the true link of connection which binds naturally Morality of both sorts, though preferentially the Religious sort, to the kind of parent to itself which it sexually follows after: this being, by inevitable assumption, the "maternal" one.

And if in this I so much vary from common practice as again to strain meaning in the term's usage, I think I shall scarcely do so to more extent than my adhesion to Developmentalism is answerable for.—The essential part in Morality which this third element plays is nowhere questioned. It is a popular acceptance that "Moral science," as such, "denotes specially the science of what is called man's duty, what he ought and ought not to think, feel, say, do":—the "science", so accounted, being the settlement of rules of life which comport with duty, while Morality in a more ordinary sense means the "art" of making practice of those rules (see *Penny Cyclopædia* in "Morals"). And hence plainly it is the

case that the crucial matter to be investigated, for right knowledge on the subject, is admittedly the sole import of this main term, whether actually there laid, as by distinction, or cast otherwise, as continually it needs be, on what are cognate expressions :—as on the terms of “ought,” or of “right,” or on that epithet of “proper,” which ages-long before it came to be Englished seems to have fixed itself in language as familiarized beyond need of explanation,—though, as recently appropriated in its Grecian form, it has served notably to give title to explanation that has been such with wide effect : namely, in Bentham’s rendering of Morality as “*Deontology*.”—But for myself the bearing of the investigation concerned is both deepened and also therein differenced from what Positivists of any shade have allowed for. In regard to the subject’s treatment by Comte, I have raised strenuously my protest that the dealing with Morality as if on the common terms of science, is a hardening it into a frame of artificialness that *prima facie* condemns it ; and that it does this by overlooking, or rather purposely trampling on, a large amount of unmanageable matter of connotation that is yet primely of importance to be done justice to, and *not* to be thus technically and mechanically disposed of, being such as thus eminently suffers injury (II. 147-8). But farther, even in regard to such purer mode of science, as I esteem it, as that of Positivists who are moral psychologists, I contend that there is still defect in what, I grant, it lies of right not with them, but with specific religionists, to furnish. And that is, indeed, what imports regard had, over and above what the referred-to words express, to what has rested until now in that latent hold of dogmatism which they, as I admit, with reason on their own part exclude :—to what lies, namely, in the very bosom of Theology, under the

religiously-toned names of Responsibility and Moral Obligation. It is only by comprising to the full what is *here* contained that I can work my own aim :—and this being the case, I must force “Duty” to bear burden in proportion.—But this only, I repeat, in so far as I find sanction in Developmentalism.

The integral plan I am upon—while it recognizes for Morality both the character of “science,” of the latter kind, and that of “art,” if made consistent with this plan,—has a ground of its own attached to it where change in the meaning of its standard phrasing is as much involved as I have found it heretofore in other ways. It is here again the case, as I have found with Religion itself, that the right differencing of internal divisions, as for several accordance with our *ideas* and with our *sense* of the affected matter, brings at once the clearing up, and with this what is actual addition, to the import of the established terminology :—while in this, as I consider, is the real progress in conception which I infer rendered manifest.—And this ground of its own is indeed that which must treat “Duty,” as a moral faculty, in no other than the same way as that applied to the two already-allowed faculties, of Comparison and Love. A developed sense of Duty which should be equal to form third to these two in the way I contemplate, *must* be that which shall have had rise, and continual course of growth, in connection with mental progress in general, just as these have been supposed to have : and especially must have had need in itself, in common with these, to undergo the “crisis” in formation which *is*, by my notion, specifically metaphorical, or indicative of its own two-fold division. And this need—this assumed theoretic need—exactly points the class-boundary concerned. The very dualizing of Morality, by my scheme, *is* its separating in class-light

from the parent-classes of Religion and Science, though with always the uniting bond which sense of Duty consists in left abiding.

I believe, in fact, that the point of religious subversion which throughout I am dealing with, as the great crisis to Religion,—the crisis of its really coming of age to conduct itself normally, in obedience to the Divine will with it,—is exclusively what conditions a true form of Morality, *capable* of being practically acted on. And just for this, that sense of Duty, in its own normal import, is by nature inconsistent with supernaturalism. This conviction has indeed deepened itself by the whole course of my theorizing; and this, precisely by the set bearing of my theory.—Religion, as I have recognized, must necessarily, for true practical effect, be to us a diffused atmosphere of influence; but, none the less, the more thoroughly I have worked at giving *form* to it, by inter-definitions made out for it, the more do I seem only to have realized the state of “Soul” which is qualified to draw its breath from such atmosphere—the state of “Soul” which for me represents an organically-established mental centre, possessed of the *religious sense*. And the sense of Duty, to be vital centre to Morality, must hence be in consistency diffused into the same generalized kind of import, in connection with an adapted sphere of function, also integralized and centralized. If this is done, but only so, will the sphere of Moral principle be furnished, as have been the scientific and religious spheres;—and, at the same time, the correlation maintained with the religious image of Deity, without which, as I hold thoroughly, Duty’s meaning would be nullified; and in actual support of which the latest of my definings of Religion has bearing (p. 35).—But the very working of this organized apprehension disperses all imagining

of power *outside* of nature, even more as to this crowning result than as to all gone before. And evidently from the very cause that Duty's meaning is essentially herein driven home to an *internal* seat in our constitution. I am impelled by all reasoning into the result, that the rise of sense of Duty in our nature, by evolutionary course, has been solely a new functional consequence of the same leading organic fact which had led before to the rise of Intellect and of Love : the formation of an established Ego-centre.

The instrumenting of Moral principle by that which is adequately distinctive to it, as set apart from these other two departments, is also no less ready in term-expression, than is the matter which "Duty" in itself answers to. Just as, called for by Intellect, rendered conscious, the term of *Science* is engaged ; and, required by Love, the term of *Consciousness*, unchanged, is sufficient : so, to fit the new class-ground supervening, is there actually laid down the modified name of *Conscience* :—of *Con-science*, which is neither turned wholly, or characteristically, as Science-proper is, on environment ; nor turned mainly within, by its effect, as emotive Self-science is : but which mingles the two effects by regarding specially the relation which Self, as such, is enforced to bear to its environment of only foreign Selves, while including view to Divine ordinance universal.—And thus, in the mode of mind-creation I have been scheming, I have marked as I have the occurring variance of this kind—between general or mainly-physical environment and that which is made up of fellow-beings,—with express view to the class-separateness of the two aspects of nature, or modes of general knowledge, pertaining severally to Intellect and to Feeling. I have however no less believed to trace, all along, a constant sequence of effect through the parted matter of development : and thus, in coming to

the farther ground of Morality, I am directed straight to the distinction just drawn. In saying as I do, generally, that effect of Science respects physical environment, treated with the very highest, or most conscious, power of Intellect ;—and in saying of that emotive kind of Consciousness which also is the highest of its sort, in being Religious, that effect *here* concerns exclusively our inter-human surrounding :—it is surely but advancing by just step to deal now with effect of Conscience by taking the compounded ground which is the following. Namely, that which is assumed to bear respect to such only kind of human inter-action, as implies that the whole ripeness of Intellect has joined with the whole ripeness of Feeling to give to it what is conscious regulation. It is plainly only thus that the character of “principle” which is here alone relevant, can be imagined brought about : but so does the precise plan only tend to make clear this very consequence.

What is “principle” of *moral* sort, means inevitably the kind of regulation that is inward. And, accordantly, the whole plan of mind’s creation I take up has led towards this Divine purpose with creation, in giving order and arrangement at all to mundane elements, I see to have worked constantly, though always by what show to us as definite stages in the progress, for the imparting to human beinghood at a certain point, and thence onward more and more of it continually, the power of true Self-regulation—or, of effective Self-control in what regulates, of specialty, the conduct of inter-human relations. God *in* man, acting thus, appears as “principle ;” though God *outside* of man can only make of him a dead instrument. —Hence the need now enforced of supernaturalism’s disappearance !—And hence also is the requirement present of even setting thought to work, as if anew, upon

matter so long studied by select minds as the nature and philosophy of Morality!—To my own point of view, in fact, the case is in no way that where Morality can be made subject to discussion as being a thing actually instituted. I can only treat it as in course of institution. I cannot take it as my problem to consider, as is done generally, “What is Morality?”—but have the rather to ask of myself, “What needs there now be *made* of Morality?”

I will then turn again to the scheme-ground I have otherwise completed, so far as this is concerned: that I may show, or at least endeavour to show, how the link of connection I require for the new class-ground with the former, *in* precisely a developing sense of Duty, worked by Conscience, has actually been that I now imply:—how this, namely, has latently been indeed springing up, while as yet supernaturalism has been in force; but how still it is only now, when the latter seems abolished, that the sense critically is realized. After this shall have been traced, but not before, I can come to the final matter in the case, of the actual state of Morality now due:—that is, as differenced to the degree of definiteness that seems necessary.

THE DEFINED TRACK WHICH SEEMS ASSIGNABLE TO THE EVOLUTION
OF THE SENSE OF DUTY.

I am now aiming, as I have just signified, to bring Duty into the strictly abstract form which, in fact, can alone give to it the means of being considered as to its history; and thence of becoming differenced in the integral manner that I intend. I need to deal with Duty by no means as Science implies, by attention to what are “*duties*,” or particular applications of the general feeling; but solely and expressly by attention to the senti-

ment in itself. I have thus treated of Love, and I must carry out the treatment with Duty :—by the inherent necessity of subjectivity.

But in trying for the general view this requires, a little-common introduction to the subject—let me notice on the spot,—is what thrusts itself on me. I find myself at once brought in face of what certainly appears curious in occurrence, as this : that the highly spiritual import of the term concerned, now grandly affixed to it, lies yet under a common attached bearing, which is the opposite to elevated. To other leading metaphysic terms the common usage which their very nature, as I recognize, subjects them to (II. 175), in no way degrades them. Space, Time, and Form, are handled in the roughest manner, but remain thence intact and unsullied :—though indeed it is true as to Love, much *more* than as to Duty, that its using in ordinary is, as such, always liable to be its vulgarizing. But the case as to Duty is unique. Alternately with its connoting of Conscience, the word stands for the purely secular matter of a *tax*, laid on marketable commodities!—And the more carefully I consider, the more I see actually that in no way is the circumstance accidental. I find, contrarily, that in this now estranged meaning lies really the proper nucleus, and historic root, to the whole needful understanding about Duty.

For in the view I uphold of Religion's history, (interpretable always by its *forms*,) what must stand as the first character of religious Duty does palpably intend, by its one and only meaning, what *is* of the very nature of tax-payment : the rendering of an impost claimed by God, as a Despot-King, on his human subjects. The very occupying by Deity of the place of State-sovereign implied this :—that He, as such, gave to his people government

and protection; and that they were, in return, to be called on to make payment for the same, in whatever way He chose to order the payment: whether in offering of worldly substance, or in any commuted form of rendered homage. To *pay* worship to God, as I suppose, was then literally but a true mercantile transaction: an effect of bartering of advantages, which, if primarily one-sided in its implication, yet always had the import attached to barter of proper *debt*. God, in character of an earthly chief, is supposable evidently to have bought his people's service *by* the granting of his leadership; while, oppositely, it is true to reason that He also, in his turn, *owes* to them his favour, as the *due* of their service. And by holding simply, but firmly, on at all events our own side of the reasoned case, to this root-notion,—which also all etymology confirms,—I conceive that we have the key to indeed the whole consequent historic progress. To the last may religious duties, I believe, be thus reckoned of, but exactly as being *dues*—or otherwise, as *owed* conduct of life,—to the ruling Potentate acknowledged by us: as *dues*, truly, which are changed ever in character so far only as to meet constantly our own rising demand for spiritualness and refinement in their claim on us.

Etymology exposes plainly that, not only is ever Duty in-the-abstract thus barely what should spell itself *Due-ty*, but that all the whole class of related terms are of the same kind, imbued essentially with the idea of *debt*—or, the thing *debitum*:—since the terms of “ownership” and “property” but carry obviously the added kindred implication of empowered command, to the individual concerned, over the matter held as *debt*. “*To own property*” means now, and must have meant from the first, “to hold appropriated to self what no other than self has any claim over, capable, at all events, of being made good.”

—But here opens the consideration, all-involved in the subject, of “*law*.” Debt could not be debt, in any perfect modern sense, nor any more could moral Duty be such, *except* for the ruling influence of Law. And thus the whole matter to be now pursued, to which Duty is the standing centre, is fully postulated. The stage of Duty’s history which is that of its connection with supernaturalism, I may class definitely as betokening Law of no more than the autocratic sort :—varying in this, with explicitness, from the final stage which needs to mark it alone as “principle.”

Thus, in following the scheme-purpose I have stated, of the natural evolution of the moral sense, it is mainly here that I see it needful to fix attention :—on precisely this involved association with Law, plainly notable in what is ordinary human history. In regard to the entire subject,—while holding always in view the important point just referred to, of metamorphosis into “principle,” as, by tree-figure, the leading crisis to be interpreted,—I need also indeed to search the lesser centre to the matter, which means the feeling’s springing out of lower than at all its own condition : out of state, as I have promised, even lower than any countable as organic. But in this case of application, it is in fact the intermediate condition that is in chief need of investigation. The very fact of human history being here in question makes the process of growth here supposed as represented that which answers the most fully to the object : in showing, namely, the true rootage to the matter which the green-leafage of any produced forms is but exponent of.—And the following is what I make of the investigation.

The season of this figured green-leaving and root-producing to the sense of Duty I indeed identify with its

historical association with Law. But from this arises instantly the indication of what must stand to it actually for the matter of first crisis. I mean, the large historic circumstance of the establishing of *Nations*: taking these in the mere general light of organized bodies of men, rendered as such to what is needful extent distinctive in character from one another. For surely what does indeed serve as such distinction is that which is to them in-several their accepted constitution of Law. It is surely this which *does* solely make of Nations, whatever be their local dimensions, the individualized human masses that we know them for. Nor is wanting the farther instant suggestion that here exactly is afforded sufficient reason for the alliance now pervadingly existent between the idea of *debt*, or of Duty, with terms of *ownership* and *property*: seeing that, obviously, it is the Law which is the internal making of the Nation that alone furnishes such sanction to recovery of *debt* as means at all any evasion of the mere savage recourse to brute strength. And is it not even clear that in this is shown the very *cause* for the massed formations?—Anteriorly to the production of Nations,—inclusively of the state of Tribehood,—the case appears this. Primal savages, in their first ceasing from exclusive practice of warfare, had therein a dwelling need of some better mode than this to secure hold to them of such share as they could severally grasp out of that common good which, as we know, *must* in some way or other be fought for. Such was, however, the occurring means of barter, if only the transactions of the commerce could be backed with sufficient surety of fulfilment beyond the actual moment, which in fighting was alone concerned: while in national Law, or the first rudiments of this, was the threat of fixed penalties provided which stood forth as such surety. Of all the kinds of debt-

payment needing this, the earliest must have been eminently that which lay solely between the leaders of fighting tribes ; as regarding tracts of land to be respectively allotted and occupied :—involving naturally the association now formed between Nations and “countries.” But this first kind of bargain held really included the second which must have followed, as for chiefs with their own subjects ; and which must necessarily have meant a reference of the kind in question, to an abstract and embodied recognition of general Law:—even for ultimate backing to such minor transactions of mutual subjects as in every furnished state are of occurrence, needing the honesty in debt-payment that all experience proves is but rendered dependable—on when it is thus supported by the whole force of governmental constitution.

And this opens out to view nothing less than the entire consistent course of the sense of Duty’s evolution which I seek for:—since the constant association with Law, once definitely assented to, throws simply upon the changes befalling our acceptation of Law, the varying by demand of the moral import engaged : namely, as carrying out the special plan of evolution laid down. The kind of Law just referred to bears on itself the index to, in fact, the leading matter to what is history of Religion, which is the passing of the state-character of Nations *from* religious *to* political : the very transit, in my view, which first integrates the nature of both the parents of Morality : a Law-secular being that allied with only social considerations that belong to Social Science, and a Law-religious being always personal and introspectional. But the constituting of this difference was the work so far off from the savage being’s comprehension, that I place it only, as to its perfect accomplishment, at our actual time of culminating crisis. And the whole period of

mere pre-Christianity I take for but employed in the slow effort of making way for the accomplishment:—*as* being the express epoch when evolving Nations were indeed no more than Tribes.—But, more than this, if we avail ourselves of help of Science, the signal-import of Law spreads undoubtedly into the pre-natal domain for the sense of Duty, escape from which was its *first* critical event. And this means, that the analogy with what are *laws* of astronomy which I am urging constantly in the case, is in strictness borne out by the very force, in itself, of this plastic adjustment. The Law of regulation to solar systems, which means an inner-seated balance of contending impulses, gained by simply the effected massing of planets in groups together, was truly, I submit, but the natural precursor to *both* of the final groupings which *now* act for regulation, in the highest known method of this which *is* moral: the Secular regulation of Nationality, and the Personal regulation of state of Family. *Worlds*, that grew into planet-order through solar rule, had fiercest heavings of internal struggle to subdue, before the motion hence prisoned up within them could bring them, as it did, into organic beauty and habitableness. *Minds* also, I conceive, had no less, at the first, of volcanic passions to compress, into the wholesome motor power of moral life.—It is the farthest from a mere simile that is here concerned! It is indeed nothing less than the common plan of creation!

When Law does bear the character alone of Science, how plainly is it visible, when we consider, that no more than the simplest shifting of language makes sign of all that happens, in the transit from ground of physics to ground of morals! We need but say, for example, that “the seasons *must* come round, because of the earth’s placing on its axis,”—instead of, that “the seasons *do* so

come round :” and the whole form of what is debt and obligation is in presence, in the true mode of “principle.” Out of physical Law, the ethical is at once evolved. —And yet I grant that I am here forestalling myself. There is still here contained, latently, the great matter of reversal, in regard to what is subject of the “must,” which yet waits its interpreting : as out of supernaturalizing conception into such as deals simply with nature. The *due*-ness of conduct, as to regulating the seasons, here adjusted to fall specifically on Deity, as *God’s* part in the work of fashioning the universe, can only now be predicated by the help of the acknowledged service of anthropomorphism :—though in fact, as I have now to urge, the real consciousness of demanded mutualness in whatever is of the kind of moral compulsion lies deep at whole orthodoxy’s foundation.

I will still take the Hebrew people for exponents to human nature in general, in this ultimate religious matter of the affording of Moral Law, and its attendant sense of *debt*. I will, namely, suppose that the very framing of the race of Abraham into a People, such as actually they ever reached to be,—and accordingly into that which was far short of a proper Nation,—was for them the initial passage from antecedent Moral Lawlessness into requisite subjection to Law, which, as such, is of right instructive in regard to the intrinsic case of evolution.—And why, but for the very reason that what served to them as “national constitution” was all along of the true character of “bargain,” which alone leads to the requirement of enforced Law?—It is surely proved in history that in no other case of tribe-formation was there furnished to the same actual extent as with the Hebrews it was, the formal matter of “covenant,” as laid between the Ruler and the ruled :—while no less

should it be certain to reason, as I conceive, that this implies the inclusive essence to the whole matter.

For, however Hebrew history is immersed throughout, as I do not fail to remember, in the mythic tone which was at first inevitable,—through the very matter of its being Religion that was concerned :—it is certainly undeniable that the idea of a bonded covenant was, not only the formal means of differentiating, subsequently, the re-formed Hebrewism of Christianity from what was Hebrewism-proper, by the very sign of a *New Covenant* bestowed ; but also formally accepted in the character in the earliest rise of the quasi-Nation. It matters little in this respect—of whatever intrinsic interest it is otherwise,—whether Abraham or Moses as actual beings had existence : the thing only of importance is what testifies that the people's form of constitution depended on the point for which their beinghood, *whether* mythic or real, was in requirement. And this point is obviously the asserted compact, as such, made by him that was the general father and representer of the Hebrew body, with Him that was the family's chosen sovereign, or chosen God.—To be satisfied on this point, I believe, we need only turn to the one of the Bible statements of the case which occurs in the book of Joshua ; and which, at all events, through whatever circumstance of its production, seems to have the advantage of being widely removed from the spirit of the over-mythic tale of Genesis,—bearing rather, as I imagine, the fossil character of a true relic of tradition such as always is the best furnisher of primal history. To see that really the state of compact which Hebrew polity ever rested on did actually imply Deity's being bargained with, in no other than what intrinsically *was* the same with State-assurance of recoverableness for common debts, we need

only, I think, read critically the following extract.

“And Joshua gathered all the tribes of Israel to Shechem, . . . and said unto all the people . . . Choose you this day whom ye will serve; whether the gods which your fathers served that were on the other side of the flood, or the gods of the Amorites, in whose land ye dwell: but as for me and my house, we will serve the Lord. And” when the people made answer, *“We will also serve the Lord,”* he rejoined, *“Ye cannot serve the Lord: for . . . he is jealous; . . . and if ye forsake him, for strange gods, he will turn and consume you.”* But they persisted, *“Nay; but we will serve the Lord. And then . . . Joshua made a covenant with the people, and set them a statute and an ordinance in Shechem. And Joshua wrote these words in the book of the law of God, and took a great stone, and set it up there under an oak, that was by the sanctuary of the Lord. And Joshua said unto all the people, Behold, this stone shall be a witness unto us; for it hath heard all the words of the Lord which he spake unto us: it shall be therefore a witness unto you, lest ye deny your God.”* (*Joshua, xxiv.*)

In this simply poetic and but slightly mythical report, we catch, I imagine, enough of what is faithful indication to be satisfying on the point in question, even as to what was actual history in the founding of Hebrew state-hood. But, so taken, the account easily interprets, besides, the richer mythic fruits placed earlier in the Bible record; and throws specially instructive light on those grandest of these which had scene in Sinai and the desert of the burning bush. For the “stone of witness” barely named here by Joshua—while plainly it is but the same kind of appeal to an authorized power of sanction, admitted by both parties, which we know to have been commonly the employed primitive means of giving weight to, or of

legalizing, any bargaining of importance : such as notably we have example of in the *Mizpah* set up between Jacob and Laban (*Gen. xxxi. 44-52*) :—is evidently but re-constructed, as with necessary symbolic ornamenting, when the place of “witness” is taken up by the stone tables of the Law. The *Mizpah* for the great case of the nation, where the bargain was that of Abraham, for his whole tribe, with Jehovah, was that mythically alone adequate to the occasion, which signified indeed actually subscription made to the bond by both parties. By the Lord, not as placing there the *name* He might be challenged by, which, as previously revealed, was sublimely no real name at all, for any common apprehension ; but by graving on the tablets with His own hand the ordinances He would have obedience to ;—by Abraham, in the yielded “mark” of self-surrender to such obedience which was set in instantly-constituted ceremonial, symbolic of the surrender : promised also for repetition, in the same strictness as to the personalness of the signature, on the part of every future rising claimant to the privilege of participation in the contract.—The two tables of fundamental commandments—alike by their direct call on each “thou” that should to the end be so addressed, which was the inherent *spiritualness* of their demand ; and by the fact that, in mode natural to the age, they were thus associated in practicalness, from the first, with a rude element of mere physical ceremonialism :—are clearly but associable in reason with that whole “book of the law” which Joshua is made here, as if in carelessness of history, to connect them with. The two tables are indeed, for mythic estimate, the true *Magna Charta* of the people’s constitution : whence no less than reasonable are even the close directions of the “book” for the providing of due custody for the important bond ;—

while the very secretness and innerness of the "sanctuary," not omitted here in reference, are but simple prophetic shadowings of the ultimate kind of Holy-of-Holies where God's law needs enshrining. But farther, —or, besides being this charter of the people's liberties; —the stone tables are no less their actual *Doomsday-book*. * They are but the actual record for the people of their assessment, all and several, in Jehovah's imposed taxes. That is, in not such kind of "duties" as would have been imposed if that sovereign had seemed always the "Man-of-War" He seemed at first; but such as followed naturally from their knowing Him as "inspired" teachers came to show Him.

The essential point in the case, which is that of inner-seated consciousness, thus clearly shines out. It is here as if adequately certified, that the Hebrew state-engagement that was entered on did indeed involve—to at all events the subsequent Hebrew thought which caught, as I suppose, the real bearing of what were earlier facts,—true personal concurrence, on the part of every "soul" within the state-body. It is this which is everything as to present theory; and this is, as I believe, as to Hebrews made good:—while hence naturally follows inference for state-beginnings in general, *not* subsequently mythicized, or capable of so being, with the same force.—In the opposing case of the Grecian, or rather of the Athenian people, which I postulate for being typical as to Heathendom, state-formation had been requisitely cultured to the true secular point of fraternal republicanism: which, in my view, is of alien kind altogether to religionism. And what here stood as *Morals*, accordingly, I believe want-

* See, for casual illustration, *Psalms* LXXXVII. *And of Zion it shall be said, This and that man was born in her . . . The Lord shall count, when he writeth up the people, that this man was born there.*

ing in any basis at all adequate : resting merely, as it did, on the vague sense of "fitness" and "beauty" which, though justly in place for "art" on art's ground, means nothing that is intelligible of the sense now in question. But, none the less, even here was the constant binding of the idea of virtuous life, and especially of observed justice and fidelity, with recognized superintendence of gods, which might well, as I suppose, and even naturally must, have grown out of the prime conditions of tribehood universal.—The case indeed lies but with theory,—is open but to generalizing speculation. But surely, the plan I trace is, for reason, substantial. I argue precisely, that whereas *un*-congregated beings were therein, of necessity, without recognition of the very meaning of fidelity in engagements, so also were they destitute of moral sense ; while the in-coming of this into human nature was intrinsically but the same with the sense of supernal government which again coincided, by the actual state of normal occurrence, with the cemented tribe-union to which always some kind of god was made witness :—a god in general that was no more than fetish, but which eminently with the Hebrew was of the kind that could escape from being such, and developmentally pass on, as of right, into first the known phase of man-like Godhead, and thence finally into the full character of abstract Principle.

I imagine that the emergency which lay in circumstance that human beings *should* thus mass themselves together, for very power of carrying on human life, compelled to take rise—was the very means of creation to—the expressly *self*-quality of inward Conscience ; and that it did so through precisely the integral or focussed nature of the emergence. I mean, as anew comprising a knot of universally-sprung and all-varying but concurring

occasions. Primarily, there was compelling need of leagued defence against enemies, and of condition for affective life-enjoyment: touching oppositely self-interest to the quick;—while farther was exactly opened new ground for the stirring passions both of ambition and of the brutal craving for revenge. But the very instant that *futurity* came in question for the league,—and this must have come in with the rising regard to offspring pacific settlement involves,—the specific alteration here theorized for, of turn from passive modes into active ones, should naturally have again worked, and *thus* given duly effects of new creation on the spot. The very instant that a parent acts for a child, in the same way that he acts for himself, self-interest, I imagine, gains the newness of active character thence to oscillate in occurrence with the passive, which, in not destroying that first kind, raises contrarily both to a solidly-enduring stage of enhancement. And this occasioned oscillation, accordingly,—in being integral as I suppose it,—is the formative basis I see to the power of Conscience. Self-interest, *being* integrally transferrable to the extent in question, of possessed status in a duly-bonded condition of social aggregation, I imagine to be inherently productive of the stage of Egoism which is this highest: the consciously-accepted obligation to answer to terms of league that have been at their first institution, at least supposedly,—though by what originally was indeed a mere tyrannic legal fiction,—fairly signed and fairly witnessed to.

Here is root to the majestic power in man—in every born child of woman,—to make *promise*.—*When God made his promise to Abraham, because he could swear by no greater, he swore by Himself (Heb. vi. 13)*. And the same happens daily at the present time, when the cultured honest man, on any merest occasion of common life,

gives his word!—*Not without an oath*, and an appeal to the whole Law of the universe, does any religious man of the present day—any Christian man duly *anointed after the order of Melchizedec*,—pass his offered security for fulfilment! And the priesthood of this sort, now opened by Gospel-rule to every one of us, and now in-rooted, as by right it is ex-local, is therefore truly an *unchangeable priesthood*. Every time we make promise, we assert ourselves priests of the High God.

He is not the God of the dead, but of the living.—Is this not rightly interpreted, by true history, so soon as we read it thus:—namely, that Jehovah of the Hebrews was in this way *not* the Gentile fetish that fellow-tribes gave their bond to, but the spiritual I AM of Beinghood universal, which therein *was* just as much a Beinghood eternal, or for all Time, as it was for all Space: and just because of the rule of nature that Beinghood in actuality, or such only as we ourselves have to do with it, is a sequence of generations of living beings?

But let me now try to realize, by imagination, the instruction to my purpose that must needfully lie contained in the earlier-than-historic state of mentalism. According to my notion, no sign of moral sense, of right-kind, ought at all to have existed anteriorly to the bond of tribehood, *as* that of a voluntary aggregation of human beings, including view to the future; and, *à fortiori*, not among lower animals than human. And I believe that, notwithstanding surface matter against this, there is really to be found here at basis what I may urge as a very special confirmation to my present plan of moral theory; and as to what in it most concerns me to have support to.

The adverse matter I allude to is that, obviously, of

the common signs that are afforded by the higher of sub-human animals, which go at all events very near to being those of Conscience. Namely, in such case as when a dog, for example,—to choose that which of all others is pertinent,—adheres to a task of custody charged on it, though left alone by itself, and exposed to peril and severe actual suffering.—Now, for my own part, I see here what, in even taking it as it stands, seems yet best to be referred only to that pre-condition to the sense of Duty which, in the missing of any previous undertaking of such charge, made consciously by the dog, matches rightly with the dog's inferred want of true individualized selfhood. What I do alone recognize is no more than may well attach to but a mere *habit* of obedience, rendered perfect to this degree by a firm *will* to resist tempting away from it : the *will* being again the sufficient testifier to what only need import a general comfort in obedience, with besides an affective sentiment in action towards its human controller. Nor even does the case seem materially enhanced when we add-in the common signs which in moods of playfulness instead of danger are coincident with this affectionate fidelity :—those, namely, which exhibit *shame* entertained : as when the dog, being found out in some casual transgression, hangs its head, and mostly proffers even more than usual of its caresses, as in cajolery for the felt offence's well-anticipated condonement. The capability of *shame* is indeed, as I believe, the richest out of all the rich elements that are engaged in the moral sense's production ; but then, as here exhibited, it is too manifestly of a mere outer kind—too plainly the mere reflection of the atmosphere of social judgment that belongs to every kind of aggregation, or even but of two-fold connection, for beings that have sought of intellect at all,—to betoken more than what is

moral pre-condition.—But this case *as it stands*, and any case that is similar, is moreover what has always to be remembered for as none truly of conditionment that developmentally is natural. Its conditioning is altogether artificial, in the sense of man's having had a working hand in it.—And it is here, accordingly, that I precisely find my point.

The relation that subsists actually between the animal tamed by man and the latter, is indeed none that we can name accurately by terms framed for ourselves. The lower creature, housed and petted, and answering to this with love of its own, is far from being rightly a "slave." It is much more near to being a *child* of its master;—but then a child only by adoption: which is an utter varying of the proper meaning of childhood. But hence, I wish to urge, there is surely here afforded no less than a very parallel to the case man has made for himself under supernaturalism. A God, treated grossly as man, is surely in regard to the man what the man may in just inference be supposed to appear to the stimulated thinking-fancy of the cultured dog. By his very adopting of the brute, man has made himself to it what the brute can only feel, so far as it is stimulated to reasoning-fancy, for in the place of a man-god to it.—If so, however, I plead this: here precisely there is done for us the true *experimenting* with supernatural religion, which ought evidently to supply us with the serviceable indication we have need of, in regard to moral influence produced. If directly we had sought means so to experiment, this in fact is the resource, and the exact one, which alone we could have found open to us.

As to then my own result from observation of the process, I give it without hesitating in but repeating what I have just said: that the actual "moral" influence

made discernible is by no means carried farther than to mere preparation for being such of right. And my reason for the judgment I rest mainly on these two things :— first, that the amusing practice which the dog, by eminence, employs, of coaxing out forgiveness for misdoing, is, in earnest, all replete with depravation ;—but also, and even more fundamentally, that the animal kind of “love” which I grant truly to be awakened for the creature’s master, is such as notably stands opposed to, and is destructive of, the love which, as I desire to assume, is alone natural in the case of human beings. The petted animal that repays nurture in the way it does, by affection for its accepted guardian, cares manifestly the less in consequence for its fellow animals, even in regard to mate and progeny. And this, I say,—and I say it by immediate instinct,—is distortion, inconsistent with true development : which ought to lead it on towards the human mode of exercise of love, where essentially these stand first as its proper objects. The dog running wild amid fellow-dogs, I feel sure, would have done better in this most necessary respect.

I grant that in the special case of the dog there is present a true beginning of the power of “promise :”—there is a genuine initiation to the deliberately-framed compact which I hold for the sole occasion to sense of Duty : shown by the noble indignation of the brute when the man is the one to fail as to the understood engagement between them,—repeated finely, as I submit, by, in some instances, the Hebrew bondsmen of Jehovah, as to all events a pleading claim upon even their omnipotent Autocrat (see especially II. *Esdras*, III. 30-6). Also I grant that the obtained enhancement of the brute’s mental perceptions in general, by its human association, is so much of sheer good.—And this I would compare with the great

secular advantage to the Hebrews of being indeed rendered, *by* their bonding to Jehovah, into firmly the solid status of a "people:" prolific to them, as it was, of all kinds of what is secular cultivation.—But in the point I now refer to there is sign of interference with what otherwise makes part of whole progress, which, as such, bears full suggestion of fundamental disintegration set on foot. And here therefore is the theoretic aid I imagine:—to be made available by its applying to human history; and more generally than under solely Hebrew limits. I mean, in taking typical Hebrewism as extendible through and beyond Christianity.

For the experimenting thus on animals plainly indicates, I imagine, that the integral partition I suppose between the inherent spheres of Love and Duty,—allowing for a third appropriate to intellect,—either has been, or must be in future, borne out. And this from the very showing, by true and deep theoretic suggestion, that the relation of *mastery*, in precisely affording ground for the existence of what is genuine sense of Duty, is none the less, at the same time, intrinsically antagonistic to the natural ground of Love. That is, in regard to the fact—applying equally to the third province,—that any *excess* in cultivation of the one is answered duly by diminution of character in the other—or rather in the *two* other departments. The intrinsic separateness of the three modes, or integralized habits, of mental being, seems thus placed in terms that bear immediate verifying.—And, taking the clue in hand, I will therefore now return to my interrupted track.

I by no means desire to imply that the Hebrew people fell actually, as result of their own bondage to Jehovah, into the animal's induced state of comparative neglect of

its own true relational ties. The very injunctions that are attributed to Jehovah for requisite fulfilment of these ties, so far as they were then understood, show deliberate provision against this which indeed testifies, in common with the known character of the race, to even a specific leaning to domestic practice of life :—so that, even here exactly I seem to find the circumstantial cause of the direct honour to domestic functions which had subsequent effect in Christianity. The innate propensity of Hebrews, I imagine, was specifically towards home life and home affections. And hence their love to Jerusalem, and to the Lord's house, which broke out into such fervour in their state of captive exile from these :—as is made known to us in those treasuries of true religious experience they have bequeathed to us in their immortal Psalms. When they went up in due service to Zion, we are well shown, they went constantly in company:—in companies of ordered neighbourhoods and families. The inclination to association in religious formalism which is, as I consider, the very sign of true character in the latter, seems perfectly exhibited amongst them.

But, on the other hand, they surely exhibit, and exhibit eminently among fellow-peoples, the other kind of indicated defect, which is marked as to the dog in its special habit of *fawning* on its master. The Hebrews, of peculiarity, are chargeable to modern sense with what appears in especially those very Psalms as but ordinary adulation of a reigning King. There even lies against them constantly the imputation of the unreal kind of homage to a superior which has eye all the time to self-advantage; and which therein is intrinsically, to human and conscious beinghood, and just accordingly to the degree of consciousness in action, the vice we designate "*hypocrisy*". And this sufficiently is witnessed to, in course, by the

series of admonitions laid on them by their national instructors, the prophets. We need only compare, above all, the exhortations and remonstrances of Ezekiel with some of those very Psalms, to confirm what arises to most of us, in hearing their repetition in our own churches, of instinctive averseness to the tone of them. To most of us, I would say, there is an inward shrinking from adopting personally—as our churches' rule lays the peril on us of requiring from us,—such exaggerated professions of our own religiousness as the Hebrews, in those national hymns, felt it honour to their God to make before Him. We cannot, for ourselves, make at first-hand the boast which the Psalmist insists on as he does, with so much passionateness, of an exceeding delight in God's Law :—in a Law that we feel well to have been framed even exactly for a different object than our delight ; being that expressly of controlling us in respect of what is wont to be our delight, as easy but unworthy self-indulgence. We feel that, above all, in “God's house,” or God's realized presence, true devotion is incompatible with such boasting.—And though truly in the Hebrew case there were circumstances that even partially make genuineness possible in these expressions, *not* present for ourselves, the vice intrinsically is such that any tampering with it under semblance of earnestness ought obviously to give us feeling of contamination.

The palliation to be borne in mind is evidently, as I allow, the unavoidable exaltation that must have animated the Hebrew's selfhood when, especially under his foreign captivity, he was enforced to make comparison of his own habitualized subjection to Law with the witnessed relative lawlessness of other peoples. He might genuinely idolize God's law, when amidst the effects of a law of idols! Also truly, under the bitterness of this exile,

he might almost bear regarding with present charity for even that wished reprisal on the actual "little ones" of his oppressors, which to take barely on our own lips is too brutal for us to imagine doing:—showing thus, as it does, but the likely counterpart to the exaggerated desire of the Lord's courts, and the esteemed amiableness, thousandfold, of the privilege of being there instructed, which his natural wistfulness towards Zion was sufficient cause for. His very cursing of his enemies—claimed, crushingly towards God, to be God's own,—is but manifestly a needful part of that deeply-unassorted stage of development, which by the dog, under human godship, is shown in matching fawning upon its own master with equal snarling upon the masters of other dogs.—The very matter of development's being in question, is enough palliative, in fact, as to the whole case. Even as to hypocrisy we are forced to make the general defence, that some viciousness or other, approvable as such to us now, must inevitably have given character to any local exhibition of a generally lower stage of mental nature.

Thus, I take it under granted historic theory, that so long as God *was* alone to Hebrews their virtual earthly King, hypocrisy was but naturally promoted for them; however this was really the obstruction in the way of mental progress which thence constantly needed struggles for its repression, such as actually prophets admirably fostered. And here precisely I find lucid explanation, on my own terms, of that ever-prevailing call for, or pretension to, the virtue of what is "*righteousness*," which so notably represents in itself the whole import of prophetic teachings. To enter into the Hebrew feeling about "*righteousness*" may be assumed at once to be the weighing fairly of their actual moral position. And when truly this is joined, as I postulate for, with the

primal notion about Duty I have now traced, I believe the subject may be held indeed, as to at least its whole basis, cleared of difficulty.

For if "righteousness" be kept strictly to connection with the idea of "debt," we are at once on common ground with the Apostle Paul as to that which is his own expressed judgment,—little otherwise explainable,—that for offence against God's law, any single instance whatever of transgression is equivalent to transgression that is entire. "*He that offends in one point,*" said this best judge of Hebrewism, "*is guilty of the whole law :*"—and this apparent moral paradox, as I will show, my own integral dealing with the matter just enables me to meet. I banish instantly, by my method, the detail notion of righteousness which is now common,—and against which, as I conceive, Paul is here in reality but raising protest,—by whose effect the term's bearing is diverted into ground that is merely concrete : being set, namely, to the direct matter of the stated ordinances of the law, instead of held to the one matter-in-general of vowed obedience to the whole body of such. To be "righteous" in Paul's sense, or in true Hebrew sense, I also for myself recognize to mean simply, "to adhere rigidly to an accepted bond, which, by a comprehended understanding, has respect of eminence to moral conduct." Or, more simply still,—to obviate reference which to us, though it was not to Hebrews, is exceptionable, as having object in now-obsolete ceremonialism,—I would define "righteousness" but thus : as mere "*rectitude of moral practice in paying up such engaged-for bond to the full.*" For this applies as much to a bond that has become finally, as it needs do, personal, as it does to the first Hebrew kind of bond that was merely national. And by this rigidly-abstract interpretation, the finest parallel is here gained

for the moral term with what is even mathematical precision in terminology: an entire connotation being implicated with what stands postulated of mere physical perpendicularity. To be righteous is to be morally upright; and what is it to be "upright" but to hold by the strict demand of leaning never any more in any one direction than in any other?—while again it is evident, of precisely this indifference as to proclivity, that if but thought of as in section, or by static view, it presents in pure essence the ideal of two-sided *barter*. To be upright on such terms is, however, also accounted for as being the same, in the way it is, with being *just*. All whatever of moral rectitude, accordingly, is hence shown to demonstration for what I claim it, of sole *accuracy* in its kind,—of accuracy in what at full is representable as but spiritual *rectangularity*.

To fulfil truly what was Hebrew Duty, therefore, we may well see to have been that which the Apostle for himself groaned over, as he did, for an infliction too hard for man to bear. It was, in my reading of him, the very soundness of Paul's moral constitution, and the very truthfulness of his own personal conscience, that here bespoke itself: as in a vent of rightly-justified resentment, on exactly his own personal account, against the primal dispensation which he felt to have out-grown:—while in this justified resentment, again, I see proof of there being now, in Paul's age, and for Paul's fellows, the true need of a new national representer to re-model for Hebrews, and in a way that might serve for all mankind, the conditionment first ratified by Abraham:—the "true need" that, as such, held promise of providential fulfilment. Nor was wanting the counter-symptom also necessary, to show the need's reality: that of the aggravation to the point of requisite urgency amid the

mass of Paul's lower-minded countrymen of the religious malady denounced by prophets: the prevailing vice of hypocrisy which, as I suppose, the Abrahamic or Mosaic constitution tended naturally to produce and foster. For when actually the required antitype appeared, in him whose simply-human career yet furnished duly proper ground for later mythicizing upon, in respect of a new covenanting with Deity, what stands out more plainly on record, as immediate moral action of Jesus, than precisely his resumption to the utmost of preceding denunciations of hypocrisy:—namely, as of the deepened form of the old disease, which, medicined vainly as it had been, had now come to head in the full religious rottenness of what the gospels make us know as "Pharisaism"? The state of feeling implied by this, I imagine, was exactly that which, as the gospel-parable represents, made the average Hebrew man—instead of saying, as the Apostle-publican did virtually, in real humility of self-knowledge, "Wretched man that I am, who shall free me from this law of captivity, forcing on me such warring consciousness of sin?"—say, in miserably self-deceptive variation, "I thank God that the sin around me I escape."—Just the arriving at this point of degeneracy I see as the full conviction of Mosaism for being, save alone as to the elect Christian few, after weighing in time's balances, found wanting.

What then was the actual product, transmitted by these elect, and apt naturally to catch mythic light, which now we may see, from present station, to be indeed deserving of then being taken for Messianic restitution? Or, in other words, how did actually Christianity afford cure that was genuine to the moral vice set on foot?—I own that again here, at first sight, my theory appears crossed. But this is still with what resolves into only

final confirmation. It is in fact merely that the course of moral progress, which at first is inevitably anticipated as straight, yet requires, by the very law of thought-formation I am consenting to, to turn primarily, at every case of new production, as if backward on previous method of advance. It is but, as I remind myself, the true phenomenon of "leaf-growth" which is again apparent.

Certainly it is now evident that the only cure for moral rottenness of any sort is what we mean by expressly the present term of *Morality*. I grant however boldly as to Christianity,—and by this I mean, without any of such misgiving for my own theory as must otherwise have lain upon me,—that especially as to Paul's handling of its doctrinism, this is *not* of type moral, but even the opposite. And this distinctly in the very matter of its offered remedy for hypocrisy. My remaining track of required thought in regard to Duty, it hence seems to me, must be the following. Premising, as I do for myself, that the real ripening of *Morality* into efficiency is alone by its own gained differentiation, into separately religious and secular, attending similar result with Duty's import : I have to show how the apparent backing on this effect which accompanied Christianity was actually but a true raising of means for it.

And I may still, it appears to me, draw reliantly on the enticing aid of etymology, so far as this is open to me. Even in respect to English wording it seems clear that the special bearing of what is Christian terminology no way varies in reality, or by what is intrinsic cause, from that of phrasing supplied by religious Hebrewism. For the new moral demand raised by Paul, which however has the aspect of being *un-moral*, is that of "*faith*," set pre-eminently above detail action : and what is "*faith*," as to at all events its Latin derivation, but the subjective

correlate to the power of maintaining *promise*, which again is the precise sanction to all *debt*? "Faith" in the Old Testament lies mainly on the part of Deity: it is God who is insisted on as "faithful." But in the ripened apprehension of the New, where the function in the case is referred justly in active fashion to man, it is the latter who is only looked to, as needing care on account of faithfulness to the prime bargain. If *man* will but keep his pledge, it is now affirmed, all with God is secure, out of reach of doubt. And hence while "faith," as I suppose, had its root-import in sole reference to the promiser on either side of any bargain, it came now to adhere rather to the secondary attached meaning of the opponent's *trust* in the promiser's fidelity. And this is all, as I conceive, that really varies the Christian case from the Hebrew.—But, moreover, the signal term of "*truth*" stands in wholly correspondent predicament. The word "truth" in Bible usage occurs constantly in association and even as in exchangeableness with the term of "righteousness;" and, as our native Saxon explains, is indeed therein but one with preserved "*troth*;"—while it falls again, just as "faith" does, into the inevitable duplicity of meaning one thing as to God, when referred to Him, and another thing as having reference to ourselves: namely, in the first case, the kind of "truth" which from the absence of any possibility of exception to it, was apt from the first to its present general implication of an abstract quality *per se*; and, in the second case, the kind of "truth" which we now designate the rather by the term of "*truthfulness*," matching in exactness with "faithfulness."—The whole class of kindred word-forms is but drawn from the slightest shifting of the common meaning:—*truth*, and *righteousness*, and *obligation*, and *justice*, and *faith*, and *duty*,

and all ramifying off-shoots from these, are but mutually-supplementary varieties of the one idea of *debt*: of *debt* that is deliberately entered into, and authoritatively witnessed to :—and the glowing symbols of the whole Bible are consistent with it. All along, from the first poetry of the burning bush, and the clouding veil of the sanctuary, to the sterner mythicism of Paul and Paul's fellows, there is, I conceive, but an ever-deepening intimation of the arriving nature of Conscience, as the truly-hidden, but none the less, the manifestly-Divine orderer of Duty. I see throughout but the constant leading of the idea of Duty into that which, in fact, I precisely now wish to define it for :—“*that which points to moral action of such sort as that innately we are aware of its being naturally of Divine engagement,*” or, “*of engagement to which God, for general nature, and Conscience for each separate self of us, are perceived to have set duly hand and seal.*”

In Paul's notion of “faith” I see thus the real gist that is legitimate, of but affording an availing expedient for exactly the needful turning of the pledge's force on the right ground of our own conscious selfhood. The moral point in demand was that of “truth in the inward parts,” in the place of mere deceptive ceremonialism. And, as “truth in the inward parts” can mean only what respects the closed sanctuary of true human affections, or central *heart* of us, it was inevitable, I infer, as first-step in the matter, that his evangelism should alone import, as we find it do, the changing of God's claim upon man into such as might follow upon Love, considered specially as directed towards God, instead of such as was chiefly motivated by Fear :—this being naturally consequent on the personalness still attributed to Deity ; and this indeed the more specially for the effect concerned, of the Hebrew's Despot now passing into instead the Christian's

God of the express "Father of Christ." The God of Hebrews, as Paul came to regard him, we may well look on as the rigid lord of the gospel-parable, to whom it was granted only for bare justice, that, in regard to failing payment of his required tribute,—in imitation, it may be, of tyrannic practice in ordinary,—he should cast the hapless debtors "to the tormentors." But the Christian's God was, on the contrary, all willing to take "security" for the payment, such as Christ, by Christian symbolism, himself offered. And hence "faith" given to God might draw naturally towards both Father and Son the sentiment, alone personal, of true Love:—that is, of the true remedy for hypocrisy, such of right, which as thus turned was indeed temporarily effective, though at the same time an acting hindrance of direct kind to its own perfect operation. Love to God, "through Christ Jesus," I conceive to have meant indeed, even for Paul, the same kind of self-surrender *in-integro* to a purposed obedience to God's law, as a law of righteousness in general, as that signed to by the kind that was Mosaic, except for this: that it went farther than the latter into the internal ground which needed noting by Conscience. The former, binding to a wholly integral observance that respected outward conduct, was but merged into the deepened demand for an integral *heart-desire* to obey God:—which, by force of purchased grace, it was supposed would stand to God as obedience actual. And this surely is what no form of Morality, however cleared of prunal symbolism, can gainsay.—The whole case is but that of a continually-increasing emergency, met by answer that was respondent. The claim on Love of the Hebrew's God was his mere rescue of his bounden subjects out of secular Egypt and Babylon: their abandonment to whose thralldom was the "torment" he apportioned them for

the false weight and false measure of rendered dues with which previously they had tried to cheat him. The claim on Love of the Christian's God was that of rescue from the expatriation that was spiritual, the soul's abandonment to the domain of Sin, where its "torment" was shown inevitably as eternal, and by apparently true logic as none the less mainly physical, just as true kind of spiritual enjoyment is the contrary:—since as to that which now we feel, that pain of body is a dead stop to spirit-growth, *this* lies, I imagine, with what for its correcting is beyond Christianity's means of touching. It was enough, at the time, that Christ should vanquish, for his own, the Power of hell. It is only now, I believe, that the reign of Sin, as a plain reality, may be seen vanquishable, to sufficient measure for the soul's "saving," by every living soul-possessor for himself.

When the Law of Love came in force, I conceive that there was brought about a rebound against the previous Law of Fear that by its very violence, though alone by this, involved temporary inadequacy in itself. To fear, in the proper sense of religion, is assuredly *as* essential as to love:—provided only that the right division be ascertained as to requisite spheres for each to have primary right of exercise in. The sphere of *Mastery*, I am contending, is appropriate always and of right, both to a rendering of tribute-Duty, and to the sentiment of Fear, if refined enough;—but the sphere of *Love*, on the contrary, needs shutting off entirely both from Duty and from Fear, as ruling influences. And therefore, when Jesus set up standard for Christianity, as he did, by adopting for it the already-produced formula, of demanded "*Love for God, with all the heart, and all the soul and mind and strength*,"—treated as the epitome that would henceforth serve for all Hebrew vowed tribute due to God:—I

assure myself that the true way of understanding him is but in duly allowing for an excess of fervour. I feel justified in but reading it as glowing poetry that for moral accuracy must be classed as but attendant on symbolism, or concrete human figuring of Deity.—And in fact I note, as to this outburst of ripened Hebrewism, that Jesus matched it with a poetic parallel as to *Fear*:—when, namely, he broke forth into the awful warning, as to that which he would have his disciples cower under; “*Fear Him, I say unto you, verily, who hath the power, after killing the body, [much worse than any killing of merely this,] of casting soul and body together into hell.*” This too, I would say, but needs treating as under colour of anthropomorphism to be felt expressive, in true moral sublimity, of the requirement which is perpetual on our selfhood, of not hiding from us nature’s well-proclaimed threat, of the suffering entailed by sin, far surpassing instant death, of slow bodily and mental disintegration. Fear of punishment of this sort, I consider, is duly refined to the point of permanence:—and just because, on the chief side concerned, the very penance implied is but the reflective kind of this forming *re-pentance*; and because, equally, the fear applied to God is now, as such, softened requisitely to *re-verence*.

But Jesus added to this great Hebrew commandment what indeed, as to the force that he gave to it, was a second that we may well count his own. It is in the reading we give to *this*, it is therefore plain, that the moral action of Christianity is mainly opened to us. And again I am bold to theorize that exaggeration is presented which, if not duly allowed for, and with attending sense of historic colouring, stands as hindrance to moral value. We cannot in literalness, I urge, “*love our neighbour as ourself*:”—so that actually in commanding this,

if Jesus so intended to do, he must again have but been raising a new incentive to hypocrisy, of the kind he had set himself to destroy. I believe the rather, therefore, that the real import to the lavish phrase was this local one: that all the benefit which followed from loving God, and being impliedly loved by Him, must be owned at the same time, and with the same kind of reference to heart-willingness, and to the willingness of the entire sphere of human powers, to be as free to fellow-creatures who were Gentiles and Samaritans as even to the eldest Hebrew in question personally. This, I think, is the one point that here harmonizes Jesus with Paul; and that, in doing so, brings consistency into the whole matter of the moral growth under process. And for the exact reason, that thus was laid free of barriers the ground needing to be that of principle, in place of now-obsolete supernaturalism, which alone *as* thus opened can befit the new character to be assumed. That is, by the very means, now urged as such, of making "Love to God" import solely the heart-tribute to God shown in yielding to Him the true *sovereignty* over—in place of a mere share in—the domain of our affections:—in making subject to God's law, with implication of taxed-duty accordant, the inter-traffic of affections applying naturally alone to fellow-beings.

And this already contained latent aim towards the ultimate differentiation of Morality. The very insight which proved to Jesus that the heart's realm needed bringing forth to light, as to its demand of regulation, caused him also to answer thus the alien disputants who vexed him, in his purely religious object, with questions of only secular import: "*Render truly to Cæsar what is Cæsar's,*" but "*to God what is God's.*" Here already seems stated in poetic prophecy the whole future event

to befall Law, of its parting finally, under agreed mutual bounds, into Law-of-man as of social statehood, and Law-of-God as affecting personal Conscience: which however it belongs of right not to Christian mode of thought, much more than Hebrew, to bring about, but to that which comes as fruit to the ever-working effect which has gone on through Christianity's whole season of endurance. Namely, that which is neither Hebrew nor even Christian sense of Deity, but such as springs as the light-centre of developmentalism.—I reach therefore here to the point of the remaining object I have marked for myself: that of trying to assign as definitely the bounded sphere which needs be allotted to Law Divine, as I have had hope of assigning definitely by this present discussion the bounding import of the pervading function of that province, in sense of Duty.

This latter I now collect then as follows.—I suppose that the one import which has been constant to the term of Duty, through all its stages of progressive enhancement,—of which indeed Mosaism and Christianity are inclusive representers,—has been that of an over-mastering impression on us, springing out of social aggregation, though affecting us alone in our individualism. It implies of specialty *self-action*: since Duty, save in reference to *doing*, is a nullity. It means a “doing” from essentially *self-impulse*:—which however is not therein prevented from being just as essentially a proper *task*: enforced by what is outward compulsion, and assented to as such by our inmost power of recognition, or the real centre to our whole nature, as much of feeling as of intellect. It is intrinsically an integral perception, both as to itself and the correlate state of circumstance which draws it forth:—an ultimate kind of miracle-of-integra-

tion, or rather of semi-integration, which has the effect of stamping the human being—still alone as by imaging back environment,—with the character of a self-motived agent: perhaps through contrast with the main effect of integration that is entire.—To produce perfectly the effect of moral sense, outlying circumstance must be rendered a true atmosphere: an atmosphere holding means in itself to recompense conduct in both ways of reward and punishment, by means of bestowed honour and inflicted shame: the latter being specifically to Conscience its guarding *pain*, just as similarly to all other human functions, whether mental or bodily, are attached severally their own phases of distinctive pain. A good Conscience means the simple complacency of being in state to endure testing, should testing arise, without loss to its own mode of well-being, as simple absence of moral pain; a bad one is that stung to precise suffering of shame. And according to the existing quality of the latter is hence determinable the possessed fineness and potency of the moral sense. To make shame the real minister of perceived Duty, the compulsion giving force to it must be that, wholly inward, which implies alone sense of Deity for that which forms the morally-acting atmosphere: the soul's pain must be purely felt in the soul itself, and have respect to nothing else than the soul's correlate. And this condition, I imagine, follows only from the due separating of the kinds of moral action, or detail *duties*, which relate naturally to aggregation that is merely general, from those whose regard is to a state of this specifically individualistic.—As to a standard indication of stages, therefore, the causal graduation appears this. Whereas ripeness of moral sense demands for itself perfect all-sidedness, with pure subtleness of diffused ability of impression: it befalls that just as sense

of God is merely personal, and especially as He is more of a mere Tyrant, the soul's bearing in religion is almost wholly in *one* direction:—whence the pain of shame, instead of merely being a liability, is such as acts but in creating as-it-were a local bruise, in itself only a hindering of moral growth. But then again, the very fact that the Power bringing men together in aggregation is for ever, as to men, but expressible by relations than in due working are not tyrannic, but only varyingly-affective in beneficently-human sort which, as such, is indeed *therein* all-sided in full response to the case's need,—the very fact of this implies, I would say, the induced world-like revolution for our own minds which, in itself, brings the outlying burden to the mere weight of world-like atmosphere, adapted *as* such to become morally inspirable. By the time that God's symboling has really done its work, of creating in us the Consciousness, in regard to it, which is alone *fit* to beget Conscience, I conceive that the apprehension is made ready of an "imperative" of *must* and *ought* over-ruling us, in the proper mode of *principle*, which is inevitably to be taken for the sublime mode it has been ever taken.

Science came, as we know, to its actual height of character through its realizing for itself the ability of *pre-vision*; while of *Consciousness* we see, that it has played its actual part in whole development through but giving to all mentalism the leading boon of *re-reflectiveness*. The engendered function of *Con-science*, therefore, seems elevated but of right to the crowning post which all instinct allots to it, when we see it, as by present showing we may, as uniting within itself both effects. The moral sense, as is now supposed, began with a duly-ordered engagement, for the object of carrying law, in the mode required by science, into *conduct*:—but this accordingly was in its

nature *pre*-engagement. The final action of Conscience, however, involves necessarily *re*-reflection on the engagement, more or less directly present to thought. Duty never can be reasoned out save in faithfully re-producing the first engagement.—Also, as Science has its testing by sense of Truth; while Emotionalism requires that this sense shall essentially cause Happiness:—so the testing of a law of Conscience agrees with that of both in the demanding explicitly a mental Truthfulness, exactly as carried out in social Conduct: thus assuredly involving Happiness of utmost sort, and of a sort applying as much to Selfhood as to Social-statehood. For even the abstract sense, by present plan, but comes to its own actual Divine purport—or, but comes to be felt as *the* Truth,—through forming a mere oscillating compromise, or intellectual bargain maintained faithfully, between separately-gained results of thought and feeling. And what is Duty-in-the-abstract may well owe its filling up to the same kind of inclusion of opposed departments.

THE ACTUAL CLASS-FORM WHICH SEEMS PROVIDED FOR A DISTINCTIVELY-RELIGIOUS MORALITY.

The one matter in which alone abstract Duty gains newness of character, when adjudged to a sphere formulated as secular, is, in fact, that which regards Truth: taken exclusively, however, in the sense used by Zechariah, when the latter urges triumphantly on the restored Jews, more in prophecy than exhortation,—“*These are the things ye shall do*”: besides executing the judgment of truth and peace in your gates, ye shall “*speak every man the truth to his neighbour.*” Verbal truth, I imagine, is the only religious virtue that belongs specifically to mere Social Morality, in addition to the two prime ones,

of Brotherhood and willed obedience to ordained Law.

In a true state of Nationality the sort of Mastery which its fixed government embodies is in no way more personal than I believe to be the case in the sphere religious. It is always the Nation's *Law* that holds authority. Just however in being *brothers* to one another men are wholly, by nature's plan of enforced Struggle, set as rivals as to objects to be lived for : whence Mastership, in a secondary sense, stands indeed as the only sign of obtained worldly success. Like all lower antecedents in beinghood, human integers can only compass life-position by surmounting a large number of fellow-strivers. Every atom, at creation's basis, had to master fellow-atoms ; and human beings, at the topmost stage of creation, have nothing for it but to follow out the rule :—laid originally, as I suppose, in the ultimate inevitability of pervading inequalities of condition. But the effect of Law, incidental, on aggregation, to exclusively human beings,—*when* attended with a produced sense of Fraternity, of the kind I have just referred to the second of the great commandments of Christ,—means an influence in common on all members of any Nation, which only wants for its completing the established practice of *verbal truth*, as the instrument of interhuman communication, to be rendered surely adapted for all needful restraining of such rivalry : within, namely, the bounds which are so far from preventing, that they specifically promote, human happiness.—To have a fellow-being for the Nation's *Master*, I fully recognize, is most certain impediment to happiness ; as it is to moral growth in every way. But to have a selected agent, or rather agency, for the due administration of appointed Law,—the “selection” and the “appointment” being duly “bonded,” stamped and sealed by every member of the Nation, in repetition of

what was tribal-religious practice:—*this*, I say, is no other than a just availance of religious help, in creating a due *Conscience* of Nationality: a principle as to *crime*, or secular disobedience, which exactly answers to the consciousness of religious *sin*.

It is “crime”, as we account, to break engagement with the Nation’s governing-power as to all kinds of legal ordination, each and several, which that power has also bound itself to, by force of state penalties, to maintain on one and all of its subjects: this being, naturally, the proper means of forbidding any of the fortune-favoured of the latter from battling *unfairly* with weak rivals. And indeed, in all civilized states, the prevailing function of Law is, as I have implied (pp. 169, 171), to afford only what is sureness of fulfilment to pledges given by subjects to one another, under witnessed appeal to the power of government; since Law that is merely secular can obviously deal only with express cases of disobedience, of overt showing. A promise made “without an oath,” at least virtually made present, stands for nothing in the eye of National Law;—and much less does mere accuracy in what only is personal statement.—But then, the instant a related Conscience appears, so also is the Self-respect evoked which regards *shame* of being but *liable* to detection;—while, farther, the consciousness of what is due to Self-personal, and the desire to be true to *this*, involve the care as to all verbal expression which is the import of “truth spoken to our neighbour.”

And when secular respects have worked thus far, by help of alien religiousness,—in creating the sense of personal *honour*: *honour* that again is two-fold, as meaning severally honour *shown* and *demand*ed: *honour*, or rather *honesty*, both active and passive in its implication:—nature’s “law of the strongest” is surely vindicated.

The desire of mastery for self has risen to the evolutionary point of meaning thence nought but good to even the foreign selves that are subjected.—In what is obvious fact, even the aim of pure beneficence, in requiring of a fellow-creature to be grateful to its exercizer, is an obtained mastery over him: equally if aid physical, or aid moral and intellectual be in question. We cannot *deserve* any way personal esteem, or personal approval and admiration, without forcing fellow-beings to look *up* to us; and thence to render actually the very *tribute* which, however finer in its quality, is still of the same kind of bonded *service* as that which a common master has claim for on a common servant. To force another to admire us, or to force him even to agree in opinion with us, is but a new mode of enslaving him, however voluntarily and delightfully. But then the nature of what is mastery so refined is free from injury on either side, by precisely its temporariness and shiftingness: since an accident at any time, and always the effect of age, may at once change the mutual positions:—while hence actually is made way for all ceasing of any personalness in the case, and the substituting of sole mastery of principle.—Also, in true evolutionary course, even the personal sort ripens in the end alone to become this: an obtained *mastery over self*. The function is but complete, when the stronger of the two parties under struggle is alone the higher of the two sides attached to selfism, which, in being spiritual and thence capable of principle, is able rightly to crush down the side sensually defective in regulation.—And, taken thus, Nature's "law of the strongest", it seems to me, is in no way a thing needful to be afraid of. It respects purely our arriving to embody in ourselves the final image of moral strength, repeating for us relatively the Force-in-general which is the Divine essence of

evolution :—and to develop personal ambition thus, is, we may say, by symbol, “to love God with our strength.”

For Secular Morality, therefore, the religious basis attendant I would define as no other than a vaguely-diffused consciousness of required Truthfulness, or Justice,—the two words being taken specially as equivalent to one another,—which needs to sway us in each particular instance of ordered intercourse with fellow-men. It must touch deeper ground than that of *crime*: which respects only nominated detail cases, while this respects necessarily all such ;—and it thus forms truly the *tax* on social virtue, payable alone to God, which is well accountable as laid by nature on the *commerce* of life-transactions: *non* regardable as such in just sequence of culture to the mere *battle* of life carried on by un-moralized savages, or, by men having neither Nation nor Law.—And this answers precisely to the defining terms I have laid out for the opposing sphere.

Religious Morality I am contrarily designing as that where a kind of tax, or of *due*-ty towards God, is brought in question, which is of special and unique import. Namely, as signifying a kind of commerce, or barter engaged in by fellow-beings, which stands eminently alone as dependent on sanction from Deity. Here, where it is question not of ordering the Nation but the Family, the diffused sense of having a something imposed, of required conduct to be observed, is brought to an express nucleus, importing pointedness as central in that which is the “will” of Ruling Power. And accordingly what I wish to plead is that here needs in future be brought about, by consciously directed human efforts, such framed constitution of needful Law—of the Law needful to *every* state of aggregation,—as may rightfully be adapted to the peculiarity of the condition :—since all progress in

evolutional condition *must* henceforth, by the Divine rule of the case, be obtained through alone our active aim towards it.

It is only by induced change in the integral constitution of the kind of Law concerned, that the attendant action of the moral sense can be rectified, to the need of the new stage I am supposing. Duty in regard to Family-condition, I urge, must be in its every bearing on detail action as religious *manifestly* as in worldly practice it is so only latently. That is, moral principle must claim ostensibly its relation to Divine and not human kind of Law. State-of-Family must, in fact, take up evolutionally what to Hebrews was state-of-Nation: cleared, however, from all its secular respects, and adapted to the new relational experience ripened under Christianity. God, and God only, must stand as Head to it: commanding, as He does alone, those issues of Life and Death which to state-of-Family are the properly-abiding element. God only must stand as authorizer of the rules of life whose observing forms the "righteousness"-of-Family: the detail rules which indeed are but differenced phases to the one matter of abstract Duty. And the variance in these parted phases—so much greater as it is here than any falling amid secular modes of Duty,—I take again for the proper sign of progress that is critical, attained by Conscience. The minor shades in the general feeling of Duty which attend on what are ordinarily named "duties," in life secular,—as "duties" between landlord and tenant, and between traders, and between governors and governed, and those generally between individual and individual,—are scarcely notable in comparison with those others, in life domestic, which regard infancy and maturity, singleness and connubialism, and, above all, sex-distinction. And the doing of justice to

these latter variations means the perfecting of the adjustment of Conscience to the whole circuit of constant human conditions, which implies surely new life to the moral function.—Conscience, I conceive, is alone capable of being integral, which is the same as being religious, by force of being accurately apportioned to the mental integers it concerns.—But even for rule of Conscience, —even exactly for its being Conscience that is concerned, —I find necessary the new supposal of direct “covenant” in the case: “covenant” made directly with Deity. Except for the implication of a Divine Covenant, ratifiable by every mode of ripened Conscience, either singly or all in one, I see nothing that can give to Law-of-Family its effectual establishment.

And hence the sequence I have aimed to demonstrate, as lying in reason, for the Hebrew binding to Jehovah into what may be a true contract of Marriage. (See II. pp. 560-89.) The Hebrew Nation, as such, claimed actually to be as Spouse to the Nation’s Lord; and contracted accordingly:—or, at least, was so stated to have done, in retrospective mythicism. And the fact of this I argue to be a real prophecy and antedation of what the Marriage-tie must become when moulded to be such of right:—namely, in part as to be assigned where alone it is in place, between sex-divided human beings; and in part as to the actual provision of needful *contract* in the case. Before Christian times,—or rather, before Christianity had been grounded well in moral soil,—the tie of Family was but secular altogether, and independent of Conscience, save as ruling in general over matters of traffic. The Wife was bought; and bought not from herself, but from a despot-father. *She* signed to no bond: she had Conscience of no bondage, in religious sense;—nor until Christianity had done its work, through the

whole bearing of its dogmatism, to create in her the feeling of an owned *soul*, had she truly the right power of *moral obligation* within her, which alone entitles to the right of signing to the bond, by any signature admissible as essential. It is only by the coming to a due sense as to *Sin*, in regard to it,—or to the felt incurrance of the effect of *sundering* from a state of harmony with the recognized rule of Deity: which sense belongs only to a perfectly accomplished individualism:—that the Woman can be a real party to the bond. Except as knowing herself liable to be made bankrupt, she is not competent to bear the dignity of being God's debtor, nor worthy to feel the honourable joy of obtaining finally His quittance for her contracted debt. But, none the less, while she fails in this competency,—and not yet, in spite of whole Christianity, is she formally admitted to have attained it,—the common danger, to Men and Women, of moral bankruptcy in Marriage is so imminent as to show to reason for scarcely hinderable. How should it be so, unless the Woman, just as much as the Man, is held bound by moral oath to the God of nature to pay up fully what nature's whole constitution shows naturally demanded in Marriage?—I mean, as to the carrying on duly of the great plan of generation, for the raising up continually fresh and fresh life-possessors, to keep vigorously going on the work of life, and of life's furnishing with means of happiness. To make compact with God for this, I conceive, is as much naturally attached to a state of mind duly influenced by religion, and as needfully so, as was ever from the first the consolidating in any way of human modes of aggregation. And I am claiming that the time is come—the time of eminent religious crisis,—when the power of contract in the case, and the attendant power of Conscience, is all ripe for being

exercised. A *third* form of Covenant in religion, I conceive, is drawn up for us actually in God's design.

This "third Covenant," I believe, has to show its Divine authorizing these special points. On the one hand, though bearing of peculiarity on emotive impulse, it is strictly coincident with the mode of science, as to the universal appliableness of its conditions. No favour of any kind attaches to the law of Marriage concerned in it. Appeal solely is implied to a Rule in nature either actually shown as absolute, or probably inferrible as such : or, to the imperative-in-common which allows to the "must-and-ought" of moral principle its due basis in utmost physicisism. On the other hand, however, the certain ground thus laid hold of, as the fulcrum to moral energy, is left to cover, or atone for, commensurate unsteadfastness otherwise, as incident to the frail beings making contract. For the "moral oath" in demand of these, I imagine to be indeed but of pliant nature; and therein far less stringent, just as actually stronger, than what in common we consider as mere "promise." The vow of Marriage, now contemplated, is no more than in fact an *avowal*. It means a simple acknowledgment, in face of God and man, that the human pair undertaking it—I will not say, *invoke* on their own heads believed-in penalties for infringement of its accepted laws, since the term is only barbarous in its association; but that they consciously and deliberately confess their just liability to such,—with disgrace before men in accompaniment.—The vow of Marriage, I contend, has but perilously been imagined, as it has through Christian times until now, to be addressed by the intended partners to one another. Being so supposed, it has stood naturally for a human promise, and of the solemnest of all kinds, to maintain what however it lies not with themselves, in rule of nature,

to maintain : a state of the mutual Love, whose existence is, by principle, the indispensable basis to the legal partnership. And the falseness of this primal understanding has once more, as I believe, shown its natural fruit in what alone is matrimonial hypocrisy. The *duty* attached to Marriage is but eminently above duty of other kinds to be vowed to God alone :* even in concerning, as it does, the asserted Love to one another of the pledged covenanters, the rightful working of which in this manner stands indeed as the heart-service God calls for.—This “third covenant,” let me repeat, has its naturally-Divine authorizing in its asking from human beings only that which they have the power, and the eminent moral need, of fulfilling.

It is often spoken of as a *discredit* to the institution of Marriage that it is a matter of “convention,” instead of being “natural,” in the common sense of the latter word. But here precisely, on the contrary, I find the sort of naturalness present which alone by evolutionism I am taught to look for as real. Certainly, it has been humanly natural that the law of Nations has been fixed, as it has been, through the means of convention : differing alone from that which makes ordinary “conventionalism” by the gravity of the intention at work. And to give parallel weight to the source of law-of-Family, I plead now the very circumstance I have alleged that the taxed “righteousness” of state of Marriage, there contracted for as lawful debt, is precisely what calls for the kind of Virtue, from especially the Woman, which Christian dogmas, in being conventionalized on their own account,

* “*Duty to our neighbour*,” in any kind, I interpret as so phrased in mere convenience. I read it as meaning constantly but “*Duty to God, in regard to our behaviour to our neighbour*.”

have led up to (see paragraphs 86-8 of preceding chapter). For, the regulating of the Self-affections by law of Marriage in the due manner I contemplate, which is that of serving as a true outcome of the idea of Christ, in the way of acting "for the general object of exalting Race": this, I infer, was the very aim of guiding Providence through all the series of church-councils which to the debating ecclesiastics concerned had purpose which history shows so different. While, in their own view, these were settling church-opinion on only doctrines about God's personality and autocratical relation to man; I conceive that in reality they were but raising a mythologic basis, for the settling finally into the consistency of moral dogmatism the plan of whole general relationism, such rightly as it lies with Family to embody. The one dogma of a settled notion about Marriage, *when* this shall once adequately have become such, is the only one, as here I am affirming, that the Religion now due has to mould itself by.—And here therefore, I consider, is produced to the full the class-character I am seeking for Morality definitively Religious, or Domestic.

Even to meet the demand of exact science, the class-boundary between Law-of-Nation and Law-of-Family has instant terms:—just as severally regarding the common struggle of human beings for what is merely "self-maintenance," and the common means of their yet clinging together which concern "re-production": reproduction of the sufficing number of acting strugglers which may adequately and for ever improvedly fill the void which the loss of weakened ones by Death is ever causing. Law-of-Marriage, accordingly,—such as henceforth I claim that it needs be dogmatized for,—means a pure invocation to Creative Order for inspiring motive

were to act out evolution for Providence.—Only, in the way of this settlement of the great dogma, stands the hindrance of the Woman's failure—nay, the failure of both Woman and Man,—in the needful *Conscience-of-Marriage*, which, I consider, is the great “let which now letteth,” having instant necessity of removal. How can really “convention” be perfect, or the law resulting be really upright, when, as now, the one half of the personal beings affected have in no way been convened to have voice in it?

We have in fact, I believe, the just ground of comparison for the two kinds of Law-formation, when we regard but the effect which in Law-national has befallen the idea of “property”: connected inherently, as I have noted, with the treatment of Duty as strictly *debt* (p. 169). The right of holding legalized property, or of owning anything that is made sure for one's own, is the boon gained out of ordered nationality which chief of all must be admitted to be that justly bargained for, in being taxed with charged debt to the general exchequer;—but the idea of such “property” is no more any other than conventional than the idea of Marriage-law is. The two things essentially, I imagine, fall together in being purely artificial; while, none the less, they are both so utterly advantageous, that they are thence, as if inherently, stamped with permanence in human notionalism. They stand together as what must necessarily abide, so long as ever remain in force what at all are fixed human institutions: although eminently, as I have here argued, there is over-measure of security in the case of Marriage, in the preparation sown towards it through the whole plan of antecedent form-arrangement. The kind of property secured by Marriage to the pair of debtors entered by it

in God's books, is—besides a mutual share in the beinghood of one another,—a two-fold share in the produced branches of their united stock which are the offspring common to them. It is of *children* that the right of possession is earned from God : though alone so, by most important limitation, on God's own understanding of such possession. Namely, as but on the short lease, and ever-shifting condition of relations, which befits naturally generational succession ; and but on the essential terms of sub-agency to God in the possession's treatment. And that children *should* thus stand as parental property, can we imagine that any future light, of highest reason and purest love, can oppose ?

I form then my point on just the strength of this perception :—this perception of surely-promised advantage, in the Law of property-attached-to-Marriage being made henceforth of real parallelism with that of property merely secular. Exactly as taken for ending in this way, all the purport of my investigating about Duty, and the purport in fact of my investigating of the whole subject of Religion, comes to a nucleus of appeal to instinct such as actually, I assure myself, is the very testing of my adhesion to Developmentalism which is now sufficient.

Let me sum up my reasoning. —The sense of Duty, I theorize, is intrinsically but the habitua' tone of mind engendered by human practice of deliberately-formed aggregation (—so that, for a being plaed *alone* in creation, even supposedly come, as yet I believe he could *not* do, to sense of God, sense of Duty could not possibly arise—). It is a sense wholly vague in itself, and only rendered practically efficient by expres "duties" being started, on which it may be brought to bear. And thus, seeing as I do of all secular and national constitution,

that this has produced the kind of Duty engaged to full exercise and enhancement of itself: I infer also of Religious Duty, or of Morality toned essentially by Religion, that an equal, or, rather, greatly heightened consequence will follow, when to the aggregation which is that of Family the same effect of full convention shall have been applied:—my inference to this end being supported by the whole course of interpretation I find rightful of Religion's entire progress through history.—I *argue*, that a real Law-of-Marriage, such as actually should give form to the state of Family in a way adapted to the "*will*" of Providence in the matter, revealed naturally as this has been through history developmentally-interpreted, never yet has however been compassed because exactly of the defective recognition on the one hand, and defective capability on the other, of Women: who now first, as I admit, are called by Providence to their due station in Marriage, by the true sign of an educed religious Conscience.—I *believe*, in religious trust, that such requisite Law, once established by full human consent, will be a centre to out-flowing results whose very benefit to mankind will be the fixture of their source of origin.

The Law of Marriage, considered as a Divine Law accepted on behalf of Conscience by marrying persons, includes necessarily a moral regulating of the whole sphere of emotive impulse within us, just as clearly as Law human affects that which alone it *can* affect, of the outward action of interhuman life-conduct. To the latter, from this nature of it, the only impulse needing play is the weakest of the kinds of Family-affection, as such: that of Brotherhood, to which the idea of rivalry, and of struggling for mastery, is always present, however modified and covered in:—the struggle of life secular is softened to its best when it appears but as Conflict

Fraternal. But in the nucleated state of Family the whole number of emotive currents are caught up—though representable yet by simply the tri-une plan of their marking which religious formalism has made ready to use. In dividing human action of what is struggle universal by the plan of theology—or, of what I here treat as “the embodied Relationism of mankind” (I. 495; 526-8),—and accounting of it as Conflict; which though always directed to Divine Circumstance, as the proper Israel-struggle of Religion, yet respects severally our imposed states of Fraternity and Filio-Parenthood and Sexhood, with a secondary effect of true religious integrality in each case:—in dividing thus the whole matter of life-action, I imagine, we have an adapted expression for all the office of regulation that Religion put in practice implies, as to such kind of practice as is other than strictly personal: or, in other words, that is *moral*. For, the just inclusion made here of the track of conflict which in nature lies really deepest, and, as I believe, is indeed *cause* to the two other kinds,—however it be now alone made apparent in that character,—fills up surely the state of Family to that which exactly by its form of integrality *may* ask for itself the insignium in question of a symbolled covenant made with Deity—as wrung from Creative Nature, in the mode of a justly-earned blessing: earned precisely by the strife of development fought out since the acquisition of the second, or Christian covenant.—I have noted already that, in the course of Providence, the influence proceeding from Christianity which in its appearance was external to effect-religious had this two special two-fold mode of presentation: that, besides acting in raising Women into importance, it gave form to a concrete Church (II. 525).—I see, accordingly, none other than what is natural, develop-

mentally, in a *third* dispensation's being now at hand, having outward mark in a full establishing of the form of Family.

With this ostensible sign, then, I now desire to unite my whole scheming :—since the establishing of a form of Family, precisely *as* influenced by Religion, is to me the same thing with the raising to a distinctive class Religious or Domestic Morality : while this effect I have approved as the sound testing of my Developmental Religion.—I see entirely, as already said, that “the on-coming Formation” I believe in must be “one of gradual process : one that needs to *grow up* in the human mind, and that cannot be as if stamped off by the mind at once”;—though the manner of its forming must be henceforth, in the course of things, of as purely “conscious creation” by us as the by-gone formation has been “un-conscious.” I see entirely that in waiting requisite results, to answer *as* such to my appeal laid to instinct, in regard to benefit to ensue on the formation, my ground *is* alone that of forestalling argument of reason :—while, as I have said, I still hope to be able, in my yet-remaining pages, to point to some actually-starting evidence of such results: namely, to such as present exercise of reason I believe may produce, by carrying the general view now merely outlined, into reference to what is detail experience. Even at once, however,—or, even in owning the present scheme mere hypothesis,—I claim that I am secure in this, that I am but attributing to Religion a character not unworthy of it. I claim that Comparativism *is*, or *may be*, a Religion, in its very furnishing of, if no more, yet the one point I now affirm.

Christianity, it is plain, had the smallest of beginnings. What was it, when the babe it had to deify lay but slum-

bering in its manger?—And what truly would have been felt by a pious Israelite of the time, if some ardent fore-seer had then dreamt of, and announced, the deification to come?—Certainly, it would have sounded in Hebrew ears as not less than arrant blasphemy!—Why then should it be over-daring to imagine a repetition of the same case? It is not “a babe of Bethlehem” that now again is wanted: nor even an avowed *myth* of such fateful infant. The real demand now in force may be painted in the sole expression, but assumed as parallel to the one then ascendant, that while the sign of “*Son of Man*” was that befitting the duly prophecied Messiah, coming to reveal the general dignity of humanity, the ensign now looming into view betokens a rising pride to be entertained by human beings in the title of “*Son, or else Daughter, of Woman*”:—a pride latent indeed to the myth of Bethlehem, and truly therein made ready to become actual.

And the actual advent of the formed Religion to be thus ensigned may indeed, if we trust to the reigning flush even now on our horizon, be not more than “a little while” yet destined to be ahead of us.

In my foregoing chapter I have made out my scheme of nature, by showing its intrinsic “Rule” adapted severally to the religious symboling which makes of God either a “Creator” or a “Father.” But in this added arrangement for Morality, I believe to have shown similarly that the same “Rule” amounts farther to the divine figuring of a “Moral Governor of the World.”

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The very fact of its being apparent, if it *is* indeed made so, that the moral sense has come as naturally to us by evolution as any other function has, and that it still obeys the common order of evolution, seems to justify in all sufficiency the attribution. For, to see a *plan* of operation throughout nature thus finally comprising the same guidance over human will and human conduct as over every lower sphere of operation, by the very means of a new specialized function,—by the production of an inner intellect, or direct moral vision for the interpreting of the hidden motor-impulse of the guidance:—to see an extended Providence of this sort forcing general human action to its own ends, *is* surely nothing else than exhibited Moral Government. And the difference between “Moral Government” and a “Moral Governor” is but the variance between the poetry of theism, and the clear intelligibility of analytic prose, which sets off both to a practised sense of religionism.

These three notions of Deity *are* all, in effect, I may surely say, that religionists have ever seemed, even to themselves, to make sure, by whatever pursued investigation. And to secure them in a mode of common *plan*,—*if* this really is done,—is thence surely an adequately-provided creedism.

I believe still in God,—*and* in Duty. I believe in Love and in Truth and in Happiness. And strenuously I believe also in Virtue.—No meagre creed, surely.—But as to all of these, farther, I believe that my accepted doctrine of Development now places them actually, as indeed by its own promise it ought to do, in an enhanced form beyond that which they had previously to this investigating of them. I see now in every one of these great matters but what stand as mere Evolving Ideas: the first and greatest of them just as much as all the


rest :—but they are Ideas that, exactly as such, I now own as Divinely Moral, or Religiously-influential on practice. And the purity of this perception, joined with the value of its thorough mental consistency, I recognize as the advanced consequence, compared with the moral consequence from Supernaturalism, of at least any sort known to me, which th [redacted] justifies to me a retained trust in the reasoning gr [redacted] I have been working on,—wholly changed as it is [redacted] that aforetime pre-assumed for religious. If the n [redacted] consequence from Developmentalism had fail [redacted] me, in this highest of its contained provinces [redacted] exercise, this trust must assuredly have given v [redacted]. But in its seeming to be successful here, I feel it proved equal to all I ask personally from it.



PART II.—SECOND DIVISION.

**THE EFFECT OF PRESENT RELIGION, ON ITS
PRACTICAL SIDE.**

**SECOND SUB-DIVISION. — THE PRACTICAL EFFECT
WHICH APPEARS IN DETAIL, AND WHICH REGARDS
THE ACTUAL WORKING OF MORAL PRINCIPLE BASED
SPECIFICALLY IN RELIGION.**





CHAPTER I.

THE EFFECT OF PRESENT RELIGION IN AFFORDING MORAL PRINCIPLE IN REGARD TO SEXHOOD.

SECTION I. MORAL STANDPOINT.

My remaining object is to show what I take for initial signs that the great change, of improving kind, which I am asserting in Religion, is not actually un-attended by a requisite fellow-change in Morality. A new form of Religion, such as that which I am here stating my belief in, must fail, I acknowledge, even as to its presenting in mere theory, if it be not to some extent thus accompanied by an ethical formation to correspond. That is, by at least a foreshadowing of newly-ordered moral principles. And I aim therefore now to fill up my work's design by alleging what to my own judgment appears evidence to this effect.

I have at all events a defined plan with regard to the anticipated material. I am but hoping to carry out in the sphere of Ethics the mode of dual partition which my result as to Religion has indeed made for me a part, and a most special kind of part, of the whole general "scheme" of things revealed in nature. Just as, primarily, I conceive that Religion is parted dually from

Science—in the very same manner of integral isolation and yet interdependence which parts our concrete beinghood into manhood and womanhood :—so I imagine that **Morality**, in itself being the fruit of those two processes united, needs to fall into a similar two-fold status : such, namely, as shall mark either side the respective predominance of one or the other of the modes of parentage, and this with the equal recognition that is first rendered possible when the former is set level with Science. That is, when a formal equality ostensibly Religious shall be allowed a prominent treatment in Ethics as important on its own separate terms as will still remain the class of what is originally, and scientific Morality.

—The dynamic effect of Sexhood in producing ever onwards such partition seems to me but the requisite self-proof of an abiding principle of Evolution.

The event of the partition, as repeated now in mental products after the mode of all physical being, is the sign of a state of crisis in development which, as occurring equally at a certain stage to all developing beings whatever, seems part of the deepest ordering of whole nature. And significantly in this light does the crisis now pending for Religion, in regard to its world-long course, coincide with the first rising up of Women towards a social standing. A true Religious Morality, I conceive, has no means to exist while either Supernaturalism is in force, or Women are claimed subjects of Men. And this has simple explanation in the one fact, that the whole basis to the condition is the sense of Duty, worked by Conscience : the inward motive not drawn forth under outward obligation, whether to God or to fellow-man.

A belief in the concurrence is the main element of the moral standpoint I now assume. And I reason it out thus.—In the same way as conscious **Manhood** and

Womanhood are due to obtained knowledge of one another on the part of men and women: so is it with Science and Religion. Neither one nor the other could have been what it is, except through the help of its opposite: while the real cognizance of this truth lies indeed with their production-in-common of Morality.—For Science is Science through specifically that conception of Law which it yet owes entirely to Religion's showing it a One Government throughout nature;—and Religion is a true or naturalized Religion by the very means of thus learning from Science that nature's ruling is by Law;—but when the two mental methods together have turned their meeting action on the matter of human conduct, a new character at once appears in the very notion of Law. The scientific idea of Law is revealed to be as inherently artificial, and as inherently anthropomorphic, as was also the primitive religious one. It becomes necessary to make allowance that Law itself, in being the product that it is of human thought, is subject to the very course of progressional variation that dominates over power of thought. Or, in technical terms, the very absoluteness of Law depends now on its flexible relativity.—This however makes way for that actual sex-division in Law's cognizance which involves all the consequence now predicated.

The typical idea of Law is that the matter it deals with is of unexceptioned occurrence. But even where this happens to the greatest extent it ever is found to happen, which is under the one science of Astronomy, there is present none the less a residue of mere "faith," in regard to the universalness predicated. And if thence we take the sciences in series, that which signifies *ascent* in the line is marked continually by an increase in the amount of this element that becomes called for. Once, how-

ever, the moral ground of our self-consciousness is thus attacked, the proportion of the two ingredients is so changed as to be indeed reversed. Observed cases of obedience to assigned law are secondary altogether to the anthropomorphic insistence on the intrinsic necessity of Law. And thus Law becomes classified naturally as *inward* instead of *outward*, as to the kind of subjection to it implied:—while here, as I contend, is an involved beginning of the Sex-analogy, by which the subjection to law-religious gains the quality of being relatively feminine. For, once the reversing crisis being over-past, the idea of Law takes inevitably the new name to itself of the religiously-supplied notion of Duty: “inward law” being identical with sense of Duty;—while the very kind of subjugation here imposed is that conscious but semi-blind obligation which is attached by nature’s ordering characteristically to the condition of women.

It is my trust, and my conviction, that the future ripening of all true Philosophy will be identified with the ripening of the minds of women; and that by means of the latter all that hitherto has belonged to Philosophy’s development of an ever-prosecuted contention of thinkers objective and subjective—Aristotelian and Platonist, materialist and immaterialist,—will be newly realized by respectively cultured men and cultured women: and this with the immense advantage that lies *only*, in nature’s plan, with the harmony-in-opposition attached to Sexhood.—But the completing step to this consummation is the accordant differencing of Morality. A Subjective Morality, of right such, needs raising to fellow-station with a purified, or “selected,” objective Ethic form.

It has happened to me, in fact, through all the course of my foregoing investigation, to recognize in Religion

the character that befits a transference to Morality; and thus to supply to my theory of duality an immediate support from direct observation. The true characterizing quality in Religion, I have found ever to consist in its serving purely as an influence on personality; while besides I have been led to conclude that the kind of mentalism required in religious thought is exclusively Introspection, or that which turns on the very selfhood within us that is our sign of residing personality. The whole purport of Religion stands for me as the due placing of the personified Ego, or Soul of man, in fit relation with the personified Central Force of the Universe. And hence, in passing to the ground of Ethics, I have it merely before me to rectify the idea of that relation which belongs to the whole province of Religion into such as may include, subordinately, a sphere of reference that may be justly describable as "moral," additionally to being "religious."

But still farther is there involved a distinctiveness of new kind that seems to make characterizing complete. And that is, as to the degree in which regard to personality needs extending into the immediate sphere of this attached to any speaker on this kind of Morality. The very matter of its being expressly the mark of boundary between this and the other kind, that here is sole amenability to personal introspection, implies surely a thorough, or rather a semi-separateness, in also the whole manner of its required treatment, when discussion is concerned, from what is ordinarily the handling of Morality.—This immediate concern with personality I believe has never yet been allowed weight, nor has yet needed such allowance; but it seems to be inevitable on present terms, and thence to be characteristic.

All subjective classifying supposes necessarily varia-

tion in the observant mind, precisely as opposed to variance in the thing observed. Thus, in alienating Religion from Science as I have done, I imagine always that thought contemplates the entire Whole of things; but that in the two cases it wholly shifts its own condition. The entire pose and inter-arrangement of the mind I suppose changed. And so do I infer as to Ethics. The whole here regarded is but the limited portion of whole facts which means those that concern morals: namely, such as respect inter-human conduct;—but I believe that this whole appears differently to the mind set to the key of Science, and to that imbued with Religion: repeating thus secondarily the prime difference. Nor does the differencing end here. It reaches actually into every mood of mind: all formed states of which therefore ought to be in full consistency attended to. This however being impracticable, the only requisite in general theory is to recognize the diffused possibility. And the means of doing justice to varying moods I have referred to a simple taking into classifying account of those various affective or relational positions which certainly are connected with varying moods. But still even as to these there requires for discussion of subjectivity, when overtly carried on, an indication of expressly personal standpoint such as no scientific treatment requires.

A Morality laid out by Science, and therein affecting principally our mere Intellect, deals with manifested *conduct* of life: a Morality that shall be Religious, must affect the Emotive side of us, and therein must deal purely with the hidden *motives* to conduct. This serves as the broad view, and inclusive definition in the case.—Again, in broad view we have for settled the determination, that all moral instrumentation of Religion is by the one sense of Duty—of Duty towards God, as the Eternal

Order of things. "Duty" is but another term for the moral sense. What rests then for classifying to do, appears to be alone this: to set apart in distinct moral compartments the several views of Duty which become present to the human conscience, accordingly as affective status is controlled in any one of these leading ways:—by the merely-level relationism of Brotherhood, most appropriate to thought-secular; by that which is of nature philosophic, and adapted to the view of men as on a stock of race, under rule of generational succession; and, above all, by that which gives effect of Sex. As to each of these three widely-different states of mental posture, I believe that the sense of Duty is appreciably modified, and by eminence as to the latter of these, which accordingly I am about to deal with first.—But this enforces question as to the allowableness that should be granted to any one individual mind to take indeed upon itself, in published utterance of opinion, to represent entire classes of mentalism. And it is the need of answer to this consideration that compels the mode of treatment I now allege as completing sign of distinctiveness. I mean, a peculiarity of self-obtrusion, not otherwise defensible: and this under a condition, made indispensable,—instead of, as otherwise, optional,—that the writer's name should be openly appended, especially as indicative of Sex. No opinion must be given *as* that of others, but only as being made the writer's own. By only this enforced condition—but really, as I think, by means of this,—can there be adequate expression of subjectivity.

And as to my own writing I must observe for myself that I am now only stating in principle the rule I have followed practically. I have here sought specifically, and avowedly, to produce a *woman's-view* of Religion:—not

as varying the object that I have in common with men, but as elaborating on it a "scheme" expressly turned to the contenting of my own intuitions. And may I not say that I have hence compassed ground *not* that of intuitionism in general? The aid which I had first appropriated out of the works of philosophic men had been placed under the same rule of self-appeal which my own speculations now lay under; but the result from this was the transverse estimation which precisely the idea of mental sex has alone rendered explicable to me. For while all my implanted bias of education was towards the kind of philosophy that is experiential, in place of intuitional, the pursuit of this bias soon convinced me that my only real fruit from it would proceed solely from my assimilating it in a manner not supplied by itself: and thus sprang my actual belief that women ever may and ought to find their philosophic strength from contact with a mode that is not naturally their own, but its opposite. I have indeed written under the latent aspiration of doing somewhat towards the end I have just pointed to,—hitherto all unfulfilled, but yet inherent in nature's plan,—by which women's thinking, in general, shall become the true complement to that of men, indispensable for any perfecting of philosophy.—And as to Ethics, I now aim at the same thing.

My argument is as follows. Duty, directed always towards God, is eminently the most personal of our sensations:—for we are forced to involve it in these human relations which alone give a working form to our sense of Deity.—Self-perception springs alone from relational comparison of inner self with surrounding selves. I know myself a woman:—I require so to know myself,—before I can even know myself a human creature; and this prior knowledge must itself be preceded by my

knowing of human beings who are to me severally either husband, or brother, or father, or son: besides my knowing at the same time of fellow-women to correspond.—Sense of Duty, then, needs be similarly accounted of. Its general comprehension, to be made adequate, must be primarily made out for each several relational condition. And this must be done, not only by the vague operating of intuition, but also by direct force of experience.

I feel no need arising to myself of entering on my subject with any abstract discussion of "Right and Wrong," in the way that has been adopted with clear advisableness by general moralists. I accept contentedly from these, or from some of them, a certain issue on this matter. But then I have an innate requirement to go deeper into the point, in my own sense of "deepness"—though to them it may well appear as "superficialness,"—than I find that any one of them has gone. I require, namely, to speak wholly on my own personal standing:—*not*, expressly, on abstract Right and Wrong, but on what is my own feeling about this. I require to rest my basis immediately on self-instinct:—on self-instinct, whether as springing to a formed judgment on the spot, or as consciously a derived intuition. A subjective experientialist, such as now I aspire to be, must shut out judgment, for the moment, from all experience any other than immediate. I desire, it is true, to give a Woman's-aspect of Duty in a general sense. But as to this aim, precisely, I am assured that I can only do it justice in secluding myself from evidence of even fellow-women. The improvement I now hope for in Morality—that which I wish to show as already discernible abroad,—I imagine to be due alone to ordered ethical differentiation:—differentiation not of subject, but of

standpoint :—this is the real import I attach to subjective experientialism, or experiential subjectivity. But this means an exclusive view to self-experience, and express acknowledgment of the exclusiveness.

Before, however, I can proceed to make out my view—my view of the leading points in which it seems to me that the **Morality of Developmentalism** will surpass the **Morality of Supernaturalism**,—I feel obliged to make a temporary stand on a special personal difficulty that weighs with me. It is one indeed which the very plan of my present work makes it that which I can scarcely avoid to deal with. Nor will aught that I have to say lead me really aside from the final matter I am now entering on.

COMPARISON WITH THE GROUND LAID BY MR. SPENCER.

I have already explained that when I assumed the principle of Development as that which has in future to supersede Supernaturalism, in accepting also the exposition of Mr. Spencer as that authoritative for me, I still regarded the latter but as negative in relation to Religion. I have stated in the earlier portion of my second volume—which was published separately in 1869,—that my adhesion to Mr. Spencer's scheme of nature, expressed originally in my "*Thoughts in aid of Faith*" (published in 1860), yet afforded me no more than the "indirect support," which however was exactly that which I felt it alone needful on the part of religious thought to receive from scientific. "It gave," as I said, (*see* pp. 71-73,) "nothing of a religion in itself, but the much better thing of the means of working out one. It did afford me, namely, the immense good of a scientific basis, together with the instrumentation of working

principles" whereby, as I was bold enough to imagine, I might even proceed to draw together, from the resources I held collected, a new form of Religion for myself. And by this basis I alluded to that sense of a common *causal* connection between all stages of development universal exhibited by Mr. Spencer, which I felt to be not less than identical, in reality, with the essence of all perception of Deity (*see* "*Thoughts, &c.*," p. 270); while by "working principle" I meant the logically-attached notion of a causative continuity existent in mental issues of all sorts, including therefore religious ones. Such religious continuity, however, I thought it little likely that Mr. Spencer, any more than Comte had done, should handle in the way I looked to as necessary:—namely, on the track of dogmatic controversies: whereon, as my own instinct persuaded me, all Religion of kind positive must inevitably have had its abiding course. I set myself therefore determinedly to work out my own notion to this effect: ceasing henceforth to give other than a mere casual attention to Mr. Spencer's successive publications—until just the 'recent time when, having found my own result, I have turned anxiously to settle with myself how far these may affect it.

It is obviously what scarcely could have happened, that the religious negativeness I admired in Mr. Spencer at the beginning should keep its character as such to the end. Twelve years ago—not to speak of twenty,—the unfolding of his scheme had reached no farther than such matter as required not any reference to Religion. It is only now, or but a few years ago,—it is only now, at all events, I own, that I have given heed to the circumstance, sufficient for my purpose,—that he has brought his serial discussion to the proper ground of Sociology, and even farther to that of Ethics. And

hence the difficulty I am now under, which indeed is this: that I see myself at present much more an antagonist than an adherent to his teaching. I mean that, while in no way do I change feeling as to that which made the basis of his scheme, I find its effect upon Religion to be such as is wholly repugnant to me. Or, I should say, this was such at first view, before I had had time to make out the reflections that I now wish to lay before my readers.

I desire to state my case—let me however explain,—as rather a simple narrative of the manner of my own coming to this changed impression, than as attempted arguing with Mr. Spencer. To this latter I am entirely incompetent, even in the mere respect of being still but a partial reader of his later works:—having only made myself acquainted, since completing my own object, with such portions of these as bear directly on Religion. Namely, his first volume on “*Sociology*,” and his “*Data of Ethics*.”

It was, then, in glancing into the contents of his preparatory “*Study of Sociology*,” which appeared in 1873, that I received my first shock to my before-unexceptioned satisfaction in Mr. Spencer’s works. I turned naturally to the part in which he treats of the political claims of women; and it fell on me like a blow of disappointment that I missed here, where I should specially have hoped to find, the character elsewhere seen which indeed had won from me my first ardent discipleship:—the nice weighing of entire circumstance, and full integrity of thought-direction, which I had hitherto associated with all his judgments. I felt, namely,—not to touch upon details,—that I here had before me not better than an *ex-parte* statement; nor only this, but that the writer scarcely cared it should be otherwise. For this part of

his subject appeared to me to be, to his own view, indeed a mere parenthesis, the disposal of which well might be summary, without therein his proper matter being affected.—Nor, in recurring to his earlier work on "*Social Statics*" did I feel the effect removed: so much had a new light on the whole matter been thus suddenly kindled—a new light as to what is generally the intrinsic injustice to which women are made subject. Even there, the noble words with which Mr. Spencer enters on the topic—words fit to match with even those of the Apostle Paul when he also dealt with the case of women: "Equity knows no difference of sex . . . the law of equal freedom belongs to the whole race, female as well as male:"—even these noble words, I now reflected, are but the introducing of a mere chapter; and of one that is but headed in the common phrase, intrinsically ignominious to us, of "The rights of women," followed up by another on "The rights of children." This caused me to ask myself, as I never yet had done, whether truly the writer meant, as seems implied, that all he elsewhere had said did not include women, any more than children, in its reference?—And this awakening of my woman's selfhood led me into wide generalization. I fell to realizing, with a strange wonder at my own previous obtuseness, how *all* works of serious aim, not directly religious, have been written, in the main, not only by exclusive men, but with exclusive view to men-readers: while I noted with new force how truly behind all lurks the fact which is the hardest of all for us, that our very Bible itself, all religious as it is, is, from its early date, an example eminently to the point. Our very Bible itself was but written by men who, as such, are not so much to be in thought opposed to God, as opposed to women!

I felt, therefore, but a deepened impulse to concentrate

my thinking on my own terms ; and especially to hold firm by the demand of open dualism of standpoint. If indeed I could have seen acknowledged on Mr. Spencer's part the one-sidedness I was aggrieved by,—if he had consequently, like Mr. Mill, given the matter of their social claims into women's own charge, and bid them *speak for themselves*,—I should have been satisfied. But he says nothing of the kind. He appears to me to imply always, in the exceptional discussion allotted to us, that all good to be attained by women, of the kind he has in view, has only to be conceded them by men, and not earned by their own efforts. And by this, I complain that he fails in the very integralness of what truly is philosophy in the matter. I complain that he fails to do right to the "class-bias" that as a philosopher he is bound specially to be cognizant of.—I grant that in the handling of sociologic details assertions of general principle are inconvenient : those details including, as they do, the need of a differentiation of standpoint too intricate for management ;—but I still contend that for a generalist, while referring to the lesser groups of "classes regulating and regulated," to omit referring, and referring practically, to that deepest of all kinds of social bias which affects the two great mutually-regulative classes of men and women, is an oblivion of nature's ordering that is unworthy of him.—The temporary isolation I had resolved on I thus firmly persisted in, till, having laid my own plan of duality, I should feel my ground from which to judge his further teachings.

I went on, as my writing shows, to frame for my own occasion a sort of pre-metaphysics in believed harmony with what I had learned from him of the primal sciences of Biology and Physiology, and even of that of Astronomy ; always however with a purport towards a doctrine

of Mental Dualism. (I refer, of course, to the plan of Symbolism which has chiefly occupied my second volume.) But the touchstone of consideration is the consummated view of what constitutes Religion: since only when this is feasibly appointed can the propriety of its "sex-difference" from Science be made approvable. Here therefore was the chief point of my anxiety when I at last turned to Mr. Spencer's later works: and the disappointment here befalling me is that which it most concerns me to express.

So far from his tracing out any actual continuity for Religion that should be adapted to the progressed mentalism of to-day,—according to what he indicated as possible when speaking of the "theological bias," in his "*Study of Sociology*,"—Mr. Spencer appears to me as much to pass by here its true idea as he manifestly avoids the use of its name. In the track which he pursues, while as to early ages he informs us clearly and in utmost detail of the origin and course which he assigns to "*worship*," or the practice of an outer form of Religion, he stops short at the important era of the introduction of Christianity with only a mere suggestion that primal notions were here continued, without essential change of character: the inference from which is inevitable that he regards Christian worship, as such, but imbued with what to modern sense is only rightly to be classed as superstition, and thence rejected. And to confirm the impression that such is the real meaning he points to as that which he himself abides by, stands separately this important collateral assertion, that the moral sense of Duty, which all religionists account Religion's fruit, appears likely in future to become extinguished, from the very fact of its alliance with Religion. He says, in his "*Data of Ethics*," p. 127, alluding to a preceding

statement, "This implies the conclusion which will be to most very startling, that the sense of duty or moral obligation is transitory, and will diminish as fast as moralization increases." And to this he adds, "Startling though it be, this conclusion may be satisfactorily defended:"—proceeding thence to explain that moral feelings will in time become "spontaneous:" by which I understand him to mean that the religion which but fed their beginning will be absorbed wholly into an ethical intuition, unconscious of needed help from religion.

Now I see that it may be said that all this is but a question of words. The principle that evolutionally has served to engender the moral sense in us, may well, if this sense now engrosses all value for us, alone remain in verbal permanence of acknowledgment. That is, Religion's name may become extinct for future use.—But I resent totally for my own part the implied admission. I cannot do without the express term of "Religion," in its own separate defining, any more than I can do without that of "Morality." And this, for very clearness of thought: to which it seems to me that the constant differencing of the two, side by side, is indispensable;—while, farther, I have the strongest of inducements the same way from emotive feeling.

To drop out of present usage the term of "religion" would be a loss of the whole mass of incidental association that from the beginning of human history has been gathering about the word, and the continuity of which has indeed been the vehicle for the continuity of religion's substance. Here, just as also, and *a fortiori*, in the case of the name of "God," the acquired verbal appellation has exerted on mind-action the insensible bearing that, much more than positive cogitation, is of practical effect. It is in this way that alone possibly is perpetuated the

needful *atmosphere* of influence, charged with the only nutriment that is appropriate. I protest earnestly, that the dereliction of these time-hallowed words, of "God" and of "Religion," which is implied in the positivistic practice of surrendering them to the sole use of supernaturalism, is the abandonment actually of all that has been gained by the continuous evolution of their contents;—as, on the other hand, I confide in their own elasticity to cover in all new meaning that may ever henceforth flow into them.

In the positivistic terminology which Mr. Spencer has given into, the word of "Science" has been obviously stretched in the way I require for "Religion:"—"Science," with him, must include such kind of science as varies actually so far from what originally was typical as is modern Sociologic-science.—Why then may I not parallel the practice?—I must however add here a renewed protest, in regard to terminology of Positivism, against its coined word of "*altruism*." The depicting of Religion's issue by this term, as Mr. Spencer seems to mean doing, I feel to be a source in peculiarity not of clearness, but the reverse, to the laying out of Morality, religious or other. I find in it only an artificial interruption to the simple and surely adequate idea, that all ethical progress is ever an extension of egoistic sympathy—sympathy with fellow-individualities.

That which I propose here to deal with, as the living fruit of a living parent—or rather of two such,—I do not doubt that Mr. Spencer considers well provided-for in estimation by his own plan of its reduction into science. But I complain, none the less, that to my own sense his very standpoint is defective in this respect: his standpoint of intuitional judgment. And in proof of this I allege precisely that exclusive portion of Religion's track of evo-

lution which I infer that he believes to have expounded.

In his "*Data of Sociology*" he has traced back the origin of all "worship" to the dread of savages for their dead ancestors. That which here has supernatural colouring he attributes to their proved accrediting the dead with the same kind of spirit-life, or survival of a shadowed self, which is attested-to already in the phenomena of revival after fainting, and still more in the awakening out of common sleep, and this especially when attended with dreaming. And he shows abundantly how, consistently with savage character, this spirit-double was supposed animated of necessity with a feeling of malignity to survivors: whence that which they offered up of "worship" to the dead implied eminently as its object the keeping of them off from return among the living, to which evidently their children and all lineal successors must be chiefly liable. Under effect of advancing culture, he supposes that this rude terror would pass into the kind of homage to ancestors which would foster the social organizing factors of pride of family and pride of race: while no less he propounds that it had also its direct course in converting, later, dead men into deities, and into deities not only pagan, but of the kind that had its culminating in Christianity. The idea of a dead ancestor he gives as sufficing root of all theology.—All of this is however to me, *if* I take it as the history of Religion, only purely abhorrent.

I confess that when I read this exposition my heart sank in me. I felt that if this really was the outcome of the applying of evolutionism to Religion, I should look back with longing to supernaturalism, even though ending in Roman Catholicism:—as so many others have done in like case. But the glow of comfort came again when I reflected, as I did instantly, how different was

the result my own questioning had brought me. The following was the course of thought I fell into.

I myself have come near to this view of Mr. Spencer, by taking, as I have, the fact of human dying for the basis of mankind's religion. But in my subjective view the fact of dying has been diffused into the abstract matter, or rather abstract idea, of Death, embodying in itself the whole amount of whatever there is in nature that occasions or could occasion in us spiritual fear: whence I see in this very fact the source to such correlative awe of Deity—also taken as embodying the whole ordered condition of nature,—as belongs plainly of right to Religion. The fear of coming under power of Death, understood as a fixed institute of nature, affects the deepest centre of selfhood, and requires intrinsically to be met by that compromise of reconciliation with the circumstance which, again, it is wholly natural and satisfying to attribute to what has ever stood progressively as Religion.—But I find nothing of such appropriateness in Mr. Spencer's notion. It is one thing to be possessed by fear of a dead man, revisiting his former home as a ghost;—it is another thing to fear extinction for oneself. And the former, to my apprehension, is as far from religious feeling, as the latter is in close connection with it.

Mr. Spencer, it seems to me, pays no attention to the real personal regard to death. He tries to enter fairly into what may have been the *thought* of early beings,* as to the observed effect of death outwardly occurring; but he omits to take aught of account of the internal *feeling* as to self, that yet must have gone naturally with the

* "To keep out automatic interpretation is beyond our power . . . we must do our best to conceive the surrounding world as it appeared to the primitive man." *Soc. I.* p. 111.

thinking. And is not this, I would appeal to his readers, the very sign that he would have done well to set limit to his professed treatment of the matter, and to have owned that what it lay with Sociologic science to consider was no substitute at all for what should follow from introspective research?—I affirm, at all events, for my own part, that I miss wholly in his delineation any power of suggesting to my own introspection a source of origin to my own actual mode of feeling.

He says, in the first volume of his "*Sociology*," p. 456, of the respective sentiments of primæval men towards those around them and those who had passed away,—“From these two sets of feelings result two all-important social factors. While *the fear of the living* becomes the root of the political control, *the fear of the dead* becomes the root of the religious control.”—I would protest, however, that he embodies here no less danger indeed of sociologic kind than he does of religious kind. The fear of living *men* is surely the very thing a true principle of Sociology condemns as its worst foe. This can only lead to slavishness and encouraged despotism, altogether beneath the fear of Law which is alone rightful; just as also the fear of dead men leads to something even baser, not only than what is proper religion, but than that which needs accounting *pre-religion*. Here especially I feel therefore the want of such regard to the effect of evolutionary crisis, in disguising character in evolving processes, as—in conjunction with an allowed subjection of thought itself to methodic dualism,—makes way, it seems to me, to a very different and much safer result.

My own doctrine as to the tracing of evolution on the emotional side of us, being that which supposes a laying of the whole progress under appeal to immediate self-inspection, enforces the mental method which Mr.

Spencer, so far from allowing for, fundamentally prohibits. Namely, that of the reasoning "from above downwards," instead of synthetically "from below upwards." (*Soc. I.* 712-3.) It enforces the recurrence which has been ever special with theologians to teleology: since, for introspection to have the means to find rightly its way down from present state of emotion to that state's origin, it is obvious that our thought must work first by a theoretic line-and-plummet, *so* weighted as to inform attent perception, by its note of impingement, when it really strikes a bottom that will hold; while such weighting is alone effectible by teleology. And let me here—for my better aiming at the point before me,—once more produce to view the plumb-line I have myself cast by this method. Let me show the ground-basis I have myself sounded, that I may draw from it the result which indeed I have the object of adducing: and that is, the means I find *now* of reconciling in part to myself even what in Mr. Spencer's result has offended me in the way I state.

To my own abiding consciousness the import of Religion is most purely expressible as a general *trust* in the disposition of things. It is a confidence that nature on its own part can never fail to yield support to those who lean on it: thus involving, in itself, an adequate rationale for the claimed perpetuity of the anthropomorphic ideas of Providence and of Divine Fatherhood. It is no other than a new version of the Christian thought that all must inevitably work for good to those who "love God." And certainly this trust is maintained in strength by all whatever I come to learn of in nature that is admirable and manifestly beneficial. But still I feel aware that after all it is only Death that is the ultimate cause of the conviction:—only Death has been that which, by its appre-

hension, has ever probed into me deep enough to supply a source for the profound sentiment in question. I cannot fancy any stirring of an abstract awe within myself except from my perceiving that the law of Death pervades nature,—and this with all the consequences attached which the experience of mankind has opened out to me. “Awe” is notably a thing different from crude “fear ;” and it is this, I infer, precisely from the necessary admixture of the two kinds of emotion caused by Death in itself and by the consequences of Death, which specifically are indeed the affective ties we gain from it with the fellow-beings in close contact with us. Dread of Death, when it is rightly hence softened down, as in true Religion it is, though not destroyed,—by this engendering of human love, and of this as extended from mere contemporaries to both personal ancestors and personal descendants,—becomes naturally the healthful mixed feeling of “awe,” which, as such, also naturally sustains power of *trust* in nature’s ordering.—If then I cast back into primæval times this compound feeling, I find it indeed a gauge for the whole progress of Religion in this way :—that the compensating element, inducing power of trust, shows ever in a decreasing proportion according to the depth of savagery I plunge into: while even after its actual disappearance, the dread of Death must be inferred to remain. That is to say, the abstract dread must have earlier begun to operate, than its own consequence of abstract love. For I admit nothing into view that is not of abstract kind, in whatever faint degree.—I imagine that the first uniting of the two oppositely-framed abstractions was the true natal crisis to Religion ; while that which went before was of right *pre-religion*, as naturally involving the proper origin.—The subsequent progress, again, I conceive to

have ever led to the second and greater crisis which is *now* in process; and which betokens the very bringing of our consciousness for the first time to a due knowledge of its own connection with the first origin.—This subjective view of continuity I find supported, besides, by world-history: largely and profoundly where ripe religious forms are in question, though by little else than theory, I confess, where primal state is concerned. And a parallel continuity, ever associated with this, I find afforded in regard to the idea of Deity: this being amply displayed as ever rising towards the point of our present consciousness, through the stages of refinement which import always a new realizing of abstractness in our thought of God.

Now I grant that this subjective line is far from fitted to the matter of Mr. Spencer's historic scheme;—just as neither does its standpoint agree with what appears to be his, in regard to the apprehension of "religion." The demand which to my own standpoint is essential, that no other than *ideal* forms, or such as tend to constitute *abstract* images, and of these only such as hold the germ of affective and moral import:—this peculiarly subjective demand, I have to urge, is but a part of that instinctive mode of "reasoning downwards" which belongs of right to introspectivism, just as much as it does not belong—I take his word for the fact,—to the scientific method he himself pursues. *Because* I have a present religious sense of the kind concerned, and only on this account,—and always holding this in my view,—I theorize about its possible derivation out of un-religious, un-ideal, barbarism.

My standpoint involves as its own foregone conclusion that what he calls the "worship of ancestors" is, for the very reason of its gross concreteness of implication, not

a matter of religion at all. The homage that might be paid to *dead men*, as such, even as limited to the case of ancestors, bears no actual relation to emotion of the kind I have in view, but to such only as maintains the base form of mere bodily fear, allied capably alone with a mere physical desire of self-gain. This stands in wholly different case from that proffered dread of abstract Death, which was inevitably to be associated in due time with a sense of abstract Fatherhood.—Here, however, I find now what appears to me an adequate reconciliation in the very plan of continuity I stand by,—assisted by the furnished help of the essential elasticity of subjectivity. If I take the above mark as my standard, and shift by it definedly my boundary between religion and pre-religion, so that the latter shall end and the former shall begin, only when abstract images are attained,—of Death, in the first place, and then, answeringly, of Deity,—I gain advantage, it seems to me, over all Mr. Spencer's material: and this, in the interest of an evolutionary progress that by no means stops short where apparently he would end, before emergence out of forms of Christian doctrine.—I accede fully to what no doubt he would object to in my view, that savages such as those he has spoken of were incapable of holding abstract ideas: just as also he would doubtless agree that neither was religion with them extant of a kind worthy of the name. But by the force of my own assumption of the characterizing of religion by relationism, I can make out the continuity as follows. First premising, that while true religion started only when abstract Fatherhood was first conceived of, destined later to be evolved through Christianity into a form of refinement enduring onwards in progressional perpetuity: I adjudge that the earlier period when alone Death was tending on to become

abstract, be accounted the epoch of pre-religion—the epoch when sole fear was associated with spirit notions. And then I reason in regard to initiation in this way: that the savage worship which Mr. Spencer describes was exactly what must have led, in common psychologic course, to the originating of both kinds of abstraction. The continued habit of regarding with deadly fear the departed doubles of living men, must have been the means, in time, of producing out of concrete instances of death, as opposed to life, a general notion of the kind:—while, farther, the very matter of the dead that were most feared being ancestors, was the true stimulus that was required to produce finally the second great result:—or, to provoke into existence the spiritual counteraction to the source of what was spiritual fear. The very fact of the repetition of experiences about death, and especially about its falling upon all men naturally, must have given to it other than a concrete form. And the same thing is palpable respecting fatherhood. The first ancestor whose ghost was feared would be the immediate parent; but to this would soon be joined remoter fathers in-line making series with the original parent-idol. And thence in course of time would be added-in mentally the fathers of collateral stocks. That is, the *class* of fathers would be created:—which says everything as to progress of intellection.

In this way I believe that I can utilize theoretically even that showing of early worship as directed to the concrete dead which has caused my instinctive horror. I arrange with my own thought to see here but the stage which was preparative to Religion's first beginning—or, the nutriment that afforded substance to its primary seed-leafage. Nor, if we consider it, could well this rude stage have been wanting under the actual problem that is con-

cerned : of themselves a mental soil to be receptive of pre-religion. —Also as to that which Mr. Spencer alleges in Christian forms, as but repeating primal character, I find it simply explained as but the exceptional "survival" that happens constantly elsewhere.—And this diverting to my own purpose of what belongs to his general scheme I feel justified in, by precisely my own need of giving weight in my own thought to that matter of a change of standpoint of which he makes no allowance.

By the very form of my own typical arrangement, I retain his view of Religion under the negativeness of aspect required by my own subjective dualism.—His readers will well remember the fine summary with which in his "*Sociology*" he ends his chapter on "The primitive theory of things" (I. p. 453). He says :—"The theory of the Cosmos, beginning with fitful ghost-agency, and ending with the orderly action of a universal Unknown Power, exemplifies once more the law fulfilled by all ascending transformations. So that in fact the hypothesis of Evolution absorbs the antagonist hypotheses preceding it, and strengthens itself by assimilating their components."—Now, if I treat this as meant in the light alone of science, its nullifying result I accept as still satisfying me, as much as it did when he first propounded the design of it: for in so doing I may consciously hold in reserve, as in fact I do, a very different result as to an opposite frame of mind, taking note of an aspect of Evolution here ignored. I believe, namely, that as soon as ever we look on general progress in the interest of our *inner* side of being, or personal state of selfhood, all religious hypotheses that ever have been genuine are found to be very far from absorbed into the agnosticism he expresses; and that, on the contrary,

they prove to be persistent in a mode of doctrinism yielding knowledge just as positive in its own way as any solidest fruit of science. I mean, knowledge about Mind, and Mind's dependence on the one Ordering of whole nature.

The pure sentiment of the *awe of the unknown*—which is apparently the only subjective residue of old religion that Mr. Spencer retains,—I acknowledge to be indeed an adequate substratum to religious mentalism of the highest sort : though nothing more than this. I claim that it is in fact but identical with what I myself figure, by preference, as the modern dread of Death, ameliorated out of primitive Death-worship. For what truly is there, in whole nature, that more purely draws forth “awe” in us, and awe regarding that which is “unknown,” than the dominating Power of Death throughout nature? What is there that can possibly more answer to the idea of “religious awe” than the inevitable shrinking of our human selfhood before the darkness and the impenetrableness of the mystery we are all conscious of, as lying beyond the bounds of familiar life? Such shrinking is now exactly the subdued emotion that “awe” implies, and is even in itself, or without attended consequence, ennobling:—while it is that which well might have sprung, by a mere normal continuity, out of a fear grossly physical, through the means I am supposing of a corrective sense of personified fatherly Deity. Both the one and the other of the correlate images I conceive as but convenient symbolic forms which stand for masses of concerned subjective experience:—which separate for us the class of such experiences as are fearful from such as are the contrary, and which have actually proved capable, through the real state of things, of thus showing to us a balance that is consolatory. But

the human beings whose existence was antecedent to this comparison of experiences thence precisely would want that which now profits us in relatively sublimating our perceptions. Not only must their kind of religious feeling have altogether been lower than "awe," but their power of admiring must have been less than our sense of the word, must have failed almost entirely, as much, at all events, as their intellect must have been less able to hold abstract ideas. It seems to me, indeed, that the sort of "wonder" which is joined to the religious sentiment, in his "*Study of Sociology*" (p. 31) is the terminal idea of mystery, in making up the religious sentiment, must have been beyond their power to grasp this for the very reason that, above all, the true conception of "the unknown," which only comes from the accumulation of experience, was manifestly out of reach to them.

The very instant that the "awe of the unknown" takes on it the character of *trust*, all the negativeness present gives way to the implication of affirmation. "Trust" makes intrinsically *assertion* of the quasi-paternalness found in nature. And is it not the case, plainly obvious to reason, that our conscious surrounding by an unknown world—not obliged any longer to be filled mentally by gross doubles of ourselves, and unwholesomely-conceived shadows; nor, any more, we must also reflect, to be made hideous by inclusion of a Christian hell,—is, from its very emptiness of indication, the actual *cause* of our possessing the power of "trust?" Such environment of utter mystery, as soon as its full negativeness was appreciated, must surely have necessitated the mode of integrated sentiment which concerns Religion. Religious *awe* and religious *trust*, developed thus out of mere superstitious *fear*, could only, I conceive, have been actually so developed by the

means of men's gradually being taught to know, as they could not know at first, the incognizableness of the condition of after-life.

In the earlier work last quoted from, Mr. Spencer allows of a "subordination-element" of religion, co-existing with its ethical, although later he drops view of the former. But such kind of subordination-principle as the above, embodying only a general spirit of rational submissiveness, could never be at war with the proper ethics of religion. And now I come to the great question which, as I feel, requires the utmost of care not too lightly to be passed over, of the religious doctrinism respecting Duty :—of that sequel to the moral fruit of Christianity, of whose value as a thing of permanence Mr. Spencer appears doubtful.

But first let me express my content with the distinct repudiation he has made, in the earlier work just quoted from, of the kind of substitution for mere negativness that is offered by the Comtist form of Positivism. I mean, the so-called "worship of Humanity."* In this I can only see the low kind of continuity that should have founded on the sole dregs, or required refuse, of the culture that was primitive. For what can be indeed the proper import of "Humanity," thus taken, than the kind of massed existence which alone betokens men in the

* "No one need expect that the religious consciousness will die away or will change the lines of evolution. . That the object-matter can be replaced by another object-matter, as supposed by those who think the 'Religion of Humanity' will be the religion of the future, is a belief countenanced neither by induction nor by deduction. However dominant may become the moral sentiment enlisted on behalf of Humanity, it can never include the sentiment, alone properly called religious, awakened by that which is behind Humanity and behind all other things. . No such thing as a 'Religion of Humanity' can ever do more than temporarily shut out the thought of a Power of which Humanity is but a small and fugitive product."—*Study of Sociology*, p. 311.

concrete : so that, as to what is chief and characteristic, the homage signified is that paid to the beings occupying past time, who, as such, however they may have been to us benefactors, are in reality but *dead men*?—Such homage I can only take for essentially a perpetuating of sheer fetishism.

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The real cultus of Humanity should be surely alone the cultivation of that social framework to the life of men which all history sets forth as the constant means to men's improvement. So far from there being raised by it Humanity's self as a religious object, there should only be furthered by it, in religious fashion, the common object of bringing social behaviour of mankind into its due kind of harmony with the Order that is universal in the plan of nature. Nor do I see why, on religious terms, the following out of general Order in this way may not still be as much accounted a conformity to the "Will of God," in the agnostic sense of Deity, as it otherwise has been by orthodoxy itself. For the "will" that we may now esteem divine, as anthropomorphically attached to whole nature, must obviously refer only to what more and more becomes *known* to us, in proportion precisely to our study, or proper cultus, of nature.

But still, I plead, this adjustment of the term's meaning has alone its rationale afforded when the differencing of the idea of Law is made out as I have just signified. That is, when Law moral and individualistic is set apart

with distinctiveness from Law social and corporate. For the "will of God," regard to which is thus claimed to be the only afforder of a religious side of Sociology, and to which also a religious side to Morality, through sense of Duty, must unexceptionally point, bears the kind of relation to the human will which in itself explains the need for a divided aspect to the whole subject. The "will of God," however the Divine Beinghood be conceived of by the one mind concerned, must, in reason, be different from, and more or less opposed to, the will of the individual's own selfhood; while in secular incorporation of statehood, it is rightfully assumable that private will and state-will are in unison. The "will," or the observed determination, of the whole mass of things, cannot possibly coincide with the will of mere fractionary units:—this, it seems to me, is inherently logical. The will of God *must* be different from the will of any man. And this fact of the case—being admitted to be such,—renders necessary the new mode of subjection to Law, which, as human beings possessed of Conscience, we are now aware of as attached to us:—in explaining also how true worship of Deity, carried practically into action of Life, or social living, must hence purely consist, as the word of Duty implies that it does, in the owning it for of the nature of debt, in the proper sense of a *duly-admitted* obligation, that man *should* yet be subject to general Law, even as to the entire guiding of his own selfhood.

It is argued commonly—and as I think unimpeachably,—that *if* our moral nature had been laid at once, on its producing, under a compulsory subjection to Law, it would have failed exactly to be that which it is. If it had not been "responsible,"—or, as I would say, if it had not been conditional on self-consent, and just therein made amenable to special penalty,—moral nature must

have rested a nullity in the world of things.—But still, none the less, there is this of “necessity” always shown by developmentalism to be present in the case. If the individual fail to carry out in himself, by his own voluntary exertion, the same practice of obedience to divine will that rules elsewhere, he has manifestly no power to keep his inner being in harmony. *Not* developing into inner harmony, he is a man. And this kind of even fail in the exercise of his will. The only difference compulsion is the contrary to an obstacle, shown by it is the enforcement recognized in Astronomy, is which signifies the circumstance of the new factor being in question of a produced will, on the subject’s part, able in some measure to resist what has hitherto been simply the *un*-opposed will of general nature. The subject now has the power to refuse obedience; and just herein is the conditionment moral; while, the resisting power being the very sign that Law as yet does not dominate in his inner being in the same sense as in his outer, so, accordingly, does his moral ordination, such as actually it is, effect its office of subjection to general Providence alone by means of *faith*, instead of by any certified conviction. The religious gravitation that holds man to a true relation to nature, can only be a conscious co-operation on man’s part with the will to which his own is however naturally opposed; and to bring it to be such the creative compulsion in the case could only act, as we know that it has acted, by man’s becoming furnished with the discernment, bestowable and bestowed by experience, that the involved retribution is here, on the very account of its being required to be *moral*, *not* ensured upon physical necessity. And this also implies farther an induced *willingness* in

to subject his selfhood to the imposed compulsion, which as truly could only spring from his admission of a claim on his proper gratitude to nature, as the evolutionary stower of his whole condition. It implies that the kind of *fear* which is Morality's compeller, is yet softened through evolution, on the one hand by an ever-clearer sense of the good he has had share in out of evolution's past course, and on the other, by a desire wakened in him to help this good onward in farther course. Moral consciousness is the perception that, having owed all the faculties, and therefore all the benefits possessed, to the past ordering of things, we have it now as *duty*, or that which is made due from us, that we do our part towards the ordering, or bringing under evolution, of the future: however limited be, and is actually, the office open to us, and open to the inherent case. We have to act as *second-causes* under Deity, hampered by all the personal limitation, not attributable to Deity, which is really our sole provider with means to act.

It is indeed a common way of regarding this matter, of nature's claim on us, to consider it as alone touching on our mortality. To pay "our debt to nature," in common speech, means no more than to die!—Much better, however, shall we really make up our account with her, if we rest her claim chiefly on the spiritual obligation she lays us under, instead of on the physical. We shall best make an even balance for ourselves, if we lay out from the beginning, that *our real debt to nature is to do our duty*.

But the two elements of the moral sense just alleged,—the dread of penalty, and the desire of propagating received benefit,—need a somewhat for their clenching together before they can practically be acted on. And here, as I have considered, lies involved the demand of

contract, of a sort that should be appropriate:—while to this conception of the case I find in Mr. Spencer's scheme of morals what is only the reverse of corroboration. Let me quote what appears to be opposed to it—after first slightly reproducing my own notion.

In admitting that the civilizing of mankind came as fruit of their coming into "bodies" amenable to social Law, I have said that it was indeed this very amenability which gave the binding power to their associatings: the all-potent influence that tended ever towards the perfection of corporate organization, while also it had the power of primarily originating it.—For the plastic character I assign to Law enables it to admit well of the variation shown actually in history as occurring through the growth of nations out of tribes, more or less brought to stableness of condition:—this also being helped by a corresponding plasticity in the meaning of Religion, as the *binding-power* by eminence—or, rather, by intrinsicness,—which really is the latent source of that which exists overtly in Law. The tribe form of government is thus identified with the little-organized despotism which prevails where Religion is of the rudest, and where Law had scarcely come to real existence, and much less to the proper dual partition into Law-social and Law-religious which marks its nature completed.—But the real beginning of any corporate solidity it has seemed to me inevitable to refer to a directly-verbal compact's being agreed on between tribes and tribal chiefs. And this subjective hypothesis I have supported by taking as fairly typical in the case the one notable example of the Hebrew covenant with Jehovah: this again being regarded as but the primal form to the consecutive repetition of itself under Christianity, which simply spiritualized the first notion, and makes way by

this means for the change now become due which must fairly metamorphize it into abstract moral principle.—This consecutiveness of progress in the binding element seems so natural and desirable, that on the strength of mere instinct I allot moreover an actual beginning to such covenanting to an earlier than the Hebrew stage, in ground I have not attempted to explore. Namely, to some kind of rude bartering of advantages, confirmed in a way appropriate to savages, but still always by a somewhat of express stipulation before-hand.

Now here, it is evident, the continuity desired to be maintained, is suspended on two subjective circumstances:—recognition of the continuity's desirableness, as a thing to be inherently looked for; and recognition that the stipulation contained has indeed a retained presence in the native constitution of our actual moral sense.—What I have then to refer to now, and in the last place, as that which in Mr. Spencer's exposition has thwarted me, is the following. I find him, in his "*Data of Ethics*," § 19, barely offering, on the historic side of the subject, this remark, incidentally arising in the course of a discussion antagonistically directed towards Hobbes: that to suppose "that men surrendered their liberties to a sovereign power of some kind, with a view to the promised increase of satisfactions," is a "gratuitous and baseless theory."—Surely it may be imagined, without failing in what is rational probability, that to gain a warlike defence against invasion, by possession of an efficient chief, *was* indeed a means of increase of satisfaction to barbarians that well may have been felt by them worthy of even the purchasing at such a price, with security afforded as I suppose that the leader selected should not actually break his bargain and turn against

them.— And as to the moral requirement of stipulation, he writes thus. “Following Plato and Aristotle, who make State-enactments the source of right and wrong; and following Hobbes, who holds that there can be neither justice nor injustice till a regularly-constituted coercive power exists to issue and enforce commands; not a few men would that there is no other origin for moral conduct than law. And this implies that no moral obligation originates with Acts of men which can be changed this way or that way, and which would ridicule the idea that men have any moral rights, but only allege that rights are wholly results of law, the necessary implication being that duties are so too.”—Hence he proceeds to controvert the assertion of Hobbes that “the definition of *Injustice* is no other than *the not performance of covenant* :” opposing it on his own part as self-condemned by incongruities, pointed out.—This theory of Hobbes is however in so far identical with my own statement: on behalf of which, therefore, I feel the need to explain to my own readers in what way I defend it to myself.

The idea of “justice” I accept certainly as implying reference to “law”; and the idea of “law” as implying the presence of a constituted coercive power: for I consider that there could not possibly have started the invention of the two words except from this circumstance having place. But then, my subjective method—being that of casting backward the present phase of the comprehension of those ideas upon a time in past history when I allow the case was different, evolutionally; and of making account, specially, of the new effect to be produced by a two-fold differentiation of their prime meaning:—my subjective method enables me to translate that first condition just according to my actual moral

purpose. And it is herein, I believe, that I may fairly avoid the moral injury that Mr. Spencer warns us from. Being entrenched as I am in my pure introspectivism, I have nothing to do with any other kind of facts, whether moral or otherwise, *than* such as are to me subjective ideas.—We may surely suppose that the idea of “justice,” just as also that of “law” and of appropriate “coercion,” began originally by importing what now we are impelled to reject. For my own part I believe that what is “justice” to our modern sense, was inherently incomprehensible before a way had been made to the due separating of Law-religious-and-despotic from Law-social, such as consciously is based on individual liberty. But in the early state of things—at least as typified by Hebrew tribeshood,—“justice” had but the one meaning of keeping compact with God: which I imagine also to be still its proper meaning to all strictly religious thought. Thus, I answer Mr. Spencer by indeed granting that the dawning sense of justice in men was dependent on “acts of parliament and majorities,” such as these at the time existed: for the very reason that beginning social institutions were, as such, the needful means, in nature’s plan, of the then un-accomplished creation of the moral sense.—Especially, I make it ever my chief point that I do pay mental homage to “majorities”:—what is this, in religious sense, but exactly a mere acceding to the new dogma of “survival of the fittest, obtained by multitudinous selection?”—Nor truly are “acts of parliament” much less honourable, since here precisely I see stored—evolutionally stored,—out of primitive ways of law-making, the very progress of the formation of “contracts,” taken also as a true portion of general culture.

If it be indeed a “baseless theory” to attribute to times earlier than Hebrew any instituting of tribeshood

by means of express covenanting with an accepted leader, I again but shift the boundary to my notion's application. I predicate that proper statehood-of-peoples alone exists when actually there has been laid for it the basis of a binding contract, duly registered, and hence yielding adequate means of a justified sense of justice and an ordered law. Where this basis is wanting the result is to be accounted premature. A bearing attached to the assumption of a contract which in itself has an importance it. For if we carry out legitimately the practice of this kind,—and by "legitimate" as ever, having regard to a final dualizing of its purport,—I believe we shall have before us a genuine demonstration of the actual course of the moral sense's production.

The continuity concerned is that which has had for its outward sign the prevailing formula of the *oath*, found existing among ordered states from their beginning. The *oath*, I consider, is in the very nature of it a contract, though alone of that specifically religious kind which is typified, as to its first stage of appropriateness, by the state-covenanting of Hebrews. That is, it was the sealing of a kind of bargaining that was directly made with Deity, on account of conduct held acceptable to God; and yet also having reference to matters temporal and secular which are now felt referrible better to another than religious judication. And hence the occasion of the many rude notions embodied in the *oath*'s character, which, if now sought to be explained in all their crudeness involve plainly what we now must reject. I mean, the imposed suppositions that Deity needs calling on, before it will interfere in affairs of men; and that Divine exercise of judgment is in various ways

determined by human passions, guided only by despotic arbitrariness. The human personalness of Jehovah made the Law assigned to Him only such as could belong to a good man of the time. And I say a "good" man, because both notably the Hebrew offering to God of obedience to God's law, in return for God's national protection, did respect, in its main character, the kind of conduct we now estimate as good, and thence "moral"; and because, besides, under evolutionary estimate of continuity, the law of conduct that has *succeeded* is already asserted to require our approving of, in due regard to its local stage.—But since the effect of religion's progress is that of reducing Deity into impersonalness and into abstract association with Law, the oath's meaning in what is ordinary or secular statehood has become limited to such only as belongs to the mere interhuman kind of bargaining, where Deity, as Law-giver and Law-defender, is but appealed to as witness, instead of partner, to any compact. And this mode of the oath's usage is evidenced in history as indeed anterior to the Hebrew fashion. Namely, in the appeal to reigning fetishes, where the required signing-and-sealing of important bargains was effected by the setting up of symbolic "stones of witness." Here then I find a certified root to this whole branch of the oath's usage—arrived for us at the point where the established recognition of Law, not only as Law-secular, but also as Law religiously-moral, is ripe to supersede the oath-appeal to an interfering Divine Providence. All along, belief in Providence of some kind has inspired recourse to oaths: equally when the fetish-worshipper invoked his Totem, and when the Grecian recorded vows on his country's altars, and when the Hebrew, more than all, made practice of it in dispensing with even altar as requisite, for the adjuring, as he did,

his moral reign—"the Lord do to me so, and more also, if my word be false."—And even at present, when the substitution of ceremonial any other than verbal is nearly perished,—unless as it be represented, on occasion, by the mere lifting of the speaker's hand, or his grasping of that of his fellow-bargainer:—even now, when the simple promise, with commensurate deliberation, is accounted firmer than any obtrusion, the import is still this: that the speaker himself, at the time, the liability he is under regard to faithfulness and verbal truth of all whatever of the penalties that Providence suggests as ordained to remove, still does, in a certain manner, contract latently with Providence for submitting to this liability.

Even the oath of judicial kind seems no longer maintainable from this lapse into a mere call on verbal truth, on common terms: since for ourselves the settled legalism of any country is implied as being able to defend itself, and therefore of duly guarding against the sin of "perjury." And here there needs to be considered the actual tendency of the formal practice of swearing in times past, not only to produce at first-hand the deliberation and solemnity which are still as much as ever in demand, but to originate also the very means of verbal truth, alike as to power of words and an actual disposition to fidelity. We must bethink ourselves how for early savages neither words or ideas were at all furnished to express anything of outward occurrence: while still less had they an inner view of the requirement of such;—and we must remember besides, that even the affective motive that should have led them towards truthfulness was as yet narrowed to a close domain that had no power to enlighten them

in the matter. Here was the constant obstacle to the solving of the social problem that was yet of all problems the most needful to be solved for any ordering of society: the enabling of men otherwise disposed to place trust in one another. The pristine man was by nature a deceiver, both of others and of himself. It was his virtue and his honour, at least in cases he held important, not rightly to inform but to mislead.—Before the power of Law was existent, what else should have availed but precisely the invoked terrors of superstition?—while, as cause sufficient to have suggested the resource, served surely the impending peril even in casual association amongst warriors of always-possible secret dealing with enemies. The need of guarding against treachery in war was a goading impulse towards a binding agency, that must have acted even before any status of internal order had been devised: which, however, as soon as begun upon must have swiftly multiplied correspondent occasions. And the one of such kind that was predominant, and that tended moreover to become exclusive, was the providing for a state of social law: this really being no other than identical with a first construction of social nationalism.

Religion only could effect this, in ancient times. Obviously, as to such, it *alone* was efficient.—But would it now in like case be less called for?—Surely, not. The *Religion* of old comprehended at once the binding-power that respected amalgamation of units, and the binding-power that has to do with the prevention of collected units from attempting rupture of their uniting bond. Religion meant at once the collective force of the *religere* expressed in the potent name, and the contrary force of the *religare*, which is a power of restraint, and of binding-back from infringement of imposed conditions.

The two forces together have all along been in action, and have equally been required to be kept up. Nor, on the terms of continuity can the same need be ever actually so worn out as that the office of Religion should become extinct. I mean, as to this sphere of it :—for Religion has been yielding this same office as well wherever else it has, and without suffering arrest in it. In the logic sphere it has been similarly employed by our idea of Nature; and while improving upon Science, it has enabled itself, with the latter's aid, to gain the accuracy of conclusions by the very means of restriction in which alone capacitates the mental wholeness of the idea of Truth.—Why should it stop now from also compassing the giving integralness to our attained social nature by the crowning gift of what especially is *integrity*?—Wholeness, and accuracy in combination of components :—truth universal, and a withstanding of all evasions of truth :—this is assuredly both what Religion *is*, in a moral light, and what will make it inevitably unceasing.

This supposes, however, the habitualness of the influence from oath-practice, which the peculiarity of the occasion calling for it seems exactly to have had the likelihood of preventing. And here needs considering that abuse of the practice in uncalled-for swearing, to place upon which a sufficient check has been a constant desiderandum. Is it too wild to imagine, as indeed I do, that this very dispersion of the oath's usage was, however, the real means, when under cultural guidance, of the infixing of that regard to inward Law which forms the moral instinct's proper substance? The qualities I have just cited together: of enforced deliberateness and solemnity in speech, with the implication of a latent Pro-

vidence over moral events, and of such as acting always in favour of what is recognized moral virtue,—if the condition be present of sufficient spiritual assent to the latent sway—are surely all that are required to give character to moral sentiment. The true personal consciousness of Duty has nothing else of elementary wanting to it. But the addition of the point pre-eminent, which is at once the most essential and the most difficult of attainment, of the infixing of *consent* to obligation, could only have been secured under the influence of *habit*. And a habit of swearing could not have been originally by any means the matter of pure mischief, incapable of good effect, that it has become for ourselves.

That the habit prevailed actually in early times, and precisely with an excess of occurrence that was proportionate with the stage of antiquity, is illustrated to ourselves by the plain fact that within present language oaths are thickly embedded, exactly as fossil relics of ancient practice. Our most innocent-seeming words are continually turning up mediæval allusions, profane to ourselves, which represent what is relative antiquity in regard to our position under Christianity. And as to Hebrews, we have the notable confirmation to the need found of common swearing, and what is even a direct legislative permission of it, in the announcement made to them on authority, that Jehovah's name was the name they should swear by, exclusively of the names of those other nations' gods of whom their God was jealous for His own sake.—Nor does it seem other than natural that in general the legislation of peoples should originally have favoured, and subsequently not prohibited, a usage that as if parodied its own instrument of specialty, when once strong on its own ground of provided penalties: just for the holding well in the remem-

brance of subjects their bondage to appointed law. Civil governments, as such, can have had little objection to a prevailing religion under of the ultimate sanction of all law.* And thus, leaving the control of swearing to the proper office of what was national religion, they may otherwise have well waited passively, as they have done, for the effect of good sense to reduce swearing at last to what actually pointed use,—a mere lingual vulgarities.

Oath-taking separate from religion as a means to develop national veracity, shows however such a correspondence with religion's own development of honour and the insult that were at first impressed upon us concerning Deity, are thus turned into a rightful human direction. The "honour" that is concerned is now claimed by the speaker as his own attribute and call on trust; and the "insult" referred to is but the doubting of this.—And is it not apparent that the constant working of the one phase of the idea should have led on to the other? And therein was not also the whole development of the moral sense carried forward?

But let us turn to the other side of the oath's history, which I class as of peculiarity religious. Here must be

* The oath's utility to civil governments, considered in this light, seems to be indeed a special advantage, coincident of right with the view of Deity now assumed. All the difficulty that has become apparent in the making appeal to "God," under modern differences in belief, disappears the very instant it is understood that except as to one sole kind of import, alone really in question in the case, the name of "God" is itself open to the whole range of variation existent. In regard to civil usage, the demand is precisely that of a reference to a higher *moral* authority than any that can immediately or secularly be wielded: and if the Divine name be admitted to stand in state affairs *alone* for such,—in the manner of an ideal moral standard accepted by the individual concerned,—the oath-appeal to it is surely the very instrument whose adaptableness must make it always required.

noted instantly that the check on vulgar swearing among Christians is due mainly to the express commandment in the Hebrew code which that typically-religious people soon found necessary, to guard Jehovah's honour in the matter ; and to which also we thus owe the pre-condition to our sense personal of the same kind. The third clause of the body-of-law we have suspended in our own churches makes directly a sin of light swearing : pointing this way, it would seem, even more than towards the perjury which is but the consequence of first levity. "Thou shalt not take *in vain* the name of God," was manifestly pointed at what to the Hebrew was identical with a contempt of the mode of covenanting on which their whole statehood conspicuously depended ; and which, involving as it did direct contract with God Himself, was that in which rupture would be a fatal insult. To lose respect for this would be a breaking of the very bond of their community:—and this with wilfulness and consciousness, from the palpable simplicity of their constitution : for the same thing indeed is true of all other state-formations, though only latently and remotely so.—The question now is, in fact, what answers at the present day to the need attached to Hebrewism? Is there aught that for ourselves makes oath-covenanting in requisition?

Hebrew Law is, by hypothesis, absorbed into Christian, and Law Christian is ripe for passing into Law of purely Moral principle, with included understanding of direct procedure from the sole sovereignty of Deity.—But Law acts alone through incorporation into a full system of agency ; and therefore, as the body of Christian law fell to be implanted in the Church, so must similarly another body be found that shall be adapted to abstract principle.—This need, then, is answered surely in every way—or rather may be made to do so,—by that very in-

stitution of Family which intrinsically stands apart from the form of Nation *except* on Hebrew terms. The bond which knits together ties-of-Family, in concerning guidance of the sole emotional side of our nature, (and therein as I have said, respecting not outward conduct, but the framing of proper motives to conduct,) implies, or should imply, nothing of bargaining together which worldly statehood does;—and yet eminently it supposes contract of its own which precisely is sequential to the Nation. It does or ought to imply, that the duties to the bond, in assuming headship, yet make their very pledging together contract at the same time with God, of the very kind which is also the first instituting of Nations. And that means, it implies always a proper oath—an express invocation of Deity. The continuity out of Hebrew covenanting into a form of Marriage that shall befit our own future, I believe to lie as straight through its whole progress, as did that from Gentile swearing to truth-speaking.

And “not without an oath”—not without genuine contract,—do I suppose that domestic life of the future can ever afford the soil to human virtue which even hitherto, under its actually-imperfect form, state of Marriage has been found able to supply. I believe that the moral sense of times to come will be nourished wholly as to religion, and also secondarily as to secular life, by alone the central consciousness of Duty which the Marriage-form, and this exclusively, has it in it to draw forth. A true contract of Marriage, giving solid form to religious obligation, *must* cause the law of God, in its best sense, to hang ever impending over conscience:—and to obtain fidelity to this law in general conduct, is surely not less necessary for support of virtue than was once the

obtaining of the same kind of result, of now well-acknowledged value, of empowered truth in words.

It is here I complete my case. It is *this* bearing of my view of contract which I rely on finally, and which satisfies me on my own account that the sphere of religious Duty, and of Religion itself, is not coming to the end which Mr. Spencer appears to anticipate for it. I grant that the form of Marriage as it stands—and as it has needed to stand while Christianity has represented Religion,—precisely fails in showing a proper contract as formulated: just in fact as, by the showing of Mr. Spencer, no contract was laid actually at the first incorporating of nationality. And perhaps, as to this, I ought to follow out *here* my own reasoning *there*, by now asserting that no more than I could see any truly-ordered secular statehood, in the absence of such contract, can I allow as to Marriage that in its actually standing form, as wanting in strict contract, is what really is accountable for Marriage. What I have presently to allege, on the extant evidence of prepared improvement in regard to moral feeling about Sexhood, will in fact include plainly this proposition.

Thus I seem to have gained the end I placed before me in this retrospect: the end of removing possible obstacle to my own course of thought. And I therefore now return to the latter:—carrying with me, as I hope, even an added fruit that I may not unjustifiably there work upon.

THE ACTUAL SUBJECTIVE ASPECT OF DUTY.

By the help of the above results I believe indeed that I may now give sufficiently the kind of definiteness to the idea of Duty, which my purpose in regard to it—the pur-

pose of differentiation upon it,—makes required. By the foregoing I conclude truly that the components of the idea are widely spread:—that, on the one hand, they imply an historic origin to the “sense” associated with the “idea,” with a constantly-progressive effect from changing states of historic circumstance; and that, on the other hand, they are integrally the condition of dependence on, and intractably attract, individually entered into. And all these things are embodying in a proper subjective interpretive sense.

The following proposition is to me the proposition that at basis is the most adequate.—*Duty is a sentiment, now being human attributes, which stands as product of men's impulse towards aggregation: the impulse being carried forward by them out of earlier brute-condition, with the only variance of being now incomparably more controlled by the demand of evolution that no effected aggregation shall hinder, but specifically shall promote, an advancing perfectness of individuation.*—For the one matter of the ripening of our conscious Egoism, in its due relation to the one aggregate Unity which makes Nature, is as much the clear need of an extra-spective scheme of things, as that of the most abstract religionism. And to bind down the soul of man, as sense of Duty does, to a confessed personal obligation towards the *whole* of things, call it “God” or call it “Nature” as we will,—and this, even while the subjection means, as it does, the very frustrating of what is otherwise instinctive Selfhood,—*does* amount to the sum total of a conscious assumption of Individuality.

This assortment together of the two matters of individuation and aggregation is indeed paradoxical; but I am supposing as connecting link between the two the mental fact I receive as such, that all attainment of con-

scious Egoism proceeds only from out of men's relations with one another, and from these again as corrected always by the relation of all in common to producing Nature. It is *this* connecting link that approves to me the Family, bound by contract of Marriage, as the final and most perfect of all human aggregations : a thing, as it plainly is, utterly beyond brutism. For while civil aggregation, at its best, but realizes, and only in a faint way, the one relation of interhuman Brotherhood,—all its series of changing modes showing progress but in tending to this *only*, and showing the reverse to progress when aiming falsely, as they have been apt to do, at a relation transverse to this,—the aggregation of Family, under rightly-contracted Marriage, may have in it to afford well to Egoism, for its improving, that all-sided relationism that only as such can duly bring it to completeness : in affording also the essential point of continuity for a Divinely-directed sense of Duty. The State, trying to be like a Family, has thwarted itself ; but the Family, on its own ground, and with its own kind of pliant constitution, has the means of being at one with itself, even as to an interior of all-sidedness, that well renders it the kind of kingdom to prosper.

The one necessary point in sense of Duty is the perception of an agency for retribution abiding in a sphere that is outside us : an agency that will give *consequences* to our conduct, beyond our own power of averting them. It is this which forces on us, as nothing else could do, the need of making terms for ourselves with whatever is as " God " to us ; and which has acted in this same manner from the first : affording thus the linking tie to a point of central fixture in Deity, which, as such, makes the human division in the matter no destroyer of continuity, and leaves to view the moral sense as but

subject to the course of growth which from out of the sprouting germ produces the developed plant. It is this one needful point of regarding *consequences* that made even pre-religion, for its fore-casting of collective and restrictive influence, effective towards social welfare ; though the only image of Godhead was the grossly human one of no better, a despotic, chaining minds into submissive terror,—to be supplanted finally by the moral Law-bestower, appropriate to the Family as opposed to the aggregation of individuals, which rules by especially the reverse of terror, gives perfect play to individualism, and conscience in place of a mere conscience.

Unless for aggregation of some sort, met by special individual sense of the kind in question, no power of apprehending moral consequences could obviously have been attainable by brute natures, originally, and thence by the moral beings of to-day, who in a sort reproduce the first condition. Above all, the power of *motive* to apprehend them would have been then, and must still have been, wanting. Nor does the case alter, except in the degree of the need, even with the most enlightened of mankind. The wide-spread diffusion of the consequences, with the uncertainty to the individual of their mode of working, however backed by the display of nature's general uniformity of plan, which indeed gives condition for moral principle of right,—together with, on the other hand, the permanent force of selfhood in man,—makes necessary to the last, it would seem, some minor and conventional arrangement to support rule in regard to practice. Some notion of "the divine right of kings," or of whatever in any State has kingly function,—some feeling of the indispensableness of a conventionally-ordered

kingdom of the affections,—seems attached by intrinsic need to even the free homage to the royal right of reason which is the true effect of principle. The production of a body corporate, informed by its own special laws of movement, is throughout nature the sign of perfected integration. And how therefore should it be otherwise with the new kind of integration that has the ordinating of life-conduct for men, in its politic and domestic spheres?—That there should also, however, be drawn forth a new sense for the occasion, to respond to the newly-integrated example of unit-aggregation, is the sequel that makes perfect the analogy.

The differencing of the sense of Duty, accordingly as the “conduct owed to Deity” is made payable in the almost physical mode of merely slavish obedience, or in mere secular loyalty, or in the reasonable service of a willing heart;—with the attending fact that the large historic variance of this kind, first exhibited, is repeated permanently in the moral nature; and that only thus is afforded finally the means of integration to the moral sense:—all this in reality but carries on, in heightened mode, what already has been the case with the lower sources of our subjective impressions. Let us take as simplest instance our means of knowing *colour* in outward things. To gain an integral idea of “colour” we must obviously first appreciate different kinds of colour; but exactly in our learning to define to ourselves what shall stand to us for “greenness,” &c., we have been forced to apprehend those wide differences in the perceptions of different persons, which leave only as the matter fit for naming that which permanently stands after a sifting of long-collected experiences. An idea that has the name of “greenness,” for example, is established alone by convention. At the same time, however, is established

by special proof how the basis of support to all the impressions experienced is indeed not confined to the observant faculty; and how of surety an external *somewhat* exists, of which we at least know, that it is capable of thus permanently affecting us. There is gained a proper certified relation with that outer *somewhat* for all results of the notwithstanding all allowed-
for variations al possession of the sense.
—And no magine, with our sense of
Duty. First of this in regard to per-
sonal variati and thence, the obtained
fact of perma essence of the matter,—
give a certifi ward truth that is indeed
a full basis to I mean, there is furnished
a proof absolute of the Divine Somewhat on the outside
whose existence must in reason subtend all our moral
impressions.

The mental fear that was drawn forth by the uncomprehended matter of Death, was certainly a real thing that had respect to real fact, and that also must be accounted permanent, however different has been experience in regard to it. And as real, in another way, has been the historic course of that experience. When first the primal "awe of the unknown" pierced a way into the dense mentalism of the semi-brute, I am supposing that a real parallel occurred to what happened in the outward sphere of nature when *light* was first created for man, by his mental powers being made adapted to receive sense of light, and this especially in regard to a mental *Sun*:—a mental Sun that was indeed not devoid of the sufficing *Somewhat* behind it that *first-caused* * the phe-

* Or should we not rather here reverse the common terms for causation, and, in the interest of subjectivity, account always that human agency is *primary*, as being nearest and first knowable to us, while subtending

nomenon, but still a thing that rather points, in scientific view, to a mental concentration of the light-affording qualities of our surrounding world in general, than to any essentialness of the Sun-form of light's manifesting. And the parallel concerns not only *light*, which as to mentalism means but *intellect*, but includes equally bestowed *warmth*, which as to mind is the realizing of the *affections*, and moreover, in the end, the true furnishing of a principle of *gravitation*, which as to mind is the providing of regulation for the affections through sense of *duty*:—the gravitation which is moral meaning specially that power of *walking uprightly*, by due reference to the Sun's holding of the whole globe of men, which expresses mentally the matter of human *conduct* in general, under law of aggregation. The real "Sun" of the mind—or that whose full brightness of day-splendour, as in religion, is kept up as to our power of apprehending it, by being alternated with a state of suullessness, as in science:—the real "Sun" of the mind is that which supplies not only a lamp of light to our intelligence, but which is also a sustaining focus to warm the heart by, and at the same time a solid body of concentrated force that conditions every movement of our mental limbs.—The whole effect has however been borne out only in consequence of men's congregating together, as their brute-implanted instincts have compelled them to do, under a constant progression towards an amenableness to Inward Law.

Perfect, in the sense of poetry, is the saying put forth of old, that all required of us is only that we "do justly, and love mercy, and walk humbly with our God."—

agency of Deity should be allotted as but the afforder of causes *secondary*?—This reversal would indeed mark sufficingly the variance of subjective method from the ordinary.

But the divine precept is without means of fulfilment except through our having learned to realize that the Authority enforcing justice and mercy is one common to all mankind and with ourselves. And this comes but as the fruit of social aggregation. Justice, and even mercy, would be that which is impossible to us, and for which neither should we have any incentive or motive, if it were not for the universal law which directs us: and conscience depends on the recognition of an Executive in nature to whose administration all of us are fellow-liege-men—does it matter at all?—whether the law be known to us, or not, in other words, whether the law be purely of an existent Divine plan, or of a mere human sway?—Nay, is not the reflectional law of gravity—superinduced as it is on the physical,—such as actually, by its very rendering of the mental Sun but *phenomenally* our world-ruler, only strengthens all the attributes of that Autocracy? Is not actually the very power thus asserted of our dispensing with any cognizance of the Unknowable the real deepening and also elevating of the “awe” we feel by instinct towards the hidden “I AM” behind nature?—The social *usefulness* of Morality is itself proof of the Divineness of nature’s plan.

The moral sense, as we find it in ourselves, does indeed, it seems to me, bear so clearly the sign of the exact progress here intimated, that only by this mode of explanation can it rationally be accounted for. That is, with included view to the law of mental heredity.—The moral sense of the individual of to-day is supposably lying dormant in the whole race of us, awaiting a circumstantial rousing up into the action that can alone make a real thing of it. That is, it repeats truly the case of the special senses, as to the fact of affording real

experience to us only as effect of *application* of in-dwelling capacity to an outer-lying object adapted to it: since, as solely we are aware of "greenness" by our power of vision being accordantly acted on, so alone have we a sense in regard to Duty when a state of social circumstance is presented to us adapted to the kind of action that sense of Duty calls forth. Except under application the moral sense is a nullity: or, no more than a premonition of what it has to be, when occasion shall fully realize and vitalize it. As occurring in the modern infant, or the uncultured of our adults, it is truly comparable to the wandering sight-faculty of the newly-born of mankind, or to that of a very low kind of animal. And as the application of the prepared sense to its right object depends always on commensurate power of intellect to direct the former on the latter, so indeed is the realization of the moral instinct late or early in modern cases according to the degree of culture by stock of race that each inherits. Thus, the mental soil of the ruder class of our cotemporaries answers really in this respect to the inferred case of primal savages, in a way that is far from met by the babes of a cultured stock. And here exactly we have the means of comparison within our reach, as to all three positions, which should enlighten us as to general moral origin.

The full initiation of the moral sense, I now assume, is the intellectual assent of the individual that if any mode of conduct suggested to him is out of harmony with the rule he esteems Divine, he is bound by an inherent claim to refrain from it: since the intellectual operation includes truly, and is the means of first clenching together, all the view to attendant consequences, all the emotive power of realizing these by sympathy, and all the general estimation of Divine government, which combine to give

the force of the "ought." Such assent, thus impliedly integral, is then the act of application that, in so far as it is made complete, brings home to the individual, from the first instance of its occurring, the dormant faculty that he is called forth for the first time of its being called forth for the signing of the individual to an obedience to Divine rule :—an up-coming in this manner is the only proof of citizenship in God's dominion of the claim to freedom of this sort is made out and stands as merely a moral infant : unpunishable, as such, by the Power that represents ideal equity. But as soon as ever exerted reason has forced selfhood into a siding with Deity,—either in regard to active effort spent outwardly, or to such as but acts in self-restraint,—the vowed-for obedience changes naturally its first character, and instead of slavishness takes the freeness that marks the play of active energies universally. And all action of Duty is active, by essence, alike in outward play, and in inner self-control. — The assent, however, once having been given, would have to strengthen itself perpetually by repetition, in order to the moral reasoning's becoming "principle." And the occasion for the repetition is in fact supplied by the habitual events of life which precisely an aggregated condition of men necessitates.—But still it is only, I conceive, when the aggregation gains the character of the Family, that there may really be a commensurate assurance—I mean, a kind of certainty that in being moral is also both rational and emotive,—that the fulfilling of a bond purely conventional is indeed an obedience to rule Divine. And the change implies truly *the passage* out of primary religionism into a religion of

evolutionism. I cannot now allow that when Deity bore the aspect of a state-sovereign, the fealty that was sworn to on His account was at all moral, in the now-demanded meaning of the term; nor even that the latter was fully met when the Christian modifying of the Divine kingliness into Fatherhood made the Autocrat in question in part accessible to the affections of His volunteering subjects. The only binding-together of all the elements of human selfhood into engagement that should be adequately complete, and therein possible to be of right voluntary, as to a really-religious guiding of the human will, I believe to be the final settlement of the sphere of Divine rule, such by eminence, into the affective kingdom sworn to fealty to law of Marriage.

To the being of to-day, then, who is ill-provided ancestrally with general faculties, I suppose that the moral sense is, in likelihood, never wakened to the last into real action. There is present the mere rudiment to the religiously-social sentiment in-full, which indeed but repeats the condition of un-penetrated and pre-moral denseness which darkened the primal savage. The rude modern, like the original semi-brute, is incapable of subjection to law, *except* through a coarse bondage to despotism, acting only through immediate compulsion. Let it be sought to deter him, for example, from indulgence in any kind of wanton mischievousness, and so far from his having insight of the moral "ought," he can but comprehend just so much, as to that which is mere secular control, as gives the whole majesty of state-law, for its representing, into the hands of the policeman. And even if by education the religious side of restriction should be opened to him, here again would mere person-ality of influence be his limit. The motive reaching him could lie only in the supernatural first-stage, where

the dread of retribution still answers, in fact, to no more than the fearful terrors of savagism : the premonitory frightful glimpses into consequences that are the heralds of a coming moral apprehension,* to be made perfect but in fashion of daylight principle, where law can act tranquilly and habitually.

To the well-affecting state of the true son of an interm Christian moral supernaturalism of religion, bearing "positive" to the restriction that serves legalism in "negative." And the infant that will be nurtured naturally in Christian doctrinism, under the loving admonition of the best kind of instructors, providentially set at hand to it, will already be advanced on the moral course even beyond what is average Christianity. That is, it will be ready to spring at once, upon occasion, to the application of its dormant instinct that will be the realizing of this. Such infant will take up, on the most favourable of terms possible to our generation, the tenure of the ancestral debt it is born pledged to.

By the comparison of the two states therefore,—showing, as it does, this mode of the advantage to the latter,—I feel to gain rightful confirmation to my hope as to the finishing stage : approach to which each of the two, in its separate manner, indicates. The stage in

* Does not actually this word of "apprehension," by the duplicity of meaning inherent to it, point to this very function of fear, as being our forcer into knowledge? Is there not here expressed, in clear allusion, how the mind has been driven to catch hold of what should alleviate first uneasy suspicions, in regard to unknown objects?

moral growth which is marked by the sole fear of immediately-inflicted personal suffering, can never include more than such notion of obligation as consents to an imposed duty to an accepted tyrant head, whose law stands as that of his own will; but it may lead, under culture, to the stringent Law in the abstract, which stands as a rule of absolute Justice—a moral figment, indeed, just as also is scientific Law in general no other, in proportionate degrees; but still a figment of essential utility.—The secondly-shown stage, however,—or that which answers to the better side of Christianity,—betokens rule which, although personal, imports only the kind of bargained-for obedience which has Love—or the religious fiction taken for such,—as the-regarded source of penalty. And *this* mode of fiction supplies immediately the idea of Mercy, alleviating Justice, which again is an expedient wholly salutary in its place, through the intrinsic impossibility of a completeness in moral law. But here also, and with eminence, is a way made towards the legalism where Duty may appear in its true character. Namely, as showing the self-imposed responsibility attached fully to an affective rule only, which implies the human conscience's assumption of the charge of Inward Law on its own account—except for always an answerableness ultimately to the general Law of the Universe.

The power of *truth* in general speech,—the power of general *fidelity* in affectively-motived conduct,—the power of *moral self-consistency* in the social struggle:—these three social virtues I imagine to be one and all the fruit of Religion, as which they become finally apparent in the light of a wholly modern kind of *loyalty*: a *loyalty* to the entire Principle of Evolution.—And the producing of this newest of religious qualities, inclusive as

it is of all others, I suppose to have been the function all along of the active sentiment of Duty. So soon as ever men congregated together, with stability in their mode of so doing, was the Inward Law of related rights and obligations also stably implanted in human nature; while the es-

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My first mode, moral instinct must be hence now dilated as follows. Duty, as now shown, is *an inherent impulse towards social orderliness, awakened solely into action by immediate exercise of intelligence and consent of will on the part of its subject, which however implies essentially the religious condition that will of self shall be subordinated to that which needs describing as at once the general will, and the general law, of the whole order of things.*

By this arrangement of our idea of Duty,—I must briefly urge,—the subject gains a basis which well meets and obviates the objections of various kinds to its future permanence that have weight otherwise. This taking of the moral sense as but one with other senses, though peculiar to man, and but produced within the range of historic times;—this treating it as the binding-link between Morality and Religion, ensuring self-support for each principle through the making each to rest on the other;—and this endowing it with the one character, for constancy, of implied self-restriction made needful by legalized aggregation, which character however passes

under varying conditions such as history attests, marking progress in refining abstractness of operation:—this whole ordering of the matter, it seems to me, renders simple all that else is conflicting, in regard to a perpetuated development. Nay, I plead that it enables us to see, in the very signs that else speak of decay, the actual change that gives the promise of endurance; while no less it makes apparent, with new force, the real mode of what indeed is disease, having danger we need warning from.

Under present view the kind of Conscience that, as our agent in discerning matters of Duty, may be accounted a "good" one, should mean henceforth a correspondent to "good eye-sight": implying much more a ready and a reliable excitability, with ministry of sharp remorse on misuse, than the affording of any conscious gratulation. And "a bad one" should become that which answers to a vision jaundiced or distorted, or obtuse as to excitement or induced penalty:—while that which we but feel as "an uneasy one" we must learn to find as but showing, of right, the healthful sign of an active function in want of employment. But there is still an uneasiness of moral kind that has a cause the reverse of this, and which therefore must be known as morbid. Nor has history failed, when concerned with Religion, to exhibit to us duly, on its own large scale, what infallibly stands as symptom of such morbidness:—the disease affecting Conscience being shown by the course of Hebrewism, as I have well noted already, to be of specialty the moral vice of *hypocrisy*. (See *ante*, pp. 186-99.)

Let us add however now the kindred lesson that may be drawn from the lately-traced history of the oath, and the whole nature of the morbidness, I think, is explained.

The oath's usage, I am supposing, has been from its beginning, through progressive stages, the formal outward medium for the linking-on of Morality to Religion : for the very reason of its giving means for appeal to general Law, so far as understood ;—while hence, naturally, the more that Law has become requisitely *inward*, the more has it been swallowed from common practice. But the kind of medium is the modern sense of duty, which has become a matter of profession. When a man says, "I will do it to support of any uttered intention as to my duty," it to be my *duty* to do so and so," then the duty is not a duty but what is virtually the same reference as that whose sanction as that whose verbal formula is the only difference is that now the chief force of the appeal rests immediately on the speaker's own religiousness, as asserted by implication. And this change is an intrinsic improvement ; but none the less, it is that which defeats the phraseology's desirableness. Here again is shown, namely, and only in an enhanced form, that tendency to "vulgarity" or unbecomingness in speech which, even as such, when connected with religious sentiment, must run soon into what is actual profaneness. I do indeed believe that in Religion's future course, a too familiar protrusion of sense of Duty will be that which Inward Law, on its own account,—through the very fact of its inwardness being established,—will peremptorily prohibit.—So much as this I must truly grant in concession to the idea of Duty's non-permanence.

To use large religious notions where the occasion is unworthy of them is again a taking of them "*in vain*:" even supposing that the self-assertion involved is as yet genuine. But religious frivolousness leads straight into the religious *falsehood* of which the mark is hypocrisy :

the self-deceit of which the effect is the aimed-at deceiving of others. And occasion for express talking about Duty can only be the exceptional one of needed mutual consultation of human thinkers and strivers in regard to actual purport of Duty, in general or in particular ; or else, with a still higher call for solemnity and deliberateness, some requirement of authoritative admonition :—while, if neither of these be present, the allusion, as out of place, should needs be harmful.

Thus I come to the surely satisfying conclusion, which indeed in its own stating expresses also what is remedy for the malady attached to Conscience. Henceforward we shall need, truly, to *talk* less about Duty, but this only while the more, at the same time, we act on it in *conduct*.—For the very meaning of increased abstractness of moral feeling *is* its really being driven home to the inward sphere where life-practice has starting-ground.

But there is yet a lurking peril of disease the view of which needs adjustment, in order to this result's confirmation. I mean, as to the feeling of self-content which hitherto I have slighted, counting ordinarily as the *reward* of fulfilled Duty.—Now, in judging of the moral sense by other senses, it is plain that reward of action, except as found in the sphere of action, has no ground for being asserted ; while if here, as is the case, the subjective side of the faculty is expressly but the imposing of *restriction*, which, in itself, is not pleasant, but the contrary, the outer kind of result needs great enhancing before it can be taken as so much of counter-balance as indeed to mount up to be “reward.” And hence commonly it is allowed, by cultured moralists, that well-doing must have no view to “reward,” but be expected alone to save the subject from his own condem-

ning : the latter being assumed as the justifiable substitute for the orthodox consideration that the well-doer must stand secure in regard to displeasing God.—But the very subtlety and equivocalness, thus shown present in the actual case, lead moreover into the snare of liability to self-delusion, as to the estimating of any claim to reward : to which indeed seems no antidote accessible but the accuracy of admeasurement of the influence of moral circumstances can be ascertained. The very person who is most inclined to claim as deserving of reward, is most likely to be mistaken in his claim to it.

And there is a counter-balance in favour at present which, it seems, does not open the involved peril. That is, the notion of Duty “self-sacrifice.”

This term, so applied, is, I acknowledge, as repugnant to my own instinct as is that, to which indeed this is kindred, of “*altruism*,” given as substitute for “*sympathy*.” I can hardly image a mental state more replete with liability to self-delusion than should be that which so exults in the felt grandeur of its own power of moral effort, as to be able to entertain with any kind of habitualness the conscious thought, “I am making of myself a *sacrifice, for the sake of others*.”—The idea represented seems wholly to have now fallen out of place ; and to be as actually perverting as it is perverse. Moral “*sacrifice*,” as well as moral “*reward*,” belonged rightfully to supernaturalism ; but for the future both the one and the other seem required to be left behind. *All* exercise of function, under view of evolutionism, needs accounting but as *privilege*:—and as *privilege* that no attending obligation, attached naturally, can ever hinder from being such.—The very course I am showing that of the future working of Duty, is, moreover,

a conclusive strengthener to this mode of estimation.

If the characterizing sphere of Duty for the future be that of the regulation of our affections through an ordained Law-of-Family, the balance of "related rights and obligations," or of "conscious merit and conscious need of self-restriction," may safely be trusted to adjust itself in the interest of real virtue.—But meanwhile there is still question, it is true, as to moral worth of such kind as counts ordinarily for alone personal, and not subject to the effect of aggregation. And by settling regard to this, I think we shall have all points before us.—The sphere of personal concern must be assumed as that which respects personal improvement of all kinds, whether in outward condition or in state physical or spiritual. But let us take the latter kind as of representative importance. Shall we say that it stands as *Duty* to improve our minds?—I think, it is best *not* so to express ourselves. I think that by such phrase we ignore what religiously it is imperative that we remember: that our possessed means of pressing towards such end is a pure *boon* imparted to us, *not* carrying claim of debt. And the step to this end, being the obtaining and the employing of knowledge, is too manifestly of kind delightful to need proving to be such.—It was not so always, however. To the child of to-day, as to the savage of mankind, there is often little pleasure concerned with knowledge.—And hence I thus deal with the matter. Long as ever there remains present that sense of pain which belongs to self-restriction, so long also is it *Duty* that is engaged: the child-like quality which Christianity made so much of. But directly we can take our stand on desirableness we can appreciate in results pursued, the word of Duty on our lips, and the thought of Duty in our hearts, needs full

away.— In self-improvement, however, even purely such, there is never wanting a side of *social* benefit. And so long indeed as it is *this* which we give regard to, the term's retention has its proper ground of vindication.

On the real ground of Duty, which pays tribute for Religion's portion of the affections of Family, with permanence by the fact precisely reduced, or reducible, into pleasure, conditions. And here is it, according to hypocrisy alone needful does but look of those conditions which should at once in the detecting of morbid sentiment, and, only, of the regulating of this away. It is not by looking inward on our own motives, as a thing of habit, that we can really make these pure; but the very contrary. The double-dealing that defiles can alone be cleansed, and the "single eye" obtained which for moral health is indispensable, by a prevailing aim towards outward objects of life, with which self is in ever-necessary relation. And to learn that life bound to Duty is a *privilege* is thus made easy. Unregulated intellect, as we know, runs to waste, and is of very small benefit; while unregulated affection, above all things, tends to become a curse:—but if Religion, by its restrictiveness, can give relatively the same orderliness to the latter that Science has given to the former, all life, and by eminence the sphere of it directly touched, should have a much higher valuation than has ever hitherto been allotted. The recognition should be at hand that our commonest life-action is, in itself, what may be gloriously lived for.

SECTION II. THE PRESENT NEED FOR A NEW
MOULDING OF THE IDEA OF MARRIAGE.

THE proposition that I have arrived at, that all ethics really based in Religion must centre on the obtaining of a true law of Marriage, established among mankind, is so strange in its statement, and so intrinsically difficult of apprehension, that it needs the most careful attention. I conceive that by women only, in the first instance, can it be actually understood: and this only in effect of the great crisis, now occurring, which, as I have said, acts specifically on the minds of women by the very action it is exerting on Religion.

By the substitution of evolutionism for supernaturalism our whole view of nature is turned into one of Struggle. Both within and without us, wherever we seek the natural condition of things, it is Struggle that presents itself. That which in simple physics we think of as mere *motion*, and that which in the higher observation of meta-physics we call severally e-motion or intellect, is, to the complicated estimate of our moral consciousness—so soon as this comes to be involved,—what alone can be expressed by the anthropomorphic symbol of *contention*. Passion now comes in question, as giving motive to plain motion. —Moving physical bodies have their lot all provided them, and selected for them, by circumstance; but the bodies that are endowed with an inward compass, each one of them, to steer themselves by, must fight out therein their private courses: and this, by the agencies of emotive impulses. Even our primary relation to our

outward world, lying under the sole ordering of Deity, bears morally the one aspect of proper *conflict* with destiny. And much more are our human relations those of warfare, deeply motivated by the impulses of emotion. Nature so little suffers us to be at rest, that she has laid our whole beinghood under law of subjection to movement; and this, attached to us, answers but ag of motion" w and latent.— of our moral the case of St. upon women.

at implanted constitution may well consider that it a compound of "modes 'molecular,' imprisoned g this changed conception directly to the matter of peculiarly now pressing

For the latent conflict that concerns women to the utmost, even more than it does men, is that which takes its character from Sexhood. And this is deeper far in rooted influence on us than are either of the two modes of conflict that compete with it, in respect of being general and essential: the conflict Fraternal and the conflict between Childhood and Parenthood. Yet while the two latter modes have already been ages-long in action, the former is but ready to begin! It can only be now said, with strict accuracy, to be first ripe to manifest itself. And this shows cause for the actual crisis now proceeding. All three must concur together to make up our full emotive constitution; nor only this, but they must firmly be established in intermingled action, in the very way that the bond of Marriage represents. And this again still remains to be accomplished.—If then it be true, as I have here argued, that religious forms have all along, in so far as they have been genuine, been directed to bring about this result, my final proposition is well supported. It has

all that should be needful to show it in due harmony with nature. Nature has been aiming ever to bring Sexhood to perfection; while her instrument to this end must still be Struggle. A truly natural Religion must then be obviously such as shall involve our full co-operating with this end:—"designed," as it has been, through an elaborated plan commencing with the earliest organic forms. A truly natural Religion, I am convinced, must inevitably coincide with the giving to the bond of Marriage its own perfecting self-consistency, by the means of the included perfecting of the Sex-conflict.—And the latter includes, specifically, the opening of women's minds to a full consciousness of the religious import of Sexhood.

It seems paradoxical to say that Love, which is the only rightful impulse to Marriage, is the proper fruit of Contention:—not possible to exist, by the law of nature, except in effect of the latter. But it is this which I assert, as the inevitable result of the law of Struggle, so soon as this is recognized in "molecular" fashion: or, as intimate to our affective constitution. I have treated Love, in this work, as the generic term standing for the whole range of kinds of Love. And I have assumed that Love solely had its origin in Sexhood. Marriage, therefore, as the outward form of Sex-affection, *ought* naturally to represent, by its own historic progress towards perfection, the true adjusting of that condition of Struggle which must finally eventuate the perfecting of Sex-affection. And as this adjustment implies always for human beings an arrival at self-consciousness of the matter of it, the woman's coming to take part in such consciousness is an evidently-required element of the process whose supplying has to make up the result.—In all organic beinghood, the endowment with a settled

form means the ability in the subject to hold ever more and more of the "latent force" which is inward life to it. And it is but the same with the state of Family. Unless this be firmly incorporated by the outward and conventional bond of Marriage, there can never be maintained in it, with sufficient adequacy, that concurrence in the triple system of the currents which, in spite of the multifarious inter-action, has, and needs to have, a common regulation in legal Marriage. And all bodies are proportionally to such organized multitudes as are related to the amount of imprisoned motion; whence the implication of enhanced power is dependent on domestic regulation. Just accordingly as Marriage-law becomes adequate, must the principle of Love attain fulness.

Marriage-law has ever yet fallen short of this adequacy; and has needed the very juncture of the present time to make condition for it. Hence truly do I find that this effect, in regard to Morality, is the one representative circumstance that expresses—and this specially for women,—the crisis now pending in Religion. The crisis, namely, of our passing from the mental posture of supernaturalism into that which sees true creative action, directed alone latently by superintending Deity, in the mere existence of a state of Struggle, all-pervading and inextinguishable.

The distinctive meaning of the present crisis is the arrival at self-consciousness in respect of Religion:—namely, our learning to see it as but the natural fruit of our own reaching to the mental height of accrediting things in general with an orderly or Divine control. And the regulation of our affections—being the important matter that it is to our inner life,—has its mode of

effectuation, by the law of nature, through alone the consolidation of the Family in legally-sanctioned Marriage. But this again implies necessarily the sharing of women, on equal terms with men, in the matter of self-consciousness of the event.—Such is the reasoning basis of a Religious Morality.—And it amounts to the need come to women as well as men, and even more than to the latter, of placing constantly their sex-impulses under moral restraint: or, in other words, under allegiance to Divine law.

This consciousness, however, means for us a fearful revelation of actual circumstances; and especially of the circumstance of past ages. To women, much more than to men, has the crisis of an attained religious consciousness the effect of a mental subversion, confounding all previous experience, which indeed the idea of "crisis" alone has the power of expressing. To us, the new character now given to Divine Providence, by the passage from supernaturalism to evolutionism, produces actually the impression, both penetrating and startling, which of old was wont to be artificially contrived for in set forms of religious "initiation." There is made to fall on us at once both the gloriousness of suggestion and the intensely-painful almost-physical humiliation which then precisely were brought to bear on the helpless neophyte. We have to try us all the terribleness of a crushing personal view of suffering, partly shared in,—with all the flashing of a dazzling brilliance of anticipation,—which in those ancient devices was presented by intention. Just for us, as in those dramatized instructions, the new truth into which we are being inducted is not gradually made to *dawn* on us, but is made to *burst* on us, with convulsive shock.

I have already shown in these pages what I take for

the two kinds of phenomena. The sudden glory that opens finally on our view is, undoubtedly, the ennobling of our conscious nature by the gained conviction that henceforth, in a religious light, we shall be as men before God, and may talk with Him "face to face" for ourselves, without need of any masculine mediation. And this, as to the mass of us ; and by no means as to the saints only of inspired and saintly women of the kind that already have been admitted to equality with men. We are henceforth, in conscience, a licensed *law to ourselves*.—A new humiliation we are brought under, though for indication. It is, in part, the awesome, immense new responsibility falling on us, while yet we are now precisely being awakened to see our actual incapacity, at the moment, to meet it adequately, though suffered no longer to refuse it ; and while, besides, we are being specially enlightened as to those physically-implanted obstructions that, in being such, seem laid with direct purpose of Divine Providence to hinder us, even in that very work of self-culture which is our only open road to the removal of the incapacity. And, on the other hand, it is the intensifying and completing of all this of humiliation, by the new revelation made to bear on us of what the same Providence has permitted in times past to be the lot of women, as strugglers with life-conditions : a lot shown by history throughout as ever worse and worse, in comparison with the lot of man, the deeper we look down into the past.

By Hebrew supernaturalism there was truly supplied a myth as to the creation of women which, in its appeal to contemporary instinct, served rightfully as a religious basis to Sex-principle. It attributed to the Creator the

kind of *motive* to their production which showed Him to *men* as solely aiming at *their* benefit in the matter: as bestowing on *them* the needful help-mate they must otherwise be wanting in. And perhaps for this reason has it been that the attendant superstructure of religion has had its actual success in the world:—triumphantly thus being caused to supersede all that sprang from those various Gentile myths that gave to the two sexes—more desirably, as now seems,—a separate and equal origin: as did eminently that of Deucalion and Pyrrha. The Hebrew story of Eden painted well the actual state of the sex-relation at the period when the tale was invented; and this precisely in conveying the kind of moral direction that it belongs to all religion to convey—such, at all events, as befitted the age. It must truly have been a religious boon; and not only to the existing men, but to the women even more so. For while it virtually made women the allotted servants of men, it inherently commended them to a protecting affection. And as long as brute force was in the ascendant, this was all that could be done for them.—But for ourselves, the case is wholly different. The myth has become the contrary to a boon, either moral or religious. It is that which holds back general opinion, and obstructs the course of a true rectifying progression. And hence, again, it is a blur on our sense of Providence.—If we judge it from our present point of view, itself is a thing whose endurance needs a clearing vindication. Its promulgation—and, still more, that which called for its promulgating,—is excusable no longer by the effect evolved out of it, through the agency of Christian dogmas, which culminated in our middle ages by raising up a queenly Mary in the mythic station of the primal Eve, and thus making a kind of *worship* of women the

special point of mediæval culture. This unnatural exaggeration of regard for them, if progress stopped here, must now be felt as no real justifier of the social doctrinism of the Paradise. It is only when this local state, of a grossly-unintelligent homage, shall have passed on to its own needful rectifying, that the long prevalence of the evolution. Show must be held to regard to women once with women

When history to which women proper character of mythicism came in aid,—we can but turn sickening from the contemplation.* We can only ask ourselves, shudderingly, how a rule of beneficence, truly such, could have admitted of such state of things. It is true indeed that this is but a part of the common suffering that fell then, and falls still, on lower animals of all sorts: showing everywhere a “law of cruelty towards the weak” as the seeming logical consequence to that of “success to the strongest.” That wives and mothers should be tyrannously oppressed is but part of the inherent case of savagery. But this forms just the crowning kind of

* The touching plaint of the widowed Andromache, which Virgil's lines have made to ring in our ears, suggests but faintly—though indeed with mental enhancement,—what must have been the habitual sufferings of primæval women:—

“O felix una antè alias Priamèia virgo,
 Jussa mori, quæ sortitus non pertulit ullos,
 Nec victoris heri tetigit captiva cubile!
 Nos, patriâ incensâ, diversa per æquora vectæ,
 Stirpis Achilleæ fastus, juvenemque superbum,
 Servitio enixæ, tulimus.” *Æneid.* iii, 321—7.

instance that intensely surmounts every other kind, for the race of beings that are concerned: since expressly it wounds in that deepest point of being which as much is the most spiritually qualified as it is affectively the tenderest. All cruelty keeps down its victims from ability to help themselves in the hard battle of life; but the cruelty that crushes women in their vitalest of functions is that which lays them wholly, in more or less degree, at the feet of the class of rivals among whom they have been naturally planted. Women now can hardly otherwise than feel, in looking back to primæval times, that Providence itself has been bent to keep them down, morally as well as physically, in their forced contest with men.

And this would be a hard strait indeed to find ourselves hemmed up in, by increased knowledge of the course of facts, *if* Providence were still in our belief the same as before the present crisis. Any true reconciliation with those facts, if they were supposed ordered in view to particular human souls, by a Being with accredited human feelings, would be scarcely possible. The thought that God, with moral attributes, had expressly laid out that women should in this way be made over to the brutal masterfulness of men, though but in the early life of mankind, must be surely fatal to any moral reverence we could pay to Him.—But the difficulty is not wanting in sufficient clue, in actual circumstance. The very opening of our moral sense to the dilemma is but part of the general shifting of apprehension which now shows us that all good to individual beings is alone to be obtained by their own struggling for it: and this by a double effort, turned at once against God and fellow-creatures. We, as women, depend more on our sense of God's blessing than our male rivals do; but God withholds it,

all the same, till we shall dearly have won it. In other words, our birthright as God's spiritual children can be legally conveyed to us *only* as bought and sealed by our heart's blood. The whole past race of women has needed to be thus sacrificed on our behalf, by a demand, not of arbitrary man-like Deity, but by "law" that concerns order universal.

Also, in holding this clue, we may catch besides at a reason.—All trust in religionism is an eye on view to the Future. (I have laid this analysis of Christianity, I. pp. 141—3; religionism, eminently, the idea renews itself to look onward with benefit amounts to the directing of our mental vision on the way we are going;—and this means the generating of the mental clearness and strength called in need for progression amid obstacles, which we account of as *courage*. The woman's reasoning I allude to is then the following. The woman's source of courage is eminently in her children; and the woman's cause is, after all, identified with the cause of children. All injury to us inevitably is shared in by them. But, again, all progress of general kind depends wholly on children. Since, therefore, such progress *has* been made, and has the promise of being made in continuity, we have plainly a valid answerer for Providence in regard to our own lot. We have a clear assurance both that women *have* been cared for in time past, and that—*if* human beings do their own part towards progress in the future,—the aid Divine will not fail us, as women, long as ever any progress is in course.—Women, hence, have a warrant logically for remaining pious as well as brave.

And this is an acute point of resemblance to the passage through "initiation." The trials of it must be

followed ever onward. The neophyte has no means of turning back. The "crisis" that is concerned, by its very nature, has produced, or is producing, a "new species" of condition; and herein it shuts a door on all power of again resuming former state.—Many of living women, now eager for the undergoing of their ordeal, will soon, even if they go through with it, weary of their new insight and new duties. Their hearts will soon faint under the charge they have undertaken; and they will cry to themselves, "Oh! that life could be again what it was, before we snatched at the fatal fruit of self-knowledge!" But the knowledge will have done its work, and eaten-in to their whole spiritual constitution. And to deny the sphere of action opened out to them will be a lapse into a state, not of heretofore indolent repose, but into one of deadly spiritual disintegration.

PROOF OF A NATURAL DEMAND FOR A FORM OF MARRIAGE.

It is truly in the effect of "crisis," as occurring to women and concerned in religion, that I find the decisive sign I require of the naturalness of a form of Marriage. Every kind of consideration I have been pursuing has led hitherwards; but here there seems afforded what amounts to a rational demonstration:—though alone, as I admit, by that method of a reasoning-in-circle which I claim to be legitimate for the subject.

The "proof" that I esteem such belongs indeed solely to the special mode of evolutionism which I have made out for myself, and to which alone I now refer as what I mean by "evolutionism." For only here—so far at least as I am aware,—is there attributed to the idea of "crisis" (of the kind in question) that peculiar import which I now grasp at. I mean, the import of the

“adjustment” I have been specifying (p. 291) as the occasion, in any and every case affecting mind, of at once a new production of consciousness and a perfected sex-differentiation. The latter, by my scheme, attends ever on the former, even in character of its effective cause. And as to pure mentalism, the effect concerned is that of a full reviously-gained results,
 by the contact those which have before
 been intellectual irements of the moral
 sense: since, if omplished with success,
 the phenomena iage are present, as con-
 summated betw feeling. For myself, I
 may say, the arr esent juncture of results,
 —as to the inevit nce of the discovery of

religion's nature to reflect always in its forms the extant status of human mentalism, with a new sexual consciousness sprung for women,—has been the stamping of the whole doctrine of evolution with a new credibility. It has been the realizing of an accumulated conviction, endowed for the first time with force of adequacy.

I do not think it can be doubted, however, on any terms, evolutional or other, that the resolving of religious formalism into the mode I plead for—of rendering **Marriage** a true contract for religious ends between men and women,—addresses eminently the moral sense of mankind, and with a special newness that of women. Nor do I suppose it can be denied that a real religious benefit is concerned. But moreover it is also what is surely incontrovertible in itself that this peculiar consummation of evolutionism is what naturally pertains to its theory,—or, what *should* so pertain when its theory is revised by the moral sense. A moral phase of doctrinism *means* religion: but the religionism that should follow in right sequence to all its previous show of doctrine

should be surely, on *à-priori* perception, of this very kind. Evolutionism is bound up with the idea of race-development; and is all imbued with the new assurance of hereditary transmission of constitution:—what can possibly be taken as the point of moral climax befitting it, else than that which makes religion of the rectifying of the practice of Marriage?

When I say that Sexhood stands as chief of nature's aims, I include truly a matter that holds the very essence of religionism. For Sexhood is with me not only the source of consciousness in general, but farther of that concentrated mode of this known to us as Egoship: or, that principle of Individuality through which only we have the power and the means of correlating ourselves with Deity. The individuality we possess is ours only through our subjection to Sex. Here, however, is in two ways involved the idea of Marriage. For the true Sexed-Individuality that answers to a proper knowledge both of God and our own souls, implies intrinsically that the two sexes of human beings need a correlating together in the manner the most intimate and pervading, for the fitting of both of them, semi-representers of humanity as they severally are, to stand separately before God as human integers. They need a correlating together in that whole diffused action of common life in which the sense of duty, as needful instrument for correlation with Deity, alone can be rightly brought out: to effect which end is the very import of true Marriage—extending upwards, as it does, to the most spiritual of our spheres of action, in losing never its peculiar reference to its proper physical basis fixed in permanence by the ruling fact of Sexhood. And they need the full counter-effect of the undertaken obligation towards God in regard to their subservience to the law of Sexhood, which again is

the involved meaning of true Marriage. Owing to the absoluteness of Sexhood throughout nature, the whole mass of our owned duty towards God needs be felt to lie in carrying out of Sexhood: in at all events our mental recognition, when not, as best, in actual thoroughness of fulfilment. This plainly is the moral consequence of developmentalism. Doctrinism can be attached to the theory, but Religion, must be surely that which conceives being an enforcer and a guiding law of Creation at first-hand being superseded nature, the only worship that remains, and is the rendering of ourselves her worth.

The meaning I am attaching to the word of "marriage" is indeed purely that of a law of Duty: or, of conscious religious obligation. And hence does my present reasoning depend chiefly on appeal to moral instinct:—to which matter I shall come presently. But I have farther to point back to the bearing of my own scheme upon "formalism," either physical or mental. I have said of my own theory of religion, while speaking before on this very subject, that it is expressly a "doctrine of forms" (II. 513);—I have made it the very basis to my speculating that "forms of faith," however truly the *product* of mind, are much more importantly to be regarded also as the *source* to the latter (I. 48). Even in physical modes of being, the obtaining of a settled type of what is outward formation is the sure accompaniment to the reaching of a new specific condition. A "new species" would mean nothing to our classifying apprehension, if wanting in some outer peculiarity that was definable. But in that mental existence of our own where man becomes himself the quasi-creator of his own condition by the invention of social legalism,

a definable outer character is more than ever indispensable:—for the very reason of the circumstance I have just noted, of our whole mental constitution being laid out, analogically, in the mode of latent or “molecular” struggle. Some fixed outer integument, idealistic though it be, is more than ever in demand to protect the conditionment* of the impulsive mass of beinghood that is now concerned. In our actual state of being, our mass of inner impulses—having, assumably, the bearing just alleged on conscious Egoship,—cannot naturally do without the surface-fulcrum to its prisoned motion which indeed is the bond of Marriage that alone incorporates the Family.

By the whole analogy of nature’s method employed hitherto, may I not then conclude that in fact she stands pledged to this mere carrying out of her own creative plan? For, to clench the assurance I have yet this to add on my own part. The proof that she will actually *not* fail to deal, by means of us, in the same way with mental as with physical material, is supported in my scheme by the following notion of the inherent nature of mind. Mind is what it is, I have inferred, through the very matter, exclusively, of its repeating on itself, on heightened terms, the course of action that rules beneath it.

Here then is the general sketch of my argument for the naturalness of formal Marriage. Assuming, as I do, of evolving processes generally, and especially of mental ones, that a certain stage must come at last to them

* It is a settled principle of evolutionalism that “function precedes organism;” but in function of the kind here in question, the very means of any exercise of itself is some fixed settlement of condition. And hence indeed for this case it would seem best to set forth conditionment in front of simple function as representative organic determiner.

revealing their true meaning to our consciousness, I find the case now occurring in regard to Marriage what exactly conforms to the assumed condition—and this, with the centralness of importance that implies religion. And I account this for a valid attestation, applying to this whole manner of reading nature. My religion is relationism. Our conditionment believe to have been the substance :—this nature that, if without regulation, would lead to destruction; while, if duly set in provision of an adapted integument, he together all the multiplied machinery engaged which leads us up towards the utmost possible beinghood.

But the whole force of this reasoning depends on details. And I will therefore now endeavour to follow up this faint outline by a somewhat of particular exposition. I will state, as best I can, in direct terms, what I take to have been the actual process imagined, by the working of which both our Egoship and our Sexhood have been elaborated.—The case, let me repeat, is that of three modes of affective conflict, differenced into such from a primal rude uniformity, and fighting out their three separate courses : under always a ruling tendency to such state of ordered balance with one another as alone can give to all a just efficiency.

The general feeling of Love, while it had origin exclusively out of Sexhood, was yet incapable of being realized as Love except in as far as Sexhood had had consequence in Parenthood. Or rather, in Maternity : since here Love first shows its proper nature of drawing selfhood as if beyond self. Not even for the male parent, originally, was the Love that counts as sexual—though

in later stages of emotive progress the kind that for the man is characteristic,—that which went beyond animal passion; while for the female parent herself, on the other hand, this qualifying fact was concerned, that the love she might have for offspring yet depended for its being such on the relation she had had previously with the male parent. And all along maternal love alone rises above animal impulse in the same way: through community of interest in the child with its father. For community of interest makes doubled and more than doubled action of life, generative by its nature of mutual sympathy: of which result the life-action of a merely solitary mother is incapable. It is action, the action of general life, that infixes Love into the human constitution.

But in times of savagery the dawning sentiment was allowed to excess by a feeling appropriate alone of right to the state of Brotherhood: that of *rivalry*. As soon as ever the female parent had a sharer in the keeping of her child, this very fact, notwithstanding its inherent beneficialness, gave occasion to jealousy: jealousy, acting both ways, towards the child and the fellow-parent. And, strange as it seems, this fruit of jealousy, commingled with the primal feeling, may have served actually as the means to the first purifying of the quality of Love.—The true rectifying of this agent of jealousy lies, however, with the afforded presence of the repeated progeny which follows from a duly-prosecuted parentage. And here comes in view the effect of polygamy, as imbued with provocations to jealousy. The female parent who might bear with her partner in his rivalling her in possession of her offspring, could not naturally tolerate a rival mother, supplying him with rival children. Nor could the children of rival mothers be other than fiercest

rivals among themselves. (That is, in so far as the means of sustenance were obliged to be of import.) Brothers in this loosely-ordered state could only naturally be enemies, either partially or wholly : since the limiting of the sex-connection to a single pair, and this for an endurance providing genuine brotherhood, is the only means of carrying the family into a sphere where it may be wholly united. Before this had taken place—or before the sense of right became existent,*—Love fell in every way, *without* means of being a permanent balance was wholly wanting.

Under polygamy the sense of Fatherhood was solely dominant. In consequence, no one of the relational functions was carried on appropriately. The associated plurality of wives made of them pure slaves, in the manner fit for infants ; children were rather feeble rivals, in the way natural to brothers, than new selves to the father, as they ought to have been ; brothers, among themselves, were embittered by the unnatural animosity caused by claims of rival mothers. The force of fatherhood, unbalanced by that of motherhood, pressed like a crushing incubus on the development of young beings. And this force had been derived from the pre-religion that made the father after death into a fetish. —No love of genuine kind was as yet existent : precisely for the reason that each one of the progressing modes of love was as yet without adequate respondents in the other two—vitiated in itself, and the cause of vitiation to the others. And the Family was no more

* During the season of polygamy the state of the Family was what, by my own typical figure, I should account "cotyledonous"; while the state that preceded, being that where no Father was included, I regard as without claim to be a Family.

than a pseudo-formation, not advanced to be the nucleus of emotionalism, and the generator of true affection, which we know that it was destined to become when the Family was held together by a legal bond.

But in the heart of polygamy there lay indeed the root out of which a true monogamy was naturally enforced to have an origin. This was, the low conception about children that they stand as worldly property and wealth to their male producer. To the spousal pluralist his young offspring, save as being to him the source of mere amusement, were of value only as heirs. And—in proportion, indeed, as there faded out of view the first kind of demand made on heirs, prevailing as long as fetishism prevailed (see II. 288, *note*,) —heirs were simply the needed means of holding massed together the worldly goods he may have grasped for himself and is unwilling to leave for enemies to seize on. Here, however, is an instant rendering of the domestic sovereign a dependent on his offspring: not in a manner to engender love, either filial or paternal, with any immediate effect, but with a sure bearing on the consolidating of the family. For whereas the destined heir had thus, when selected, to be also protected from the rivalry of semi-brothers, the need was now enforced of recurring to the law of statehood for the assistance that could alone be effective, in confirmation of the father's choice. And this amounted necessarily to the raising of the heir's mother to the rank of wife:—which effect, once begun upon, could only end naturally in the gradually-full establishment of Monogamy.

Pure Love, in itself, could have had no such effect. It would have been powerless amid secular institutions. But the gross covetousness of clutching firmly by worldly property was the instrument in the hands of nature for

giving henceforth a new meaning to "property": as the property *in* children, and not that which children should take up. Here Love obtained therefore a genuine nidus. And nature's law of heredity stamped success on the worldly-wise recurrence to secularity. The fixed condition of matrimony, once conventionally established, grew henceforth to a more and deeper firmer sense. For children, under matrimony were, in course of time, moulded in their affective instincts, in a manner to respond with the arrangement. And the progress of the kind stated to the emotion in general. No union of any single kind ever these might be each of them selected, could produce an offspring such effect of advantage as indeed might be hereditarily perpetuated, according to the requirement which is made by evolution of long-prosecuted continuity of conditionment. Only an established institution, accepted by general human-kind, could hereditarily avail in the way demanded.

Beyond the point that is here reached—of the first legalizing of Marriage, and therein virtually of the establishment of Monogamy,—the evolving process concerned bears no longer this outward treatment, and must be left to alone a subjective weighing. And to this mode of judgment I shall soon proceed. But enough is shown here, I believe, to mark the semi-physical analogy I am resting on.

It is the Tree-law of growth that I appeal to:—as to primarily the formation of a central stock within which growth is provided for, and as to afterwards the lengthening upwards of that stock. I predicate of the law of Marriage that it was that which indeed first conditioned

our impulsive Egoism in the manner of a central stock ; and which made this of such kind as that henceforth it could grow only by its ability of diffusing itself abroad. The stock was formed, I have been alleging, by the encounter of the ripening substance of emotionalism with the effect of worldly utility. The two forces combined were as if centripetal and centrifugal in the action of creating an outer shell, or outer rind, to the idea of Family. But after once there had begun to spring a sapful stem, the organic agency of leafing outwards into branches was at once the sign, and in greater degree the cause, of the stem's filling its own destiny of upward progress. And sufficiently in general history is the reality of this process supported.

The despotism of the rulers at the head of nations was a would-be continuation of the idea of "fatherhood," as this existed before the tie was legalized. And the attempted transference had a double falseness : for the divine right of fatherhood, which had the right of so proving itself in time, was grossly parodied in its application to kings, and in even its own sphere was yet far from being shown in a true light. Also the idea of brotherhood, opposedly, was expressly taking root in state secular, through its fitness for the indefinite widening that here was called for ; even though it was as yet ill-furnished for the office, through paternal repression :— while the slightest sign of the real conflict of Sex, only as yet in its merest germ of home-production, scarcely availed in any way with the outer world. And in the want of the latter influence is the call for that second and chief crisis in domestic statehood which is my object. Onward through the intermediate progression, the secular repetition of emotive states was a helper to home improvements ; but only at last when a new Marriage-law is due,

such as *may* give to Sexhood its true province, appears the promise of the great final result, which is truly in itself sexual. I mean, that showing finally of the inherent *difference* between the Home and the State—the actual and the reflectional modes of Family,—which will make virtually feminine the one and masculine the other. In the type I imagine that the sign of government will appear in a deepened union of State & Family, while in the true Family the characterizing sex-influence will be the merging of the good-absolute, into that of but one side.

The creative nucleus of the Family has been, in fact, as a nervous ganglion which physically subserves mentalism, by at first throwing out its effects, and thence afterwards by the gathering in from these new produce of increase to itself. The brain thrives through exerted action ; and so also has thriven subjective emotionalism. All the animosities of public life are but weakened repetitions of those that stir the family. It is the latter that gives character to the life abroad. And therefore if this well-spring of Love is defiled—in proportion as it actually is defiled, or remains short of true correction,—the motor influence over conduct in general, the entire subjective stimulus we depend on, is defective. If the form of Family should no longer progress in character,—if it should fail to endure the crisis now affecting it,—I believe that true human individuality, bound up necessarily in conjugality of constitution, would at once dwindle away. Love and Conscience would decay together ; and the mass of human beings would fall together into a characterless herd.

But the full rounding of my argument has to be made out by an idea respecting Marriage that is scarcely

yet prevalent:—an idea, namely, that belongs peculiarly to the principle of sex-division between law-secular and law-religious. I mean, the merely negative character required to be that of the former in the sphere where the latter is paramount. The specialty of law-of-marriage is that both kinds of law are included; but law-secular, I imagine, can be here positive rightfully only as to succession in worldly property:—in all else it may be only prohibitory. It has, on the one hand, to forbid more than one single chosen partner at one time; on the other, it has to keep off outsiders from infringing on the privilege attached to marriage. It has to ward off from the religious enclosure all intrusion of external sexualism; and, no less, if less manifestly required so to act, all unwarrantable interference even of parents with the rights personal of the two concerned. For the actual positive conditionment of the state of Marriage—which, as such, should be made over wholly to Religion,—is in every way that where a sacred isolation needs ensurance.

The Egoism of the individual unit is throughout a matter of seclusion from environment. It is the effect of a conscious union with God, gained by cutting off the sense of fellow-creatures. But since that Egoism, in itself, owes its validness to human Sexhood, the real cultus of Sexhood to be paid to Deity should manifestly have its solitariness protected, or at least assented to, by secularism. The demand exists *naturally*, I conclude, within the whole bearing of evolution.

Such desirable reverence has, however, not yet been paid legally to the idea of Marriage. All here that can be averred is, that the formalism adapted hitherto to the idea has been such as to lead on to this result. And I will now pass to the consideration of this progress. The

first crisis in the development of a law of Family—fit to mate with a fraternal plan of Statehood,—was the calling of the State to witness, at all, to the importance to every existing generation of that which has to follow it. The *second* must be the forcing of the State *not to hinder* the Divine working of nature herself throughout the entire m tion.

MORAL BEAR

AN FORM OF MARRIAGE.

That identifying with a fixed ad shment of legal marriage with a fixed ad monogamy which belongs to the foregoing a now be carried on to a farther and spe of also the identifying both, by as if an dication, with the introduction of Religion into the matter. I mean, through a recurrence to the solemn practice of appeal to Deity, in regard to any compact engaged in, which is the essence of the ordinary oath. This junction of effects may at all events be assumed safely in respect of Christianity, when this had once been taken into alliance with Statehood. Whatever may be said of result proceeding from the degree of religious sanction to marriage drawn from other religious forms bound to Statehood, the one notable matter in Church history of the great papal institution at the close of the twelfth century, giving marriage up wholly into the power of priests, was evidently, in the course of things, the firm sealing of the endurance of monogamy. After once this relegation had been made by state-rulers, it seems clear to retrospective view that no return to antecedent conditions of sex-union was possible, through precisely the moral influence that poured in:—not possible, namely, except by a decisive thwarting of evolutionary progress in morality.

And the power of holding by this ecclesiastical event,

and treating it as typically representative of necessary evolutionary circumstance, gives most helpful simplicity to the present object. Nor is this all of the same sort : for although the form of marriage adopted under Innocent III. cannot be asserted to be now free from alteration, considered as to Christendom in general, yet as to ourselves it may be said fearlessly, that the form still prevailing in our own country does adequately represent in itself the essential purport of the original ordination. We may therefore by limiting attention to this—as now I propose to do,—have every thing before us that moral judgment is concerned with.

When the Church converted Marriage into a sacrament, the consequence, as I have already shown, was that of bringing the whole mass of Christian doctrinism to bear on domestic life. Not before this special epoch had any standard of domestic duty been set up to have authority over private conduct. But the form of Marriage now provided, and made religiously obligatory, was indeed from the first, as it still remains, a solemn beacon that directs all concerned—and who is not so concerned?—to a stated mode of fulfilment of the state of Family. It is a guiding rule for the control of emotive impulses—those of Sex being always chief, though by no means the only kind regarded,—from which no faithful consciences, once deliberately subjected to it, can ever after permit wilful departure. The vow taken at Marriage must be ever, naturally, the standing sign of whatever forms existent home morality :—being, as it is, at once effect and cause of moral growth in that department. It is here the main vehicle for the diffusion of authoritative religious influence.

And if we turn to make comparison backwards, one

clear indication is before us of the progress in moral growth here accomplished. In no antecedent or non-Christian conditionment of the nuptial bond has the woman for herself been called on to take a part in the appointed vow. It has been held sufficient that, for any needful self-control of moral sort under marriage, the man alone should be answerable to the judgment before heaven. And where this has been the case, the matter vowed for has been respected only, as to the just maintenance and treatment of the woman. (in some degree) But when the man took control of the matter, the woman, through the influence of Christianity, was as much entitled to be considered before as much required, to make appeal to pres. as the man : there being under Christ, otherwise than as to inter-relationism, neither accountable male nor female. And truly was this a most signal point of gain :—though, none the less, it was involved in derogatory circumstance whose rectifying was yet far from being prepared for.

The rite of marriage which our liturgy presents appears certainly to betoken a kind of “contract,” made between the two parties concerned, so far as up to this initial import : that they engage, mutually, to remain faithful to one another, exclusively of any other man or woman. And this indeed is the essential matter at foundation. But then, in all that goes beyond this true basis, there are marks of inconsistency with it that cause doubt as to its allowableness to stand for “contract.” A “contract,” in its proper meaning, implies always such conditions of agreement as belong to some provisional *bargaining* :—and hence the force of the term in regard to marriage lies with the stipulating together, by not the parties themselves,—or, at least, by not both of them,—but by the parents or guardians of one, with the other of

the two parties. And such transacting as this implies naturally, and implies always in actual fact, an affair of merely secular possessions ; and is such, besides, as concerns only betrothal, and *not* accomplished marriage. As to the parties themselves in the latter act, we are therefore driven to suppose, if we aim at the retention of the idea of “contract,” that here again becomes repeated some kind of bargaining which, if in matter that is mainly different from secular, still virtually admits of such dealing with it. And this is met by the substitution of the material of the affections. If then we take here—as I think we may rightfully do,—our clue to the entire case, we have to observe how the terms of bargain are here arranged. And it is thus. The man has been made to engage “to love, comfort, and to honour the woman, and to keep her in sickness and in health” ; —the woman, additionally to a repetition of the latter point, and to that of responsive “love and honour,” is made to promise the man “to obey him and serve him” : —and this, on both sides, “for better for worse,” as well as “for richer and poorer”, and “in sickness and in health.”— This composite arrangement, however, if duly sifted and weighed, brings down the case surely, in reality, to the very type of “bargaining” of coarse quality which ostensibly appears to be avoided :—a mode of “bargaining” that, according with the strict bearing of the word’s meaning, respects proper *sale* and *purchase*. —So curiously does the ecclesiastical formula fall at issue with itself!

This reading of the formula does indeed point to the known root of the marriage institution. Passing over as we must, in our retrospect, the rude ages when the mother, unaided, had the possession and the charge of all her offspring ;—and those farther when the man,

desiring progeny on his own account, must have felt naturally the desirableness of securing it in his own homestead, as attached to himself personally, and as if legally, by his open character of its father: while thence gladly he may have placed occasionally, or even habitually, as appears to have been the case, his worldly substance of wealth in the mother's hands, for her means of doing both them and herself as well :—passing on to the present state, we may well perceive how, as fruit from the first settlement of home life at all genuine settlements, consisted in the known practice of obtaining a wife in instant by the means of capture: of capture, which first followed upon war, but which could also be effected and was actually effected later, in times of peace, through simple purchase. And from such beginning it is evident that the running into polygamy, for the strong and wealthy, was inevitable; as was also the recourse, farther on, from involved difficulties with rival mothers and pseudo-brothers, to that settled monogamy which, except for its included reference to "property," may be viewed as having been, even in the judgment of savages, the marriage-plan alone sanctioned by nature. But moreover there is here suggested a mark of continuity to the present day in the human motives giving cause to marriage, which would seem to stamp completeness on the idea followed. For we are helped by it to an explanation quite intelligible of a part of our present rite that, in itself, has no rational interpretation. It would seem, namely, that the same selfish regard to his own benefit, and his own power of drawing fruit from his belongings, which then influenced the man marrying to entrust them to a captured slave, is the very motive that re-appears, in thin disguise, in the modern lavish endowment of a wife

with "all the worldly goods" of the husband. This unlimited surrender of his possessions, so unmeaning to our present tone of thought, yet would seem the true natural sequence to the savage's first committal of his rude chattels to the safe hands of her, the household drudge, who as such could use them only for *his*, and in no way for *her* advantage.

Such laborious charge laid upon them was the only "honour" that was done to pristine wives:—those poor, un-lovely Enids, bound to wholly un-chivalrous Geraints! *Behind* the Bible-poetry of the Paradise there lies truly much, very much, of which the survival to present times can only be morally insufferable.

The idea of "sale and purchase" in fact lurks throughout our own form of marriage-contract—supposing it to be entitled to be so called. The woman's part is to *sell herself*, in the fullest and grossest sense of the words, *for a maintenance*. That is: in so far as she takes standing as no longer in herself a mere chattel, conveyed, for a consideration, out of the hands of the sovereign father into those of a sovereign husband. She is here required to make over herself to the latter in a way that renders her in absoluteness a slave: to be fed and kept creditably alive, but still held back essentially from free agency. It is this which is the real nature of the bargain imposed on her, however it be softened and veiled, as indeed it is, by the call made on both for enduring kindness.—It is recognized judicially as to the latter, in fact, that a breach in its observance, considered of sufficient magnitude to be important, shall render marriage actually of the nature of common contracts, which allows freedom from conditions to either party that may be injured by failure in fulfilment on the other side. And yet this only but in part: in conse-

quence of the difficulty which is super-eminent in regard to children. But even as to the deepest injury the case admits of,—the virtual rupture of the great law of monogamy,—while the man may in law transgress with impunity, the woman stands bound: and this through the terms allotted by her own enforced consent. She has conditioned and this “for better for worse.”—This contract, in justice, but *only sale*: soft legal slavery is compelled to be, by the cl of living, for herself and children.

Shall it be s indeed a something done for her when s owed as that her consent should be asked eased to be assumed as a thing of course that she was merely the kind of “property” herself, which being held in the first instance by the father, or his heir, was thence to be only made over by him to the husband: a barbaric treatment remaining still undisguisedly represented in our “solemnization of matrimony”?—In one sense assuredly this is gain to the woman. The asking of her own consent is a sort of neutralization, in reason, to the very grossness of the insult, still uneffaced, contained in the enjoined query of “who gives her away?” It is a pitiful compensation; but it is that which was perhaps the only means of making evident to the woman, in the end, the baseness of her long-standing humiliation.*

And the boon, such as it is, must be traced, as to the good in it, to Christianity. Nor do I allude only to that

* It must be observed that something of the same kind has occurred with regard to the civil privilege of holding “property.” This being generally denied to women, as would seem, by a tacit kind of hypothesis that such holding is inadmissible to them in the same sense, and for the same reason, that it is so for children, an arrangement has been made by state-law against the injustice here perceived by granting

increase in the kindness always following on the conjugal relation in which Christianity, although eminently influential in this way, has but shared in the work of

power in each particular case that money destined for a married woman may be entrusted, to make sure to her the power of having benefit from it, to some alien person on her account. But the fact is obvious, that any voluntary acquiescence in this arrangement that has been made on the part of women has been a committing of themselves virtually to the underlying hypothesis of their civil incapacity. There has taken place, with whatever little positive intention, an insidious drawing forth of their consent to the position assigned them :—just in secular correspondence with their otherwise betrayal, on religious ground, into the owning that they may rightfully be made slaves.

But happily this condition, at the present time, has just been turned into a thing of the past. So far as the holding property is concerned, the marriage-law of England has freed itself from the encumbering demand of "settlements" even while I have here been writing about marriage. And this has been done, I rejoice to know, through the unwearied though long-thwarted exertions of a noble body of women, under the leadership of Mrs. Wolstenholme Elmy and Mrs. Jacob Bright. This glorious success leaves *only* to be yet dealt with in the matter the main religious difficulty now treated of. May it prove that this also will ere long be taken up determinately by women.

As a sign how the leading minds of our time are become alive to the matter, and how they see in it the special kind of importance, the very "crisis," here supposed, let me quote the following passage from the *Times*. I give it on the authority of the *Women's Suffrage Journal* of September 1st, 1882: the italics being my own.—In speaking of the "Married Women's Property Act," which had just passed (August 28th), the writer in the *Times*, after noticing the change induced with regard to settlements, says: "An important legal presumption will be altered, and we shall not have to wait long to observe the result. Those who do not marry without settlements of some sort will continue in the same course; but the millions who do not, will live under a law which gives a *feme covert* much the same rights as a *feme sole*. Other consequences, perhaps more momentous, are latent in the measure, which will leave little of the Common Law intact. *It probably portends indirect social effects much greater than the disposition of property, and it may in the end pulverize some ideas which have been at the basis of English life. Measures which affect the family economy are apt to be 'epoch-making'; and probably when the most talked of Bills of the Session are clean forgotten this obscure measure may be bearing fruit.*"

general culture. By the inherent case, the conjugal union implies an enforced mutual complacency, and that tender feeling on both sides, any wounding of which is a spousal crime: the tender feeling that is involved in all enjoyable transactions of life, and that is ever deeper as the nuptial tie becomes closer and more enduring. Monogamy would be bound up with the common call of life to keep and cherish one another to the end. But monogamy in itself, by the present condition identified, in a broad sense, with adultery. It is therefore here that I find the difficulty to be attended to. The Christian sacrament of Marriage, if taken duly as such, appears to me essential to have ensued, naturally,

from the putting into a practical form, in the way of all sacraments, the general spirit of Christian dogmatism. The sacrament of Marriage, as such, is that, I would say, which first rendered *efficacious* the inherent *grace* that was laid up in Christianity.

Certainly, the line of moral continuity which I have attributed to the course of religion's progress through Christianity, is patently confirmed by the obvious cast of our liturgical service. The alleged case of Christ and his Church makes the substance of all the sanction to matrimony that is here presented. With this purely dogmatic theory of the Apostle Paul the rite opens; and the practical exhortations it ends with are but simple quotations from epistles turning mostly on direct allusion to the theory. In no other religious service is there plainly laid bare, as here there is, the dogmatic essence of Christianity in its crudest guise: that of Christ being fore-determined in God's design even already when man, as yet innocent, was however hastening to the Fall whence Christ alone could raise him by his miracle-

working power, first shown, as stands recorded, in providing wine for a marriage-feast :—this statement being followed up by a solemn prayer for God's blessing on the pair concerned, which throughout expresses how the consecrating of matrimony had indeed imbued the whole provision for man's redemption : a prayer truly which carries with it the strangest of bold assumptions to be uttered at the present day in the face of Deity ! It asserts to God, of Himself, that He had, by His mighty power, *made all things out of nothing* ; that He had appointed that *out of man, created after His own similitude, woman should take her beginning* ; that it should *never* be lawful to put asunder those by matrimony made one :—besides formally giving stamp of the force of oath, as being uttered before God, to the professed belief in the sole consecrating power as to human marriage of Christ's uniting with his Church ; with an included acknowledgment of the woman's duty of obedience to her husband.

And all this, from an evolutionsal point of view, I grant to have been salutary in its own time :—or, before men's view of nature had become enlarged beyond narrow orthodox bounds, and before women were capable of a sense of duty not hampered in the same way. If as an evolutionist—and especially as one who is a woman,—I seek for a true philosophic thread through this mystical interpretation of marriage, I feel that its vindication becomes easy ; and that what now appears eminently inadmissible of retention was yet, before the crisis of conceptive reversion, an expressly salutary mode of doctrinism. I believe, namely, that the clue which applies to everything—to each and every stage of progression in regard to marriage,—is the association of the fact of Sexhood with the fact of Death, which I attribute as the

proper source of all Religion. Let us only try to take up the actual mental position of the Apostle Paul, as intermediate between that which produced the notion of the Fall and that which raised marriage into a sacrament :—let us set ourselves as nearly as we can into the frame of mind that is betokened in his epistles, and this one thing is bold relief, that he was penetrated to his y the notion that “Death came into the w of Sin”: the latter word meaning, of pec -abandonment to sensual impulses. Sin a so “exceeding sinful” as it was, beca eating by individuals of that original o God which he had been taught by Zoroastrian... y to the account of women and of sex-connection; and to see as having drawn down at once, by that typical occurrence within Paradise, a penal subjugation to mortality for all mankind. He labours hard, in the prime epistle where he first expounds his great doctrine of propitiation, to show that the dread sentence of universal Death was however but a “legal” one,—or, one which the Law-imposer could remove, and had always willed to remove, when the debt of punishment to be undergone should have been satisfied;—and on this he rests his triumphant confidence in the office of the true Messiah who had just offered himself, in Mosaic fashion, as the sacrifice that must be acceptable to God, and who actually had been attested for such by his miraculous revival and ascent to heaven: the true Messiah who must be consequently henceforth known as the redeemer of men in general from the claim upon them—the canceller of the primal law of Death’s infliction. If only mankind in general would by faith leave their case in the hands of Christ, they would be free from their old bondage to that Evil Principle who

gave his wages in the form of inclinations to sin ; and they might strive against these manfully with full effect, as being turned into the servants of Him of whom the service was alone a righteous freedom :—they would stand before God on the original paradisaic terms of inherent possession of immortality, by at least an hopeful anticipation, now incalculably enhanced by the witnessed resurrection of Jesus.—And at this point it is, we need to observe, that there occurs to him the idea of the pertinence to his object of the interhuman relation of conjugality.

“ Now being made free from sin, and become servants to God, ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the end everlasting life. For the wages of sin is death ; but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord. Know ye not, brethren, how that the law hath dominion over a man as long as he liveth ? For the woman which hath an husband is bound by the law to her husband so long as he liveth ; but if the husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of her husband. So . . . ye also are become dead to the law by the body of Christ ; that ye should be married to another, even to him who is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God :” (Romans vi. 22-3, vii. 1—4.)

The notion thus felicitously suggested was adapted to take root in the way that actually it did, by peculiarly its accordance with the feeling respecting women, as well as that of women themselves, which prevailed in the time of Paul. The myth of Genesis had expressed the irreprovable conviction of early speculators that of all sources of general evil for men their enforced connection with women was paramount : while it also expressed the opinion they held resolutely, as men, that all this consequent evil might and should be attributed to women

only. And under this determined view of evil's origin it was wholly natural, accordingly, that they should have dramatized the work of creation as they did, by figuring that when God, after pairing lower animals, had to provide the human male with a fitting mate, He gave such to Adam, not formed like mere beasts from out the ground, but out of one and flesh :—that is, He gave her to him in the way that alone befits a Divine donor, as fathers give, or sell, the female issue of their kind, and thence, after Eve had been corrupted by her rival in divine power,—so that Adam, in offering her to God, “the woman that Thou gavest me,”—it was but natural again that God should be made to punish her misuse of her free-will by committing her throughout, both in body and soul, to the disposal of her wiser possessor. This, we may concede, was what *may* have seemed desirable at first to the male interpreters of Providence. And no women, of themselves, had yet the ability of being stirred to raise their protest. But when the sound of the large Gospel was abroad which Paul preached to the Gentiles,—in which God was wholly glorified by His *grace*, and in which, moreover, men were blended up with women, in one mass, under expressly female colours,—women converts, and those especially who were Gentiles, were as eager as men to give ear to him. And it seems even very possible that it was some rebellious aptitude on their part towards a practical application of the new theory for immediate benefit, that drew forth from this apostle, and others after him, that vehement injunction of personal adherence to the yet authorized plan of the connubial relation which remains in force even for ourselves.* With Paul, in his new mental

* At the conclusion of our marriage-service stands an injunction to

position, the necessity in every way was compromise : chiefly as to the inherent nature of the great idea he was filled with, but also, immediately and obstructingly, as to the notions and prevailing interests of those he was endeavouring to win over. The *generalness* of the revealed function of the Saviour, which made it necessary that none should be turned back of those who came to him, caused the apostle to welcome gladly the women that pressed forward into his ranks ; but at the same time it was impossible that he should have relaxed, even if he had willed to do so, the strictness of their prescribed duty as wives, while precisely his ruling object was to set up the headship of common husbands in parallel with that of Christ over mankind. Nor could he have omitted to be aware that, even if this could have been theoretically arranged, the favour he would have gained with women the newly-married that suggests much as to the leading controversy in the Church that led to the integration of Protestantism : "It is convenient that they should early receive the holy Communion." This bare admission of what to Catholics is so all-important as the connection of the two sacraments—reducing that of prime doctrinal import into one of simple commemoration,—shows indeed in present view as a rupture in dogmatic continuity that could not otherwise than be resisted by central churchhood. If marriage were indeed, as now believed, the effective purport of Christianity, so likewise must the Eucharist have required to maintain supremacy over the whole worship of those adhering to the primal form of their creed.—But the connection has also another implication too pertinent to be left out of sight. Besides thus explaining the easy passage that was prepared from the first into the final mysticism of the "transubstantiation," it carries us back straight to in fact the old Roman form of marriage prevailing in the time of Paul : the pagan religious rite of *confarreatio*, in which marriage was made good by precisely the eating and drinking together of bride and bridegroom,—or, perhaps, by communion in one kind only.—As to the Apostle himself, there is certainly no sign of this complicity in his writings ; but the idea of it is so naturally consecutive to his own—as expressing the apt junction of Gentile practice with the Hebrew rite of the paschal supper,—that it must inevitably, as would seem, have been quickly superinduced.

would have been dangerously overbalanced by offence to the men-disciples who were so much more important to him. Still, the urgency of his desire "to bring all souls to Christ" carried him through, and he made out his course with at least a full local sufficiency, however now it may entail moral discontent. The spouse that was "given by God" required to *obey*, had obeyed; but merciful entreaties attached to her husband's magisterial with whole body so loved her and called to offer himself in "sacrifice" for her, in order that he might endow her with a merit not her own. The doctrinal arrangement had recourse to was thus indeed but a mingled kind of benefit as to moral principle. The covenanted-for advantage supposed gained on the female side appears naturally but as that which accrues in ordinary to wives whose husbands make the assumption that the marrying is on their part a condescension :—and such imagining on the part of husbands may reasonably be supposed general among Paul's contemporaries. Nay, worse than this, it would seem that here lurks an included suggestion, or opportunity of suggestion, of the gross feeling belonging to sensuous men that their submitting at all to the bond of marriage is a self-denial in their birth-right privileges. The presence of such kind of parallelism was perhaps inevitable at the stage in culture when the idea of "imputed merit" could be relied on, as forming part of the Divine plan of government : although in neither case might the Apostle be answerable for the lack in his disciples of power to follow

out his own subtleness of distinctions, here as to the new meaning of an abrogation that was spiritual, and there as to imputation that was only a "legal fiction." —At all events, even as blighted by the connected import it suggests, the symbolic theory of Paul must be accredited by us for having done morally the thing which is here of leading importance: the promoting of the growth of conjugal *love*. The un-moral trust in the goodness of another as availing for our own, which to modern sense is a real vitiating of Paul's Gospel, may indeed be yet traced, as to the spousal symbol, as the ameliorating agent that *only* in this way, of concern with Sexhood, it can, I believe, make out its proper evidence of having been.

It took a period of some three hundred years for Paul's doctrine to gain the form of the Nicene Creed;—and rather longer for it to ripen into the Augustinian notion of Sin:—but it took more than seven centuries yet longer before it had become ready for practical application; and then only through the help of a firmly-organized ecclesiastical establishment. The Church, come to matronly Popedom, turned its naturally feminine ability into making the abstruse Creed into a thing of daily use:—a thing which wise humanity will never henceforth let go, even though Popes and Creeds may have had their day.

There is a vast amount of testimony to the moral stamina of Christianity in the fact that this fruit of it should have lasted down to the present time. And the attestation is but strengthened as we recognize the local error that has been transmitted. But can we doubt, nevertheless, that for some considerable recent period the inherent falsity embodied has been working at the root of the domestic institution, and loosening away its

outward form, in the very interest of its inward material? —It cannot be questioned that pre-monitions have arisen, and must have arisen, to show the need of a reformed standard of apprehension respecting matrimony.

If we consider the two over-passed stages in Sex-principle, which have been severally represented by the Paradisaic ideal and the Jewishian dogmatism, it seems clear that the moral standard of the former, as applied to the woman, was next to nothing, and that which we call the Jewishian standard, in the first, if the husband had a tendency to sin, it was her husband's duty to sin, if that was bound to check the progress of grace which the wife gained in mythology. It is so equivocally based in views of nature and Providence as to be indeed but the narrowest opening, however perceivable as such, to a true sexual morality :—the only genuine moral impulse awakened being that of gratitude to the husband who was considered to have stooped in taking her ; while, to all modern apprehension of psychologic truth, this means but a very small advance towards a personal sense of duty.

The Christian doctrine of matrimony for the woman is, that if she only “serve” with due affectionateness her husband, she is as free from legal (or punishable) sin, as is the believer who adheres to Christ by force of faith. But this practical repetition of Pauline creedism is of a kind to work out self-condemning fruit ; and in obvious experience it has done this actually, and for the man nearly as much as the woman. It has produced in wives the slackness and diffuseness of mind which have made them proverbially chargeable with the defect that attends irresponsibility : the abandonment to a capricious self-indulgence, with regardlessness of effects to follow. And in husbands it has fostered that very notion of their own

egoistic importance, as the one centre of all the objects of domestic life—the end and aim of the existence of the family,—which it lies with the true purpose of all religion to prevent. Nor is this two-fold effect of injury other than a fair response to that which may be recognized also in the symbolical agents. The spousal short-comings of the Church have been historically an open shame ; nor, in truth, is there wanting a suggestion the most painful in regard to the Divine Husband, which in itself would seem sufficient, to modern feeling, to necessitate a cessation of the symbol's use for the future. For are we not, in the matter just alleged, forced inevitably by moral logic to an idea respecting Christ that yields a Calvinism more remorseless than Calvin's own :—the idea, namely, that redemption was to Deity as much a Self-object as creation was ; and that He, the Son of Man, who came to be “lifted up” on Calvary, that He might “draw unto him all mankind,” did this, after all, *not* for men, but only that His own name, with that of the Father, might be glorified!—To refer back our judgment in this way seems indeed the applying of a test that is at once called for, and yet incapable of being undergone.

But even supposing the symbol laid aside as having now done its work and become antiquated, the Christian rite would have this still against it, of deep psychologic force, that the vow imposed by it, with the apparent object of turning gratitude into spousal affection, is essentially of the nature of a moral snare. The very promise to “love” —to the fulfilment of which on the part of women the *only* kind of answerableness allowed them is attached,—is that which tends naturally to defeat itself, and to leave behind it, instead of real affection, a deadly trail of affective subterfuge. Even with all the impulse that might be gained out of gratitude, or any other kindly

motive, to make a forced effort to love, and this especially under the binding of a solemn promise, is to attempt that which is beyond human ability. The very benefit that might otherwise proceed in the rightful way of inducing love, would be neutralized. A certain kindness, *if mutually intended*, may safely be enjoined and demanded, with true respect, and such as helps the perpetuation, or if first-producing of love :—but a *vow* of love—*which is dependent*, through its need on *not on one but on two*,—is become under *the weight of self-knowledge*, a wilful blindness *in a dangerous circumstance of our condition that is not contempt towards religion*. The vow to love—and this, when joined as it has been with the terms of “for better for worse,”—seems to me a fearful paltering both with conscience and the asserted presence of Deity.

This intrinsic falsity, added to the flagrant ones already noted—besides the special sign just supposed of immediate degradation in the reigning symbol,—seems fully to complete the show of need for a re-construction of our marriage-service. As it stands, it but faithfully represents a state of creedism which is gone by, as an authoritative influence. It is surely fatal to the moral efficacy of the service, for ourselves, that it should still require of those who marry to kneel before God and utter, or hear uttered, what the mass of present thinkers consider falsehoods. It can but seem a profanity that the priest who has to bless them, should on the one hand say to God that He has done that which modern science finds incredible; and on the other hand assert deliberately, *as facts*, Bible-matters that historic criticism repudiates—besides the mockery of entreating for them the life-experience of an Abraham and a Sarah, or of an Isaac and a Rebekah.

And does this signify any less than a true moral necessity, no longer to be trifled with, of re-moulding the religionism of our country, and of religionism generally?

All formal imposition of antiquated creedism brings evasion on professors. And is this endurable with regard to domestic duty? The very depth of the mischief that has been done, already in the past, is now visible in fact in the recourse that has been adopted to escape it. For what has this been but the endeavour to ignore the actual meaning of the service?—to ignore *that* which of all religious teaching should be most important!—It is a common answer to all remarks of the above kind, that “no one thinks about it; so that *therefore* is the conscience not hurt.”—Delusive trust!—The very making of the marriage-service a *mere* form, that cannot with convenience be thought about with entire sincerity, is an imparting of hollowness to the whole substance of the religious consciousness: the implanting of equivocation at the heart of all practical sense of duty. How much of mere foolish inanity do we constantly hear expressed by young couples, on the subject of their binding together! Of course, “they never meant it in earnest” that the one should obey like the Church, and that the other should love as Christ loved.

This associating of Christian dogmatism with the instilled duty of married life, which probably was esteemed at first the sure fixing of the former in enduring perpetuation, turns out now to be the actual means of only immersing that “duty” in all the evasiveness of import which now attaches to the creed itself. Married persons are in the same position as vowed clergymen. They have undertaken, before God, to carry out a so-called “belief” which they no longer believe, or can believe. They have indeed by their very act of marriage signed

“legally” to an admission of obligation which henceforth they are compelled, by one or another subterfuge, to repudiate. That is, as to the ordinary resource, they are obliged to stretch their consciences into accommodation with a false interpreting of plain language. And this manifestly is for them more dangerous incomparably than it is even for clerical persons, though it is true, as I hope, and believe, that in many cases of both kinds the effect amounts to the same thing, the falling back on a religiousism that is instinctive, and that is mere triflers in matrimony there may, and in fact, be a virtual encouragement in unprincipledness ; but for those who come to the altar pure in heart, there will be an antidote within.

But there is a low case of this kind of injury abounding amongst us, which has no moral safety or background, as being the letter-in of *ridicule* in respect of state of marriage. It is a prevailing fact at the present day that, not only among common-minded persons, but also, and almost without exception, amongst the cultivated and honoured, the very mention of marriage in any general conversation draws forth an instant smile with more or less of the character of a sneer.—Could there be a stronger sign of the deep wrongfulness of the actual type which now moulds the conception of the condition?—If this type should much longer prevail there seems little to be expected but that Marriage, in its best light, should become a thing of no other than worldly interest. But then Religion’s own nature may re-assure us that such an issue as this could be never final.

THE FORM OF MARRIAGE TO BE EXPECTED PREVALENT IN FUTURE.

That which is needed is a *natural* form of marriage. It is nothing against human institutions that at the first they should be only artificial : or, ill adapted to both the

nature of things in general, and to our own instincts of what the latter ought to be ;—but it is everything against them if, when read under the light of “ Divine Design,” they do not actually exhibit power of re-adapting themselves in accordance with general fitness.

In all kinds of framed instrumentation it is the mark of perfection that the means employed should work straight to their point. And by my own plan of teleology, the true point of creation’s general aim being laid in the completing of a Sexed Individuation, so the Divine guidance of Christianity’s historic course ought to show a track bearing specially in this direction : although necessarily subject to the law of all natural formations, whether physical or spiritual,—the law of progress to the extent of its tether, and thence of decadence. Here, accordingly, I find placed the Divine rationale of the event of the great Protestant Reformation.

I imagine that the “ Providential Design ” of Christianity really culminated in its yielding a form of Marriage that sufficed locally : or, as the first-cast of the institution, artificially built up on a dogmatic scaffolding. Having done this, Romish Church-supremacy became constantly more intolerable, so as to make the revival of Grecian literature with its free notions the mediæval desiderandum it proved to be. Papistic dogmatism entrenched itself vainly on monkish sophistries. Reforming doctors proclaimed their exclusive holding by the one side of Apostolic teaching which concerned only the strictly personal matter of the justifying of each soul by its own un-priestridden faith in Christ. And, meanwhile, the time was coming on when the Church-victimized Galileo turned his telescope on the physical heavens, to see what was actual truth there. Much more notably, however, as to religious concern, was the assured discoverer of earth

motion followed up by our own Milton, the sublime poet of "Independency," who bethought himself to depict for mankind a beginning of the human race upon earth showing naturally, in chief purpose, (as leaving doctrinism for mere subordinate embellishment,) real accordance with the known station of man in the solar universe, amid trees and lower animals. The amplified view of the world as they are, in this version of the aged myth made to appear* the epoch of a true fixture, for at least English minds, of the mode of sex and Christian marriage supposes. Perhaps in fact, that the domestic feeling of those strict Protestants gained the endurance that was necessary for concern with inspiration. The "Humanism" that was breaking loose from Ecclesiasticism was saved from entire rupture with the

* Dates alone may here speak for themselves. As, e.g.—

Epistle to the Romans, say	A.D. 60
Nicene Creed	325
St. Augustine's <i>De Peccato Originali</i>	418
Idea of transubstantiation broached	731
Marriage made a sacrament	1199
Friars ordained:—Dominicans, to put down the Albigenses; Franciscans, to preach peace and poverty }	1203-15
Lateran Council—marriage-sacrament confirmed, and transubstantiation established }	1215
Roger Bacon, died 1292; Wiclif died	1362
Revival of letters, 1395; invention of printing	1440
Lorenzo de' Medici	1469-92
English Liturgy composed	1547-8
Loyola, and the mystics; Francis Xavier, St. Teresa, }	15-1600
Luther, Council of Trent	
Galileo, 1610; Milton's " <i>Paradise Lost</i> "	1674

Shall I add, that in 1186 there is recorded a great conjunction of sun and moon and all the planets in Libra;—and also that in 1190, just before the settlement of domestic rule on the one hand, and on the other the encouragement of most unnatural asceticism, there was a sudden outburst and a wild proclaiming of the idea of the final advent of the Antichrist?

latter by, eminently, the pure beauty of this gem of puritanic fancy.

But the "heavenly Muse" that was here invoked meant nothing else than the ideal in the poet's mind. The image of spousal blessedness that Milton pictured was signally that of only a man's possible conceiving. No woman, though assisted by whatever believed inspiration, and even if capable as he was of admitting it, could have entertained the imparted image as he did. No woman, even at the date of the poem's writing, could have felt the Miltonic "restoration" to be any other than a mere copyist's filling-up, and re-varnishing, of a one-sided piece of barbarous ideation.

In the now-supposed general Design of things, Christianity was the initiatory stage of Sex-morality, which, after its own required culminating and thence decaying—through the very fact of having yielded up its fruit,—had to make way for a much higher understanding of Sex-union than it lay with the age of Paul to produce: and this, as bearing specially on bringing up the Individuation of the woman into a relative parity with the man's. But the "Independency" of the puritans was limited in idea to men only. And it was left to Roman Catholics to support the woman's cause by their adherence, as long as might be, to the mystic dogmatism that in essence favoured her. The time could not become due for an effectual quittance of this till a new scheme of nature in its entirety should have been produced. A law of Marriage, of the kind required, had to wait for the full epiphany of the doctrine of Evolution.

Christianity had begun by sweeping clean away from the human mind an artificial prepossession respecting Death, that choked up the roots of moral feeling: being the procedure from a bestial antecedency. Once for all

it rid mankind of the notion that the sovereignty of the realms of the dead was made over to the Prince of Evil; so that to die was no longer the same, for mankind in general, as to fall into the power of Satan.—And the more death was relieved of its first terror, the more was imagination turned, and with infinite benefit, to realize the importance of Birth. A new meaning is however given to Birth through the opening of nature now opened to us. We see it rather as the one miracle of miracles in nature, a miracle which surprises in reality within itself all vital operations. Birth now signifies to us the drawing of all particular centres, from far and wide through all the scattered dynamic energies, both physical and spiritual, that are anywhere in existence :—and this by the sole agency of the force of Love, as indeed a Divine Chemistry that alone has the means of integrating beinghood. What should practically follow, then, but that the proper exercise of Love should be directed solely in future by a regard to the rightful nature of Love, in its highest and best form: namely, as freed from the erroneous notion of its connection with Sin, which has truly hung about it, though decliningly, as long as Christianity has held its sway— notwithstanding the precise aim of the latter to show matrimony honourable? Until the idea of marriage being in any light an “atoning sacrifice” is abolished,—until it is regarded as a pure “privilege” bestowed on us by nature,—the real nature of Love must continue to be treated wrongfully in the institution. The “lawfulness” that belongs intrinsically to things natural must inevitably under Evolutionism be subjected mentally to a rule of moral “expediency.”

The true spiritual Chemistry of Love (*see p. 91-2*), is that which requires condition of expressly the contrary

to the "becoming one" of the two persons concerned. The integral attraction here implied requires essentially a personal individuality on each side, complete in itself, and complete in opposition of character to that on the other side. The quality giving source to the attraction is, of peculiarity, not a native similarity of personal constitution, but a resident constitutional antagonism. And this is manifestly incompatible with the "oneness" that Christianity assumed necessary, and that since has been cherished in our idealism as the true type of connubialism. But a second peculiarity is involved also, of no less importance, which softens and gives reason for the antagonism. And that is, the condition that the uniting element acts alone by sudden and exceptional operation. Man and wife, being in general affective opposites, join together in close union at times, all the more for their life of general apartness; and apparently on the very account of this:—seeing that the very nature of all sentience is that of being enhanced, and even primarily created, by precisely an alternation of conditionment (*see* pp. 99, 131). It is contrast that produces feeling at first, and that ever after keeps feeling alive. And the very matter of the cessation of strong feeling is the opportunity of all the friendliness on a lower scale which may at once mitigate, and give power for the renewal of, the extreme distinctiveness of the moral acid from the moral alkali. Too much of such distinctiveness would cast the two beinghoods out of reach of one another; but a sufficing measure of it is made by nature indispensable.

Nature has given but a narrow range to the sphere where the human chemistry can work. She has limited its adapted season to a mere fraction of human life; and admits far from the entire number of human beings to

have part in its effects at all, while as to the full potency of these the partakers are made rare to the extreme. And yet there is an influence provided by the experience of even these few that applies to the common life of all mankind. An ideal is created as to the special force of Love when it does rise to passion—as the desperately-mingled produce of attraction and repulsion,—such as actually is the case in the marriage-rite, and appropriate to the entrance into state of fact. It is a state of intense joys and intense anxieties of course, and a something like this for the propeller to the other. —And may it not be well said that the general feeling is thus affected? The possibilities of marriage-bliss and marriage-agony are liable to endure but for moments, mark always for the average of mankind, and rightfully so, their highest level of attainable joy or pain.

This ideal, when it shall have gained its due ascendancy, must assuredly be of higher power than the Christian one as to the adjusting of the connubial relation for real advantage on both sides. The union being made to rest, in this manner, on the primal self-sufficiency of each, as to that which forms general condition, there is eminently a ground secured for the partial and mutual subjection, to be yielded voluntarily by each to each as occasion for subjection rises up, which was out of question by the strict technicalism of the first notion : that of the woman's becoming to the man as "his own flesh," to be governed by exclusively *his* spirit. *Each* ought to have the power, on occasion, of leaning fully on the other ; but to ensure means for this, *each* well must have ability to stand upright and firm upon his or her own proper ground.

And the new ideal must in reason be that which shall determine the new *form* of the marriage-rite. All con-

ventional as this must be, there is now clearly opened the way by which it can be made as *natural*, also, as also it is rationally required to be.

The real significance of the matter, to be seized on by a just principle of religion and morality, has indeed been only waiting for the office of the new rationalism of to-day to assert itself. The present clearing away of now-antiquated notions about marriage leaves exposed, in a way not to be missed, the nature of the actual residue yet remaining, which needs cultivating and securing :— as indeed the true natural link between old religion and new : the religion that respected *only* the saving of the egoism that is individual, and the religion that means *also* the maintaining of a progressive character in the race.—Manifestly, the one point that is of urgency in marriage, of perpetuity, is the call that it needs to make on the two parties for united feeling as to their common charge with regard to offspring. *Here*, undoubtedly, they need to be at one, in at all events the intention and the practical directing of that new-springing impulse of parenthood which should be shared by them. And it may be, accordingly, that here too may self-subjection of one or other of the pair be compulsory ; though between them, as to which should be the one to submit, it is always nature herself, and *not* human law, that must select. It must, namely, be the spiritually stronger of the two, and only such, that shall be owned to have the right of direction ;—while everywhere else, in the affairs of married life, there must go on for ever, more or less, the open struggle for dominion that attaches generally to life-condition.

We may then safely conclude that in the marriage-form of the future, which the enlightened religious world will

agree upon, the nuptial vow will be turned expressly this way : so that each and both of the marrying pair may have before them in view, impressed with the utmost force of religion, their common obligation towards children. And this truly concerns—not only the promised physical maintenance and the spiritual culture of children, with the general self-life which on ; but also—birth-conditions that may assure health of body . worldly kind of them, in respect of well as vision over all efforts of at the first are dependent ing them beforehand the to them : the conditions reasonable anticipation, ind,—with moreover the through infancy may suffice re and culture. The vow of marriage, instead of any longer regarding, as now, alone the affective “help” that the pair may realize between themselves, must be a mutual engagement bearing even more specially than on this on the after-fruit of marriage, affixed to it of right by nature. This would indeed be the “contract,” truly such, that would imply, as a contract should, a fulfilment of its terms on both sides as its one source of security : which would fitly make an opening for a requisite interference of state-law, whenever either failed in parental duty. And eminently there would thus be provided an insurance of the degree of love between man and wife, which however falling short of affective “passion” would suffice for life of family in general. There would be the *enforced* requirement of pervading co-operation in life-objects which of itself would secure love from dying out—supposing, as ought to be supposed, that love existed from the first between the pair.

The “enforcement” in question is obviously the essential part of marriage-ritualism, the keeping-up of wh

—and this with special increase,—must be respected *à priori* in the future moulding of the institution. But in what manner must the keeping-up be effected? It is here that is the matter to be considered. And I think that by the very effort of making marriage henceforth “natural,” in the sense of conformity with the general laws of nature, we shall find a ready clue to such preserved continuity.

The problem to be answered in the rite is surely that which I have already assumed it to be, and which I have argued on the strength of its being:—the power of giving to what else would be a simple affirmation the force of a religious oath. It is not common swearing, such as serves on mere secular occasions, that would here suffice: since the mode alone appropriate is that of the “vow,” which is the softened form of oath that while retaining the proper function of affixing a religious stamp on contracted bargaining which gives it worldly value, is yet accessible to all the influence of refining development which the proper oath is incapable of (p. 268). And by this I mean chiefly that it may cease naturally to be the invoker of divine wrath on the head of the non-observer of the vow, in at least any direct way. It implies necessarily nothing more than a latent acknowledgment of Divine displeasure awaiting such offender in the general mode of all natural retribution. The invocation contained in it becomes naturally, in fact, no other than a simple prayer: the expressed seeking of Divine help to give the power of holding firm to present purpose, which a faithful self-humility must be always alive to its need of, and which actually resides, upon present understanding, in the general sense of the ruling nature of things. A promise made in this petitionary guise has the advantage of being intrinsically at once stronger and less strict than one on

ordinary terms : for in the very calling upon a witness more than human for its confirmation, it binds itself to a "Will" acknowledged surer than the will of present impulse. The "vow," by its very nature, has a concentrated efficacy that exactly matches with the whole nature of Religion as an influential concentration.

Nor is there any reason why at the invocation should be made in direct the character of the tone of mind that is desired in thought and feeling, is supplied in the marriage-service by already the whole circumstances of the institution. As in common swearing the oath may be made to lie in the life and, so in the marriage- invocation may its character be represented by the mere bending of the knee. And besides this, there is a fund of association left abiding both in the place that is of wont resorted to, and in the wonted office of the appointed ministrant of the service, that supplies exactly what the oath was provided for the sake of: the assurance of needful solemnness and deliberateness of intention. There is an atmosphere in the very building known as "church," as well as in the formal language of old creedism, that of itself predicates religiousness of feeling. And a deliberateness and solemnity of purpose, even as turning on the conduct of marriage, are the utmost that religion's self can be imagined called to supply.

Such habitualized sanctification I hope will never cease to be called for. I see nothing of unnecessary superstition in this clinging to honoured places, and revered phraseology. I conceive it entirely wholesome to our emotional constitution, so long as it lies open to occurring stages of timely reformation. Nor do I feel any of the objection often made to the idea of "prayer." I grant that there is here an utmost stretch of recourse

to anthropomorphism. But then surely the very nature of the occasion of marriage is that which *compels* such recurrence—precisely through the child-like frame of mind which is, or ought to be, intrinsically produced by the actual depth of the religiousness brought in question.

It is indeed true that no possible state-appointed religious service can be adapted to all kinds of intellectual conviction: whence the need is imperative that there should always be left open to choice the alternative of a form purely secular, to be employed merely as such or filled up under personal predilection. And in this way would naturally become repeated in private the same kind of variations to the marriage-form as those which have been publicly adopted at various times in various parts of Christendom.* But evidently the more “natural” that a service should be made, the less would be the occasion for divergency. The very terms of “wedded husband” and “wedded wife” are indeed so fully stored in themselves with the genuine import of conjugality, that their simple usage in the act of making contract

* Let me quote the two following examples which I have noted down for remembrance, out of widely-opposed doctrinal departments.

The first is from the account of the marriage of the present King of Portugal with his first wife, given in the *Graphic* of Feb. 9, 1878: being the concluding words of the primate’s exhortation.—“I admonish you to love each other as husband and wife, and remain in the fear of the Lord. Amen. I give your majesty a companion, and not a slave. Love her as God loves His Church.”

The second is from a notable recent wedding amongst the ultra-dissenting body known as “Quakers.” It is the form of engagement, addressed to spectators, which is exactly repeated on the woman’s side.—“Friends, in the fear of the Lord and in the presence of this assembly, I take this my friend *N.* to be my wife, promising through Divine assistance to be unto her a loving and faithful husband, until it please the Lord by death to separate us.”

may well serve for the entire fund of religiously-domestic association that existing consciences require to take up, as the standing basis to their own future experiences. And a religionism that is built up on domesticity, as I urge that developmentalism must be, may be surely so turned as to stir little objection to its own measure of formalism, from either rigid or persistent approvers of, our extant cer

The following is a sketch of the actual alteration I have in view, which on all accounts seems to have right to be promptly brought forward, by those in whose hands the charge of the rectifying of our service.—There must be set up for continuously-repeated contemplation, with never-ceasing ability of application to each case of particular marriage-union, the bearing of the entire scheme of Providence. Only, instead of the bare recalling to attention of the present theory of a primal Paradise and a Fall, there may be alleged the immensely deeper beginning to marriage in which the modern world is instructed. It may be told to the offered candidates, in a few pregnant words, how God from the first planned the coming together of male and female for the carrying on of human life in the general race:—how He made the lower animals to pair by the urgency of mere instinct, for a kind of life that was of instinct only; but this, only as leading on the way for the coming of higher creatures, with whom, as human beings, the binding of themselves together should be an act effected more by a law of spirit than a law of body, and fit for those who had light of reason to know of the bond's obligations. It may be said with the true voice of authority, as of that which is the "will of God" revealed in these later times, that the man and

woman who wed must do it not alone for their own solace, but also for the conscious end of raising up to God true observants of Divine law and commandments: themselves being felt as bound at the same time to such observance, in a true personal self-subjection to that ordinance. They may be shown, to any extent felt desirable, the injury that has been suffered in times past through the absence of such self-subjugation, and such acknowledgment of what is primal religion;—and they may well be referred to the great share in the filling up of this want that was accomplished in the doctrine of the “Christ,” as our “Saviour” from the tyranny of brute sensualness, and our enlightener on the sanctity of a sex-union duly spiritualized:—the whole view being made to bear on the awakening of special gratitude to Providence for our own enjoyed benefit from the past course of improvement.

It may thus be impressed generally on the two concerned hearers how the one religious matter required of them is a true moral determination to act up to the highest notion of marriage yet unfolded. And in view to this, the preliminary assertion exacted from them—in sign of their actual preparedness, personally, for the kind of union that has been explained,—may indeed vary advisably in its plan from that required at present. For the “impediment” to be guarded against might truly include reference to much more than appears now to be contemplated, involving previous examination made privately: namely, into a certified state of health, and even into the ability of needful maintenance; besides the matter of which purport is now covered, partially and undesirably, by the words given to each to repeat, that for the future they “forsake every other,”—interpretable, possibly, as sanctioning antecedent irregularity, in at all

events a due affective self-control. And this might naturally be followed up by personal inquisition of these three kinds, addressed to each in turn. First, in place of the existing query of "Who gives this woman away?"—by this: "Art thou come by free choice of thine own, to take this woman as thy wife, or this man as thy husband?"—Secondly, by the art thou willing to engage to maintain, with labour, a bond of loving kindness between of mutual fidelity?"—Thirdly, by the Vilt thou undertake thy share in the fulfilment of the duties which religiously belong to the station?— After which, the two being bidden to express their troth, the affirmation of each might be given singly in an enlargement

on a purely secular one to this effect: "I take thee as wedded wife, or wedded husband. I give thee my hand in pledge that I will be to thee a kind and faithful husband, or wife; and that I will be to thee a helper through the duties now arising for us both."

And for an adapted blessing on the pair, it would be as natural as accordant with standing practice to lift appeal—instead of to the mystic Essence that has been attributed *Itself*, metaphysically, with the characters, in one, of Divine Father, Divine Son, and an equivalent to Divine Mother,—to that manifest Ordainer or Ordainment of whole nature that has laid out *mankind* into families.

If such change were effected, who can doubt that the character of our present "sacrament"—thus retained, as it would be,—would act with a deepened power on the moral sense of especially the young, for the exciting of a true Conscience in regard to marriage? A true conscience belongs only to the sense of *duty*; but a sense

of duty has no basis while *obedience* rests the principle that is consecrated.

Such renewing of the sacramental institution—which, as I have urged, includes the essential spirit of all other Christian sacraments (II. 586-8),—would truly answer fitly to that assumed “binding-power” of religion which I am here asserting. And I cannot but regard this adaptableness of the existing form to a form suited to evolutionism as a strong confirmation to my whole theory of religion’s nature and development. The whole principle I have aimed at is filled up. Religion’s first beginning of formative action was a consolidating of the state of “nation” through the agency of the “oath,” and the attendant starting of the rudiments of moral law ; and this beginning is duly carried out in the present consummate end, of making firm the state of “family” through precisely the inducing of a religious vow on the consciences of the two who are the heads-of-family, for their observance of domestic duty. There is here made but the normal change from a rude beginning to a refined end which in evolutionism is self-approved.

It was the *childhood* of mankind, and that alone, which admitted of the idea that conduct could be directed in detail by authoritative injunction : even as that of God Himself, and *à fortiori* as that of the fellow-being that a husband is. The God that gave directions in detail needed speech in a voice of audible thunderings ; while the husband that claims detail-authority must also have thunderings at command. And hence the moral degradation of the actual status of the woman : sinking her even lower than would otherwise have done her legal ranking with mere children, through her being forbidden by the very tenure of her agreement to emerge from that status to her life’s end. And if it be said that the

injunction to obey her husband is, indeed, the sort of general command that may of right be attributed to God, as first-design in creation, I reply that the very matter of the sway-in-detail made over to the husband, as God's vicegerent, condemns still the supposition. The woman who can believe in her heart that to obey her husband is Divine law to her, is indeed in the state of ignorance in regard to the actual nature of duty which betokens, for her, moral infancy. I mean, on account of the absence of the moral sense, for any awakening into principle of its own, on the actual exercise of intellectual judgment. The only acknowledgment of the moral law is that God has implanted in woman the same terms with men, the need of a fixed adhesion to principle. The doctrine of obedience, otherwise directed than to principle, was "milk for babes": not suitable for the moral nutriment of adults. And, accordingly, the doctrine of proper duty, whenever applicable, is that which supersedes mere obedience.

And in regard to marriage the importance of this definite understanding has a bearing that is unmistakable on the primal sentiment of Love. The very omitting of direct reference to this in the questioning of the two claimants of marriage, is itself the admission of the necessary implication of Love as the cause of required licence to marry. The actual absence of Love in the case is a thing that needs of right be ignored as a possibility: except indeed as made a part of that matter of private conscience which needs treating in the overt light of "impediment," in junction with the allied point of the "forsaking," or rather of the "abjuring," of any other for the object of Love than the one chosen partner. The taking simply of this for granted, in the actual office of

marriage, will leave the element of religious duty concerned in that place of predominance which is obviously appropriate:—*duty* being of right our emotional posture towards God; just as *love*, or the contrary, respects always and exclusively human beings. The rite of marriage, I would say, is a pure formula of expression for that “service of love” due to God,—meant by the offering up love to the regulation of religion,—which I assume as the true final interpreting of Christ’s first great commandment of love actually “towards God”: that is, as *not* turned into a mere anthropomorphism. And the effect of this subjection to religion, and this making of love bend to duty, is the real natural means, all the time, of not only purifying, but also of deepening, the sex-impulse that is at root of all love:—since, by evolutionism, all purifying is inevitably coincident with both deepening and strengthening.—And no more needs be said as to expected benefit. The enhancing of the power of *love* in the human breast expresses all of inherent good that is imaginable.

The kind of love to be hoped for, as promoted by the change of standard now predicted, has to vary from its present mode chiefly, as I have urged, in its ceasing to merge the womanhood of the wife into the character of a mere adjunct to the man’s nature. She must henceforth love her husband on the proper basis of her own womanly individuality. For the mere omission of making reference in marriage to the authority of parent or guardian as needful for either woman or man, together with the call upon each of the two for an assertion of free personal choice, has the effect of casting duly on themselves that entire responsibility of the act which indeed amounts to their lifting up to the full state of thorough human self-possession. **Marriage, truly, is the turning-point.**

in life where, or nowhere, is self-character brought out. And love is the natural agent to this end. The woman who shall accept the love of a man on the plain acknowledged ground of her love to him, will in no way on that account so subordinate herself to his direction that she will cease to have the right to live still for the great purpose, dear to her nature. She may be able, even more than he, to satisfy all desires on this head that in legitimate. — But here the subject will present that will make it better to be treated the exclusive view here regarded. The as I consider, does truly represent in its general effect on human conduct and feelings naturally on the ordered sanctifying of sex-union,—or, in other words, on the giving to the state of Family a true religious stability;—but the *influence* of the rite spreads everywhere, in fact, throughout life.

SECTION III. THE INVOLVED DEMAND FOR ENHANCEMENT IN THE GENERAL CULTURE OF WOMEN.

THERE is nothing that seems to me more strongly to show, on the very surface of the matter, the wrongfulness of the heretofore view of marriage than, precisely, the argument it has fostered against the thorough educating of women. It has raised on every side an alarmed cry of the danger of this proceeding.—“Oh! ye of little faith,” I am disposed to cry out in return, “can

ye really not trust nature as to this so far as to believe, that the same Power that made us women can and will keep us such,—to whatever wild extremes we may carry our own efforts, supposing that we make them, at the blind aim of unsexing ourselves!”—As evolutionists we may rightfully only smile at the bare supposition of such a consequence.

The more, at all events, we fix our trust in the institution of Marriage, as endued with religious character, must this visionary alarm be dispersed. The real safeguard against women’s even wishing to be as men, either in general or in part, is their natural destination to become married. And the high kind of importance now apparent in the institution must give ultimate insurance to this security. Even as a mere general consideration, the fact of this enhancement in the assumed importance of the matter of marriage has an immediate weight that may at once be set in answer to the most grave of the suggestions of “danger,” and left to speak for itself. I refer to the serious warning of the effect of over-study in physical debilitation, against which women, it is supposed, would be less mentally armed than young men. The mere general respect for Marriage which it belongs to the present notion to draw forth, would, I think, be soon proved, if acted on, to be an all-sufficient antidote to preserve from such fatal self-forgetfulness.

Nor could there be any of the commoner and milder form of danger which lies in an opposite direction, and against which it is women more than men that are wont to feel the need of finding antidote:—namely, which has chiefly stood as motive to those women of the present day who have urged a course of study on young girls. The wisest women among ourselves dread especially for the latter that habitual thinking about marriage which

indeed is, in the actual state of things, not an elevating, but a deteriorating influence. It is their very problem of difficulty to keep attention *back* from the subject, as too captivating and at the same time too morbidly enervating :—whence naturally they feel to be in requirement intellectual tonics.—But this fear, like the other, has its instant remedy in the idea of the high *importance* of marriage. Should marriage should be made, as now supposed, a sufficient modifier of duty, all fear of enervation might be removed. Even that frequent turning over of pages to the ever easily-opening ones, which now appears as a matter for reproach, might henceforth as desirable as it is natural, and as a source of encouragement as it is at present felt needful of repression.

The association of duty with married life of peculiarity, would indeed bring requirement of a special turning of attention to the office of mingled wifehood and motherhood which the marriage-ceremonial initiates. It should enforce even a somewhat of direct training for that office made to underlie generally the whole amount of the general education of girls :—in exactly the same kind of manner that orthodox religion now does. And this is the actual nature of the safeguard I assert to be provided. The fact of the case is two-fold. The education that stands as general must have for girls, as well as boys, the proper object of imparting to them knowledge, partly as means of the opening out of their intelligence to a delight in mental exercise for its own sake, but chiefly as the means of the future practical employment of knowledge : this kind of education being therefore, when judged in the present light, accountable as being secular in character. But the education that must stand apart from this, as being of specialty affective and moral, must

be opposite and complimentary, in supplying a true basis to religion, such indeed as will be thoughtful and intellectual in some degree, but mainly turning on emotional guidance. And both sorts, it is obvious, are due to children of both kinds, male and female:—while, however, the former is to boys the sort that is characteristically needful, and the latter the characteristic need of girls. According to my own terms, a religious education as such is identified with, on the one hand, a training adapted to the whole native constitution of girls; and, on the other, with the actual instruction of these in the essential meaning of their duty in regard to marriage.

Thus the safeguard from over-study for girls lies indeed with nothing else than the constant panacea of evolutionists, the mere establishment of rightful differentiation. The *danger* dreaded is no more than what necessarily belongs to a heightened stage of mental growth, as to which established method of education falls short. But as soon as ever the female side of education shall be appropriately sorted out, to agree with the heightened quality of women's minds now attained, the danger will be at once cancelled. For the two modes of education will play naturally into one another, with the very help that on both sides is now called for. Secular education will have the need and the means of being permeated with the induced sense of a religious foundation, more than ever yet has happened to it to be; and religious education, even at basis, will assimilate to its advantage the pervading tone of generalized intellection.

To forbid women to follow out their bent for self-culture, whenever and to what extent they possess it, is surely contrary to the whole spirit of evolutionism. It was indeed natural in times past, when marriage was

alone regarded in the light it was, that the whole nature of the woman, as well as her whole term of life, should be claimed exclusively for a ministering to the service of the man possessing her. And hence, truly, the education that has hitherto been given to women has turned mainly on superficial accomplishments. That they should actually see, to know of the truth of things for its own sake, has been thrust out of sight as an end to be attained.—But evolutionists cannot fail to admit, later, that the woman, like the man, is in the self-position of her own. The recognition is forced on her, even if she herself do not come to conviction by her own effort, that she is a responsible being in full: responsible for the due tending of herself and her children, just as much as for the tending of her husband.

I will begin, then, with endeavouring to show how the mode of religionism I am advocating bears indeed an educational capability: and this, even as to the season of the mind's opening when the planting of religion is manifestly in demand of being secured, if at all reckoned on for adult life. I believe that the capability is plainly to be found, notwithstanding the new and special kind of difficulty that on present terms rises up in our way.

THE TURN GIVEN TO THE DIRECT TEACHING OF RELIGION.

It is obvious that if the chief practical office of religion be, as is now supposed, the controlling of the impulse of Sexhood, the work of religious education must vary widely from its present character;—while if also it must be recognized, as I assert that it must, that the root of such kind of education needs be laid in the earliest stage

of intellection, the difficulty of catching rightly at the matter of what is teachable is immeasurably enhanced.— But the chief reason for the difference is, after all, but in our loss of assured symbols to speak by: such as have through all heretofore religionism given conventional covering and concealment to thoughts not allowable to be plainly stated.

I imagine that it has never been thought of by Christians that it forms the duty of parents to expound to their children the real meaning of the emblematic union of Christ with His Church which is their authorized type for the practical instruction of those who marry. The father can scarcely ever have tried to impress upon his son the feeling towards his bride which is attributed to the Divine Saviour; nor the mother have endeavoured to make her daughter enter into the amalgamated feeling of the abstract Church towards Him who made the sacrifice of Himself of condescending to become her Lord. Ascetic monks and nuns may indeed have laboured at the unprofitable task of comprehension; but surely not those who would instruct usefully their children. But may it not have been for this circumstance that the *duty* concerned in marriage has remained hidden as it has, and to so great extent unperformed? The probability lies decidedly this way. And accordingly, the religion that must transcend Christianity ought intrinsically to supply remedy in the matter.

I believe, in fact, that the very width of the prospect that evolutionism unfolds to our mental view lays open a true condition for explanation that makes a plain discussion of the subject—in, at least, the case that lies between parents and children,—only wholesome and desirable.—It may indeed be well thought that the whole matter, whether treated under colour of religion or of

sexhood, is from its nature best left under silence to the working out of young people's own minds, un-swayed by parental tuition. But I cannot accede to this opinion: partly for the plain reason that in the present state of society it would be impossible to prevent children's hearing of the two subjects, from casual intimates, whatever might be the reticence of the parents; and partly on account of the immense waste of time and energy that would thus be made of gained experience respecting the subject. If children really were made obliged to hear of the two subjects, they would be obliged to form their ideas as to marriage and religion, and to be influenced by the religiousness of the parents, say, as to the natural religiousness of the parents, which would be a grievous loss to both themselves and to the world. And why, in this eminent department of education, should it actually be more harmful than elsewhere to profit by hereditarily-transmitted knowledge? I will then set this objection aside, and aim at once at my point.

The root-element to a religion-of-sexhood, I conceive, lies in the perception of which children are capable, from even an early stage of infancy, of the existing sex-difference of their two parents. To infants the human world is made up all of parents and children, and the relation of the one class to the other is all-important. But even the infant knows at once that the parent of male kind is not the same to it as the female. And as fast as it advances in age, it gains an added strength to the perception: and this, in proportion as the recognized difference extends from the simple region of primal impulse, where the mother exclusively is attractive and the father is a mere alien, to that of outward observation of dress and voice and of general manner and habits; and thence to the sphere of conscious reason which is affected by conversation and tuition. The first actual comprehension in the child's mind of the

respective sexhood of its parents must naturally proceed from its being aware, by its own excited effort of comparison, of the variance of the father's teaching from the mother's. It is purely *mental sex* that first concerns it. And on this very account is the primal notion of the kind that may survive, if well established at first, to give future direction to the proper or self-prosecuted education of which the ripened season of the child's life has to form the stage. Hence the manifest desirableness of the father's not leaving to the sole mother the task of intercourse with offspring. A boy might indeed develop better into real manliness of disposition by living at first only with a mother, than a girl grow up into real womanliness: and the reverse as to living with the sole father;—but to both the boy and the girl the sense of the distinct character of the two parents is, apparently, the normal means for their rendering in time aware of the fact of sex-development in themselves.

But the emotion as yet inspired is altogether anterior to religion. In the feeling of a young child towards either parent there is little or nothing of reverential. The babe is itself pure sovereign in the family, and looks down as much on father as on mother; and it is only by slow degrees that either genuine love or true reverence is called forth. Accordingly, through the season of this mere preparation—repeating relatively the state of infant mankind,—it must be best on the part of parents to retreat a little from their own actual mental standpoint. And by this I mean that they should base their instilment of religion on the retained character of a kind of christianized theism, frankly though guardedly* anthropomorphic: as both answering

* The "guard" that I imagine necessary over expressions used is such as regards suggestion of *motives*, as influencing Deity. To tell a

to the poetic instinct of children, and always capable of a future ripening to the full poetry of adults. For, before the true awakening of religion, its precursor must consist in but this: the habitual but unobtrusive pointing out of whatever in surrounding nature affords sense of admiration and delight, and that especially gives suggestion of presence:—and, as required Source of this, the "Word" is alone appropriate, and is all-sufficient in the deepened ground of self-inspection is the question becomes raised of, "How is it? or any other living creature in the universe? Inclusive term is still adequate. The greatness in its first crudeness, will avail as yet with more than the expressiveness

it had for supplying Cause to outward things. Religion will lie hidden up within it, as if in its own natural cradle, sleeping healthily through the interim that subsists before its time of a safe arousing. But the waking touch will come at last. And then will be the moment when rational exposition must begin. The occasion, I believe, will be that of the child's first acquaintance with Death in the sphere of its own personal concern. When its heart has once been crushed by real sorrow for a lost friend—even if this be only a pet animal,—something nearer to the mark than a mere poetic symbol, however permanently beautiful, must be administered to the little

child, for instance, "God did so and so out of love for you; and withheld from you this or that because it would have grieved Him to allow what He knew would injure you," is trenching dangerously on the false ground of the doctrine of particular Providence. All anthropomorphism ceases to be legitimate the instant it goes beyond that mere surface of the ideal matter it acts on which is truly all that our human faculty has command over:—the surface matter of generalized actualities. Particular love, or any kind of particularized regard, is incapable of being generalized.

mourner : and this under peril of deepest injury. For Death, once suggested as an impending liability that is inescapable, will at once empoison all the attributes of Deity yet known of, *if* not instantly met by the counter-action that is truly furnished by nature itself, although latently so. And this, as I believe, is the natural coincidence with Death of general Sexhood.

The full import of Death is truly no more well to be forced upon children than is the full import of Sexhood. But while the latter has to wait, before thought rest upon it, for the season of stirred emotion that belongs to it, which comes on much more late than in the case of Death, it is too likely that the child's feeling about Death will come on prematurely, while as yet it is wanting in self-resources to meet it with. And thus the mother—to speak now only of the parent who has chief place in religious teaching,—must thus early afford the thinking about Death, which presently she must also afford on Sexhood. To pass the matter over in silence, when ideas respecting Death have been started,—as hitherto it has been common to do,—is, I think, a cruel trusting in the child's own ability to right itself. The whole future life-impression about Providence is at stake. And if once an inward terror fall on it in regard to dying, such as naturally it will be ashamed to express, the rankling injury may be established that will never after admit of cure.

The sole advisable course is surely for the mother to unfold to her child's reason some faint general notion of the plan of organic beinghood in nature. Let us suppose that the child be enough intelligent, as well as sensitive, to have put the question, "*Why* is it we must die? *Why* did not God make us all differently so as *not* to be obliged to die?" This query, which indeed is typical

of the whole difficulty, might be met, I believe, by a kind of reference to actual facts that would point faithfully to real natural causation, at the same time that it preserved thought from too daring a forestalment of future knowledge. A careful mother, who should wait always for the right moment to speak, and who should not say t e time, but produce her disclosure by tin at indeed indicate a true line of causation, ture, that so far from destroying would en the child's already formed confidenc . But she must always aim at *general* ough beginning straight from the partic ing the child, she must always feel her ... neral rule of the matter.

And first she must impress the prime truth, that Death in no case ever comes excepting as preventing suffering that would be intolerable :—for, even as to its close following on sudden accidents, this is certainly an admissible statement. She must however preferably lead to the proper and inevitable connection of Death with old age ; and draw attention to the fading powers and diminished pleasures of lengthened life. And then may the turn be made to the commonness of the lot to all animated beings and things that are.

“Not only all the animals,” she may say, “but also all the plants on the earth have to die, because of their sometime becoming helpless and maimed and shrivelled. And is it not better that they should do so, when beside them, as we see, there are always fresh young ones upspringing who have power to grow and become strong and live happily? There would not have been room enough for both ; nor food enough. A tree that is well watered casts out widely its branches to blow about in the wind ; and trees and plants are crowded over with

young buds each of which wants to grow on its own account. The buds of plants are their babies : the sort of babies that are fitted to plants. Not the sort that want loving, as our children do ; but the sort that want only the means to grow, and, in the case of the best of them, to put out lovely flowers and sweet scents. But the old branches and stems keep decaying, to give place to the growing buds. If they did not, the whole world would be soon a forest, with no room for better creatures to live in. Then with animals, of the lower kind, the case is almost the same. Swarms of babes perish, because of the immense numbers that are born and left un-cared for. They are far too many to have love for one another: they mostly eat up one another, because of being without other food. The dear birds in their nests are however different. You have seen them in their cosy little homes, nestled warm up together. And why are they so? Because their mother has a partner to help her in feeding them. You know that the father-bird brings to her what she wants ; and thus gives her means to sit warming her brood. But this does not last long, even with birds. The chicks are very soon grown too large for the small nest, and the mother is obliged to turn them out, one by one, and does not seem to be unhappy in doing so : for her love is by no means such as ours. It is only the true sort of babies that are nourished with a proper sort of love. It is only they that have a pair of watchful parents who are never tired, in each of their two different ways, of rendering them ever happier as they grow.

“And must we not all feel it well,” she must continue, “that God should have laid our lot in this way : that each of us in turn should have to grow old and to die, but that in the best part of our life we should have the happiness of being parents and children? For the two

parents have the love of one another, as well as the love of their children. Yes, and the trouble of them too: which God knew it would be good for us to have, so long as it is only natural trouble, and not that of naughtiness. When the time comes that I shall be dying, do you think that I shall not be still happy to the last, that I have helped to make of you the same kind of happy as I have been? And for yourselves, the same may come again: that you also may have children. But not certainly so: for it is not all those who have children. God allows only those parents who can find proper partners to be in raising up a family. But even those who are met with such partners, and who therefore remain single, and not married, have ways in taking share with those that do, and sometimes of being even happier in this way than if they did."

A linked train of suggestions of this sort, habitually brought before the child's mind, would, I think, establish there a just balance for its prevailing view of nature and of human life that would be to it continually a steady influence. The distinct perception of the advantage had by human beings in their possession of *two* parents, oppositely constituted, would itself enforce that conscious cultivation of sexhood which bears on a future sharing in the state of parenthood. And the connection of developed sexhood with a perfected individuality is witnessed to throughout by the express voluntariness signified in every act of the taking up of the state of parenthood. The idea of any but the parties themselves having aught of determination respecting marriage, is here in full hypothesis abandoned. The religious implication reigns alone, that sex-opposed beings can lawfully

come together exclusively by the leading of the Divine hand controlling every part of nature: this leading being expressed by the same impulse of attraction that all beings are aware of, as burning in due season in their own breasts. The only guidance in respect of Love that is allotted to parents is that tacitly residing in their function of education in general:—except, indeed, for required aid in a farther direct matter of religion that must be glanced at.

A full religious culture has to lead up the young into a sense of the Divinely-ordered character of indeed the whole circuit of affective relationism, of which Sexhood, although the primal sphere, is finally but one of three allied provinces: the realized totality of which has alone the power of constructing the sexed-egoship due to the adult. And the home-life which is required for the young is perfect in its adaptability to this culture. But I refer especially to its concern with Brotherhood,—since of Parenthood or of Filiation, as real matter of consciousness, children are incapable of holding cognizance.—The mixture of a sufficient (but not more than a sufficient) number of children, of both sexes, while of different ages, forms the typical material of the Family: and exactly is it this complication of conditions that forms the ego-producing power of the relations. Here however is the miniature prefiguring of worldly life, still accessible to religionism, which therefore religious parents are bound to promote.—And it has to be considered in what way would the Religion now in question, as specifically that of Sexhood, here newly set its mark.

Chiefly, I think, in a manner of apparent opposition to the culture of direct sort I have been tracing. For, while the latter has borne immediately on the apprehension of the difference between the sexes, the mode

to be that of *brotherly* communion must opposedly make the least of the sex-difference. The typical idea of family instruction is that where boys and girls share together in all kinds of elementary tuition. The special charm that belongs to the intercourse between brothers and sisters lies always in their really having different natures, and yet trying to do them alike; and this charm is at its best when tuition leads its aid to the effort. In this present the effective circumstance that the of sex, being unawakened to characteristic standing the near levelness in point of force of its impulse as if against itself, wount wholly the dividing barrier caused by sex, g useless and worse than useless; and a stimulus is thus gained which works rightfully to purpose in the field of that struggle for self-improvement that conditions the quest of knowledge for all mankind: while the atmosphere of affection is, or should be, a saving antidote against the spirit of mere contentiousness. The brotherhood of a family is of right a true republic where all, male and female, have equal chance of success to begin with: a true republic, enclosed within a despotism supervising the level working of its interior, and itself neutralized as to the inherent evil of despotism by its own self-balancing duality. And the choice quality of this only true fraternity will be found in after life so to differ from the secondary sort that rules abroad, as for ever to supply hence an enhancing contrast to the original experience of the relation. A true brotherly-and-sisterly fraternity, once made out, is a moral education in itself,—besides being inclusively a political one.

Thus we come now in face of the matter of true personal cultivation,—so much fraught with supposed

danger to female students. And I will pass to its consideration. The time of life to which this refers is the time, we require to remember, when the working of sex-feeling is of right to be held in abeyance, and prevented from the unquestionable calamity of a precocious maturity.

THE RESULT AS TO EDUCATION IN GENERAL.

By the present filling up of the idea of Marriage the question as to female education is placed on an assured footing. The act of Marriage—being now taken as the central point of all human condition, for its affording to the woman, in the same way as to the man, the possession of a realized individuality, of respective kind,—is peculiarly confirmed as being that which of specialty in the case of the woman must be allowed sway over the whole previous course of training:—for the reason, that the mode of individuality due to the woman* is itself as much of religious kind, personal and imbued with self-consciousness of responsibility, as Marriage by its nature is religious. The assumption of her full womanhood in the way supposed implies in itself a tending, and a directing, of every faculty of her being beforehand to subserve the great end. But this being granted, what should follow in moral logic but the clear concession that the religious conscience alone must be controller:—first as that of her parents, till gradually her own shall be empowered to act? As to actual Marriage all authority of parents is now rejected: the woman who marries being required to do it wholly for herself, except as to the assistance of advice, which parents are as bound by nature to give, as the child, whether daughter or

* The woman's individuality, it must be remembered, turns as mainly on the product of innerly-felt, or emotional, intercourse with fellow-beings, as that of the man on the fruit of outward communion, sense-supported.

son, is bound to seek ;—and neither as to education must authority any otherwise gain its end. The woman is endowed henceforth, in principle, with a full release from all restriction as to the matter of it. The problem as to its requisite range is narrowed to the simple terms, that the woman from the first has a true personal right to an universal development, so that her own instincts for self-development, though no longer than, she bows to restriction. That is: her own opening conscience, fully fostered, of her destiny of Sex, is to be no check on any possible overweening intention.

It has scarce been taken into systematic consideration with a view to its nature, and the desirable limitation, of parental authority ; while in absence of this the philosophy of education is at sea. But on the present understanding thus much appears clear. At the first beginning of the life of children the authority of parents over them is indeed absolute, and herein the acting substitute for law Divine ;—but in the act of Marriage such authority ceases wholly to be present : and this, evidently, because the turning-point is being passed wherein the same kind of authority is due to be taken up by former infants on their own account, with view to a new infant-generation. Hence, for practical regard to the matter of education, it seems safe to infer generally that the right of parents to prescribe should continually diminish up to the point of its total abrogation : while from this basis it becomes easy to include the following more particular point of note. In the case of girls, this gradual cessation of parental restriction on their mental action is expressly answered by the essential quality of this action as demanding by its nature a degree of freedom beyond that of boys. The mind of girls, when it has once set

itself on the work of growth, needs peculiarly a sphere for an universal opening out of its powers. It requires, by the very quality of its female constitution, the means of glancing lightly, and not deeply, over the entire field of human knowledge; and this equally as to the education that must be practical or "professional," and that liberal training whose advantage mainly rests in itself. If, then, it be laid down as a common rule, that the interval in a girl's life between the two epochs of severally a confinement to home-teaching and an absorption in the contingency of matrimony, shall be allotted to the free pursuit of knowledge in every way that her own instincts may direct, *excepting always* as proving such as to parental judgment appears morally injurious, I think every end will be secured. Her full capabilities that are lawful will be admitted their chance of having play: and this without hindrance to her leading up to her proper destiny in marriage;—while moreover a special fund of resource is provided against the great condition of her lot which is that of uncertainty respecting marriage. Education of this wide sort, bearing always an acknowledged aim towards instruction on its own account, is indeed characteristically adapted to alone those predisposed to live single; and the education that is "professional" is that which has throughout a prevailing view to marriage, in the intention of those directing it. But none the less, the girl trained to sufficiency will be alone she that can stand either emergency. The girl adequately brought up must be at once fit to be married, and fit to live profitably alone.

This kind of class-distinction being attached to the terms of "liberal" and "professional," much of ordinary difficulty with the subject appears settled at once. For in giving the characterizing mark to the training adapted

severally to married or single life, the "professions" that count usually as such are fully allowed for. "Professions" of almost every sort have in fact a virtual place in the work of the female head of a family. She must truly, to perform this well, know a little of almost every kind of business—as to law, and medicine, and trade, and even labour, as well as to the general office of religious teacher. But all the same do the concerned admit of being treated with a special regard to the ways severally required: which treatment, on, must relegate them justly to the department fitted for the single. And throughout, or now maintained, the girl must have the for herself, though with always more or less of regard to parental guidance. Just as much as her mind requires, by its nature, to have an open prospect before it of mental occupations to labour in, of all the actual kinds that are possible, does it need to be exempt from outward pressure, *more* than such as youthful age in itself calls for, while employed in making out its own choice from among them. Undue pressure either way,—either as to impulsion or restriction,—is of real danger. Not else than in the free open air, with free power of motion besides, can her mind use its energies to purpose. And the harm of stifling her is not greater than that of over-stimulating her.

Can it be doubted that any strong predilection in a girl's mind towards a particular mode of study, settled there after opportunity of selection, ought to weigh more with parents than any preference of their own for the laying out of their daughter's life? A specific taste for any kind of art, or any branch of learning, ought assuredly, so far as lies within parents' means, to be allowed its course: except for the matter of regard to

health, where advice might at times be suffered to become peremptory. To place against such learning on the daughter's part any obstruction merely arbitrary, should manifestly be nothing less than criminal, by the whole showing of the moral law of individualism.

But on the other hand, this same law provides for a natural averting of the girl's will from the sphere of studious isolation. And this, through precisely the widened import of "professional" learning. This latter, in meaning that which should adapt her to the supervision of a family, embraces *all*, in but a lessened degree, that pertains to the other class. Every kind of intellectual attainment belongs to it, if kept to the lower stage which causes no strain to the mental powers; and in being so, still possesses the charm to attract her which consists in practical utility. For the superficialness that is purely such from its want of depth, is as *true* in its way as is actual depth, and as effective for its own sort of good:—by which I mean, an ability of immediate adaptation to an existent call. To prepare herself well to fulfil the mother's office I have been considering,—of imparting a rudimental * understanding of religion,—she will be called on to fill up in some degree the bare sketch I have been hinting at, as to the course of organic evolution: and for this, some general comprehension, though the faintest, is needful of the prevailing truths in physiology and chemistry, and of even deeper matters. And what better kind of motive could she have to the exertion of possessing herself of this, than the lurking presentiment of requiring some day to impart to her own

* Here, apparently, is an absurd contradiction in terms, "rudimental" implying ordinarily the opposite to "superficial;"—but I bethink myself that still, in reason, the term is justified: since there is a sort of vegetable life that grows downwards.

children what her own mother has done for herself! A motive such as this would be one that would be at once strong and without strain—forceful, and elastic, and continuous.—The slight knowledge of language that gives power only of reading and conversation is the helpful medium towards enlarged social intercourse ; and also of storing up an : h new literatures, always capable of en- e.—And the same is true of that low sph embraces mere “accomplishments.” y cultivated, for not only the partial er those who may in future become husba gly for that of being able to diffuse plea ; a family, they are fully justified and made ... their actual merits.

A woman that in her youth is made fit for married life is truly fitted at the same time to live single, with greater certainty than lies with the contrary alternative. If her first religious training at her mother's knees have been supplemented by a general introduction into knowledge that is practically useful in any and in every way, she may limit herself in the end to any specialized pursuit without failing to have done well with her life. Such final absorption in select objects of her own choosing will leave her proper womanhood unshaken, though not developed to its utmost. And in the event of the normal course being fulfilled by her settlement in the state of family, any extra intellectualism she may have gained, not actually brought in use, will serve well in the mere dilating of her own nature. Men, it seems to me, are little aware, generally, of the intense weariness of mere household occupation that at times falls on mothers and wives, of even the best-adapted temperaments. To plunge, now and then, at precious moments of mental leisure, into subjects of abstract bearing, is the occasion of incal-

culable refreshment. It will not, under an abiding sense of duty, seduce them to a too great luxury of self-indulgence ; but it will renovate them throughout. This luxury, it is true, is always best obtained by them when it happens, as indeed it ought always to happen, that the husband has a meeting need for the same relaxation, so that both may enjoy it together, with multiplied delight. But a perfectness of intellectual sympathy is at present rare between the sexes ; and here is apt to intervene the assumption of mental mastery on the man's part, which—much more than any man can be aware of,—destroys all the effect I am referring to. The instant a woman's mind is made to bow, and herself forced into the attitude of a scholar, the renovation I speak of is nullified. The invigoration which should come to her is flattened down to nothing by her compulsion into the frame of submissiveness. The book would do her good by its rousing her to mental originality : the tutor-husband does but deaden her oppressed faculties. The wife and husband must be scholars together : and then each will help the other more than any other school-mates can do.

And here is ample vindication for the extended education that may be in readiness to be turned to such account. But, moreover, such enlarged female culture will be already during its course employed provisionally in the enabling of young girls to carry out with discretion the full liberty of choice to be henceforth theirs in the selecting of their mental partners through life. It is a recognized desiderandum with judicious parents that a season of familiar household intercourse should be allowed to young persons before positive engagement with one another, for their best means of intimate acquaintance. But the desirableness of this allowance would be enhanced greatly by increased mental communion. It may be

almost said that in proportion to increased culture of intellect would precisely be measureable the girl's power of doing justice to herself in marriage. Not directly for the use of her powers, in the manner of ostentation or argument; but for feeling her way to the mental encounter with a man's mind whence the agency of comparison may be supplied that, in the inducing of inward harmony between her own, while attending, and a man's ideas, she may consciously admit that she is fitted to be his spiritual companion, and not any other person. And such whole-some encounters will be incomparably a safer preparation than the specious flatteries that lead on to foolish marriages.

To a girl who should be accustomed to accurate discussion of general topics,—to an accurate use of language, and an accurate observation of facts, and accurate reasoning upon them,—small seductiveness would lie in the unreal homage of a merely self-seeking wooer. She would be furnished in herself with an instinctive test as to the presence of moral truthfulness; and by means of it would discern with instant tact the hollowness of his attempted flatteries. Her own ripening state of moral principle would know at once whether or not it was requisitely responded to. And if from infancy she had been taught that such response was in marriage indispensable, she would easily surmount passing temptation.

Above all, a girl that was well instructed in the *duty* attending marriage, and that also had had intercourse habitually with men of intellectual kind, would be prepared to deal justly beforehand with the most painful of any possible dilemmas concerning the consent to marry. I mean, the case of physical unfitness for marriage in any man whom she might otherwise approve:—and I

confine the case to him for the mere reason that if any unfitness were in herself her lot of single life must already have been determined. The religiousness of the idea of marriage that had been instilled into her from the first would involve this as a moral necessity. And the aid of religious parents, if at hand, would here eminently show itself. The religious education begun in infancy with the effect of pure authority would be now resumed, after the growing pupil had drawn nutriment sufficient out of ordinary intellectualism, on the advanced terms of the communicating of experience and the power of insight into the conditions of social life. The latter is out of reach of the girl herself, and the parents who omit to afford it, in proportion to their ability, are indeed to this extent still responsible in regard to their child's giving herself in marriage. Their last and highest duty in tuition is to bring it home to their daughter's feeling and conscience that from no motive imaginable may she give to future possible offspring a father not fitted to be such. Every woman ere she marry needs be made to understand that she has no *right*, in the religion of nature, to be knowingly the cause of what must follow from this—the unutterable anguish of all concerned. And to shut herself from knowledge—or for parents to shut it out from her—is the same thing. She and they must be alive to the whole truth of the matter, or never may they lawfully trust that the marriage will have the sanction of the God of nature.

There are constantly-occurring fallacies in the matter, pervading specially the abounding literature of novels and romances, which a clear reading of the law of nature can alone rectify. The difficulties on which commonly this kind of fiction turns might be settled in an instant by a conscience that made habitually its appeal in this

direction. Such are : the supposed duty of stifling genuine love by regard to idiosyncracies of persons only secondarily concerned ; the suffering of marriage to take place under cover of any kind of deception ; and the blind following out of an hasty engagement through a fancied regard to “honour”—as if a matter of religion might admit of being limited to mere worldly etiquette. But all others where the need of fixed regularity is felt, owing to the peculiar absence of existing habits, respecting it, is that which I have already mentioned, towards protesting against. That is, in my preceding section on “self-sacrifice” (pp. 100-101) I have already stated that such a policy has been more dangerously encouraged in romantic fiction than that of its being a merit in a virtuous girl to bestow herself in marriage on a man of abandoned life with the object of *saving* him. Let me grant all that possibly might be said in favour of such a course, as to the doubtful event of such a man really benefiting by it, even if young enough, and enough accessible to good influence, to be capable of thorough change in his life-habits :—the certainty still remains of the peril made to hang over possible offspring which can in no way be cancelled. It is these, together with herself, that she is victimizing ; and for this she will be always chargeable before God. Let her aim to do him good in any and in every other way. Let her be to him the truest friend, and the truest sister, that she can ; but let her firmly assure him and herself that she abjures marriage with him.—This one moral fruit, if no other, must be carried forward from Christianity, that marriage is indeed a “holy ordinance” and a true sacrament, profaned unless approached on both sides in true personal purity.

By affording help on this highest and deepest ground

of morality, the mother, eminently, must complete her office of religious education. She must use every social advantage she possesses to lay open before her daughter, for the exercise of her daughter's own instructed judgment, the sources of security for married life that are livingly exhibited in reach of her: besides using the assistance of the moral fables in habitual circulation, whether as lessons or warnings. She must talk with her daughter about marriage in the abstract, before comes the occasion for its particular discussion:—this, instead of about only the worldly accompaniments of marriage. To make of marriage a merely worldly affair, after it has been acknowledged the central matter of religion, will be direct *ir-religion*; and the mother who assists in the degradation will be guilty of direct profanity. The mother who should suffer her daughter's thoughts in regard to marrying to wander away, prevailing, to superficial vanities, will be one who has denied her religious faith.

But still the girl must rest on moral strength that is her own; and with mental faculties that have been generally well trained, she will scarcely fail in requisite caution, or in requisite self-confidence. The latter she may gain, and can only gain, by a power in herself of defending rationally her rule of conduct, to at least her own conscience.

And to women under the contrary alternative of devotion to single life, the means of active communication with men resulting from adequate cultivation is an opening to future benefit, not only to themselves but to mankind in general, that can hardly be made too much of. Even considered, as it must be, as regarding but the open social world which is that of the mere state

of general brotherhood, the gain that must result may be taken as safe and certain. From the lower kind of pursuits upward, the bringing of the minds of isolated women into active contact with those of men, in work that may engage lawfully their faculties at full stretch, must end necessarily in wringing out a partition in present methods of work, which cannot otherwise than be serviceable. Work for the bare means of subsistence for the masses, or for the attainment of professional skill in handicraft employment, or, better, in the instruction, or ministrations of nursing, or surgery;—or, as urged by the noble logic of science, which holds its full reward in itself:—a woman's engrossed interest may afford result that men, working on at the same object their own way, may still profit in observing exteriorly. For a woman's nature, when acting freely on any matter whatever that is responsive to the difference caused by sex, will finally select for herself a mode or a sphere of treatment that will make her co-employment with men the opposite to an occasion of mere rivalry, and therein of lessened gain. Her presence in the field of competition will but naturally sort out occupations in a manner that will be advantageous on both sides. The occupation will itself, as I have argued, become "sexualized," and have room as much for women as men, *without* consequence of overcrowding. And the fact of their being work-fellows together in this special way, of yielding help by means of difference, will act for both on their whole personal character with a somewhat of the proper influence of sex.

And the same kind of effect should ensue if women of strong character and wide abilities betake themselves to the subject of state affairs. Here it seems obvious

that their admixture in the work of men must create in time a new department truly wanted. And that is, a department for the close organization of the interior of public government, and a bringing into the administration of the state-home a true relative repetition of household plan. Such department should include eminently a share in the official work of the church: the church being now assumed as the typical female to the public state. And this plainly corresponds with the mother's part in domestic education; while connected with this is the physical charge of the sick and of infants, which means in state-life a general sanitary regulation, and an exceptional kind of care of the idiotic and insane,—with moreover a due ministry of lighter sort, in provision of recreation and life-adornment. Such is fully adapted alone to maternal surveillance. And the latter, if allowed, would replace with clear advantage the compulsoriness of government that is "paternal," by a despotism that would in no way give offence. Women of a truth would be "conservatives"; but their kind of conservatism would not hinder, but would the rather promote, the freest radicalism—the extremest handling of the root-matter of all politics. Women's influence would give a moral tenacity to the constitution of legal "countries:"—making patriotism indeed a proper virtue. And all danger in recurring revolutions would be lightened in proportion. The infusion of a housewife womanliness into state institutions,—searching into and cleansing out little details of corrupt practice in political holes and corners,—would do much towards enabling them to keep afloat even through whatever plunging in political "Niagaras."

But this kind of sex-partition has yet another mode of appearance. It has yet to be wrought out in that

highest of all spheres of intellection that concerns abstract philosophy and especially the philosophy of religion. Here, for an ameliorating and a reconciling influence, the value of such partition must be consummate. The very levity of a woman's intellect capacitates it for the bird's-eye view of large subjects which is needed for their reduction into the dimension of the known as such, and free from the obscuring bias that limits the working group of weapons in the hands of men, engaged on the confutation of opponents. And in the ideation of religious she is at home. That is, for their reducing of *ideas*, consciously of a woman, notwithstanding its slight bias, besides need of working group, with besides need of confutation of opponents. The ideas of Plato that were the luxury of enjoyment to poor Lady Jane Grey, re-appeared, in due time, in that "Worship of Sorrow," always natural to women, which their modern "*Sartor Resartus*" directs them to out of John's Gospel. And, imbued with this, they may well furnish adequate balance to the materialism and externalism of inductive science :—the kind of balance without which science naturally must fall to ground.

Here then is the first and chief portion of the evidence I am aiming to produce for my religious scheme. I plead, on behalf of the Evolutionism I take stand on, that if indeed it bears the product I adduce in this deepest of all departments of morality, it has religiously justified itself. The enlarged view of the *Sex-relation* springing out of it has indeed set a seal on all it

previous results for human good. To have bestowed, as it has done, a new character on general Sociology may suffice in the doctrine's favour on the ground of mere secular advance ; but in its farther exalting, in the way now supposed, the constitution of the Family, it will have gladdened the inmost heart of humanity. And conscious Happiness is the native element of Religion, —of all Religion that is at once natural and truthful.

The more conscious is human nature of its own happiness, the more inevitably does human thought establish and enrich its idea of Deity. But what is palpably more true than that Love is the main source of human happiness ! No dictum in all philosophy is more sure than this. It is only Love that has been ever the alleviator of the human ills which, as such, have set minds at issue with their Creator. But to this verdict of all human experience, Religion on its own part—well also backed by experience,—has added this sure word of its own : that Love fails in the very power of its maintenance, save as adequately it is supported by the moral strength of an established bond of Marriage. Before the time when this settlement was effected, which indeed it required all the course of past culture to bring about, Love was not in real existence. It was not and had not means of being genuine, in any sense our present instinct can recognize. And the Happiness that was due to attend on it was in accordance un-real. Love itself, ever up to this actual time of ours, has been necessarily all imbued with hypocrisies. It has been that which on an average or abstract estimation must be inevitably set down as the matter of only specious allurements and shallow flatteries : rendering the consequent state of marriage, as was likely, full of bickerings and gnawing jealousies :—while however in such view, it must be

remembered, are included cases of exception whose blessedness points us onward, precisely, to the state of progress yet to come, due in hope to all mankind.

The effect of Marriage, and especially of the kind of Marriage now contemplated, is that of bestowing upon Love the same proper *personality* of character that attaches through the degree of practice in life full powers of intel- tion with intel in *action*, and vital warmth, *and*

And alone in its possession precisely in proportion to *real*. The active involved draws out the d of this in full connection sentiment so occupied capable producer of the which lowers our entire

nature. The fire upon the spiritual hearth is the true birthright possession of every member of a family : and because it is this, it may also radiate its influence all around, in widened circles of ever lessening potency, till it spreads varyingly a general glow through **society**.



CHAPTER II.

THE EFFECT OF PRESENT RELIGION IN AFFORDING MORAL PRINCIPLE IN REGARD TO BROTHERHOOD.

SECTION I. THE DISTINCTIVE SECULARITY NOW GIVEN TO THE FEELING OF BROTHERHOOD.

I AM maintaining, by the argument of my last chapter, that all raising of the character of our affections depends fundamentally on the differencing of their spheres of action: such differencing being naturally provided for in an ordered state of Family. In coming therefore now, as my plan leads me, to make specific consideration of the case of Brotherhood, I have primarily to deal with this fact of differentiation on its own account. That is, to bring together, and complete, all the points relating to it that I have already suggested in mere outline.

The peculiarity in the sense of Brotherhood which has mainly to be attended to is its power of indefinite extension; and its inability, accordingly, to be restrained within the bounds of the domestic mode of life that originated it. For it is this peculiarity which supplies the ground for its obtaining for itself the integrated character, on which its final differencing from its fellow affective elements must depend. Fundamentally, all

affections, by hypothesis, are alone regulated into proper order by Religion : the plan of Family being the agency employed by Providence to this end. And hence the idea of Brotherhood, even taken as an integral or abstract conception of that which by its nature escapes from the bounds of Family, is to be remembered as never otherwise than associated with the most religious sentiment. The fraternal sentiment, however, remains always as it were, and is, in reality such, on the proper substance of which, arising separation from the latter, and yet, to a degree of independence as allows of the Father's being traced for it, threading the way of man's development. And this manner of proceeding with Religion-proper is thus indeed the essential point that directly serves as means to the required differentiation of Brotherhood. I believe that the real history of this relation will strictly follow out all that hitherto has been seen of the process of theologic ideation ; and this through the inevitable implication, in a general light, of the Fatherhood over men referred to Deity. I believe, namely, that here again will be seen repeated the case common to theologic ideas of a needed settlement in anthropomorphic poetry.

Religion-proper, I assume, has no existence except as directed to God : while the true progress in Religion's nature has been ever marked by an increasing refinement charactered by precisely man's growing perception of the inadequacy, and thence of the utter vagueness, of whatever seems his knowledge respecting Deity. In the same way I believe, then, that a lawfully religious sense of human Brotherhood towards all members of God's Family, so accounted of by us, will alone *rightfully* fill the character due to it by a similarly

chastened way of understanding it being adopted.

The intrinsic reason for the kind of relation that is borne to Religion by the fraternal sense is obviously the circumstance just referred to, of the close union of the former with the idea of Parenthood. Brothers have no possible source for being such, except through the means of parentage, possessed in community among them; while parentage, on the contrary, may imaginably be excluded from connection with Brotherhood.—It is true, indeed, that when Marriage had been formally established, as indispensable to the religious ordering of the Family, the point of Brotherhood was essentially allowed for, in the very fact of the tri-unity of import which in nature belongs properly to all unity. Still, in ordinary thought, the distinction present is evident. Parents can be such without having any more than one child; but brothers are without means of existence if ever parentage is thus actually limited.

But while the mythic Holy Family of theology may and does aptly dogmatize the universal conditionment alone rightfully to be connected with idea of Deity,—through the very fact of its virtual reference to human Brotherhood,—the imagining of such condition brought to earth for a type of practical life-of-family casts it instantly under logical condemnation. Once relentlessly examined by reason, the idea of all mankind-in-the-concrete being the Family of God, through His being the Father to all,—even if consistently we add the idea of Nature as common Mother,—is simply a contradiction in terms to the accepted meaning of the word “Family.” This necessarily stands for a concentrated nucleus of human beings, isolated as such from outsiders: a select few, as contrasted with the many, who are bound to one another by ties not existing externally. And the contrast

tors,—the domestic foundation had no means of being realized. This alone could ensue when the notion had sprung up of a *Totem* over *totems*, who had become characterized as the proper Enemy to, and Sovereign of, the dreadful Potentate having rule over Death, or rather over the general Dying of human beings. And to the Hebrews was Jehovah, though perhaps in early times Himself the Moloch-fetish needing conquering, yet at last the All-subduer, and the embodier of the idea of Life as insubjectible to Death.—But Hebrewism, as such, involved Gentilism. Whatever might be the claim of Jehovah's unrivalled dignity, this was practically made out for the "peculiar people" by the assigning of outer peoples to the rank of foes. The Hebrew claim to the last was one of "race," selected as such: and, however it was the case, as it was, that not Israel himself as an actual man, even as linked with his father and his father's father, was the accepted founder and maintainer of his massed descendants, but alone He who was the spiritualized Patron of the ancestral trio, still, the tribe-Father of this race was alone proved to their apprehension for such through a religious repulsion engendered in them towards other races. The idea that made congeners of Hebrews to one another, forced the members of all other races to be religious aliens. And religionism to the Hebrews was so all-sufficient, in this power of self-exalting them, that they naturally dispensed with the idea of "country" as of need to the expression of their solidarity. The terms of "God's favourites" and "God's enemies" were the only descriptive epithets they felt needful.

Thus the attribute of universal sway, which inherently and indispensably marks the genuine idea of Deity, was so weakly at first furnished as to be gained, virtually, by precisely the mere device of *ignoring* fellow-claimants.

But a new and positive implication that was still only much of the same kind, in respect of injurious exclusiveness, was raised by succeeding Christianity. I mean, by the primal Christianity that was yet unaffected by any secularization. The religious Family that had for Head the Divine "Father of the Lord Jesus Christ," revealed to the inspired Apostle Paul, was immediately obliging the new expansion in human charity a gracious allowance made for outsiders that had who, as such, had to be relegated to the No brotherhood at all was possible to us, elect out of mankind, except with fit kind of mutual love was admissible among rough their all bearing in common the badge of confessed faith in the Redeemer, who had conveyed down from heaven the stamped pledge of their adoption:—while in fact, as would seem, the very matter of this alienation from outsiders itself served as the very fulcrum to their internal congeniality and compactness. "Country" was for Christians, even more than for Hebrews, a thing of no admitted account.—And whence came, in due time, the remedy to this affective narrowness, but from assuredly that mingling of things religious and secular, which appears in history as the institution of Popedom: this also being specifically, by its very claim, independent of relation to "country"?

Before this ecclesiastical event, the working of the moral power of Christianity was a rude and semi-Hebrew beginning that had but little of its now-revealed character. And very gradual was the progress towards the latter which then was started: being hidden at first under an absolute increase in uncharitableness, acting henceforth the rather at home, in the Christian body itself, than as turned to external unbelievers. Sorely was true

brotherhood in abeyance while men, as far as creedism was concerned, were mainly bent to make out that fellow-men, if children of God, were still only such as were forever *disowned* by Him. The Church's foes were of its own household: thus differing indeed from the case of the compact Hebrew people. And the immediate result was a burning warfare of the central priesthood with sectaries, and moreover of sectaries with one another, which caused truly the production of a habit of animosity within that was a novel provision of environment, in regard to each separate religious body. But the benefit, always latent in this severance, was the sorting out of opposite principles, in regard to the kinds of social institutions that had right to prevail among mankind. The contest of the papal Church with diffused heretics—whether as kings and heads of armies, or as royal-minded claimers of mental freedom—had the office of drawing forth true notions of right corporate conditions for collected peoples. And such notions were gained in the ever-natural way of apportionment of ideas that are opponent. Kings and priests, lords temporal and lords spiritual, even in following out their personal ambitions, were ever leading the way to that settlement of ideas in their right places which can only begin by a vague duality in the import of principle. That is, notably, it was seen, in a general way, that Protestantism bears alliance with Democracy, and Catholicism with Despotism:—while herein also evidently lies connection with severally Fraternity and Parenthood. The reigning struggle of parties had a constant end in the clearing up and deepening of this leading difference: turning always, as it did, on an adequate definition of the Family.

The apportionment signifies that the general thought of mankind had come to recognize a certain measure of

truth on both sides, to which equity required that justice should be severally rendered. The forming of two departments for the sway of opposing principles of government was the obvious resource of mental fairness; while the advantage to follow was at least as obvious. From the first of the establishment of Popedom it was proved to the experience how great was the moral benefit to subject means of appeal from local tyranny to an appeal, claiming specially to rule by law high notwithstanding all disturbance to civil not fail to be involved. But supposing appeal to have obtained a seat of diffused the body of each localized state, in the main Family, made consonant

with the Divine plan of Nature, the character of the antagonism occasioned would be so mitigated as to be something much better than harmless. The "environment" thus provided on either hand would be simply a most animating stimulus. The preceding hostility would be made to turn into an action of reciprocity and civic balance: the state of Family being made as much a needed "environment" to worldly life, as the latter to the state of Family. For as, on the one hand, the consciousness of each person in domestic life becomes that of possessing all around him an atmosphere of ever-varying public life, into which he is continually obliged to plunge; so, on the other hand, the consciousness of the member of a state-community is that of being ever able to return into the native atmosphere of domesticity, or of religiously-exclusive personality. The member of Family, as such, knows socially even the members of outer Families as but civic environment: however open to a removal of the barrier at the instant touch of awakened sympathy. And members of statehood, as such, notoriously ignore domes-

ticity as outside to their public consideration : they ignore it, although certainly without enmity.

But even in the abstruse view of pure philosophy this balanced division may be seen to have had firm ground for the progress it has been making towards fulfilment. Let us think of the idea of the "divine right of kings," which has ever formed the strength of kingly despotism. This idea in its crude origin we must take as pointing back to even the fetishistic notion of gods having descendants among mankind in the very manner of merely human progenitors:—of kings that were god-like heroes of whom the parents were reigning deities of heaven,—or, it may be, of the dread region of death. But without extending view to this dim source, we may think of the idea of divine right as represented to its best by the example in Hebrew history informing us so instructively as it does of the manner in which Samuel proceeded to yield to the urgent call of that people to furnish them with a king: who, however, he resolved, should be such as not to thwart the theistic constitution provided for them. The prophet, we are told, selected for the office first Saul, and subsequently David, by that which he represented as the direct guidance of Jehovah. (1 *Sam.* x. 1; xvi. 13.) Each in turn was offered and accepted as the anointed substitute for Deity: only in this way having right to reign. And the virtue of the anointing was empowered to descend to successors. Is there not here, accordingly, a just precedent for two separate trains of what is modern assumption, rivalling one another hitherto in their ascendancy:—for the papistic idea of apostolic descent, as well as the more direct one of hereditary kingship?—When Christian priests had so gained their worldly status as to have virtually a real king of their own, believed also to have been heaven-selected, the divineness attached to

common kings was inevitably made to dwindle in apprehension. And this *ought* to have been, in philosophic view, if it be true, as is now maintained, that the only rule that can be lawfully despotic is that of the proper Parenthood which by nature is confined to the state of Family. It was a sign of the inherent virtue of the Christian creed that should have given rise to the crude mode of family shown in Popedom; but that hence it should have been—ed—and this directly by the sanctifying of such final development of the domestic system for us supersede Romish domestic system in the heart of every Christian; abundantly a higher evidence of the cr.

With this new limitation to its import the bond of Family will again coincide strictly with the idea of race-descent; and the just consequence of this, in direct observance of hereditary tendencies, will be of eminent benefit to mankind. A justified absolutism in parental hands, united with a rigid self-restraint on the part of parents as rulers in the domestic kingdom, will be as helpful an aid to the religious side of human nature as can be imagined.

And that principle of balance which rules generally throughout nature provides intrinsically the counteraction to parental absolutism which requires the special kind of response now pleaded for. The differencing of sociologic departments into secular and religious, as to which Fraternalism shall as much reign in the one as Parentalism in the other, is identified in reason with the assuring of free republicanism to the state :—though the latter indeed must admit always of such retaining of the law of Family within the state as imports a representation of *historical* ecclesiasticism. And the state of Family, in

itself, by its very nature, sets on foot the demand of the differentiation. The absolutism of the parent lasts no longer than till the infant has grown up into the capacity of being the member of a state : while the all-sided relationism of the Family, attending on parentalism, acts incessantly in filling out the individuality of each unit comprised in it, so as duly to make condition for republican independence. The Family is the natural cherisher of human Egoism, of true and rightful kind. But from its deeply-affective character, the Egoism of domesticity is but relatively *passive* ; and nature demands ever that any quality which is passive shall become at some time *active*. This change is then but due to occur when the brotherhood of the Family has turned into the affectively-enfeebled brotherhood of civic life. *Here* the Egoism, before passive, is alone duly completed by becoming active. Social brotherhood is provided for on the artificial terms of an allowed ignoring of the point of parentage : and this altogether gives new function to the "brothers" now but nominally and fictitiously such. The "divine right of kings," which is appropriately made over to divinely-furnished parents, is extinguished entirely for the social beings who, *as* such, have inherent right to choose a parent *as* king for themselves : a parent, *not* such literally, but only idealistically.—And, if once such change in position should be recognized, nature's principle of balance would not fail to fulfil itself. Secularity has its rights, just as much as religion has ; and both would be in this way attended to, with mutual advantage. For the opposed kinds of social hypothesis would thus be enabled and induced to play helpfully into one another.

I will now proceed to argue how the feeling of Fraternity, when thus qualified, may become adapted, more

than otherwise could have been possible, to the progressed state of Society to be henceforth looked for.

SECTION II.

D CHARACTER GIVEN TO

BROTHERHOOD

ED DIFFERENTIATION.

THE mode of looking at things in the future contemplate has regard to the future brings relations into an adaptation more accurate to the law of Struggle, which is shown especially by Evolutionism as ruling through the whole extent of nature.

I have been assuming here throughout that the aspect of Conflict is indeed that which belongs of right to every mode of our relationism: treating even that of Sexhood as being equally subject to it with Fraternity and Parenthood. But in the Brotherly relation there is present a peculiar cause for the characterization. And the allotting here, as I have done, the sign of "secularity" for distinctive mark, brings out prominently the circumstance, with what, as I consider, is real advantage.

The characterizing of Brotherhood by "secularity" has the effect of showing brothers above all in the light of *rivals* to one another. But if it really be the case that they are such, and must be such,—if it be indeed the plan of nature that, as now appears, the individuality that is due to each one of us is a thing to be much rather *fought* out than simply *worked* out, the more fully we become conscious of the fact, and allow for it in our moral reasoning, the more likely is our morality to be

serviceable. In the admitting to ourselves clearly that our subject is placed in a "worldly" light, we are incomparably more able than we else could have been to bring to bear on it reflections we may esteem of a nature higher than worldly.

But moreover there is here implied a deeper kind of general recognition. Just as Struggle involves Rivalship, does the existence of rivalry involve a mode of feeling that is naturally the reverse of religious. The effect of Struggle which is *not* secular, and therefore *not* typical in kind, but only domestic or religious, is the endowing of the emotive side of us with the general sentiment of *Love*. But the Struggle which in being alien to the Family engenders typically a state of Rivalry, is naturally the producer of a sort of feeling opposite to Love. That is, not necessarily distinctive *Hate*, but still that which we must think of as positive *Aversion*.—It is inconceivable that rivalry should exist under limited conditionment, without the actual springing up, among fellow-competitors, of a mutual feeling of antagonism. The active egotism of each makes him eagerly demand a full space for his own exertions; and when others press upon him all around, with fellow claims, he cannot otherwise than desire to keep them back.—And it can scarcely be realized in idea that any general conditionment whatever is without limit. Even if we tried to form an image of what in general stands as "good" or means of happiness to mankind, we should be obliged to suppose that the amount of this possible to exist at any given moment is fixed—or, in theologic language, predetermined. But at all events it is justifiable to make such inference as to detailed conditionment. Here it is at once palpable to perception, as the fruit of all human experience, that any obtaining of a personal means of happiness is wont to be

impeded by efforts in the same direction on the part of others. It may even be taken, in true logic, as an actual law of nature, that every striver at good can obtain success for himself above that which is a fair average, determined by the number of fellow-strivers, only at the expense of those who are less fortunate.—And thus it would appear from the first beginning of social life so that the cultivation of feeling should have made part of the constitution of human nature, in the character of a governing instinct attached to every unit in

And such e imply actual strength, and not weakne at in the world of physics the inherent p... action is duly answered

by a counter-principle of Repulsion : and of the kind of Repulsion that if primarily appearing a mere negative to the positiveness of Attraction, needs be subsequently seen—in regard to nature's higher creative range—to be itself indeed as positive as the latter. Mere physical dynamics may treat the opposite polarities of magnetism by one idea, parted only into positive and negative ; but the magnetic energy of sociologists must not fail to be doubly represented.

A true social philosophy must be furnished with a means of explaining adequately the contrariety which has expression for itself in the whole tenour of human conduct. It must show a principle of causation for that crossing of the general texture of the web of life which, as I have been saying, has given to life all its actual rich variety—all its glowing emotive colouring, and all its firmness and strength of substance (p. 156). The jarring passions of mankind, stirring up social action continually, have caused often distracting entanglements in life-experience ; but all the actual degree of smoothness it has realized has

been secured at the same time in the same way. And a true philosophy must interpret the process.

NATURAL MANNER OF THE AMPLIFICATION OF RIVALRY.

The rivalry which exists among the brotherhood that is limited to the bounds of Family is widely marked off from that which counts as general to all mankind :—and this for the very reason that brotherhood itself does not here possess the character that may stand as typical of fraternity. Brotherhood, in the plan of Family, is altogether subordinate in importance to the two other constituent relationships : and in its being so, its moulding of the mode of rivalry is too peculiar to suit a general representing.

This arises, obviously, from the express predominance in this department of emotive action : such being naturally the attendant consequence on the immediate community in parentage which is distinctive of the Family. The excess of sway that is here given to the affections is sufficient cause to prevent rivalry from here following its true process of mitigation, out of that which was at first, necessarily, only a feeling of the very rudest sort. The improvement, where it has occurred, has been only abnormal :—what has happened has been either virtual extinction, and absorption in domestic love, which is the appropriate alternative ; or an added quality of bitterness, an aversion that instead of mitigated is intensified. In the region of secularity, on the contrary, the nature of rivalry is comparatively free from affective influence : it works out freely its own course of development. For the idea of community of parentage is here so diffused, through remoteness of imaginable ancestral origin, that no other relationism is maintainable than the ideal sort of such which I am treating as merely figurative. Under secu-

larity the rivalry of mankind is at once naturally milder, and naturally stronger and more enduring, than that which is domestic. And also here, as I contend, it has neither need of being condemned, nor of being regarded as a thing to be ashamed of, by even the inheritors of the affective influence of Christianity.

But none the less, taken as an assured truth that these two have ever acted on one another with moreover that the benefit ought naturally through our consciously classifying the We know familiarly, in fact, how the has been gained in domestic life ne have effect on the most strenuous contently strife. The mould of feeling that has once been formed under the practice of the home-affections, becomes settled as a moral habit to the emotive nature subjected to it; and the impression of it can be never wholly effaced, however it may be forced to become latent. Even as hidden from direct consciousness, the precious fruit of household tenderness will mingle with worldly feeling, and soften away a somewhat of its asperity.— And no less may an alterative infusion of worldly feeling into the habit of domesticity improve the latter, if consciously accepted as an intruder.

Human beings shut up in domestic bounds would be ever, as it were, mental infants. The stringency of mental nerve that is produced by mental warfare is the proper means of raising spiritual existence into its destined spontaneous activity. And the wider this extends in its range, the more does it become needful that a duality in regard to it should be recognized.

And as soon as our philosophy of morality is thus accommodated to the emergency,—as soon as we specu-

late on fraternity on its own account, with allowance for the mere symbolism of its preserved name,—we indeed obtain view of a deeper element residing in it than even that which has source in parentage. Even in our seeing of this fraternity how specifically it requires crediting with the active presence of a furnished spirit of rivalry, we may still discern in it a root of amelioration inherent to itself, provided for it by nature independently of the alien influence of domesticity. I mean, the inherent instinct of organic beings to congregate, in pursuit of whatever interests are common : a tendency that in fact underlies the state of Family, and has been the impeller to all improvements there occurring.

The real strength of the adhesion of true brothers and of all members of the group of Family with one another, is undoubtedly the common interest affecting all, in regard to their specialized stock of welfare. Their common interest, concerned chiefly with the maintaining of a smooth play of the affections, is the proper nutriment of domestic love. But also in the opposite condition of the merely nominal brethren who make general society, the same uniting element is always latently present, and waiting to be called out. In every province of action human beings find inevitably that they have common interests, and that these are most satisfyingly fulfilled when a certain number are together engaged in them. The sense of the desirableness of union cancels for a time, to an adequate extent, the opposite instinct of repulsion attached to rivalry : which again is on the alert to resume itself. A just balance between the two is ever needful to be made out and secured. And thus constantly in all civilized life are such minor aggregations called forth : the greater part of the well-being of mankind in civil life being found to depend on them ;—

while the disposition to form them increases naturally in proportion to the variety of pursuits that become prevalent. The tendency to fall into social bodies is the proper habit of the subjects of culture. And the habit, in being such, is the agency supplied by nature for the spread of culture, and of all the social amenities. But the benefit of these minor aggregations must consist—on the principle of their resting on the motive of self-interest,—on their essentially voluntary bearing character and of easy power of

The common question must be such as hinders nothing personal interest which is that of each and every individual. The solidarity of the interest that is incorporated must be alone a formed compound of unit interests that are none other than egoistic. The indispensable hypothesis must stand firm, that each unit has been led to the combination only as believing that he shall thereby carry out his own egoistic object:—that, in fact, he shall find the egoistic objects of all his comrades coinciding with his own.—A conviction of this sort is obviously a direct local extinguishment of rivalry: lying open, however, to the probability of aggravation for the latter elsewhere.

And life-secular is truly furnished by nature with also a due fund of emotionalism, laid deep in our social origin, and as appropriate to this extra-domestic sphere as it is to the life of home: having a well-known proper name of its own that has been long assigned to it. The term of *Sympathy* is the happy expresser of the vague but all-capable sentiment that springs for all beings out of the practice of merely clinging together. Beings that cling together are aware, in the very act of their clinging, of the common interest affecting them at the

moment. And the more often, and the more variously, the desire to cling is called forth, the more are the occasions for it multiplied. Sympathy is as competent to promote efficiency in the highest occupations of mental sort, as it is in the humbler kinds of co-operative handiwork. It is so free from limitation in its character, through its universal applicability, that it may be thought of as even an abstract species of sentiment, without need of any object to explain it:—herein differing pre-eminently from Love. Love depends wholly for its character on the selected object of Love. But Sympathy gains character by being ready for attachment to any object:—that is, for any object that, like the subject, is endowed with egoistic personality. Sympathy implies essentially a conscious individuality, as present on either side that is concerned: while Love, though always personal, begins naturally without consciousness. Sympathy, unlike Love, owes peculiarly its normal growth to heightened intellection; as the latter owes itself to an increased range of action.

But Sympathy, on its own part, has the power of inducing a mode of emotionalism that, however it remains general in character, still is as truly capable as Love of being engrossed by a particular personality. It naturally engenders Friendship. And Friendship is perhaps the very choicest of all the attachments human beings can have with one another: the true perfecter of all domestic relations, and, no less, the never-failing resource of the unhappy subjects who have none of these. It is also, with all its generalness, much more generous*

* Does not the word "generous" mean expressly the bestowing upon aliens the same benefits and good-will that are rendered ordinarily, and by right, to the fellow-members of a family exclusively?

than Love : for the very reason of all the obstacles to fellow-feeling that abound—all the rivalries that it must and can surmount.

Sympathy is at present, and long has been, a fixed instinct of our nature. But it is instinct of a kind that, as I have noted before of the sense of Duty, is primarily alone dormant in us, and is aroused with us, by virtue of inheritance, it is aroused into action till a fit occasion presents itself. Sympathy has not like Duty, however, as it is excited, it is indistinguishable or divertible as it is excited, it is immutable, because of its direction. But sense of Sympathy, applying only to the good, may at an instant be again dormant, and it is continually alert for disappearance and for renewal. And the emotion of Friendship, springing out of it, owes its nobleness to the same character. Friendship, unlike Love, is essentially unsubmitive to any bondage : it is ever free, and self-sufficient to give law to itself. Alike in its cessation and its endurance;—and it is capable, more than Love, of strict permanence,—it is that which enriches with moral strength the egoistic conditionment of individualism.

And Friendship is indifferent to state of Sex. It may exist equally between man and man, or between woman and woman, or between a man and a woman :—with indeed some tinge of variation in its quality, but none such as to disturb its general import. — And I must observe that my reflections here throughout, as to the case of Brotherhood, are intended as of this kind, in respect to Sex. By the word “brothers” I have been meaning that in which “sisters” are comprehended. And in fact this omission of regard to the point of Sex I believe to be both involved within the nature of the subject, and to be that which may be alleged in its allow-

ableness as the rightful sign of the subject's "secularity." I feel strongly, in behalf of my own womanhood, that nothing is more desirable, in consideration of the Philosophy of Sociology, and of human life under the aspect of Struggle, than a fundamental understanding of a postulated ignoring of Sexhood.

This view of the general impulse of Sympathy, and of its power of ripening into personal Friendship, seems to me to redeem amply the principle of self-interest from the aspect of baseness that is superficially apparent, and therefore commonly attached to the idea of it. The only kind of "baseness" that may rightfully be charged upon egoism, under the present view, is that which may proceed from a wilful resistance of the counter-action supplied by nature to the spirit of unmitigated rivalry. Through the effect of alternating life-conditions, pressing with just balance on the developing human conscience, rivalry gains the means of duly compassing its own proper development, into a mode compatible with a strict obedience to moral law—the high kind of moral law that has been rectified by self-knowledge. Such developed mode of rivalry is indeed its turning into a form of noble emulousness, both compatible with Friendship, and high out of reach of moral blame. But the failure to attain it, through want of *will* towards it on the part of strivers, is undeniably contemptible.

Above all, there lies moral condemnation against the sort of wilfulness in question which should consciously aim at serving self-interest by direct *hindrance* of the working of that of others.—And here I must observe that the formula of Social Ethics which has been fundamentally asserted by Mr. Spencer, and carried out through his whole doctrine of Sociology, seems to call for the very aid of this mode of explanation, in order to a true

applicability. Already in his "*Social Statics*" (at p. 78,) Mr. Spencer laid down for his general basis of principle the proposition, that "every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties compatible with the possession of like liberty by every other man." The kind of liberty here contemplated is however obviously restricted to that which is consistent with the laws of nature and the just human enactments; while the right to the fullness of it is dependent on the in-born constitution that nature has provided us with, and each one of us is to be satisfied with the reality, it is little for us to know that we are not hindered by our exertions, compared with those of others, to feel that we are endowed with the same capacity, which in framing "rights" on the plan of "equality" we are forced to imagine that nature *ought* to have distributed in fair levelness, but which obviously she has *not* so distributed. One person, in demanding freedom for self-advancement, may be obliged to crush out others, by the inherent circumstance of his superiority of natural state, even if guiltless of any wish to do so. And it would be too hard upon him, in practical morality, if it were required of him continually to pay attention to the circumstance, and to guide his social conduct in accordance. Mr. Spencer's proposition observably keeps clear of this difficulty; and in fact leaves it open to every claimant of "liberty" to arrange with himself what he shall practically understand by the term. But on the ground of introspectional and subjective morality that is here taken up, the latter is the point of main concern. And here therefore it seems necessary to assume the position now stated. It appears to be, namely, the true logical *sequent* to Mr. Spencer's basis, not indeed to require of *each* that he promote, or even consciously desire, the suc-

cess of rivals, but only that he forbear, conscientiously, from ever trying, with direct intention, to hinder it. He is called upon never to make it purposely his aim to keep down others, however he confine his object to the merely limited advantage which is his own. This, it seems to me, is the utmost that formal law should pronounce upon. —To “succeed” in worldly life without injury to fellow-strivers, is, in strict theoretic reasoning, a moral impossibility.

The notion of “Equality” is itself a merely artificial figment: a legal fiction that can only stand on a ground the reverse of natural. And for this very reason is it adapted to the political matter of secular fraternization. “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity” run together as the true watchwords of republicanism:—but, all in doing so, they are each of them ideas that nature laughs at on her own account, to the ear tuned to sympathy with nature. No two human beings are made the equals of one another, in any sense of equality that involves integrality, or proper egoism.—Nor is “liberty,” any more, that which naturally attends on individualism, in respect of what is personal independence: while a true secular “fraternity” involves rationally such difference from real brotherhood as forces on worldly governments the adoption of a mode of legalism that is again the reverse of natural.

The legalism of constitutional statehood is rationally alone safe, or secure from doing harm more than good, when it is indeed limited to negation. “*Thou shalt not*” is obviously a less infringement on liberty than the positive enjoinder of “*Thou shalt*”:—supposing always that the secular authority has been voluntarily assented to by each person subjected to it. The moral law of the Ten Commandments appears perfect in the light of a

merely secular code, adapted purposely to the child-like stage of cultivation which is implied by there being need of a moral law.

And if this be granted—if indeed it be legally recognized that the whole principle of secularity, in being that of fraternity, abjures all pretension of achieving ends that are mental,—the true bearing of all social economy traced. This must lie in the simple open course to that practice of voluntary combination every way accordant with nature and will of fraternity, and which is ever the proper character's improvement:—in the open e, and in constantly protecting it from struction. Governmental aid employed in this way must be indeed serviceable; while clearly it would be free from the objectionableness with which state-compulsion is fraught when exerted positively with direct view to moral benefit. If all cases of infringement of moral law, and also of law physical, were dealt with consistently at mere secular tribunals by alone the safe dictum of the "*Thou shalt not*," nothing would offend the principle of individual liberty as being a needless transgressing of the bounds allowed for in all voluntary republicanism: namely, as to personal restraint which all subjects had supposedly agreed with one another to be controlled by.—And this reticence on the side of secularity would even positively promote the authoritativeness of the action of religionism, where absoluteness of injunction is the expressly appropriate means of treating moral infirmity—where liberty is a thing out of question, to every conscience that has owned subjection to the law-natural esteemed by it divine.—Also, among the methods of amalgamation of masses which stand as religious means of improvement, is that feminine repeti-

tion of statehood which precisely needs henceforth to import a quasi-secular respondent to the primal religious organ of the state of Family. The State-church of the future has to be, as far as it may be, a moral Popedom, wholly turned to the producing of an outward fulcrum of support to the inner practice of virtue.*

By such assortment as this I imagine that the matter of human rivalship may appear that which need not other than content religious questioners of Providence. It is exhibited as a great natural fact which we have no reason to wish different. The fruit borne by it is undoubtedly little palatable in ordinary ; but we may fairly be satisfied that we should be doing ill by ourselves if we could actually succeed in extirpating it. If the pressure of self-interest could indeed be abolished out of life, many a bitter contention, it is true, would be avoided ;—but life would have little spring to it. Egoism would be

* Thus, in regard to State-education:—the compulsoriness that is here implied might be entirely left to the religionism of any country, which should exercise it in the mode of indeed rather *maternalism* than *paternalism* : supplying only such national schooling as, except for homely moral instruction, should not aim beyond merest rudiments ;—while the bearing of the state-action which is rightly such might thence be duly limited to an infliction of penalties, principally chargeable on parents, not for ignorance in itself, but for any overt nuisances consequential on the idleness and misbehaviour that may result from it : besides the general condemnation of ignorance which should be shown in excluding those affected by it from public offices.—The national training, state-appointed for those who, like state-infants, are assumably without home-instruction, ought naturally to apply mainly to the affording of a right direction much rather to the affections and the moral conduct of those befriended, than to their intellectual faculties. The body of all the instruction imparted might advisably turn, not indeed on any substituting of a new form for present catechizing and creed-teaching, but on a general expounding of the great religious injunction, not easy of a truly practical interpretation, of “doing as we would wish to be done by.”

subdued into a vapid sentiment incapable of sustaining Friendship, or even the consuming warmth of genuine Love. Without rivalry in the Life-Struggle, we should have to choose our friend and to raise up our family by mere rule :—and we should live but coldly, in consequence. All effort would be scantily furnished with motive :—exists as a flat thing altogether.

Social struggle is as that which has the power of so far from being a combining or crushing out the true humanity, that it actually is the development of self-interest that the natural course of the struggle on foot, has already drawn ever more and more to promote, the elements in our emotive nature. The enhancement of general sympathy, following on that adjustment of the separating and combining influences of civic life which is the constant problem of all secular legislation,—with the attendant capability given to sympathy of concentration into personal friendship,—works out for our affective constitution a character of priceless value that could scarcely be imagined as proceeding from the sentiment now so frequently substituted of so-called “*altruism*.” The emotive impulse that could attach to a feeling so loose and so desultory as that of a mere general love of Otherhood, seems unworthy even to stand in competition with natural Egoism as an efficient moral agent, discernible as such to philosophic view.

And let it be remembered that the view here attempted to be set forth is alone a purely abstract and speculative presentation of the subject. In the very stating of the prime conditions of my present scheming, I have spoken thus respecting “*Happiness*,” which is indeed the general term for an egoistic (or subjective) apprehension of the

object-matter of self-interest:—I have said that while Happiness is indeed “our being’s end and aim,” it yet is so “only in reference to what in nature is nature’s own Divine design”;—and that, “however it be the fact that Happiness is not such unless appreciated, yet the turning of direct notice on it destroys it. . The true earning of life-enjoyment, as a thing of struggle, is the actual gain of what is struggled for; with the addition of what always in right exercise of function is labour’s payment of itself, as enjoyment of the very exercise on its own account. If our being’s end and aim were indeed to ourselves made the conscious pursuit of Happiness, most naturally *ought* it to turn out a mere shadow.” (See *ante*, pp. 64-5.) And similarly do I intend of “self-interest.” The habitual reverting consciously to this in ordinary life-action would thwart the very process of self-development:—though, none the less, is the strained effort to command knowledge of it indispensable to a true philosophy of life.

The power to *enjoy* life is in itself a kind of virtue—or, at least, the abiding fruit of exerted virtue. Constitutionally possessed (namely, as an inheritance drawn from virtue of progenitors) it needs regarding as a natural gift of Heaven, the value of which is great beyond comparing with any outwardly-obtained good, and the suffering of which to waste is not less than sinful. But the only way of preserving it is, by Heaven’s appointment, the diffusing of the effect of it abroad. We cannot naturally maintain our sense of Happiness except only by its communicating to fellow-beings. Here, accordingly, is the true tendency of “self-interest.” To interest ourselves in others—to feel ourselves engaged, not vaguely and uniformly, but varyingly and selectedly: certainly in some, and possibly in any, out of the whole number of

the separate selves of our fellow-creatures,—is the only proper filling up of our own egoism. For, to imagine egoism alone concerned with the sensual rudiments of existence is far from part of a truly human philosophy.

And if idealism still cling to the supposed beauty of “self-sacrifice” as the highest attribute of virtue, I hold none the less, *not*, by the *safety* of this newly-moulded *not*, by its immunity from provocation to *not* self-flattery. It may be taking compar *not* and for human virtue to assert of it tl *not* suit of “self-interest”: but perhaps *not* yields in morals, as in physical condi *not* stage to be depended on. —I see rather *not* similarity in acknowledging to ourselves that there is *gain* to us in every action of virtue.

But the benefit in this re-cast of basis has to be judged of most effectively by examination of some detail points of principle. If the present modifying of social principle-in-the-mass be correct, there *ought* to be called for some attendant and more specially-defined rectification in regard to the actual working of such principle.

SIGNS OF A PROCEEDING ETHICAL TRANSFORMATION.

By the plan of the present differencing of morality into religious and secular, the state of things to be considered is thus determined :—while, in general, all positive regulation of our emotionalism lies exclusively in the province of religion, the function of morality classed as secular is mainly limited to an outward control over the action of the state of rivalry that arises necessarily to social beings out of their measure of egoistic independence. The evil of social warfare, in the view of Christianity, was nothing else than evil ; and was slightly passed over

as a thing to be extinguished with all other of mere worldly concern, in being reduced under the sole power of Love, carrying everywhere its own spiritual or super-human influence. Evolutionism, on the contrary, attacks its object thus: partially in eschewing the Christian remedy as out of place, but chiefly in falling back on the agency of general culture, as sufficient in itself to supply cure for every natural kind of malady. Hence—in place of a mere arbitrary requirement of an emotion not under our command, as Love is not,—we have now but the enforcement to a wise directing of that common spring of Sympathy which has been made innate to all existent human beings.

Evidently, this shifting of the position of the subject ought to involve more or less of transformation to all the leading moral images concerned. It may cause possibly a direct passing of the contained implication out of the sphere of commendation into the reverse: as happens eminently with the idea of “disinterestedness.” This idea, which has hitherto been held expressive of the noblest quality of human virtue, and one specially associable with friendship, has absolutely no place for itself under present view in that light, and demands an instant extinction. It is the presence and not the absence of interest that the cases which have wontedly suggested the word must henceforth signify; while the image of a “disinterested friend” above all must become obsolete, and merged in that of one who possesses an “*alter ego*.” The latter term, cherished worthily among us as it is, marks indeed how, from long time back, has been awakened a moral instinct towards the change in question. And an obvious reason for the change, and for its likely spread, appears in the circumstance with regard to “egoism” which I have just affirmed:—the

word of "egoism" being indeed the representative exponent of the whole event. Just as much as I have seemed forced by my own principle to lower the meaning I can admit with verbal accuracy in the word "altruism," so, with regard to "egoism" do I feel compelled to require a raising above its ordinary implication. I require to assert for it a standing any longer, as it has hitherto indulged in, of self-conceit, it must of right be as expressing that fruit of concentrated self-interest, as desirable as a habit, but immensely so—*which is an averaged*—which is an averaged or, a doctriated sense of self-interest, or, a doctriated sense of "interestedness," and of any like terms, I judge, to express only the lower and merely partial self-consciousness that prevailed when they originated; while I insist that the inward stature of mind has to-day outgrown that first verbal arrangement. When a friend could be called "disinterested," I argue that there was in vogue a sensual and material cast of consciousness which need happily be no longer perpetuated.

Here then is the clue by which I now propose to test my theory. If, as I believe, our relationism of fraternity can be better understood, and intrinsically improved, by its placing on an open secular footing, there ought to have been proceeding some marked evidence of the latent fact which I assume : that of a heightened mental standard being due to egoship. I will therefore aim at the producing of such evidence.

Towards this quest, it must be primarily noted, there is one great assistance at hand. And that is, an empowered view of what has ever formed the *obstacle* to improvement in fraternal sentiment. Fraternity means

specifically an independence of the sway of fellow-beings; and yet nature has planted in us, as inherent fruit of our individualism under state of rivalry, an ever-working desire of *mastery* over others. Nor ought we to imagine that any deeper kind of evil here exists than in the source of the desire: the redeeming fact being still present that it acquires an actual nobleness for itself under effect of all progression in sympathy, just as also does the on-coming power of friendship. For, when imbued with a duly-enhanced sympathy, every subject of conscious egoism is aware of, and consents to, the fellow-operation in all others of an instinctive aim at mastery like his own. And thus on the part of all may a voluntary concession be put in practice; while if sympathy have deepened in any case into friendship, it may well happen genuinely that the wish for the gain of mastery by another even exceeds the same wish on behalf of self. The friend who "sticketh closer than a brother" is able so to do for the very reason that any personal masterfulness is here a thing wholly out of law, as it cannot rightfully be in the state of family: any "lording it" by one over another being un contemplated in secular fraternity.—There is also found a proper sphere of mastery in each and every case where it only acts partially. In such limited manner there is no degradation in the assumption or the surrender of command. To be a master, or to seek a master, in a particular branch of culture is the farthest from a loss of personal dignity:—though perhaps only through the temporariness, as well as partialness, of the engaged subjection.—But, omitting view to these legitimate consequences, which are as if but the breaking up in fragments of the general obstruction to fraternity,—we may see in history a clear course of the passion of domination, thus lending

itself to amelioration. . Namely, as out of an inordinate excess, into only an arousing exhilaration.

The farther we look back into barbarism certainly is the love of mastery the more gross: and this precisely as implying that integral subordinating of its object which is the treating of a fellow-creature as a mere portion of material, or that which may be bodily taken possession of, or an article of food or of other physical enjoyment, as the savage who lived by warfare had his wealth in the person of only his wife, or wives, but his means of subsistence of every sort were represented to him as the property of who, as such, could not be otherwise than his property. But more and more as the barbarian advanced he came to understand the real advantage of service that instead of life-long was only temporary; and that also could be paid for on the spot, in barter or contracted for debt. And thus the spirit of commerce began the work that had finally to be the antidote to warfare; and that speedily turned itself to that raising up of partnerships, mercantile and other, by which sympathy was engendered and every way promoted. Down however to mediæval times the rule of partnerships still held by the crude plan of mastership, as possession of bounden slaves by a despotic head; nor until now has this begun to give way to the only notion which is rightful, of a true fellowship of workers. That is, of a figurable fraternity whose incorporating together is purely voluntary at first, and remains such to the last so far as to the retained right of only submitting to a selected head, who is limited to agreed-upon terms, and moreover always liable to be coerced by the ruling will of the several members of the combination :—such being the ideal of all republican institutions.—But this final abrogation of mastership out of secularly-ordered inter-

course is still naturally balanced by the relegation of mastership to the state proper to it, of family ; and is still therefore maintained in the sphere that needs it, with the power of thence casting an always salutary reflection.

Hence inevitably does it seem that which was required to follow, that a general renewing should have progressively taken place, as *pari passu* with the declining of mastership, in all the philosophic notions that lie at basis to political economy. Namely, of those which are concerned with what stands as "the natural right, or rights, of every man." Evidently at the present day is it needful, to an extent that it has never been before, to inquire into the proper meaning of this phrase. Economists have studied well the claim of *men* of every sort to share, and share alike, in their rights. But they are now compelled to think, by the movement that is astir among *women*, whether here the same admission, never granted as yet, may any longer be withheld. I appeal, then, to philosophic thought, whether really the whole difficulty in the matter does not vanish at a stroke, the instant we allow that secularity has of right another logic than that of the natural reasoning of religionism? The matter of its being here needful, as I affirm, to exclude Sex altogether from consideration, makes the plan of all civic constitution alone desirable that which casts the right of voice in state-affairs exclusively on proof of competency and civil qualification. This being settled, the actual matter of women's coming into civil offices would easily arrange itself: so that as long as they were in any way unfit for public life, they would naturally be kept away from it. I have full faith, for my own part, that as soon as ever legal obstacles were removed,

and mere arbitrary restrictions were abolished, the whole tendency of women's striving would be to gain such remoulding of the present Church, both in doctrine and in its plan of ecclesiastical alliance with Statehood, as would furnish them appropriately with a rightly feminine mode of serving their country and through their country the world. Such a confusion must doubtless happen: but it would not be long before politicians would see that in thus opening their bounds they would receive the benefit of a deepened principle of sociology, and that it had dawned on them while women were still in the process of civil status.

The force of this matter tells strongly against women: through the very fixing, for ourselves, the common meaning of the word "brother" as it has done, to an application to men only. Very soon it must surely happen, either that gender must be resolutely here disallowed, or that a new word, of common gender, must be supplied.*

But a deeper kind of alteration appears in prospect as attendant on this widened sociologic basis: a truly philosophic point not conducing at all to confusion, but on the contrary to moral clearness and order.

The conception of the natural rights of individuals turns wholly on the idea of *Justice*, considered in an abstract light. Here, however, the case recurs which comes ever to the front when the actual transition from supernaturatism to full naturalism is in question. The hitherto-maintained notion of *justice absolute* rests entirely

* Might not possibly the word "*compatriot*" suffice, in at all events political usage? This would aptly correspond to the fellow term of "*congener*": which marks commonness of race-descent, just as here is demanded import of solely commonness of a law of country.

on the theory of a Divine Autocracy ; while on present terms there is afforded but the kind of moral fulcrum which has the self-supporting force of a moral balance oscillating dualistically throughout nature, in the place of any Autocrat Disposer. Thus I imagine, with regard to the idea of *justice*, that again has to be allowed for the continual phenomenon of the transition, of the passing from apprehension that is literal into that which is reflective and but symbolical. It is only in this way, I believe, that the idea of "justice" as to "human rights," can at all maintain itself ; while, at the same time, I recognize thoroughly that such maintenance is as desirable as permissible.

When the sustaining force in nature is thus cast upon the principle of balance, it is self-evident, in fact, that justice has no footing to stand on, except as between man and man : while in such limited position it is cut off from any power of strict abstractness, or absoluteness, of implication. The origination of the idea of justice, as has been seen, was that which indeed was built on the anthropomorphic assumption of Deity's being no other than a Divine Man. God was held to have directly bargained with His creatures : while the idea of "justice," thence invented, referred only to the faithfulness of either party to the contracted-for terms of the bargain. The Supreme Head of nature was supposed binding himself upon oath, self-sanctioned, that he, on his own part, would not break his given word ; and the men who should similarly preserve faith were the men accounted "just." The "just men" were those all whose conduct, even towards fellow-men, was in accordance with the promise to God, for ever registered as between God and man.—But, in our own time—thanks to that Moral Order in the world which has developed human nature, by the means of the human

commerce of mankind,—the innate feeling of justice produced in us has gone beyond that which satisfied at first. We cannot now recognize that the forming of such a contract on the part of Deity was at all accordant in itself with the idea of justice. We have now learned, by accumulated experience, that not any human beings, and that some in much the same manner as in others, are so made by their Creator as to be bound to a promise of "just" to a given promise of obedience to a law:—whence Himself remains morally re-chargeable with *injustice*. —If, however, we take the first crudeness of the statement, and the rational symbolism, this solid truth remains that the intrinsic will of the Disposer of nature is indeed that men

should for themselves duly exercise the justice which otherwise is not in nature provided for. And by the giving of this turn to our thinking, we may indeed retain for the idea of justice a virtual substitute for the kind of "absoluteness" first imagined.

The word "justice" would simply stand for that which appears such to the conscience of whoever uses it. And its being attributed to whole nature—as is signified by its abstract qualifying,—represents alone the speaker's conviction, that this very effect of conscience itself betokens that bearing of the entire general course of development towards the creation of a human conscience which amounts to the exhibiting it as a formed *design*, on nature's part, that the human agent she had fitted for the task should be her exclusive instrument in all intrinsic or conscientious execution of justice. The very sense of being possessed of a conscience is in itself the imposition of a virtually-divine command to effect justice. And thus is adequately borne out the religiousness of implication which the merely secular interpreting of

justice, on its own most legitimate ground of proved utility, fails to include.

The idea of justice on a secular basis is little used among us now in an abstract mode except in technical application to the office of certain ministrants of state-government. The official guardians of the state-law of any country are named "justices:" for the very reason that they have in charge, not to issue new law, but to secure the standing law's operation. We do not speak any longer, in a general way, of the person we hold estimable by the name of the "*just* and the *righteous* man;" we do, however, use commonly the former term to express always the continued import of strict accuracy on any subject that admits of vague interpretation, and we think of common honesty as an *upright* fulfilment of obligations. We speak of a *just* decision as one consonant with the law on any subject which to ourselves is admitted as such. We speak of a *just* sense of propriety in behaviour; and also of a *just* eye for colour and size and form, and a *just* feeling of perspective, and a *just* ear in music:—while, if justice be any longer mythologically personified as of old, it must strictly be confined to the official import which peculiarly is still the sign of its antique origin. "Justice" designed in emblem must still be signified by its sword and scales, as well as by its expressive blindness to any but its proper object.

Official justice does not make any longer, it is true, the claim that was original, of being "Divine." This is forbidden by the actual state of human knowledge and of the human conscience. The kind of justice that was first thought of as the attribute of a Divine Ruler who had the guise of proper secular sovereignty, now has parted itself in two:—leaving in separate form, on the one hand, mere secular rulership, ordered out on the plan of frater-

nity ; on the other, the rule of conscience taking up the assumption of Divineness. It is the express character of conscience to account itself as acting on the part of Deity: this being simply interpretable as authorized by an averaged estimate of all past experience. The voice of conscience, now uttering itself within us and calling on us to act on its

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for in the dark. Here, I conceive, is the track of the natural forming of the moral sense ; and the development of the idea of justice I imagine to have been ever, and to be still destined to continue, the attending consequence that is exponent of the progress. All branches of the matter here adequately coincide:—the derivation of all morality from belief in Deity ;—the first rise of the moral sense in a supposed contract with God, to pay for maintenance by the service of obedient duty ;—and finally, the recognition brought home that the only way of fully paying up our debt is the undertaking of responsibility in regard to justice. Namely, through making justice the guiding principle in all ordered institutions, to the extent that humanly-limited capability admits of:—the latter qualifying being necessary to be understood as a thing of course.

This reduction of the idea of justice to a human aspect—merely such, even as still not unassociated with a Divine one,—surely lightens the whole subject. We cannot at the present day—informed as we have been on the power of heredity to influence human lots with tremendous

difference among one another, by apparent chance and without means of self-producible remedy,—go on forcing ourselves to imagine that the rule of things is inherently just. But if we see that it is revealed at the same time that human effort, directed firmly towards justice, is signally compatible with, and apparently included in, the plan displayed generally in nature, the purest spirit of religiousness and the purest spirit of moral truthfulness are together satisfied.—And also, in regard to the human action of justice, this is helpfully relieved from the extraneous considerations that have hitherto weighed on it from the original connection with religion not other than supernaturalism. When the administrator of justice was identified, as he was at first, with perhaps a military Lord of Hosts, or with at all events a quasi semi-human despot, it was only naturally demanded by the conscience of the time—or, at least, it must be so now by our own conscience,—that the One Judge of all the earth should be therein thought of as seeing to it of himself, and for himself, that each one of all his worshippers should receive, in his own person, the share of Divine benefits that was due to him in the very fact of his being such. To us it appears palpably necessary that an Autocrat *ought* to do so, in simple justice.—But on the present understanding, that the power of executing justice to individuals is only now become feasible, through its conscious taking up by men themselves,—while this, as a human office, is also necessarily limited in its ability of accomplishment,—the work of justice is relieved from this concern, as of a kind extraneous to it. A defect obviously must be allowed for as prevailing. But the executing of human justice must be pursued, notwithstanding, without view to the defect's existence. The defect must be supplied—in so far as it

may be supplied,—by a direct call on affective impulse.

Is the idea of *Benevolence*, as commonly understood, to be held then as competent to yield an adequate supplement to that of *Justice*?—I think not. I think that here, as much as there, a wide rectifying of apprehension is called for, but two together can avail as the case requires.

Under the head of *Justice*, whether secular or Christian, the idea of "good to others" which has been contained in only such as has preceded from the "brotherhood" of one being over another, treated with resistance. Mastership being admitted, the only lightening of the evil of it has been regarded as its ameliorating on the one hand by mercifulness and on the other by submissiveness. And the result of this has been that benevolence, in chief part, has been identified with almsgiving. Such interpreting as this is however intolerable under a reigning notion of *Fraternity*. We have therefore now perforce to produce for ourselves a new conception of benevolence altogether: a conception that shall assort naturally, in its affective aspect, with true brotherly equality.

And the new kind of conception required lies already formed in what is now suggested in regard to justice. If the executing of justice is understood as committed wholly to human hands, so also must all effort towards human happiness be directed mainly towards that equitable distribution of good which man's instinct assures him to be in demand. The one and only certain kind of good which must be the aim of benevolence is to bring about, in proportion to possessed means, a just sharing of general happiness among mankind. Nor is there

wanting in human nature that which duly should call up, in the affective consciousness of each separate individual, even the abstract sort of impulse thus required. The man of "just" feeling is inevitably made aware by his own conscience and power of sympathy of the claim on him to act in remedy of whatever undeserved suffering occurs in reach of him. He suffers actually in his own person with the alien suffering. It is to him both a bounden duty and an egoistic impulse to exert compassionateness not in feeling only but also in deeds. Nor can he think of this as being "merit" in the olden sense. So enlarged must become henceforth the notion of religious obligation!—He must even do more than justice, in particular cases, to keep to his own character of justice.

Such impulse of conscience would be wholly different from that implied in the command to "sell all, and give all to the poor"; repeated in modern times in so many utopian ways. It would act not as violent enthusiasm, but as a steady principle. It would also mean nothing which should make the poor seem to themselves entitled to be in personal charge to others, beyond the admitted boundary of justice. That is, the effect of this mode of beneficence would tell chiefly on the raising up of general institutions, available alone on self-effort of those benefited. And there would largely be removed the present feeling of degradation that weighs on the recipient of beneficence.

No danger would thus arise of the extinction of the wholesome feeling of gratitude to benefactors. The very matter of justice being always, as it is, incapable of full accomplishment, and dependent on the apparent "accident" of personal inclination, leaves room for, and in fact renders necessary, those mutually-respondent sentiments between donor and receiver which make beautiful

variety in our world of feeling. How impoverished would be the tone of social intercourse if possibly it could happen that full justice would inevitably be done, in each and every case!—Still, the present truth remains that an immense mass of petty misery now exists in this special department of social life, whose alleviating is an urgent duty. Not a few is the lying under personal through circumstances, an incubus of al slavery.—It may be, and it most c as, that the benefactor means one who physical help, or such as depends on in h or rank: but let it happen at the far from being unusual, that the dono. in what is really an

incomparably higher kind of moral currency, and an injury is inflicted that is as galling on the one hand as unsuspected on the other. The poor are expected often to repay worldly coin by the most precious of moral jewellery: by true affections and lifelong habits of devotion—besides a practice of unremitting subserviency. The rich give what costs them little or nothing: they expect to be repaid in heart-blood.—No doubt, mostly what is yielded is hypocrisy and flattery, by a transaction alike ruinous to both; but any lessening of liability to such dealing must be welcome.

And as to prestige of birth, always fretting to inferiors in social rank, as unjustly taking precedence over real merit, an effective alleviation is now, as we know, ever silently working. Namely, that which shall throw the value of ancestry mainly, for the future, on the healthy constitution of mind and body which indeed is far from attending constantly on worldly rank.

But this kind of renovation is not complete till it falls

on the usage of another term, in close but still unsettled alliance with those of Justice and Beneficence. That is, the term of *Charity*, which long has shared the meaning of almsgiving, but which, as I desire to think of it, may better stand as alone a qualifier of Justice.

It has been constantly recognized that the strictness of Justice needs tempering; and the rightful temperer has been accounted as *Mercy*. It appears truly that a reliance upon Mercy in those amenable to the law of Justice long preceded any reliance on the latter, as a security to always-possibly erring creatures. Mercy, as counterpart to Justice, belonged naturally in idea to the admission of sole Deity as the Judge who weighs human deserts. It supposes inherently the position of an Autocrat Despot; and it has descended for ourselves into a human prerogative only as part of the sharing of human sovereigns in the *divine* character of kingship. It is an appurtenance of the right of kings that they may pardon offenders whom Justice has condemned. And if the sphere of Mercy spreads occasionally lower in the social scale, into private hands, still the assumption is made that he who exercises it is in this respect an absolute superior over its subject.—Such mode of implication can however have no place under idea of Brotherhood. Another kind of temperer of Justice must be introduced. And the idea of *Charity*—if we allot to it the best meaning which also is indeed now happily become the commonest,—seems abundantly well fitted to supply the need. That is, if we understand by it, the practice of putting always the best construction on others' failings.

If we set ourselves in modern times to fill up the inclusive Hebrew requirement,—of doing justly, and loving mercy, and walking humbly with our God,—is it not

closely evident that a veil of symbol must fall equally on every phrase?

To put this interpretation on the word "Charity" is in fact to cause it to express most aptly and thoroughly what needs to be expressed as the practical effect of human Sympathy. What egoship on our own account does for us, as a latent fund of complacency, is to make the best of ourselves that a faithful intro-jection of : to enable us to keep out of sight of : necessary, the evil elements in our moral nature. It is not an egoistic Sympathy that does the same for others. And is it doubtful what we do with this—this occasional harmless magnanimity, and of others on a par with ourselves! The temporary complacency thus engendered no more than mildly softens the asperity that would otherwise encase our egoship:—seeing that the effect would be ever under a salutary check. For to social comrades the maintaining of a rule of strict Justice is pre-eminently the point of self-interest in demand. If self-indulgence as to crimes should exceed fair limits, such a thing as inflicted punishment would soon end, even as an agency of deterrence. Crimes, in fact, would be speedily ignored as such :—with what imminent effect of peril we can scarcely imagine. Here, however, intervenes for consideration an important element of retribution, of the kind needful to prevail in future, which seems a part of the entire change now in prospect.

If Justice be kept strictly to its own work of carrying out conventionalized law, the only office left for Mercy to accomplish is to induce a favourable construction on dubious evidence of guilt; and besides this, to fill up "charitably" existing gaps in legal forms. Mercy must

not mean any longer a *pardoning* of offences, accounted such.* *Pardon* for transgressions is as much forbidden as is personal *revenge* against offenders. Enlightened Sympathy cannot minister towards either; and the law of nature in itself is both entirely un-forgiving and un-revengeful. It is also clearly a thing of general advantage to self-interest of every sort that Justice should be above tampering with: forming, as it does, the principal of all the benefits of aggregation to mankind.

But the best formulated scheme of human Justice can penetrate little way into the ground of transgression. It can never deal with more than overt conduct. It cannot hold in check the secret kinds of fraud and of theft which belong to all untruthfulness either of word or of suggestion; it cannot maintain guard against the moral form of murder which is present in all slander and detraction, such as even is too prudent to commit itself to an aspect that is detectible. To kill or to maim a neighbour's character is an offence that may be perpetrated in defiance of legal justice. And yet it actually destroys a larger portion of the happiness of individuals, taken in sum, than does the open mode of crime. It produces a gnawing misery that saps the life-principle

* The word "*mercy*" would seem to have had a curious history, embodied in different languages. If we endeavour to trace it back through the strangely-divergent terms of *merci* in French and *merces* in Latin and all the implicated offshoots of the latter expressing *reward* and *traffic*, I imagine that we must come to a primal import little consonant with modern feeling. That is, we must find ourselves in face with the barbarous fact that all pardoning of offences, or remitting of decreed punishment (considered as of right that of death or slavery), was accounted as a rightful matter of purchase or bargaining. *Mercy* was the remission of payment due to be made either in blood or in service; and in this way became naturally, for the object of it, a something to be thanked for:—the permitted redeeming or buying back of himself, which was, in light of the permission, an act of grace in the irresponsible master.

of all society.—What remedy, shall we say, is at hand for it? Under orthodoxy the resource was immediate, to the justice that should be done, by God's own hand, at the final tribunal of Judgment. Is there now a fitting substitute before us?

Surely, yes :—and a substitute that admits of a closer accuracy of application than the former. It may be attributed as discernible in the other world, but needs not be taken on trust, but may be applied to the world as it is. A righteous judgment of the frequencies underlying human conduct may be effected, separating what is possible from such as stands due but to here on: the which distinction, however easily we may apply to Divine Omniscience to

effect, cannot even be conceived of by ourselves. We have no right to deny that such distinction is possible, but we have no means of even imagining it realized. But if in place of an ultramundane "Day of Judgment," we think only of the constant exercise of judgment by human beings on the actions of one another, we see an agency of retribution at once intelligible and at hand, which has every sign of being adapted to the requirement. There is now set out of question a full probing of the secret sources of error : the affair is only of such occurring transgressions as touch immediate experience. And the verdict that may be given carries nothing of any penalty that can be defined, but is as vague as the charged offences : namely, as that which concerns general "character." The penalty alone liable is that which, in the nature of it, may adapt itself—under always the guidance of Providence,—to any mode of moral circumstance.

To sit in judgment on the character of fellow-beings is indeed replete with peril, and not only to the person judged but to the person also who judges, except for the

two conditions that still attend on the acting justly. The present way of "loving mercy," through the means of moral Charity, based on genuine Sympathy, is a safe preservative from the human rashness and ill-will which are the general occasion of that which may turn out to be injustice. And the final reference as to penalty to Divine Providence, working gradually and unceasingly through the whole course of events, which belongs essentially to the scheme of morals now in view, is in accurate response to the old beautiful idea of "walking humbly with God."

The injunction laid on Christians to "judge not, that they be not judged," scarcely approves itself to our modern sense of duty. It belonged to that reign of moral terror which pointed to a hell of future torment; while in the happier view of natural ordination, each one of us, rightly minded, can only desire judgment to be passed on us, as the proper means of all moral redemption, hoped for by us. Judgment that is attributable to Divine agency we have only to submit to, and endeavour to improve under; and judgment of the lower sort, in the hands of men, we must also be the better for, if only in the effort to parry it, so long as this be in a lawful fashion.

The real evil that attends on forming personal opinion on characters of those who come in contact with us, lies only in fact with the matter of the irresponsibleness that is wont to be assumed, and to be permitted, in the self-appointed judge. But this is obviated on present terms. The very fact of every person's coming henceforth to know himself the appointed minister of God in regard to justice, involves absence of any aim at concealment: it involves a direct repudiation of any avoidance of that expression of opinion in which must lie henceforth the virtue of this exerting of the human conscience. The

only dangerous defamation is that guarded by secrecy.

It has been the orthodox practice to refer those who have been wronged, and cut short of their rightful share in worldly honour and worldly good, to God alone as their proper defender. "Only wait, and He himself will set every thing right."—But this reference has now become little more than a subterfuge: an excuse for the moral meanest kind of cowardice in existence, and a means of relieving the oppressor of the weak. The innocent, by leaving all accounts of right and wrong to be finally settled at the divine tribunal, has served only to promote the selfish quietude of those who might otherwise have been ashamed of withholding succour.

And let it not be forgotten—may it not fail for the future to be well understood—that any omitting of expressed blame on wrong-doing is itself a new defrauding of the virtuous. We can never shield the guilty from punishment without inflicting injury on the innocent. We cannot do more than justice to one without doing less than justice to another, or to others generally. And yet farther, we cannot help a criminal to maintain the aspect of a good character, without a slur on all the characters of those who are connected with him.

To receive a benefaction is always more or less of a humiliation. A true sympathy ought to cause us to feel, whenever we desire to bestow gifts, "should I like for my own part to be thus burdened with the inevitable sense of obligation?" And to be made the object of another person's self-sacrifice is above all unendurable, and even insulting, on the plan of making others' case our own. Would we wish for ourselves, we have to ask, to be thus forced, without our knowledge, to become the wrongers of those who choose to suffer for us?—The

true feeling to be maintained between man and man, as the necessary condition of all real brotherhood, is the feeling of *Respect*: never to be infringed without fatal injury.—But there is nothing of infringement of *Respect*, there is nothing of inflicted humiliation, in the having done to us what we feel to be *Justice*! In this is the kind of doing good which indeed is blessed alike to the recipient and the donor.

A mutual *Respect* between each and all of human beings is the final desiderandum for social life, the want of which can in no way be atoned for. Hence, to keep up this feeling is indeed the matter of common interest which may well serve to bind all together.

Still, I acknowledge that in this newly-turned notion of Retribution there is that which for a long time to come religious feeling may be unable to adapt itself to.—Mr. Mill has somewhere said that of all sources of general sympathy this at least can never fail, that “we all of us have to die”;—and thoroughly has it been here admitted that this common consciousness has formed, for one and all of mankind, the exciting cause of all religion and virtue. But religion up till now has added-on the sequent reflection—“and after death follows judgment.”—How else can it be then for ourselves, to whom has risen on this head such demur as piety itself forbids our slighting, than that long we should feel a void, in our habit of religious anticipation, which no afforded substitute for old ideas can immediately fill up? I admit fully that no reasoning on what are nature’s own suggestions, barely such, can at all supply the absence of that definite assurance the proclaiming of which has been hitherto religion’s stronghold; and which has soothed so many hearts, aching in secret anguish over wrongs,

with the sure trust of their being one day righted. The want of such a certified proclamation calls truly for a stronger measure of faith on our parts in Divine Providence than has ever yet become common among us. It is hard to feel, as so many an one feels, and may henceforth still more be obliged to feel, "it will never come to light and others, have been treated." It is as *need* of Retribution, we might almost say, more than the desire of re-union, first believe in a Future Life. And the need, though it may be softened, can never abate, and can only be submitted to.


Much however bears concern with the phase of affective life that has finally to be here considered. It is only under view that includes specially the mode of Parenthood with the other two modes of relationism that the matter of Retribution can be fairly dealt with.

The ground of Parenthood is that where pre-eminently religion's influence is dominant;—while in the matter of Fraternity I have been assuming that it is at its least. And yet it now occurs to me,—as I desire to state, before closing the present chapter,—there may arise out of the preceding moral re-arrangement, if I suffer myself to rely on it, a line of thought that I can only take as an important strengthener to my entire view of religion's nature.—I have here been aiming expressly at a worldly view of morality, relatively to its subjection to religious influence: but in doing this I believe to have obtained

a special aid to a renewed philosophy of religion. That is, in the mode of a "new species" of religious teleology: a "new species" which, as such, follows strictly the evolutionary demand of consecutiveness to precedent ordination.

By the foregoing I have come to see that in all secular morality the leading principle is that of Justice: while the idea of Justice, as I recognize, is wholly animated by the sense of Law. And this rationally accounts for the sole action of man himself being concerned: seeing that Law is manifestly a thing entirely of man's own intellectual devising. But this aptly falls in with the opposite conception here allotted to the characterizing function of religion, the endowing us with the human sentiment of Love, essentially of nature's own sole producing: whence the partition of morality into secular and religious imports simply, that all the virtues of life-social depend on Law, and all virtues of life-domestic spring from Love.—And it has so happened, in the disposition of events, that the formation of this partition in morality has coincided with the breaking up of the heretofore formation of theology: herein testifying to the true procedure of moral cognizance out of over-past doctrinism.—Now this may be interpreted as but a spiritual repetition of the attaining of the power of physical vision: as to which the un-seeing orbs of lower creatures had to arrive at last at the sensitiveness of a proper retina only by straining existent capabilities. The human mind at the beginning had assumably no moral sense at all: it knew nothing whatever about "right or wrong." But when it had accomplished a long series of hypothetical efforts, through projection of a magnified phantasm to experiment on,—an exaggerated Man, improving as its projector improved,—it was but natural that a mental crisis should

come to pass, which should truly represent at one stroke both the effect of a clarifying of moral notions, disentangled by self-strivings out of the primitive confusion of their unassorted elements, and the re-action thence made possible to the creative impulse engaged of turning back to effect inwardly a stable organizing of mental powers: which by the time it was effected, must suffer the phantom's dispelling.— Say then that the end result was in itself the very object of the design, and all difficulty of philosophic understanding state of old religion is disposed, eminently, retains as a religious form of a veritable Divine Origin. It stands as a central part of an universal Plan. It may still be interpreted, in anthropomorphic truth, as the issue of Divine inspiration: the only change being the specific one of the understanding that the inspiration concerned was that which impelled men to be themselves the inventors of Christianity. God, in these later times, is revealed as creating mental worlds by alone the mediate agency of his ideal Son, the multitudinous constituency of modern Christhood.



CHAPTER III.

THE EFFECT OF PRESENT RELIGION IN AFFORDING MORAL PRINCIPLE IN REGARD TO PARENTHOOD.

SECTION I. THE DISTINCTIVE RELIGIOUSNESS OF THE PARENTAL-FILIAL RELATION.

THE peculiar religiousness of the frame of feeling that is associated with Parenthood, as compared with that which belongs to other emotive states, appears to me to be a point that ought henceforth to be admitted as self-evident; so thoroughly does it seem supported by the whole course of religion's progress up till now.

In regard to Sexhood and Fraternity the view we have to take of mankind is alone concerned with the level status of co-existent fellow-beings. These appear as alone consisting of those who live side by side, now loving and now repelling one another, ever kuit in mutual struggle that fills up the entire field of present consciousness. Each personal unit of the entire mass of human integers is laden with the private burden of its own destiny, such as weighs on the present moment. The sphere of the encircling Now is all-in-all; while Past and Future retreat dimly on either hand. The wife or husband needs be gained by immediate intent; the friend must be selected

out of the number of the indifferent by express effort of discernment. All agency of the human subject needs be voluntary. And such posture of human faculty is inherently more alien than akin to the frame of religiousness. Religion must subdue, before it can take part in, such mode of mental habitude.—But quite different is the case in parenthood. Here the matter of Before and After is that which reigns supreme. Immediate power of concerned facts, immediate power of circumstance, are at their minimum. The sphere of religiousness is hence thrown open.

The failure of this point which indeed still prevails, a distinctive feature in modern thought, I believe due to the very want of such sufficing historic survey as alone evolutionism is competent to. Still the failure in itself has brought a consequence which seems to be decisive against it: namely, in betokening absence of a settled principle of relationism such as that I have just been arguing for on the part of Fraternity. Through a defect in the proper type of Fraternity appears to have risen that assumption of the real attribute of Parenthood which has lain at root of the great mass of social evils; and the only cure for such mischief must lie with a defined understanding of each separate department of our affective nature. I have believed to prove that the modern effort to endue Fraternity with the character of Religion is a degradation in both ways: a delusive straining of the idea of Brotherhood, and a drawing away from Religion its true value and dignity. To rightly difference the two spheres is to furnish the only basis to proceed on, in philosophic morality.—Nor do I think it difficult to apprehend that a something of the same evil is at work, and perhaps unusually so

regard to the third element of Sexhood: the element which is here, as ever, of deeper though later-manifested concern than either of the two others. This third side to the matter seems in fact to be as requisite of consideration as the other two in any attempting at the needful differentiation.

Just as Positivism has wronged Religion, as I believe, by presenting it under the aspect of "Altruism," so a parallel distortion appears at work in the effort that is gaining ground to merge religious sentiment in *Æstheticism*. And *Æstheticism* is surely rooted in specifically the mode of human emotion which springs from Sexhood. We know well that the kind of Love which retains permanently its primal character of being the fruit of Sex-difference is, by its nature, notwithstanding its gross physical beginning, yet ever capable of ascending into the refinement which belongs to mental association: whence in the end it may even rise, under pressure of circumstance, to dispense wholly with the lower mode of attraction, and lose itself in stimulus purely spiritual. But the result out of this, I contend, is in no way such as can stand in stead of Religion. It falls naturally into an abstract love of Beauty; and this, while of inestimable value in its right place, is so far from bearing character of Religion that its actual ranking in religious terms is nothing less than a confounding of proper landmarks: a mixing of two provinces together with confusion as to both.

It is true, indeed, that the love of spiritual or abstract Beauty may amount to a passion, and may thence induce what in loose terms may be called "worship." But the kind of homage paid can of right be never more than a partial and local idolatry. It can have nothing of the integrity of devotion which marks the religious sentiment

of peculiarity as that of all-pervading obligation. To take up with Æstheticism in such light is accordingly an instant lowering of the mental standard set up in us as to Moral Law and its claim on us.

The full type of the course in question is in fact laid before us in the moral history of the people who have taken lead in it. The ancient Grecians have exhibited, for instance, the effect of a procedure out of indulged sensibility, and of an artistic worship of Beauty. They have been the most successful of the world in showing the nobleness of their nature by means of sculpture, and the touch of their life in dramatic verse. But a moral realism is wanting. They are but polytheists, and run widely out of reach of real ethics or religionism.

Let us however take in junction the effect shown upon Art in mediæval times, when its Grecian form had revival under Christian influence, antidoting or rather supplementing its own character, and we see how a true humanism comes in place of the sheer grotesqueness and profaneness which first disfigured it.* The new mythology raised ideals that were high above the idols of earlier Art. They had the genuinely-godlike nature of universalness and beneficialness for man. They were the wholly-spiritual images of Fatherliness and Sonlikeness, with an intervening Conjugalness conceived of us without taint. And thus, when Art came to take them up and deal with

* We have but to call to mind in illustration the Faust legend. It seems to me that the very nobleness imparted to this by Goethe ought of right to rank only as false art. Namely, by the incongruous mixture attempted of mediæval and polytheistic devilry with the humanism that belongs only to the kind of belief in Deity that has repudiated a belief in Satan. This modern version appears to me as an irrelevant anachronism: a magnificent *jeu d'esprit* that as to its subject cries for moral disapprobation, and an uttered protest on behalf of true religionism.

them, in its rightful and characteristic manner of playing around the fading stages of once-genuine beliefs, the result had the double usefulness of at once disposing of worn-out forms, and carrying the spirit of them into common use. The woman-form which represented a feminine side to Deity through the mystic union of her spousehood and maternity, at once rounded and mellowed the ideal of all-encompassing divineness, and transfused an ideal grace into mere ordinary portraiture of individuals, which itself is a moral teaching, and such as possibly could not else have been attained to. The idealism which was spent on Madonnas, as well as that on the divine manhood of the half-suffering and half-triumphant form of Jesus, had indeed a final purpose that vindicated it: just because of its being beauty of mind, as well as person, that was depicted.

This, I argue, was a true and natural disposal of a Christology that was fast hastening to become obsolete; but the same course must in no way be supposed applicable to Christianity's proper essence, as to which is concerned the practice I am referring to. The æsthetic cultus of the ideal forms of Mary and of Jesus, *if* prosecuted as religion, seems to me as deleterious to religion as indeed it is false to real art. It appears to be a spurious perpetuation of what in true prosecution had to be the kernel of Christianity's moral fruitage.

The doctrinism which made the Church the figured Spouse of its Head,—by a wedded union of the New Jerusalem with the sacrificial Lamb of a slightly-spiritualized Hebrewism,—was a new departure of Sex-principle that was in a manner final. It was, from the first, a marked advance on the previous notion, fraught with all the pitilessness of Mosaic law, of God's aggregate people being joined connubially with Godhead supremely such: while

the latter figure had, again, been a high improvement on the coarse fancy of polytheists which painted gods as direct progenitors of human beings without any aggregation being in question, or anything of imagined marriage being concerned, through illicit loves with any beautiful female mortals that chanced to please them. But even the lofty Church as had its own baneful ingredient near related in our own times. The idea of a church-member's being related to his church-in-ma the same way as to his church-in-ma t help following close, has had the two- which is well-known; of, on the one hand, to banish the male believers in it, and on the other, an unwholesome extravagance of erotic sort to the female ones. The thought of Jesus being the "lover of the human soul,"—or, alternatively, of God Himself being the object of spirit-love to a worshipper,—has, it seems to me, been a lowering element from the first, and one that calls still, and perhaps more than ever before, for watchful attention. There seems threatened by it the invasion of a false religionism as low in moral character as it is otherwise adapted to the highest culture. Namely, in the referred-to practice of identifying virtually the love of God with an æsthetic love of spiritual beauty. The Psyche of modern thought is too much one that fancies itself an object of tender interest to its Creator.

And shall it be said that this has followed on the very track that was laid down by St. John!—It must at all events be charged, it seems to me, on the critically-condemned treatment of this evangelist which is now in favour. Whenever the fourth gospel is determinedly set in front of the first, as the expounder of original Christianity, the whole consequence now asserted seems

inevitable.—The whole essence of the teaching of this accredited apostolic writer centres on his one saying that "God is Love." And this phrase, if we judge it by law of symbolism, and not in light of moral verity, stands incontestibly as the highest poetry of religion. The idea expressed by it is at once obvious and transcendental: it is as simple as it is utterly metaphysical. And the more perfectly it is comprehended, the more healthful as well as subtle does it become. But taken literally it awakens surely alone our moral disapprobation. That is, when we enlarge our idea of God as now supposed, into the breadth required by science, as symboling the general government of nature. In this light, assuredly, the evangelist is at fault. For the idea of the God of nature, as such, is incompatible with what is meant in human language by the term of Love.

If, however, we allow duly for the primal stage of Christianity's being in the time of this writer overpassed, and for what appears, through the safer record of Matthew, to have been the import of that first stage, the fervid utterance of the supposed John falls in place, with no danger of misleading us. The actual germ of Christianity is shown by Matthew—as, at least, here interpreted,*—to have been the proclaiming by Jesus of an on-coming reign of heaven upon earth, the aim at the realizing of which by his own effort ended speedily in his own dying upon the cross. Let us then only take to ourselves this idea of Jesus, and imagine it left to work in a strictly natural way, and a course falls clear of a proper mode of its fulfilment, notwithstanding—or rather

* I need scarcely repeat that I am here following the view of the "Origin of Christianity" that was published by my late brother, Charles C. Hennell, now forty-seven years ago.

by the very means of—its apparent crushing at the outset. Not in the way supposed by Jesus, but in the way that is that of God, displayed in His general providence, the kingdom of heaven has been assuredly advancing on mankind. Not as compassed on the spot, which would seem to have been expected by Jesus, but as signalling a line of effect to the first gradual, but a conditionment, as goodness and a specific matter any other special the descent, in

it has answered richly in supporting simply an always reach to the required con- rosaic facts of increased only this, but moreover which more closely than light on earth. That is, accumulated Christian dogmatism on the common ground of an obtained sanctifying of the state of Family.—And, as to the fourth evangelist, his new commandment of Love may be well adjudged of by this thread of interpretation. The death of Jesus, he assures us virtually, was, however due outwardly to Pilate and to Caiaphas, that in which they really had no share:—the matter of a Divine decree quite apart from them, betokening a new revealing of God's Fatherhood over men: over men, as whole mankind, represented in symbol by the personality of a chosen man. It was God's Fatherhood that was at first pointed to in the attributing Him as Love. It was not until Jesus had himself become deified that the Love inspired by him tended to an unbecoming character.

The sanctifying by religion of the ideal of human marriage, which in present view was the kernel-point of Christianity, was the same with turning Love into the direction of Parentalism;—as, on the other hand, it was a providing to human thought, from its first spring in each new-born subject, of the only safe symboling of

Deity. Once the original idea of Jesus, which was accurately a blending as in marriage-union of the life of earth with the life of heaven, had been supplemented by the vivid doctrinism of "John"—showing how the actual character of God was not that of the relentless Lawgiver of Hebrews, but of a Father disposed tenderly to all mankind,—there was furnished for all time the true type for the state of Family, which indeed may in itself be held to satisfy the gospel-promise. How could possibly have come the likeness of a life of heaven upon earth save alone through increased perception of the Divine power of Love? To teach men to believe, as the fourth evangelist did, that Love, and Love alone, was the means of spiritual renovation, was indeed a proclaiming of indefeasible metaphysic truth! And when the active logic of the spreading church went to show—as it did under furtherance of the inspired doctrinism of Paul—that the intrinsic nature of Love demanded, after all, a signified spousal union even with God, whether as Divine Father or Divine Son, the consummation was full prepared for that descent on the safe ground of human life which was alone manifestly its appropriate destination: the affording of the ordination of religious marriage. The imparting of a religious sanctity to Sex-principle was assuredly the only mode of regulation that could ever secure to Love its rightful character.—And can we doubt that the adjusting of such instrument of control was a true sequence to the primal object of Jesus: a true filling up of the mythic data at the foundation of Christianity?—It was an assertion of the proper sacredness attached to Sexhood; and, as such, was a moral cleansing of the human soul that could alone make it fit for the Divine presence.—It was a bestowal at once of, at all events, that "heaven to lie about us in our infancy" which it is

the reverse of mere dreaming to imagine realized in a happy childhood.

Christianity, which first started the idea of a rule of righteousness, divinely embracing the whole earth, has indeed given us means of at least beginning on it in our private homes.

SECTION II.

LEVEL OF THE FILIAL

THE mode of influence now attributed to Christianity accords manifestly with the new importance that has been assigned to Birth, as compared with Death. The latter was supereminent with supernaturalism, but evolutionism, of necessity, reverses the estimation: since the idea of forward progress, which is the essence of evolution, cannot else than carry preference of regard to life budding over life decaying. And the finding of a full bearing in the same direction of the whole doctrinism of Christianity seems to me a result that is invaluable. Namely, as affording consequences of many sorts that are altogether harmonious.

Above all does it follow from the new attention given to Birth that an unprecedented interest should be allotted to the whole range of attendant matters, as much spiritual as physical. These matters are at once included in the one circumstance respecting Birth that the opening life of the new beinghood is sheathed over by the life antecedent. This fact means at once an apparatus for

all affective development and a stimulant to all subjective mentalism. It may well be thought of as the part of the universal plan which has lain the nearest to nature's heart: as secondary to that primal design which gave for the parting out of all beinghood's continuity the one method of generational succession. The continuity was from the first to be preserved by alone the means of links; and the only admitted mode of improvement as to these was the increasing proportion of the protecting sheaths, and the greater flexibleness of their inclining forwards. But in this constant mode of junction, if it be studied, lies accordingly a vast measure of access to divine design. It is a relatively unexplored region every item of knowledge gained from which must immeasurably enhance our sense of nature.

Ever hitherto the continuity of the human race has been taken as but a line of grown men, threaded together at maturity. Infancy and old age, as well as the whole beinghood of women, have been left out of sight as mere adjuncts, of no account. But in these adjuncts is contained actually the working "second causes" which, it may be said, are the rational explainers of the very process of evolution in general. The very points of Birth and Death, it is true, remain hidden from examination: lying, as they do, in the utmost depth of their sheathed recesses. Birth and Death stand accordingly, as ever, in simply the direct hands of Deity. But for each there is adjoining conditionment which needs but increased study for its revealing.

The very recognizing of the importance attached to the point of juncture of the sheaths in question is the producing of that Tree-image of growth which is the standing sign of evolutionism. It asserts at once that it is the outlying parts of organic structure that begin creation,

and ever after drive it inward.—It is the Leaf that from itself is now known to produce the Tree, stock and roots and all beside.—Let us then, instead of Leaf, speak of Motion. Instead of Tree-stock, let us think of abstract Circumstance : or, in other words, of the general Struggle for existence. Is it not, I would ask, a safe theory to assert that the **Leaf**, as such, is but the product of all part **Leaf** carried on wherever beings are once formed **Leaf** more dispersedly as new functions, vary **Leaf** g, are added to the first uniform organ **Leaf** apply this same theory, as it is needf **Leaf** al growth, we have this similar result : **Leaf** in whole, must be again but the produc **Leaf** ying processes in speculation : ever varying and conflicting as these also are, according to mental temperament, either as outwardly or inwardly affected. And thus, it would appear, is indeed accounted for that very sense of Time, taken abstractly, which as such is the root-notion of evolution. The mode of mental struggle which arises from human Sexhood and Fraternity must have tended ever to the simpler widening out of Space, as a mental product ; but so also must the struggle between the generator and the generated have imparted to thought the lengthway stretch which has compassed the more difficult idea of Time, composite as this is of innumerable repetitions of ideas of Space. The idea of Time, for any practical purpose, must be apportioned from the first either as meant for Future, or else Past, or else Present. It is impossible to think of Time in the lump ; as we may, in some degree, think of Space. If however this be admitted, there is reason shown availably for the primal falsity that was displayed in all religionism, consequentially on the battle waged ever between the two egoisms concerned in the matter of generation ;

and reason also for the corrective agency that religion's growth of itself brought to bear on that battle.

It is this mingling of widely-parted considerations which has formed my clue in the present work to my attempted search into religion's nature. From the outset my guiding thread of interpretation has been the tracing of the inherent correctiveness in religion to rectify the enforced consequences of the existing manner of generational succession. In my First Part I confined my view to the effect of the original reigning falsity that remained as long as Christianity remained: claiming it as a natural fact that a distorted sense of Time, as to the respective values of Time Past and Time Future must necessarily have had its course in the furnishing of that idea of a primal "Fall" which demanded Christianity for its cancelling, and the full endurance of Christianity for the cancelling's accomplishment. I laid it down as what might stand for an all-inclusive "transcendental distinction" that a preferential regard to Time Past, however rightful for Science, as the due object of Investigation, is unlawful for Religion, which has to act by Aspiration:—the former searching rightfully for *causes*, while the latter is concerned chiefly with *consequences*, and with such as, being moral ones, are of greater need than any other to be held important. To face rightly moral consequences set forth by Religion is, as I have urged, the authentic sign of that possession of a "sound mind" which implies ever the religious desiderandum of an "erect bearing and mental eyes set in front to look always straight-forward in the line of advance, escaping the coward tendency to look perpetually behind." (I. 135; 140-2.) But Science is at its best in turning back, and has its actual highest courage in facing without flinching evolutionary beginnings.—In the first instance, however, neither the

one nor the other saw its course. And perhaps to both, but manifestly to Religion, a reversal in speculation's whole method was a necessity.—Christianity did much in this way when it placed the "Golden Age" which not only Hebrewism, but in one or another form every mode of religionism began with, firmly and for ever in its true direction of

Christianity did not and could not do doctrinism with expound the induce finally feeling between

Christianizing the involved doctrinism with evolutionism to of generation. That is, to consciousness into the mutual t.

The standard of all religionism I am here identifying with a regarding God in the light of a Father, common to all mankind: the which aspect of Deity I conceive necessitated by the parental sheathing of infant life. I repeat, then, on this culminating point what I have adjudged in every previous case, as to the realizing of moral truth being ever signalled by its becoming to us the subject of consciousness. I have said as to Christianity that the manifesting of its true natural import is expressible as Christianity rendered conscious of itself—which is the anthropomorphic for our becoming conscious in regard to it. And it is but the same idea I now apply to the whole mass of progressed religionism. For I am truly uniting in idea that growth of common mentalism in each one of us which palpably results in varied manners of consciousness,—all tending to the general progress of self-consciousness,—and the growth of mankind's whole religionism.—Let us only be duly conscious, as I think we now may, of the intrinsic oneness of the two processes, the particular and the general, and the religionism of nature may be adjudged to have established itself.

The opening sentiment of every infant towards the parent that overwraps its own beinghood, must necessarily, I conceive, go through a sort of parallel to the very course that is shown by history to have been that of religion : that is, the sort of parallel which includes the fact of an ever-rising level for each child to begin upon, as effect of a continuously-enhanced store of inherited intuition, or a general rise in the development of filial sentiment. Each parent and each child—each child turning ever into a new parent,—who between them form the substance of all human continuity, have all along had to look on one another in no other than the sole light that religion has produced for them ; and the two developments have worked together, alternately as acting cause and produced effect. The idea of an Abstract Father—being, as it is, the true essence of all religion,—has been all along the moral teaching of both the generator and the generated. In proportion as it has revealed itself, and only thus, has been made perceptible to mental babyhood, and onwards, the right attitude towards the beinghood that has laid the mould for the child's own ; and on the other hand, only thus have parents learned the divineness of the moulding office.

If we force ourselves to enter into the mental state of infancy, I think we must acknowledge that no instinct to be called " filial " is born with it. This is left to be as if first-created in it. Love, other than of the primitive sort, depends wholly on sympathy ; and sympathy between infant and adult is impossible. Sympathy, on at all events the infant's part, has need to be produced as-it-were artificially. Is it strange then to suppose that the kind of artificial aid that was here actually employed was religious imagery?—The inherent conflict between parent and offspring is too unequal to allow of any ordinary rise of

sympathy the infant is too wholly at disadvantage, in a mental light. It is only when the case is judged religiously, as regarding the general race, that the struggle becomes equitably arrangeable. The struggling selfhood of the growing child is most in favour with nature, as acting out the plan of advance; the struggling selfhood of the declining is in favour with the unobtrusive backing of material circumstances. The conflict of the two aims can be only that which the child's feeling towards its parent will be the result of the imaging of fatherhood into religious abstraction.

So long as the child's relation to its parent is a mere animal one, the child's obedience is a mere obedience. Parents are, at least the most pleasant part of outlying circumstance. And a merely pleasant environment is not that which should excite active intelligence, or the affection going beyond self which is sympathy. The fact of the case imports—we must well note,—that the only road to the child's sympathizing with its parent is, alternatively, by its imaging to itself the parent as a child, or by its imaging of itself as become a parent. And though either of these is dimly possible, yet it is so alone as fruit of undesirable precocity. The natural course of the affective growth is that which should follow on the companionship in domestic offices which life of family expressly promotes. The child that works together with its parent, in whatever inferior degree, at objects of common interest learns amply to appreciate the difference in their respective capabilities; and this in a way that directly causes sympathy, where sympathy is possible—though scarcely in the mode of filial sentiment. Companionship of itself implies fraternity. And if the case should be such as that the intimacy engaged in should but show to the child inferiority of any kind in its parent,

the result would be even more aloof from filiood. As the best and truly beautiful alternative, the child might see its parent bowed by physical infirmity while striving beyond his strength to do his duty by his family or by mankind, and hence might learn truly to pity him with mingled gratitude and admiration. And on the other hand it might happen disastrously that the child should see unworthiness revealed that would cause hatred and contempt. The problem is always open to be anyway resolved, according to conditionment. And thus is manifested conclusively the need of a full affective differentiation.

The parentage which affects the child is indeed twofold: and to such extent that it would seem to be even natural that that of the father should at the beginning excite rather animosity than adhesion. Even at the present day, with all inherited preparedness for filial feeling, the infant rather turns itself away from the father than seeks him. And may it not be believed that here is the occasion for all the long effort of idealism which has centered itself on the ennobling and rendering amiable of the type of fatherhood?—Let the following serve to hint at the mental process this supposes.

The beginning point of the development of the world's religionism is here laid at not earlier than Hebrewism: since anterior to proper tribal institutions no rudiment of domestic life was begun upon such as rightfully depended on acknowledged fatherhood. Before Hebrewism the father's place in the family was entirely undefined. Hence the state of gross fetishism—or, it may be, even the state of that multiplied polytheism which was the same with essential irreligiosity,—which alone prevailed, must be assumed the parallel to the state of human infancy where reason has scarcely dawned on the subject's

consciousness. With the first opening of the rational capacity, and not antecedently to this, I imagine, did the spiritual apprehension of fatherhood begin for the children of both sorts, ideally or realistically such. And the formation of the tribal state, taking the lead over the formation of the family, was itself, as I conceive, thus the actual cause of that spiritual apprehension, and therein of the proper filial sentiment. This sentiment, when once maintained, was at first largely imbued with the notion of this wholly agrees with the now-supposed filial piety on the child's part, and moreover with the terror that afflicted savages. The kinship was reflectedly suspended over Hebrews, and of quite higher kind, than that which gave a shudder to the crouching worshippers of dead ancestors ; and it was also entirely nobler and more humanizing than that facing of the iron rule of destiny which was the only redeeming strength to lax polytheism. The Hebrew's prostration before his Divine despot was the same with a conscious bowing to a Moral Law : and it was thus the sort of fear that had the right to endure without frustration. It was the rudiment of the rightful awe that needs permanently be kept alive, in the first place towards Deity, and thence in a lower and an affectively-softened form towards the human father.

The patriarchal first step to proper Hebrewism afforded, as we know, but an undesirable domesticity. It was the scene of jealousies and contentions which made welcome a settled absoluteness in an accepted State-father : answering well to the moral consequences of heathen polytheism which indeed Hebrewism itself was slow in escaping from. And here opens instructively the parallel with modern infancy. We see, among ourselves, how in

children for whom culture has done little towards affording the companionship just spoken of, the only personal feeling towards the father that exhibits itself is the rude one of boasting of him, to others accused of less advantage. To be able to say with impunity to fellow-children, "my father excels yours in wealth or in position," or, it may be, "in cleverness or wisdom, or in bodily strength," is a conviction to the child's self of his own holding, as it were, a possession in his father, as such; and this intrinsically is a true ingredient of filial sentiment, however coarsely displayed at the outset. The only rectifying required in it is the attaching of the filial boast—or rather the latent pride, *without* boast,—more and more to what are qualities truly admirable. But turning hence to the Hebrews, *them* too we find making it their boast, of speciality, that their Jehovah stood as greatest among the gods, surpassing every other tribal or patriarchal deity. They had personally their satisfaction in this boast: and accordingly it was a feeling that was genuine, and such as also was allied genuinely with what formed their religion. Farther than this Hebrewism that was characteristically such had no means of going: since it was out of reach to its believers to imagine of such thing as a Parent that was Sovereign universal. The idea of such a Parent would have been an anachronism. The God of Hebrews, as such, could be only limited to that people. And hence manifestly there lay between theism of this sort, first capable of any rightful moral influence, and the ultimate theistic desiderandum, the enforced moral demand of Christianity.

Christianity, when regarded with this moral end in view, cannot otherwise than appear intermediate. It becomes palpably but the intervention that alike was indispensable and un-calculated to endure. I mean, on

account of its proper object having been the alien one of the promoting of fraternity : whence, in view of paternity, it was as if a digression from linear progress, however providentially assistant.—The Hebrew's boast in his own God, who was *not* at the same time the God equally of others, required the putting down it received in the doctrine of a common Father. But this doctrine was on its own part seeing that human beings, practically, are of general character,—and the charity of general character,—and the charity toning down : while here exactly appearing in regard to the development of filial sentimentally condemnable, to the extent of calculation. Namely, in respect of its interaction. Namely, in respect of its good less than rightfully the object of filial reverence.

It is the merit of Christianity to have first-produced the true notion of a Divine Father, through precisely its revealing of a Divine Son ; and this by the duly-recognized mediation of at least a partially divine Mother. But then the involved mythology for the bringing out of this effect had in it, of necessity, to draw forth in the believer's mind an undue familiarity with the subject : a familiarity so misplaced as to diminish awe in regard generally to religious matters. The myth of the Incarnation of Deity implies, on Christian terms, a supposed power of access to the *motives* acting on God, in the devising of this plan of salvation ; while to modern thought the supposal of such ability in poor limited human beings is a mere impertinence. It is a fancy as presumptuous as illegitimate. It stirs an echo of the solemn warning raised aforetime, "ye have thought of me but as one of yourselves."—The dogma's influence has accordingly in great part run counter to filial sentiment in common form. All the members of Christian families together were at the first levelled

down by it into mere brotherhood. Men and women, awaiting only the "second coming," ceased to care for having children; children were made to think of parents as but accomplices with Adam in bringing progeny charged with sin into Satan's kingdom. It was Christ, and Christ alone, who was looked to as making all alive.

Now I imagine that both these two relative defects—the Hebrew over-boasting in native advantages, and the Christian under-valuing of the prestige of paternity,—have at once answered to corresponding individual defects, and have worked correctively upon these. To the child in a state parallel to Hebrewism, to whom "father" is another name for an absolute despot, either cruel or beneficent, it has been morally helpful to be assured that the tyrant over himself had a much greater tyrant above him, and one who would care as much, in due time, for himself as his father. And still more to the child—or rather to the growing youth,—whose state has its parallel in that of early Christians, is the kind of theism attained a moral boon, in respect of its very power of establishing an independence of paternity that may wear the colour of either absolute disrespect or of undue familiarity. Here, in fact, we are not left to mere conjecture, as in the previous case of Hebrewism: since in regard to Christianity two things to the point form overt history:—the first, that the moral virtue demanded by it at beginning was specially the unreal one of ascetic celibacy; and, secondly, the attendant fact that for celibacy's sake, children, when moved to it, were expressly encouraged to disobey parents.

Christianity appears to have done little as to ameliorating the common life of children, through softening of the common tone of parentalism. Children of Christian parents remained long in the state of utter bondage that would appear, from the little to be learned from history,

to have been carried onward from the præ-moral habit of barbarism. We have scarcely any glimpse into the actual filial posture of minors even among nations where a formal legalism was established for adults, as among all that had adopted Christianity. We see that minors were expected to be obedient; but whether much, or whether any, were to render their subjection voluntary, we do not know. At the point where filial duty and filial piety came in question, the alternative was not given to them in their own minds. e. Mediæval children had no choice given to them in their selection of partners; but this they were to do, whether or not they would be married at all. The alternative afforded by ecclesiasticism of their accepting a spousehood spiritual instead of human. I cannot help imagining, in trying to realize this state, that for girls especially, who must have learned something of the brutal tyranny of common husbands of those days, it was a genuine vocation that wrought in them frequently a desire to live for Christ in a cloister,—or for the mere sake, as it might be, of but the herding together with fellow-maidens, in security from the worldly miseries of ordinary conjugality.—If then for this limited share of option alone, granted equally to females and males, the afforded opening towards moral independency must be credited to Christianity as an assured benefit, to go against what may otherwise appear doubtful.

The Puritanic movement in our own country would thus appear to have been precisely a providential re-action against monasticism, for the very end of reviving adequately for a time the stern notion of Paternity marking Hebrewism. Namely, until Christian mythology should become ripe for the full dissolution which had to await

the clear perception that was called for as to the real character of mythology : its sole purpose of conveying to mankind no other than strictly human knowledge, as expressing nothing but the unfolding, by a new stage, of man's capacity for knowledge. The complementing of monasticism by puritanism amounted, I would say, to such cancelling of one excess by another, in regard to the very point of paternity, as led rightfully to the "final purpose" of religionism in showing true paternity in the abstract:—which was the same, in reality, with the awaking of human reason to the conscious fact that not God, but our own notion of God, is alone the matter of all religious revelation.

When the Hebrew form of theism had been duly enriched, but not harmfully over-charged, by the Christian form, the time was naturally come for an inclusive kind of theism that should give to all relationism its assortment. The whole mission of Christianity was a breaking down of barriers, grown cumbersome and obstructive of right development; and when actually "Jew" and "Gentile" were abolished by it as religious terms, religion gained to itself a firm lateral support which, if only such, was yet secure of never failing it:—for the new moral sense of brotherhood, thus created, gave to the idea of God's paternity, through the very fact of the universalness now asserted of the relation, a natural indefeasibility. But the true assorting of this conception lay beyond the tether of Christianity. The mythology of Christianity must have even temporarily delayed the consummation portended: for the very reason that the kind of conduct and of motives there obliged to be attributed to Deity, in character of Father, were impossible of imitation, and even of admiration, to ripely-mentalized human beings. They showed God, it must now be felt, in a light that

rather than superhuman was inhuman. And thus precisely was made necessary the full religionism we have now in prospect, made attainable by the very means of the fulfilled office of Christianity, as aided by general mental advance. The fruit of enlightened culture is that ever of diffused sympathy. And this, acting in the domestic sphere, dogmatism has induced it to act, is the ground prepared for the bringing of every mode of religionism to its rightfully religious character :—by leading to closer union the sex-divided heads of the family, and in specifically raising children to parents to share together in a common life, which either are hence truly in a manner fraternal only with a most wholesome effect. No distinctiveness of relations need be submerged, nor the proper efficacy of the family be destroyed. The whole relationism of domesticity is brought out, as first drawn into a conscious fulfilment.

The repetition of this general process on individuals is only different in the being softened as well as localized. The child of to-day passes on through its fetishism and its Hebrewism with the afforded help of all by-gone experience of the religious world. It is the heir of all past ages in this, as in all other respects. And when it comes to take up its Christianity, it has indeed its particular advantage. It has now, we must remember, been turned into the grown youth who, if not yet become a man and ceased entirely, as Paul supposed, to think at all as a child, has gained the consciousness of being destined for manhood—or, let us say rather, for parenthood. It is now mentally of age, and aware of its coming-on maturity. The child is now a parent in possibility. And this imports that there has come to it an opening of real sympathy with its actual parent : which sympathy,

while real, is however of such sort as is also abstract, and therein capable, as all other abstract sentiments are, of fast developing in new directions. The direct point of Christian dogmatism is the revealing of spiritual Sonship; but this very revelation, by the action of its attaining, forced a working of thought on the appointed source of generation in the matter of Sex-difference, which inevitably in such generalized treatment reflected back upon Deity the new attribute of paternity: the attribute, all-desirable, which could not else have become spiritually conceivable. "*He that hath the Son hath the Father also.*"

This abstract comprehension, descending on the ripe soil of youthful mentalism, becomes what we speak of in common terms as a general reverence for age. And in so speaking we think little, in truth, of the immense amount of experience that in reality has been condensed into the phrase! The term "reverence" stands as residue out of the whole mass of true religionism of every form, after all error and false sentiment have been filtered out of it; the term "age," thus employed, is the compendious expresser of the relation of the brief term of human life to the effect of abstract Time on existence in general. And here, curiously enough, re-appears the falsity that has been native to all religionism in respect of Time: seeing that the kind of Time which is "old," or "ancient," is *not* that which rightfully, with deliberate intention, we can own to be deserving of reverence. Ancient times can be revered *only* when thought of as affording basis to the Present, and still more to the Future.—But none the less is the individual application of the highest and truest moral suggestion. The youth that reveres age in the abstract is the only kind of child that is capable of true honour to its actual parent. A regard to age that is so developed as to be intuitive is the standard sign

both of private filial feeling, and of the feeling that is the essence of religion.

The rightful import of the filial sentiment is alone that of the affective leaning of son or daughter towards a parent, on the sole account of the being a parent: not because of any recognized special merit, as of something that might arouse sympathy, or of the felt enjoyment of companionship, or of the felt sympathy, but of the attained consciousness that either parent or child is one of the human beings that gave birth to the world, and that the world is the sole medium to the latter of the fruits of past development. The parent and child are thus inevitably the chief personal representatives of the Past Ages of Past Time have given spring to; and as such is the standard object of immediate gratitude. But no immediate personality can be other than entirely defective in such light. And hence, now and ever, remains, and must remain, the requirement of the perfect image of Parenthood which religion has produced once for all. The divine "Ancient of ages" is the ever needful maintainer of the abstract reverence for age which is the highest qualifier of filial sentiment.

Under evolutionism, all genuine intellectual culture goes to the deepening of our conscious valuing of Past Ages. The youth of mankind-in-general was obliged, through its lack of knowledge respecting nature, to pay a homage to primæval Time that was false and mischievous, except for a certain local endurance; but the youth of particular individuals, at the present day, has the means of seeing truthfully in the great Past the inciter to the most genuine religious reverence—just for its having held within its bosom the seeds of all actual development, whether of aforesaid, or of present possession, or of rea-

sonable promise to come to pass. To the youth of the present day it is therefore true, evolutionally, that the world's past religion, in mass, has indeed been no failure from first to last. And this, just because of the constant homage to Fatherhood having raised our filial sentiment to its required quality of abstractness.

Let the subject be then now filled up finally with that yet-awaiting side to religionism which is the filial sense's counterpart. The filial side of relationism, by its dealing with the awful Past, endows us with the belief in God, on an enduring and non-illusive foundation. The parental side has to endow us farther with an equally in-illusive trust in the religious image of Eternity, to be drawn from our contemplating of the darker and the yet more awful Future.

SECTION III. THE HEIGHTENED LEVEL OF THE PARENTAL SENTIMENT.

WHEN youthful beinghood has arrived amid-life, it has gained the commanding station where first it can look around upon existence and begin thence to know itself. It has reached the apex of its proper human condition, and is aware of its own appointed limitation. The apex is, however, no pointedly-marked promontory. It is no other than a high table-land, imperceptibly rounded, which has been gradually risen up to, which must gradually be surmounted, and gradually declined from. It is noth-

ing of a marked barrier between youth and age, but a field of vivid animation which is as if an organic plexus, weaving into connectedness all threads of vital energy that previously had run hither and thither, unaware of their own purpose.

Mid-life, as I have urged, is the season which is under influence especially of Religion, and is hence directed to the end of life with some definite aim, and partly concerned with external things, and partly with human nature.

Fraternity and Sexhood; with secularity, and not a relative state of struggle, individual into adaptation, an effort, partly intuitive and partly conscious, of the various internal powers, and for the two sides of human nature concerned, the intellectual and the emotive, it is precisely the rule of Fraternity that befits the one, and the rule of Sexhood that befits the other. And thus necessarily, through the endurance of this season, Religion rightfully is chiefly latent; though far from inactive, notwithstanding. Religion is, or ought to be, now engaged in its own work of preparing its crown of life for the sanctifying of the hearth and home, with a furnished cultus of domestic virtue.—But the mid-season once over, Religion has a new character awaiting it: instead of longer resting latent, it needs openly to assume for itself a reigning sway.

Previously to mid-life Religion works blindly—or, rather let me say, providentially: blindly, as to the individual's own share in the work, but in a manner that his own reason, when ripened, will be enabled to give consent to. I am speaking, it will be understood, of the child-like mode of religion which has been supernaturalistic. In this up-hill working, it was only the Filial side of emotionalism that naturally should have acted, and that did act. And the result was thus confined to the

production of an ideal of Deity that was exclusively Parental ; and that consequently promoted only the one-sided, but the fundamentally-required sentiment which is Filial. The showing of God in a Parental light was the only means, as I have argued, for that giving to a father's character the appreciable amiableness which originally was wanting to it.—Could it be, however, that the father's character should become amiable except in his own sentiment towards his child becoming rightfully parental?—Here, accordingly, was latent office for religion, in the mid-way organic plexus. Nor indeed was religion only here needed : but a multiform inclusion of associated innovations, and that reversing of primal error in regard to Time which was the main step towards a true ordering of parental sentiment. That is, an abolishing of the despotic and self-willed temperament incompatible with true affection for offspring. The God of supernaturalism was of peculiarity a God of the Past : the God who supplied causes, against the consequences of which human beings had for ever to fight in vain. To learn to see God in the Future, continuously drawn out from the mundane Present, belongs only to the enriched notion of Time which is the issue of evolutionism. Supernaturalism made little account of Time : it set up only an ideal of vague Eternity, or of a constant Now. But to abolish despotism and parental self-will, was the same with the human parent's being made aware of the providential importance of the child, relatively to his own value in God's design of things. And hence is proved the higher ground now attained. The new basis now given to religionism goes straight to the moral honouring of the Child : and is it questionable to the moral sense of to-day that this phase of affective worship is transcendent above the former ? The greater is the felt importance of the Child, relatively

with the felt importance of the Parent, the deeper and the purer is religion's character: namely, in ceasing from the false note of supernaturalism, and arising into that which now shows as real naturalism.—It would seem a palpable truism to say, that to give to Deity the standard likeness of the decaying Parent, and not that of the growing Child, is a sign of weakness and immaturity. Subsequently to the foregoing, therefore here that is religion's desire

The note of the pro-creative hill term of perverted into

was that of reverence for general. And for the up-worship is un-liable to be tion, from the very cause of the mounting energy of the human subject, really destined to evolutionally surpass ancestry. Each human mind in turn must advisably have well strengthened itself first in a rooted faith in the past ages which have held the germs of all to spring in the future.—And if the note of evolutionism is to answer besides to the need of declining life—I mean, to this as an allowed-for stage, succeeding to the mid-way plexus correspondent to the youthful stage,—it should show, characteristically, a chief reverence for the beinghood yet to come, as compared with the by-passed. Parents, as such, ought as much to revere children as such, as the latter ought to reverence parents.

This mutual debt of reverence between youth and age is the perfected action of religionism which inherently accounts for, and substantiates, all anterior to it. The alternation involved in it, between the recognized superiority of the Parent, reposing on the sense of the Past and supported by the instinct towards supernaturalism, and the admitted superiority of the Child whose hold is

on the Future, which alone is maintainable by a belief in nature that is much stronger than supernaturalism, may be accredited as the acting source to the whole life of religious forms, and therein to the whole growth of at least the affective side of our human nature.

The Parent's reverence towards the Child has obviously no means of making part of affective life before the time for parentage is reached. And so in world-religionism was it also un-presented before the mid-season was arrived at, which, in form of Christianity, here reflected the organic plexus of each person's mid-life. Manifestly, to Hebrews, irrespectively of Christianity—that is, of their providential leading up to the latter,—no such feeling was started. Children were the gifts from the Lord bestowed on parents, or rather on the sole father, in the manner of all other possessions, as to whom therefore he took pride in the having many of them, just as he boasted of his flocks and herds. Even as to that moral nurture with which truly he was charged on account of these by the Bestower of them, and which deepened in its claim on him in proportion to his own grounding in the Moral Law which was that of Jehovah's government, the object set in view to him was more the honouring of the nation's Sovereign than the children's own personal welfare. The whole morality of Hebrewism was national. The whole motive to morality was laid in the keeping up of the Hebrew race.*

To substitute for this the one only-sufficient motive of true religion—which gives as God's requirement the

* I am here omitting to take account, not only of the chiefly-secular teaching known as that of Solomon and the son of Sirach, but also of the exalted admonition found occasionally in the prophetic writings and in the poetry of the Old Testament: all of which, as I consider, lies outside of proper Hebrewism. I am limiting my view to what is

bringing of the whole mass of human beings into the membership of God's kingdom,—was thus the problem of Christianity, of which the only solution lay in the arousing of a moral sense, personally such, in each constituent. To make morality personal, the obligation laid on conscience needed moulding into adaptedness to the parent, just as the law of the child befitted the child only. Sonship requires a law of its own, justifying.—And an actual

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Deut. chs. iv-vii).

of Hebrew morality affords aid
e allowing for it seems at once
iculties that obstruct a natural
reading. The following seems to me what may actually be taken
as such, after a due sifting and comparing of the complicated docu-
ments concerned, in regard to the important point of the supernatural
beginning ascribed to it in the so-called "books of Moses."—At
Ex. xxxi. 13-17 it is said, the *sign* given to Israel's children, *between*
them and the Lord for ever, was the Sabbath. This was to be kept
throughout their generations for a perpetual covenant: whosoever worked
on the sabbath should be cut off, because of this being ordained for rest.
Accordingly, in the version of the Decalogue in *Deut. v.* this motive to
its observance is retained, with but the explanatory addition of the
humane appeal that the Israelites had themselves been afflicted slaves.
Let us suppose then that we have here our true standpoint. Moses—
let us call him such typically,—made the noble determination that here
should be his people's peculiarity, of the formal outward sort he felt
desirable. But by the time of Hezekiah and of the earlier Isaiah and
Micah (say 750 B.C.) a movement arose, which was stringently resisted
by those prophets, to give effect to the sabbath ordinance, fallen under
neglect. And this led to the "books of Moses" being tampered with,
and as if seasoned up with sensational aids of miracle: so that now was
the Decalogue not only set off with the thunderings of Sinai, but the
fourth of the commandments, writ directly by God's finger, gained
the sanction of a special story of Creation giving palpably God's example
for the sabbath's authorizing. It may be supposed that Moses, or
whoever stood for him, had had access to a preserved scheme of what
indeed had been a virtual "revelation" to the primæval-cultured
Egyptians, or else Chaldeans; and he may have been struck, as by

parallel effect to this does or ought to take place in every human individual that has passed the initiation of parentalism.

To every single human pair that shall henceforth join beinghoods together with gain of fruit from the union, there may well arise, simply and naturally, an echo to the very outburst of messianic triumph that heralded in dogmatism the incarnation of Christiauity. The idea

natural "inspiration," with the feasibility of adapting this to his purpose: whether or not its grand cosmogony was already laid in an actual course of "days"—of "days" figured on a gigantically-divine scale. If it were not so, it would appear that the sublime beginning, as well as the winding up, was of Moses' adding: since the former proves visibly the train of purpose laid throughout. The very first of creative acts is made that of Light's dividing from the Darkness. The breeze of morning, as God's Spirit, stirring the face of the massed waters, was the proper Hebrew imaging of the Dawn: and the leading day of the course was provided. This *may* have been an after-thought; but the apparently similar treatment at the end seems conclusively such. Namely, in the over-crowding of the sixth day's work, as if to make room for the desired sabbath. The day-arrangement might originally have been well laid as seven-fold:—seven being notoriously held by at all events Hebrews as a sacred number; and this with the clear reason of its quartering of the days in a month. And if the days of Creation were at first seven, it would have been only natural to have allotted the last to the sole making of man. But, as it stands, the narration gives up this, for the sake of providing time for Deity's sabbatic rest.

If this bold handling of the subject be allowed, there is a true logical consistency observable in the charge on Hebrew parents to cause their children and their households to keep the sabbath. And, moreover, there is a maintenance of the same logic in the commandment following that would seem to involve its being continued throughout. The required honouring of parents, and notably of the mother as well as the father, is weighted with again an association with length of days in the land appointed to the people as a nation. The unusual reference to the mother would seem even to imply that the intrinsic meaning of the commandment was bent mainly on alone the keeping pure of the race of Israel, as selected by God. Namely, by a hindering of alliances with the daughters of Heth and others, such as that which we are told made the life of Esau's mother a burden to her (*Gen.* xxvii. 46).

that "*unto us a child is born*" has in it to convey to all believers in evolution such sense of religious background to common joys as, in not destroying but only enhancing the latter, ought naturally to dilate parental consciousness to a new range. On the one hand, the perception brought home, with a new light upon it, of the having shared in that *miraculous* e's miracles, the repeating privately of the *creation* creation that belonged to the general da existence,—on the other, the newly-gai the continuity by inheritance of even the continuity by inheritance of all experience, showing that life be a virtual perpetuation of the p l rightfully to produce an exultant forest s behalf. The infant well may be imagined in hope a destined select agent of Providence in the future work of the required guidance of God's people: one who may itself—little babe that it is now—come to be a mighty father, bearing helpfully on its own shoulder the burden of needful action and wise counsel. And when seen with a prevision such as this the child inevitably must become of religious value, over and above all its immediate worth. It is a thing to be honoured even more than to be loved. It is a point of personal possession that indeed bears a hold on the future: showing in this way, as alone properly can be shown, the advance in parental sentiment which lies in the present fashion of it, as compared with that brutish intuition out of which the actual state has been developed.

The parent has no need of being adventitiously taught to love the child. If he or she does *not* love by instinct he or she does not love at all. There is nothing present but an affective accommodation. The beneficent emotive impulse of mere animals, instead of being duly ripened, has been frustrated. The love of parents, following as it

does in natural sequence to the primary mode of love which is sexual, is, although weaker than the latter, yet freer from the impediments to which the latter is liable. If it amount to a passion, as the earliest sort is wont to do, it is abnormal and distorted. But nature has bidden it be of rule unailing and self-sufficient for its own maintaining throughout the course she has given to it: varied as this must be by circumstances, of which the chief needs be esteemed the parents' age at their time of marrying. If this have taken place at the due season between youth and age which allows the means of doing justice to the advantages of each, the course of parental love may run smoothly along to life's end, with only a gradual diminution of intensity commensurate with general loss of vitality. But if marriage has been either too early or too late, parental love must be a sufferer: and this eminently the more in the first case. I have already spoken, in regard to Sexhood, of the irreligiousness and direct sin of all lightly-formed marriages, defective in right conscience respecting children; but the more clearly we take in view the case of the latter, the deeper shows the injury to be guarded against. A too-early rushing forward into matrimony is the cause of an enfeebling of constitution which evolutionism especially must condemn unsparingly, and which is ruinous equally to both the parties concerned: namely, as to the tampering with youthful life by its early forcing into maturity, and as to the imparting to offspring what is less than their due of innate energy. But the injury is as vital on the side of spiritual development.

As to the parents who are thus prematurely such, they are obviously cut off, by this robbing them of youth's full enjoyment, of a benefit that should give pleasurable tone to the whole of succeeding life. And this involves their being deprived of that happy power of sympathy with

their children which is the only true nurturing of parental love.—The practice of early marrying stands in fact as already sufficiently condemned by the result shown in history on the attendant state of women and children, whose lot as to the matter runs in one. The child-wives of Asia are the open sign and cause of both the feebleness of and that of Asian doc-
 trinism. Among nations their endurance has
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 rude stage of s It has included necessarily
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 each of them lordship over at all events
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 borne out by the of Deity, announcing of
 women that they had solely been made for the sake of
 men :—while the holding back of the average period of
 marriage appears indeed to have here proceeded in the
 same ratio with human culture in general, and specifically
 with that of women. The natural action of cultivation
 —and this, as working specially through evolving forms
 of religion,—has led on women to at last a ripened con-
 sciousness in regard to their relation to men : and this
 implies in itself every needful improvement as much of
 spiritual as material kind.

It is precisely on domestic life that the cultivated religiousness of especially women will henceforth have to act. And no less is it here that future creedism, evolutionally turned, is in readiness to occupy itself. As soon as consciousness and conscience have been duly awakened, and only then, can maternity begin to act spiritually. A due conscience as to conjugality implies intrinsically the resolution to abjure conjugal engagement save, primarily, as fittingly conditioned, and secondly save as formed with personal and unfettered consent : which two-fold resolu-

tion can alone proceed from a thorough personal understanding of both the outward and the inward laws of being. A mother who has become such on the terms of self-consent and engaged love cannot be doubted to be full prepared to enter on the blessed lot of maternity: while a church-institution of evolutionism—if such may be hoped for in future,—must surely be so ordered as here to strengthen and carry out the private teaching of conscience.

The laws of outward and inward being, if indeed such as they are here imagined to be, import that as every season of life has its own mode of relationism for self with fellow-beings, so the due accomplishing by the individual of each season's work in turn is the means designed by nature for the full completing of individuality, in the case of each member of mankind. Not only is the exercise of affection, in all modes of it, the prevailing source of happiness, but it is the source of the proper selfhood which conveys all ability of happiness. The subjection in turn to all appropriate phases of affection is the sole conditioner to the personality of every subject.—Or, in other words, it is only through the power of diffusing outwardly what is proper self-existence that the latter can support itself in its actual character.—It is ill-speaking to say that to give our love to another person is to give ourselves: we should rather think of it as the making of ourselves. Namely, as the hinderer of that morbid self-regard which casts vision inwards with the pertinacity that is destructive. But better still is it not to think of it at all: to love for the mere enjoyment of the loving, reflecting back, as it always rightfully does, the enjoyment that is given to the person loved. To be ready to die for another, as we know to be possible,—and especially in the case of a mother,—can alone analyse itself accu-

rately, if analysis be needed, into the self's refusal to be thwarted in its love.

But the love of parents, like the fellow-kinds of love, can only rightly improve itself, and at the same time exalt egoism, by the common means of passing forward into abstractness of quality: which is the same as saying that it must be that egoism must be to God's order without spirit parental love the result see

For a sufficiently-exalted consciously subject itself and of the world's Future is would be impossible if but by the help of this

The religion of age must be always thought of as different; and yet at the same time as of essential continuity, the latter being the growth out of the former. As already shown, the religion of youth has been that which led the mind of the growing being to open out into the consciousness of a divinely-acting Providence: or, of an all-pervading harmony and beneficence, exhibited in the general plan of nature's government. The religion of mid-life, being plunged mainly into secularism, needs to have brought this conviction under practice: through the consciousness of the involved requirement of every personal subject being himself or herself an active agent in the administering of Divine rule. The religion of age must thence mainly consist in the human effort to second Providence as to the shifting of this agency into new hands: the hands of newly-generated beings who pass onward humanity's continuity by a new link. The proper virtue of old age must accordingly be a conscious acquiescence in the divine "design" of the case, which as appearing bent on alone humanity's endurance, irrespectively of that of individuals, would seem to have found here the only fitting

kind of means to its object, in the keeping up in this way of an ever-juvenile freshness to humanity, through a recurrent renewal in baptismal births.

And the attendant mode of looking onward into Time-to-come has been marked correspondently in world-religionism.—Under early savagery the baby-like mentalism alone present was driven perforce into its sheer belief in supernaturalism by the absoluteness of the tyranny of savage fathers. And on the same account the only “hope of the future” for the savage child could be none other than a looking forward to be himself a tyrant father in his own turn: even which anticipation, rudely personal as it was, must still have been a rise on a mere living in the present.—But the mental youthfulness that appeared as Hebrewism took the important step of showing a Future laid up for a whole nation as a body: having its end in a general triumph of the Hebrew people above all others, which again had a point of value wrapt up in it, which was now of the deeply moral sort that no subsequent experience could gainsay: namely this, that the law of Hebrews which made them a people was of that relatively high character which had a right to assure to them a moral victory over rival peoples in spreading the domain of righteous Deity throughout the world. The Hebrew “hope of the future” was but a national hope; but it had in it the moral vigour which led up well to the crowning mental stage of a full animating of individual aspiration. Through the highly-strung personalism of the mind’s realized belief in Christianity, each member of God’s accredited kingdom has had his “hope of the future” exalted to such excess as to lead him to imagine that he himself should be endowed, for his own part, with the same endurance as that which God’s kingdom was endowed with. The primal error was taken up of a human

being's supposing that by a feeding on divine sustenance from the trees of knowledge and of life he could truly become as God in respect to his assured destiny : to cure which error was again required the divine reminder of the law of death which has not yet, in reason's view, been ever shown as repealed.—Accordingly, as to the religion of after life, w
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To depict the character of the result that is here intended, and to defend the possibility of its occurrence, is the final point of the present test to which I am subjecting the mode of the Evolutionism that I am maintaining. The kind of sentiment towards the Future which attaches, or needs to attach, to this showing of the doctrine is here, as ever, the proper touchstone of the value of the interpretation of religion adopted. If there be not effected here some appreciable improvement, however faint, on the consequence of preceding religionism, the attestation I am seeking for will have failed in its most eminent requirement.—Let me then try to produce fairly the moral balance in this respect which I have to offer, as that which I have been led to believe tells actually in my doctrine's favour. That is, let me try to show how the "heightened spiritual ground" which I claim as such, has due power of being attained in the common manner of development.

The mode of viewing the Future is, on my plan, but

one and the same thing with the regulation that is required of Parental sentiment. The matter truly is not easy: and for this very reason does it carry with it, as I argue, the mental elevation supposed. There is called in need by it a many-sided alteration in the state of age, as compared with previous life: a new infusion, into the substance of individuality, of at once a widened range of intellect and a rare spread of emotion, under the seeming opposition to this of a proceeding depression of all physical ability. And this manifestly implies a new plan altogether of the distribution of vital energies. It implies surely a gradual shifting of the vital centre towards an allotted limit in a spiritual direction, such as must end, phenomenally, in restoring the same state of non-existence as that which it emerged from by its material part:—a gradual recession into so much more than the second childhood we in common allow for, as to extend to the much deeper declension which is into the all-subtending inorganism, not capable of retaining either body or soul in fitness for the combining both require. Both the mind and the heart within us need much of obtained power of accommodation to this apparent ordinance, before a voluntary acceptance of it can be attained to.

The sorest obstacle to reconciliation with this lot is the binding law that each originator of a new being has to nourish it into becoming, more and more as life advances, the suppresser, and at last the superceder of himself. Children are made to thrive all along on the extinguishing of their parents. And the "grace" to accept this position, without demurring against Providence, seems scarcely what can come by rule of nature!—It is, however, but the inevitable attendant on the law of general struggle:—and it may be that the love which is provided for the parental-filial relation is in fact kept alive by the condi-

tion : namely, as balanced by the power of religion. Parental love at the first is little other than pure selfishness; while, as maturity of the parent passes on towards decline, the relational struggle becomes ever, till the final surrender, more apparently that in which the object of love is the vanquisher of him that loves. But religion, of the character now described, produces a new and a more perfect acquiescence in Divine Law, appears as a new agent to step in between the two, and softens away the all-sidedness of influence and the discordancy of discordancy.

The cross is in fact scarcely thought of as such, except as a result of experience, through the advantage of it, and that naturally is forced so to attain to a true doctrine is a true one, of Religion's whole associating with the law of Death. The idea of Death is, by present showing, not only absolved from all the terror laid on it by supernaturalism, but is made to appear our most special benefactor : not a curse, but an assured blessing. Death, responded to, as it is naturally, by Sexhood, is here accepted as the true source both of all the affections that have made life happy, and of that ability of inquiring into life's secrets which has realized for us all our actual belief in God. And to each personal individual of us all, so also does the coming on of Death appear that which should hence rationally follow, as to the possession of a proportionate creative force : acting truly with peculiarity on the spiritual side of us, and this in spite of, or rather on the very account of, the increasing feebleness of the material side. Nor can there any way be given to this effect so true an expression, as I conceive, as in the accounting it, in the way it is here accounted, for a due raising of our principle of Selfhood to the highest point of spirituality it is capable of : that point being understood as represented by a conscious

self-subjection to "Divine Will."—And I think that the latter period of life's decline, in approaching Death, shows the kind of alteration in mental character, of its two kinds of emotive and intellectual, which entirely corresponds with this conception.

During the mid-term of the parents' life before the summit of their own personal life-enjoyment has been more than just surmounted, the emotive impulse springing up in them by rule of nature through possession of offspring is, or ought to be, assuredly a large allotment in the general fund of happiness which supposedly has been gained for us by Death. And as long as ripe maturity endures children ought to be, and mostly are, real portions of the parents' selves. Children are to us, inevitably, the matter less of objective apartness than of a subjective outspreading of ourselves. They *are* what we make of them by our feeling towards them. They *are* to us the love that we bear them : and our love is indisputably a part of ourselves. It is no idle piece of metaphysics to say, as obviously we must in accuracy, that, like all other objective forms, they are only what we feel them and know them to be. And the power of thus extending by emotion our selfism, may hence rightfully be estimated as the egoistic development which must stand to us individually as the set "will of God concerning us."—Also, during this period is parental love enriched rightly with all the mutual interest of proceeding culture of all sorts, and of initiation into all social pursuits. But ere long, the balance of advantage becomes disturbed. It must inevitably happen soon, except by peculiarity of condition, that in this kind of communion the teacher will have outgrown his own power to be such. And this, in consequence truly of the varying bents now imparted to the two kinds of minds that are concerned :—whence the aimed-at per-

sistence of the first relation needs the checking which it is precisely religion's function to afford : since, as needs be observed, the occurring state of emotion is being laid under a similar variation.

Ever after mid-life it ought surely to stand as religion to parents to follow out the divine purpose of making ready the success for them. Religious duty consists for the most part in not lingering too long in the field of social activity, but in yielding to the end we have made for ourselves, but in yielding to the end from they themselves shall have rendered it even better than they have done.

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bring with it a due natural reward. When the time for detail occupation is over, whether as to general learning or to social activity, the full season of life's maturity is at its best in regard to mental endowment ; and the very view of approaching Death ought to serve but as enhancement to self-delight in it :—for self-delight in this case has the very meaning of being the imparter of itself, not only to surrounding parts of self, but to the ulterior environment of fellow-selves. Now is the time for the rich enjoyment of literature, and of a critical weighing of discussed topics of all sorts that importantly affect men. Now especially is the time for a steadfast dealing with the higher kinds of philosophy. For the mental quality of mature age is truly that which bears less upon knowledge than on that which we name "wisdom :"—wisdom, which cares much less for facts than for "principles" raised on selected groups of these ; and with principles much the rather as moral ones, specifically human, than with such as belong to science. Wisdom is the attribute for, above all, social regulators and law-makers. And if

hence the endurance of party strife be made incumbent more than should be in advanced life, at least the very spirit of worldly struggle might be excluded from the sphere where it would purely be harmful. The kind of struggle that most of all empoisons age is that amid the members of the home. But the due retirement from worldly action now supposed on behalf of children, would banish hence, at all events, that element of rivalry which must destroy, if it exists, all the proper tranquil comfort of declining life. And this truly is the final meaning of that reverence which religion makes mutual between youth and age. The latter ought especially to be assisted by the former in that practice of "taking things easily" which in itself is an invaluable influence to be spread abroad in the busy world; but there must here be no mark of domination. The assistance given must not cease to be filial. The aged must be never made to feel that they are taken possession of, as if actually turned to infants, by those who have the tending of them. Even in lapsing into the state that cannot else than suggest a second childhood, they must have the means left to them of the only mental compensation still open to them, which lies in their sort of infancy being such consciously. They must never feel that their mental personality is interfered with.

The turn of thought which I am pursuing, let me repeat, is that which finds mingled in one the two matters regarding age—this being taken typically as of healthy sort, following on a course of life also generally healthy,—first, that all failing of mental powers is the same with an inclining towards the abstractness of quality that we find inherent to religionism, and secondly, that this effect is identical with a desirable winding-up of the true development of selfhood. The idea of Futurity, which is the

essential characterizer of Religion, I conceive to need associating more and more, as Religion becomes purified, with the idea of Childhood. But the root to the idea of both must be always personal to the mind at work. And the decadent course which in the second childhood now in question is that ordinarily taking place, is entirely in accordance.

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thence indeed into a diffused feeling towards all mankind which as to the concerned self is nothing more than a mere passive complacency, altogether pleasurable, which in effect is the same with a cherished trust in Providence. At the same time, however, the sense of childhood may and does yet linger on in that semi-infantine mode which retains brokenly the true quality of self-consciousness: by the help of a partially-preserved memory, repeating in fitful snatches the incidents of the childhood attached to self, as in due vital connection with actual beinghood. And this indeed is a true preparing of the concerned selfhood for that state of the nursing babe that last awaits it, when it lies cradled in the very mode of its first spring into life, in a faint sense of all the gentleness of domestic tendance, now as then required ever to surround it, all unable as the dying one may be, like the new-born, to respond else than by a contented reception. It is thus that the subject self again enters the parental sheathing which nature has provided: the sheathing that is now simply material, as formed by

the curling backward of loosened physical powers, thus folding it in. And the enfolded self is thus ready for its sleep upon nature's own bosom.

And the course is similar with intellect. Here also it is children that are the parents' cast into Futurity. And the anxiety as to the lot of children that in vigorous life was legitimate now may naturally and most advisably turn into a diffuse regard for all humanity. The egoistic sense, having been purified to its utmost by the force of its endured contradiction, is now adapted only for the sort of outward spreading of itself which is wholly an ideal expansion, freed from all its heretofore impediments of concrete connotation. In itself and in its working intelligence has become purely subjective. It has fallen into the character of abstract vagueness that alone is appropriate, and that eminently *is* appropriate, to a religious frame of mind. It is wholly permeated by the consciousness of the personalness attached to self: and this precisely is what answers to the effect of religion, of a secondary child-like sort, of claiming abstract personality in Deity.—Well does it follow also on the known lines of world-religionism in the matter of that subjectedness to fate which among Asians attended physical incompetency, and which they also called on religion to enable them to make voluntary. The religionism of Buddha gave as its only palliation to the sense of evil that oppresses men the idea of refuge in an imagined divine nothingness which might truly be encountered voluntarily on certain terms:—namely, by a previous emaciating of all active capacities in man: a dwindling down of selfhood to the narrowest means of holding itself together—or, a diffusing of death-influence throughout life. But this involves an omission of that which, as I urge, contains the proper essence of religion, truly such: the trustful self-subjection

to what shall is here named the "will of God," in the language of the anthropomorphism alone natural to the case. In the Asiatic the subjection to nature's ordering, when at its best, was truly in no way abject; but on the other hand it was irreligiously defiant:—the ever-sought plunge into Nirvana being in fact a daring challenge to fate, as denying that it was the power of being master over him: or, as if the subduing must be inescapable to him, yet that he would be still of his own disposing. It was a display of mental strength that, however strenuous, was rather animal than human.—But the character of bravery in the aged among ourselves is a character that is eminently more desirable than that which is the immediate experience and for the kind of reflective foresight that it casts on whole life: seeing that the "will of God" as now esteemed, as importing the general tendency of progress, means constantly self-fulfilment to the utmost, and not self-abnegation. The secondary religious childhood that amongst us comes with age, though not previously, is too instinct with the abiding fruit of our Western culture not to admit of a constant genializing by hope, in the place of the deadening influence of Asian thought.

Those who shall henceforth among ourselves approach personally the dark gate of the Future, may be well animated to the last by the kind of spiritual joy that can even inspire life into the bare images of Space and Time. All idealizing of these can never henceforth be separated from that of the general Beinghood which is the first essential to subjectivity. The feeling of hope, once made abstract, is truly not radiant with force of passion; but it has the serenity of a confidence so different from a mere bowing down to Fate that it rests on the sure ground which evolutionism has made its own, and which altogether

takes up, though on new terms, the basis to all past true religion : namely, as to what signifies an ever-extending stretch of "God's dominion among men." What else can be understood by this all-expressive phrase than what really is intended by human progress? Let the dying then be indulged—or rather be not hindered—in a feeble dreaming over the images it suggests. The human selfhood in its dissipating must surely lapse easily into the thought-correlate to itself which is to it as the Self-Centre of all Nature. And the fluttering spirit—supposing always that previous life has been such as not to impede the religious ending that is natural,—may still feel itself, on this modern understanding, as much as ever it might have done, to be "entering into the joy of its Lord," on the very account of this belief in mundane progress. The dying person may indeed assume approval of himself if he is able to offer himself back to his Creator—I do not say as a willing sacrifice, since none can give up what he has no power to retain, but I would say rather—in the light of one who had been entrusted with a temporary agency on the part of God : as if pleading for himself—"Here Thou hast what is Thine : the 'talent' bestowed by Thee which has not been wrapt up in a napkin, but put out into all kinds of human interest."

The "crown," also, that has been looked to as the promised recompense of faithful servants, is not wanting in a similar interpretation. The "crown" that a righteous Providence has in store for each faithful hastener of God's kingdom, *may* mean simply the enduring remembrance of those who have loved us. But it *may* also mean so much more, in addition to this, as will simply make up an adapted parallel to the first-intended meaning. It *may* mean an appreciative recognition of us, both as to ourselves and as to the work of our hands

and thoughts, by some fraction of the general mass of posterity, such as will indeed afford to us, in our empowered anticipation of it, a reflective immortality of substantial kind:—of a kind that is healthfully and not more than healthfully stimulative, and free from aught of insidious temptation. It may however pass on farther into a character which goes beyond this as to be altogether independent of thus much of personal reference. The character of reflective sort that is attainable to us is purely in an actual power of foresight in the course of development. Those who may have spent some time of life in a truthful seeking of the nature of things, may well be so familiar with the truth as not to err from it, or lose trust in their own keeping to it, even in a letting themselves go into a mere dreaming about it. They may feel, with just reason, to have mounted each into a mental Pisgah of his own, from which each beholds, without need of any doubt of his doing so, a land of Divine Promise spread before him. A genuine prophetic insight is the ultimate endowment which lies, and lies exclusively, in the power of religion to bestow.

I have now completed the moral testing of my religious scheme which has appeared to me its proper winding up. And the effort has brought me back, as I hope may be perceived, to the very point that I made my central one at my first entering on the constructive portion of this work:—since the fulfilling of egoistic development is plainly the true answering requirement to that *personalness* of religion which I have asserted at basis.

There is however yet a kind of test to which specially I desire still to subject my doctrine. And that is, to its

showing ability of being reduced into a direct form of exposition, such as should adapt it to the purpose of instruction for young persons, and for those generally who are uninformed in the matter. I feel that the drawing up of a general summary of my conclusions, in the simplest terms I can give to them as with view to such instruction,—I do not mean as addressed to such learners, being aware as I am how sacred is the ground to be here ventured on, and how altogether unsanctioned is my own thinking by the needful judgment of higher minds than my own: but as offered experimentally to those with whom already the office lies,—is a farther effort not to be shrunk from. And I hope therefore yet to accomplish it before the closing of my work.

But let me add at once one single reflection on the preceding chapters which seems to cast back a new clearness on my course of speculation. —In my treating of the affective province just dealt with, I have scarcely hinted at the idea of Retribution: this has seemed to me best excluded from view. But on that very account I seem now to be enabled—through the involved implication of the idea in all uniting of Religion with Morality, —to trace rationally the actual vindicating of our instinct towards the *personalizing* of Deity. The most practical of all notions, which Retribution is, runs in one with that subtlest of conceptions which makes of *personalness* itself an abstract image.

Retribution that is accountable as *Divine* has ever been referred mainly to the Life-after-Death which in my scheme it is not open to us to think ourselves entitled to reason from, *as* in connection with our own Personality. After-life belongs to children, as Before-life to ancestry. But still children, when thought of in whole, *are* intrinsically, through the qualities that are innate to them, actual judgment on their parents, whether as recompense

or penalty: Their virtues and their vices, so far as they are inherited, are what parents have simply to *submit to*, and this without failure in their proper sentiment of parentalism. Still, for Retribution that is rightly such, in being actually personal, there is here no place:—adapted as true Retribution is to alone the province of Fraternity, and justice, wanting otherwise throughout nature in the mind of man as informed by God on the ground of Parenthood, and also concerning Sexhood, Retribution may thus well be *passive*: as otherwise *active*, in the *owning* himself employed personally by and the mass of human strugglers, as —

ment, of treating general Retribution as but secondary to human action, agrees wholly with the fact that all Religion turning generally on our sense of Nature renders Deity on its own account *impersonal*. The Personality given to man by his appointing to the main office of Retribution, relatively withdraws Personality from Deity: but only in such phenomenal semblance as applies in fact equally to our own human Personality. The two remain in balance together. They remain in the perceptible correlation which gives to all Religion its actual value.

Whether we call our vital centre our point of Selfhood, or our principle of Individuality, or our seat of Conscience, it is all one and the same thing. Our mental standpoint, kept in place by our sense of Deity, is the one thing that is everything to us. It is that which enables us to stand upright. It is that which we are bound to make as broad and as firm as we can. It is that which has given us all that belongs to us of *capability of being and of becoming*.



A GENERAL SUMMARY
OF RESULTS,
HYPOTHETICALLY DRAWN UP IN A
CONSTRUCTIVE FORM.





CONSTRUCTIVE SUMMARY.

THE IDEA OF GOD.

RELIGION is a thing that has been changing character ever since it began to exist. But through every different stage of its course it has assuredly been that which we must think of as having formed the chief means of the improvement of mankind: and this for the reason that it has always been associated with the idea of God. This idea, the greatest of all ideas possessed by us, is that which has been ever our best cultivator; while Religion is the feeling that has brought the idea home to us, and made it profitable.

The more we gain knowledge about ourselves and the world we live in, the more we have the means of becoming happier, and in every way better. But all knowledge whatever consists in our possession of *ideas*. Brute animals have none of these, unless of the very simplest and lowest kind: such as stand but for few objects at one time, or, perhaps, but for one only. But the idea of GOD stands at once as expressing a relation to every thing. The idea of GOD comprehends all that possibly can be known by us, either about our inner selves, or about the whole universe outside of us.

Very gradually did the idea come about; and very coarse and unworthy were the images first produced to

give form to it. But this has also been the case, in a lower way, with even the humblest of our mental impressions. These have gathered themselves together on certain objects, or on certain classes of objects, till suddenly a perfect notion has sprung up, such as fitly might be labelled by a *name* given to it. And this was the full making of an idea which could be remembered and talked about: while in the process there was thus thrown upon the subject a name which was to be shared by all that could take it. This was the beginning to the idea of God is therefore the first step towards it in the end, when its own name is attained, or but begins to be attained. From the moment that ever human thought began to work, we must suppose that it aimed towards the Idea. But at first, like a baby child, it could only gropingly and awkwardly feel its way. The infant mind of our race could grasp only at outward matters; long effort was needed before at all it could look inwards on itself. However, it went on adding image to image, mingling and storing all in memory, till at last, when the mind was at maturity, the two kinds of ideas were alike so active, and were so helpful to one another, that a one general impression began to dawn, which, once risen into full mental perception, gave indeed a real daylight to the mind. The idea of God, shed abroad, was felt so intimate to mankind that at once it gained a *name* for itself: a *name* that was so needful and desirable that it could never afterwards be lost, but has continually been passed on by all peoples in turn, and by one generation after another, all down to ourselves, who, it must be hoped, are more than ever unwilling to let it go. The "name," indeed, is in itself almost all that we have to hold by, in regard to the immense meaning the word covers; but the word is so enriched by all sacred as-

ciations that it is, in itself, a sufficing treasury of religious feelings. Whatever religious questions arise in us—either about the world within or the world without, about our first creating or our final destination,—the one single word of “God” holds all that we can ever reach for our answer.

If the mind had proceeded by details only, adding separate bits of knowledge together, now on one kind of matter, and now on another, till it had seemed that the piled-up heap included everything the universe offers to our understandings, we should surely, after all, have possessed ourselves of nothing but a very deadly accumulation of particulars. There could have been nothing to keep alive in us any interest in it. But once there should have been started the Divine image—as of GOD present throughout all, and keeping everywhere His strong rule over the mass,—and the whole must have been kindled in reality. The idea of GOD, once produced, whenever or for whomever it is so, puts instantly a *soul* into our thinking of the universe.

The Divine image comprehends in itself all that Science has made known to us by the phrase of the “Unity of Composition throughout nature.” This is but the same thing as what Religion has called, in poetic terms, a common Plan, or Design, running through the general course of events—*except* for the circumstance, which indeed is all-important, that scarcely yet has the scientific image been thought of as applied inclusively to the sphere of Mind. Mind is alone capable of being known by us through our power of inward-looking, or of *introspection*; while Science has wholly sprung out of the practice of outward search, or of *extraspection*:—as, opposedly, the stand of Religion has been expressly in the practice of *introspection*. And thus, while neither

of them concludes from itself the object-matter of the other, but while both of them bear view to an object common to both, the operation concerned falls naturally into two mental departments. Science, just as much as Religion, aims at a comprehensive survey of whole nature; but Religion needs begin where Science ends. And with Religion, as with Science, is the idea of Community of Interest. Science is more appropriate to the human mind, being suggested by our human nature, implying only that it is bodily as well as mental. Religion, on the other hand, is ethertheless, Mind naturally takes the lead in the religious image. It is as true that the Body rules the Body; but the truth in the first case must be taken in a lower sense.

To make clear this important matter, we need only to examine a common phrase. It is often said that if it truly be the case that God is to us but an Idea, it is we that give our likeness to God, instead of our taking likeness from Him. But this appears only on the surface of the matter: because, in fact, all our power of originating ideas, and applying them, depends entirely on that general constitution of mind which God alone has supplied us with: or, in other words, which the whole power of the world without, and the power of the world of mind, joined together, have produced in us. If we have created God in human image, yet always it was God that created in us the ability of so creating His image. And the "we" that is here spoken of must be never thought of as one single individual, but always as representing the entire number of human beings that have existed since first the great Idea was begun upon. **Our power of at all thinking about God is an implanted**

instinct worked out for us by the entire heretofore course of natural progress.

Hence it is entirely forbidden us to suppose that *behind* the idea there lies nothing that we can call *real*. The direct contrary to this is implied expressly. The idea that we hold of God expresses all that we, as human beings, have the power of attaining to and comprehending. Beings higher than ourselves, if there be such,—or, if there shall come to be such, as indeed we have all reason for expecting,—must necessarily know more about God than we yet have the means of doing. But the idea implies always a reality of background in the region that is inaccessible to us. Brute savages knew almost nothing true of God;—brute animals still less:—but the knowledge we ourselves have attained to, so far as it may be called such, has come to us from that actual *experience* of the course of nature which is certainly the most *real* of all things to us.

Still it is always true that the idea that each one of us has of God belongs solely to himself, and none other. The instinct he has inherited is but a foundation that the mind of each one has to appropriate and, if it can, improve upon. The instinct is an average result out of the whole best experience of mankind: but to each single person who attains to realize the common instinct as his own, the effect is none other than closely personal. It is of the kind which so acts on the individual as to cause the sense of God now attached to him to appear as if to *radiate* all around him throughout the universe, as springing always from a fixed point in his own breast.

And this is the real source to the human being of his possession of that full knowledge of himself, which has the name of Self-Consciousness. A man who is conscious of his own Selfhood is at the same time made aware, in

a general way, of the everything that belongs to his own nature: just as consciousness of Deity respects generally the everything in nature, of the two sorts that we call severally material and spiritual. The human being began at first by knowing himself only bit-by-bit. He knew that he was a parent or a child, a master or a servant, a strong or a weak person: but he never knew rightly that he was a human being, independently of such particular distinctions, till he felt that he had within him the sense of "God." The perception of possessed Selfhood is none other than the inevitable "reflection" of the possessed sense of God.

THE IDEA OF GROWTH, AND OF THE ESSENTIAL
RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND MATTER.

As soon as ever we understand that all knowledge whatever has come to us *gradually*,—excepting for those final results which have been spoken of, as the sudden winding up of completed processes,—we have an opening to a just reading of nature that was wanting under the primary idea of immediate Creation. All gradual increase means *Growth*:—and Growth is a matter that is continually going on under our own eyes: whence much that relates to it is intelligible to us. And on account of the great Unity of Composition throughout nature, which is our present interpretation of Deity, whatever we come to know, of whatever kind or degree of knowledge, is *always* capable of leading on towards what yet is too

difficult for us. The idea of Growth, when sufficiently extended and deepened, is indeed one that matches, in a secondary manner, to the Divine Idea itself. This too has obtained finally, and as it were suddenly, for the common thought of to-day, a *name* that stamps it for common use. Growth, as soon as thought of as universal in action, is thenceforth known under the title of *Evolution*. And in the adopting of this word as our clue we have a wonderfully helpful means for that assorting and due arrangement of all ideas, which is the needed framework to all knowledge.

The ideas we possess can alone be produced into proper "knowledge" by our having reason to believe in them as "real":—that is, as substantially supported by our experience. But the doctrine of Evolution altogether meets this demand at foundation, by revealing to our comprehension how Growth, at every stage of it, depends on the realistic quality of all functions. Man has become what he is through precisely his having gained a command over outward nature;—outer nature, on the other hand, has been ever growing into what it is, at least in regard to man, through its subjection to human powers, both physical and mental. It is clear, therefore, that unless the outer world and the inner one were both real, the one just as much as the other, all experience would go for nothing,—which is an absurdity.

In the unfolding of this mutual relation the doctrine of Evolution has added on to the idea of Deity a new principle of Causation, which has the advantage over the hitherto accepted one of admitting of our rational examination. The sense of Deity remains always behind: but in front is made discernible, in part dimly and in part clearly, the *manner* in which Deity has worked. In regarding Universal Growth as the "manner" of creation

employed by God, while we are taught by experience both that growth of Mind has all along come as fruit from the ministry of outer nature, and that growth of the mindless kind, which is growth of Matter, has proceeded, since Mind began to be, out of mainly the ministration of Mind.—we obtain a view of Causation that inevitably can strengthen our belief in God, as the implied Fountain of movement throughout nature—the Source of movement as well as in the Whole of things.

But it must be remembered that in such general survey “Mind” must be distinguished from the “Mind of individuals,” but as that of the lower animals, and moreover to successive to a preceding state of organism in all of which, as well as in that of brutism, a preparation for Mind was existent. The *Mind* of individuals is naturally correlative with *Body*: but whenever general nature is in question, we do best to compare *Mind* with *Matter*.

The comparison, however, must turn always on *contrast*. It means nothing, if not the finding between Mind and Matter an essential contrariety to one another: though still in alone the manner of contrariety which Growth supposes, in regard to their being mutually nutritive. The movement throughout nature caused by Mind is antagonistic to the movement caused by Matter: for the very reason of both proceeding from the one Source of never-varying Deity. From their antagonism the two movements are forced to be alternate: and this means that each of them must proceed at the expense of the other. Each must work out its share of divine impetus until it has so spent itself that the opposed one may in turn drive it back, and lead progress in its own direction. Of all the general “laws” found in nature,

the law of an Opposing Dualism is that which in itself shows the right to take the lead. It has in itself an open cause, and has moreover the ability itself to serve as cause to the very meaning of "law," discoverable only later. It serves as giving to general nature an intrinsic principle of *Balance*. It means a swaying to and fro of the movements of contraction and expansion, of concentration and diffusion, of combining and diversifying, which share between them all natural eventuation. The tendency towards Dualism of this kind is the same thing as a Divine *pulse* found in nature, giving to it a breathing life on its own account.—Or, instead of a *pulse*, shall we not call it a *pendulum*—a *pendulum* set in motion before organism began, of the kind that has possessed within itself from the first, and all along, the power of creating for itself the whole clock-work machinery that has been due to it?

Before organism had been established, there were doubtless in existence the "natural laws" which are supported severally on the principles of Chemistry and of Magnetism. Of these, the one kind had for basis the Dualism of the powers of heat and motion, of acid and alkali, &c. ; while the other had its ground in the Dualism of mere "positive and negative," acting towards polarization. A Dualism in both these kinds was already a diffused fact: though not yet had human thought wrought upon it, and given name to it. And in regard to organic beinghood, so again was the proper Dualism, now arrived at, a similarly-diffused fact, tending ever to concentrate itself into the importance it has come to hold in all animal physiology, and especially in all science respecting man: the Dualism of Sexhood. Animals were male and female—or rather, female and male,—long before human thought had taken note of the fact. But in the

human Mind, after all, is the seat of Dualism which has set an index to the universal circumstance. Outer Dualisms, notwithstanding their reality, have necessarily gained solely their definiteness through the Inner Dualism of the Mind itself, into its two functions of Extrasppection and Introspection. The Outer kind, all indefinite as to itself, is as *cause* to the Inner kind: but in the Inner kind which has *caused* development of the Outer kind. Mind has constantly endeavored to surround it; while the Dualism abroad is given to Mind its own proper development. Namely, in imparting to Mind-developments of opposite characters of intellectual and affective are of the nature of mental Sexhood. The Inner and Outer facts are standing proofs of their mutual reality, through each being standing cause to the opposed class of facts.

This view of the inherent pulse-like or pendulum-like spring to vital action renders easy that practice of investigation which so naturally suggests itself, of passing from the one sphere of nature to the other, in any difficulty as to either. And manifestly it is the sphere of Mind and of Introspection, that—although we are required to begin with it,—is that where difficulty is the greatest. In outward observation we look at objects with our eyes, and handle them with our fingers: which draws on mental power for little effort, in at all events the first instance. But for introspection we must examine with our thoughts: and these are subtle in their operation. These alone can turn in upon themselves: which is a strain such as would happen to our eyes if their usage were forced back on the visual nerves of the retina:—a strain which indeed would not be possible except for the artificial aid which is sometimes actually applied in the case of sight; and

which also is, or may be, applied relatively in the very office of "reflection," which is precisely the ensuing fruit of introspection.—But when our mental action of "reflection" includes within its play both worlds of contemplation, there is mostly something easy that slips to view which may carry us lightly, and also safely, over otherwise hard ground.

One help to Mental Science is before us that is now become recognized as essential, as to the subserviency of physical observation to the understanding of even our spiritual selves. That is, as to the observed constant relation of mental effort to what we may call the general "mental retina" of the entire brain. The nerve-matter of the brain has been found to be so peculiarly associated with mental action, in point both of quality and amount of substance, and also in respect of comparative growth of the individual and of the race concerned, that it seems lawfully assumable as a true index to the growth of mind which we appreciate through practical experience.—The departments of experience which affect severally alone our special senses, of sight and hearing, &c., seem to have begun by producing for themselves minor ganglia of nerves, as in insects. But in man those minor ganglia have in part become moulded into one:—and it may apparently be inferred that at this epoch in development, occurring after man had begun to be, a root was laid to the production of self-consciousness, notably exclusive to man's possession. If so, it may be supposed, and with the utmost help to our comprehension of human nature, that the alternate actions of extraspection and introspection have together served as actual *cause*, both to the increase of the brain-ganglion in man, and the enlargement of man's mental capability:—the latter being indeed, like its counterpart, a complicated result

obtained mainly through the ministrations of the special senses. The mode of cerebral nerve-action seems actually to be that which on these terms it should be expected to be, of continuous but minutest vibrations.

Vibrations seem established by Science as universally the primary fact. But no less it seems established in thinking that vibrations concern Mind.—It is true, however, that Science is of attributing to Matter for its rightful end, which is peculiar to man, but the which is co-extensive with Matter, in pace. In a cosmical or universal view vine Fount of pulsation to be recognized falls inevitably into a great master-vibration between passive Matter and active Motion. And in regard to whole nature, an in-seated power of Motion is indeed a true Mind, just as Matter is true Body. Nor apparently could the "Mind" of nature dispense with "Body" any more than general Matter could be alive without Motion. This understanding must be taken as the essential basis to our every investigation into nature.—By the so taking it we seem truly enabled to reduce to a minimum the greatest difficulty of philosophers with the subject.

Our own consciousness of the possession of Mind is such as naturally makes it alien to us to assign an equal importance to Matter; notwithstanding what experience tells us, as it does, of our possession of Mind depending wholly on our fellow-possession of Body. Our human Mind is at the utmost degree of variance with Matter that exists anywhere in nature. But this variance is only such as belongs naturally to a pair of divergent lines conditioned as these are supposed to

be: *pointing* truly at basis to a junction in a perfect angle—as radiating out of Deity,—but not more than “pointing” towards this: not actually revealing more to us about this origin than the rationality of its inference. For the line of mental development may be traced as all along essentially interwoven with the line of growth physical,—if we attend exclusively to the select form of Matter that has by “Providence” been united with the select form of Motion implying Mind: namely, with the amassed nervous substance of the human brain. Here alone are we concerned in the case. If comparative anatomy and physiology could be helped out by a sufficient psychology, there is every sign that it might be shown how the growth of the ganglionic nucleus of nerve-material, in conjunction with the bony case that protects it, has strictly corresponded with the course of mental condition which human history unfolds to us, when backed by philosophy and present consciousness. Man, springing from the state of brutes, and thence from out of lower and lower states till all organism disappears, may find an index to the whole progress in alone the ascending character of the brain. But if actual knowledge must here cease,—as in fact it very nearly if not wholly does,—imaginative hypothesis may go deeper: and this without requiring condemnation, if only a due analogy with proved knowledge be preserved.—And our aim, if it be even deeper than actual knowledge can justify, is but that of a supposed stretch towards the idea of Deity, as Deity is now comprehended.

The Unity of Composition throughout nature, which is a scientific recognition of Deity, contains within itself the assumption of what is called the “Persistence of Force”: or, in other words, the impossibility of any change having occurred, or being destined to occur, in

the actual amounts of Matter and of Motion, together affording the balance without which creative Force would be nullified. But this idea of the composition of the universe points to nothing like a *beginning* of things: which is one of the unsupported imaginations that indeed have hung about the former notion of Deity, but have no place with *balance* intrinsic progress ever. We are forced in development progression in a in imaginative Matter and what again might occur, and perhaps *must* occur, in all events small departments of the growth arising out of decadence.

The idea of a prevailing is to see that formative on can be only partial. We receive that all progression rily answered to by retro- therefore any indulgence co-arrangement between s to nothing more than

The most level of all conditions has been scientifically depicted as a filling up of Space with a substance jelly-like and tremulous, in which float, at far distances from one another, minute atoms of slightly thicker material. But let us only assume that the distribution of these atoms, and perhaps also the density of their composition, was irregular, and it would seem that already here we have a clue to the natural plan of formation in general:—while the matter of the irregularity is at once provided with explanation by the inference just asserted of a previously-undergone dispersion, such as naturally would scatter fragments.—The irregularity being assumed, we apparently possess here the lowest-traceable conjunction of Matter and Motion: and yet even here appears the sign of a possible beginning of all formation. Clearly no tremulousness could exist except for a certain substance to be agitated. But if the agitation was in some

places more marked than in others, and if the size of the atoms and their distances from one another were also unequal, there must surely have happened this:— that the swellings of the chiefly-agitated spots of ether would in time, in consequence of resistance met, in part from fellow-swellings and in part from encountered atoms, turn for each to a true vibration, and to a vibration that would become a little heap of vibrations, and thence farther a proper whorl of centered motion: after which the event could not fail that the whorl, in being such, must proceed to draw into its sphere the floating particles that might come within its reach. But this must mean that this would draw around the whorl a bounding wall, or rather shell: for the very reason of those particles being kept from falling in by the whorl's own force. And, if this be the case, we have at once a furnished type of the actual organic "cell," which is the "unit of composition" to all material embodiment whatever.

Let us follow out this notion by at once passing in general glance to the existing embodiment of motion which we find in our own material framework. Our human bodily frame, as it stands, may be well thought of as no other than a bounding shell that is in two ways restrictive:—in part against the tendency in environment to sweep inwardly upon us; in part against the tendency within us to diffuse the compressed motion within us to the plain level of the motion outside us. In these two counter-tendencies, then, is the agency which the type demands. The two contrary actions once set up, in the alternating mode necessary, show apparently an adequate foundation to all that gradual depositing of material around an internalized fount of motion which is now attributed to the primordial cell. That inner fount of motion, infinitesimally small as it must

have been at the first, may have had in it, *from* the first, to evolve into the spring of all that henceforth building up of the human being, which again had to prove itself a miniature repetition of the very making of the whole outward universe. The outer process of evolution must have always preceded the inner; but only by a single step in advance. The old work must have been of the very kind of evolutionary formation which has occurred. Energy behind nature all the time from the beginning till our own. The world we live in is a immensely-magnified inner whorl of primary struggles of tempestuous passion, but solidifying partially its own mass, and hardening firmly its own crust. And the vegetable forms that have sprung out of that crust may in fact be regarded as not other than an actual part of that hardened surface, any less than are the hairs and nails and various bony or gristly appendages in ourselves what anatomists now account them for, as the developed product out of pulpy flesh. Nay, our entire structure of limbs, with their articulated junctures affixing them to the main trunk, are but relative rocks and chains of mountains, spread out from the inwardly-heaving globe of our bodily habitation. A one only type runs through all modes and fashions of creation. And whether we think of these as working outwardly or inwardly,—as operating through environment or from the isolated whorls of motion on their own part,—we come finally to the one consistent result, that all development which has landed itself where we find it to have done, in the production of individual human beings, has compassed the very end that was laid out in what still we can only figure as the *DESIGN of whole creation.*

This interpreting of the idea of Divine *design* is the scientific equivalent to that which has been followed by theologians. It explains on a material basis what has been meant by the Soul's consciousness of having sprung out of Deity; through precisely the scientific revelation of the procedure of self-consciousness in man out of that uniform Plan of creation which manifestly has here reached its culmination, so far as to all yet-gained experience. This inherent evidence of Man's connection with whole nature is the true clenching, and in no way the destroying, of our belief in God: it is actually that whose *failing* to appear would much the rather be destructive to religiousness.

But this evidence ought to be filled up in detail, as science has alone the power of doing. And a somewhat to this effect will be here presently attempted; though to a subjective view like the present very little of this lies in range. There is however one thing, of truly general explanation, the importance of which is such as to call immediately for attention. And that is, as to the point in development where simple Motion first turns into what requires to be known as *Mind*. If our present consciousness of correlation with Deity be, as supposed, the direct fruit from the first enclosing of a whorl of motion in a bounding cell, there ought to be discernible to us some signalizing mark of the change in character on its first appearing. And surely we are on track of the finding out of this mark. This change has been shown to imply that the prime mode of vibration was but a heaving left as residue from some inferrible previous agitation; while the vibration that belongs to the sphere of *Mind* is an oscillation that has become known to us as concerned with the opposed mental actions of *Extraspection* and *Introspection*. But thus

already is conscious Mind identified in very terms with what equally we might call "conscious motion"; while in regard to the term "vibration," certainly the "Mind" that we are aware of within us is as consciously the subject of vibration as it is of being the mark of human selfhood. To be the subject of vibration is as manifestly to the Mind being alive as the feeling of vibration is.

The important point is surely near at hand. It must lie v in the later portion of development government of Mind, while previously the d, as simple Motion, was over-mastered or is there difficulty in assigning suffi. This reversal, if we only add to the first conception of cell-production that of a degree of inequality attached always to the alternate forces in action, active and resistant:—attached *always*, except precisely at the point of shifting the focus-point of oscillation, which is the sign of pure extinction of existent relation, and the constituting of a new one—or, of a new *species* of condition being called forth. If we consider that in the first state, while Matter remained dominant, the Motion imbibed inwardly was chiefly spent in forming limbs and body generally, while nerves generally were chiefly "motor" and little sensitive; and yet that all along the abiding store of motion was increasing: there should obviously have been a season due to arrive when the relation should be reversed, and the in-storing be as much the chief event as acquisition had been before:—this epoch being represented by the fact that the central ganglion of the brain had provided ample play to the now fully-made-out characters of "motor" and "sensory." But let it be added, as seems needful to be inferred, that at this epoch precisely sprang

first into human mentalism the attribute of *Will*, and the new assumption of holding rule over Matter has at once its explanation.—A Divine interposition, or immediate creative act, must indeed be felt to have occurred: though still in no other way than that which in *all* new experiences alike must be seen suggested.

We can in no way account for *sight* by the tracing of nerves of vision; nor for *hearing* by calculating the vibrations on the tympanum;—nor for *pleasure* or *pain* by the clearest demonstration of bodily harmony or disturbance. The “feeling” is always separate from the intellectual “perception”: and neither the one nor the other is more than the long-familiar impression we have come to give *name* to, for introspection’s usage.—The word “feeling” again, as we all know, has itself been compelled into the farther difference of alternatively meaning either a sensory or emotory impression.—And the same thing is also true as to even the final quality of Consciousness, applied generally to the sense of Selfhood:—supposing always, as already said, that the root-element of all mentalism whatever is the power of making *comparison*.

Let us help ourselves towards the understanding of our own case by turning to what appears to be in nature an actual parallel to the stage of human experience which the epoch of transition is concerned with. Namely, the wondrous instance of cell-formation afforded in the hives of bees. The mathematically-ordered honeycomb which is the admiration of all students of nature is plainly to these insects the needful means of storing up their in-gatherings of the pollen-dust of flowers: while it is unmistakable to us that in all their working we have no right to infer the presence of consciousness, unless possibly in regard to one point—which point precisely

touches of true preparation for conscious faculty. That is, a point which indeed we may lay hand on as betokening the initiation of Will, in the strictly negative form which certainly would be exclusive in the first appearing of the power of Will, and even, in all rational probability, to its latest development. The bee hovers above flowers from the vague desire of their perfume, and often blindly stumbles upon finds of no value to it; and here it detaches itself for an impulse to turn away on this surely may stand as fruit of Will, at the occasion: though certainly with the element of consciousness—the mental process being analogous to none other in ourself...

all else in the insect operation implies surely nothing more than utter passiveness of subjection to influences outside of self. The supplying of living creatures with food lay originally with environment alone: which swept into them what might or might not serve as food,—at the same time that it was adding constantly to the store of motion that for itself went on organizing mouths and limbs and all other means of dealing with environment. As soon as animals could creep at all, they were at advantage in regard to obtaining food.—But bees are already highly furnished with sense-appurtenances. Let us follow them in their returning, when satisfied with present food, to the swarm in which they are wont to aggregate. In feeling themselves clogged, as they must do, with the dust about their bodies and wings, they must naturally turn themselves round about to shake it off thoroughly from them. But in all of the swarm doing this together, it is evident that each one must claim and make good for itself sufficient, though not more than sufficient, space. And here at once may be

accounted-for the hexagonal distribution of cells produced at last. The pollen-dust in itself is of no avail to this end. Its efficiency depends on its mingling with substance already native to the bees, which precisely their active turning of themselves about must cause to exude. It is from this mingling alone that results the wax exactly fitted for the raising up of the private walls in which they each become encased; and moreover for the general adding at last of a common wall enclosing the entire swarm, and forming a common store-house of composed honey.—And all this, let it be observed, is accurately analogous to what happens in human thought, in regard to the formation of those properly-mental “cells” which are to us our abstract ideas.

Outward impressions, which are the food of the mind, began to shower in upon it—as at first a passive subject to them,—in proportion as the open loop-holes for the special senses had ability more and more to take them in: before yet the general brain, which is the stomach of the mind, was laid out for their receiving and for their duly holding by the mental agency of *Memory*. But such receptacle being furnished, a real beginning of ideation, or mental cell-formation, was entered on: and this, through precisely the preparatory substance of each coming-on idea, gathered by a dawning effort of purposed *Observation*, being obliged mentally to struggle out room for itself amidst fellow-strivers at the same object. Every abstract idea is formed in this very way: by fighting out a mode of its own defining that shall not be broken in upon by rival images. This is the very nature of abstraction and definition. But the “pollen” that is collected by Observation is alone ripe for being contained in definition when it has duly become mingled by attrition with that “wax”-forming part of the mind

which is the emotive side of it, already lying in mental being:—the remaining "honey" being truly that semi-fluid and infinitesimally-vibratory result which is the actual medium of the agency of Memory.—Because of this signal power of retaining images which our Memory possesses, has the mind gone so much beyond power of insects as it does, through that action of *experimenti* mere *observing*, which supposes work on the general body, and moreover of that assistance to the mind, as an encased whole, which is the result of mental practice; and which bestows, as would seem, by the actual distribution of force, a higher quality in the mind, fitted to the ministration of Intellect than belongs generally to the service of sentient beinghood.

Man's consciousness of his rule over environment, and of the power of Will that he possesses to control that rule, is primarily the occasion of all that dealing with the world around him which is as much the source of increased energy to his own intelligence as it is to the reducing of the outward world into an habitation he can thrive in and delight in. All operations of culture reflect back new advancement for growing Selfhood.—But another side to the same effect ought to be, and has been, going on step by step with the special progress of intellect, to keep the latter in force. Namely, that which maintains, and is maintained by, the motor portion of the entire substance of the nerve-system, whether cased in the jointed bones of the spinal column, or in the compacted covering of the brain. The marrow of the spine, like the medulla within the skull, has its sentient accompaniment which is a sort of appropriate "Will" to the general body: though indeed regarding chiefly

the apparatus of which the heart stands as centre, and which therefore is as peculiar to our realm of Feeling as is the brain-apparatus to Intellect.—And thus has proceeded with ever-magnified efficiency, the means of that just balancing of our nature that affords its present condition: where the oscillation that prevails in supereminence is that which respects the vital action of Intellect—itself oscillating already between its component modes of Extraspection and Introspection,—and the vital action of emotive Feeling, maintained by Sexhood.—This completed construction to our at-once mental and bodily framework, is indeed the proof that lies within us of that great Uniformity of Plan which has now come to enwrap Deity as with a new form of garment to be known by.

The Soul of man may henceforth know itself as being literally, and not only poetically, affiliated upon the Soul of the World. It is an emanation out of Deity that reason need not turn from examining into: a true effluence from the Spirit of Growth, which philosophy may unhesitatingly claim as giving right to its belief in the relative divineness of the Soul of each of us. The human Soul is thus shown as endowed from the first with the means of its own development. And this is surely the same with a Will permitted to be *free*, just in order that the Soul's growth in embodiment might proceed.

The human Will, implanted as it is under its actual embodiment, has truly its set limitation. But still, as swaying the immense gathering of motion that human matter is animated by, it serves as the coiled spring that is truly lord over all the machinery that unless for it would be inert and lifeless.

THE PROOF OF DEITY WHICH IS AFFORDED IN THE
ORDERED MODE OF OUR GROWTH OF MIND.

The idea of Deity, once we have possessed ourselves of it, constantly the proper action of Deity through evidently a special guidance produced by all effort at Self-knowledge, reality, is in himself the creative foundation to be, we have but to look out for that repeating on his own part of creation general, in a certain measure and kind, which seems involved. Introspection ought to be able to discern within us the very same *mode* of creation that Extraspception finds reigning abroad: as indeed is implied in the very notion of a Divine Uniformity of Design.— We have therefore now to see if we can verify this result, by carrying our creative theory, now obtained, into the essential department of experience.

But we must never forget that our actual position in development implies much more than outer nature can show pattern for. Man's standing, as he does stand, on a platform of development altogether higher than any other he knows of, makes it naturally impossible that he should see his true relation to outer nature except precisely through the religious device of attributing to Deity a quasi-human *design* in creation. The very faculty of reasoning intelligence which gives to him his topmost station, is that to which of right the conception of "design" is not only appropriate but inevitable. **Man cannot**

reason generally at all *except* by the means of inferred "design," both in regard to his own thought and to environment. It is this by which only he can thread together his own personal remembering, and by which also he can only link in one the outward gleanings of knowledge that have come to him. The problem laid for him is to see how the lofty quality of his own organization has been constantly in course of preparation: while the supreme quality that exists for himself, in the elsewhere-absent faculty of self-consciousness, makes it necessary in reason that conceived-of Deity should Himself have been figured as also *conscious*, as to that final production of human selfhood which has been brought about. Before organism began to be, the individualism of the human Ego needs be inferred to have been already provided for—*pro-vided*: which is the same as *fore-seen with intention*. This inference is indeed a pure fruit of the creative human intellect; but it is indispensable as a guide for reason's help.

The purest exercise of intellect we can attain to is still dependent on its *not* being pure. It depends always on a due relation to the emotive side of us, here considered as the afforder of the tenacious *max* of the mind. And similarly, on the other hand, is the purest exercise of emotional feeling rendered pure to the degree that it is so by alone its connection with intellect. No organic matter whatever is unmixed; and this especially in regard to the great dualisms concerned. This two-fold dependence, well known to us by realistic experience, must thus be held as the proper sign of required mental *Sex*-division. And the accomplishing of mental *Sex*hood is thus raised into the commanding importance of indeed standing as the due "teleologic" respondent to the prime theory of Divine *design*, lying ever at the founda-

tion of the *Sex*. A true mental *Sexhood* is thus rendered the logical *end* of all creation.

Nor is there here any contradiction to previous terms:—seeing that the matter of *Sex-division* is altogether involved in that of human individuality. No personal *Egoism* had apparently any means of being produced, except by a *negation* to the enhancing *progression* of the *Will*, which that of *Sex*, when once realized, *controls*. A continual *progression* to the *end* may be imaginatively *dis-*cerned at as *long* as the *Will*, the first starting of any faculty or

Let us consider the *Will* of the first adding to the *Will*. This power, notwithstanding the character of its function as peculiarly that of negation, is essentially of *active* quality. Here therefore should *Sentience* have first begun to be made aware of its own ordinary *in-activity*, or passiveness. But the attention of the dawning *Mind* being thus awakened, the perception must have followed in time that all dealing with outward things by external observation, or *Extrasppection*, has an inward correspondent which, though still of the same nature of observation, need specially to be known as *Introspection*, or the work of “*reflection*”: while here already is the intimation of coming *Consciousness*. This splitting of *Observation* into compartments led onward, however, in direct course, to what should finally appear as *Mental Sexhood*:—this implying, as it does, a two-fold difference, appropriate in the end to respectively *Men* and *Women*, on the one side showing the *Outward Observation* predominant, and on the other the *Inward* kind; while farther bearing consequence that the average working of the *Man’s* mind is preferentially though not exclusively turned to *Science*,

and the working of the Woman's towards Religion.— This final effect is indeed such as that we may infer it to have been that which in its realizing has supplied to Mind, of both sorts, its main characterizing attributes:— on the one hand, the consciousness of *Self-Identity*; on the other, that of all the *Self-Relations* which together result at last in the proper *Consciousness of Selfhood*. That is, through the continual imparting to Mind, by the respective methods that are sexually appropriate, this instruction:—on the one hand, what Self is *not*: whence it learns, by comparison, what it *is*; on the other, what it *may* be, by voluntary combination of each separate Self with fellow-selves.—A Man's selfhood has its central pivot of action in the department of individual self-sufficiency; a Woman's has its fulcrum of movement in the sphere of a semi-passive dependency on union.

Such then is what now has to serve us in the manner of a general *Type* of progression, to be followed out in the more detailed examination to be now entered on.— There can surely be nothing that needs vindicating, to the mode of modern thought and modern feeling, in the importance here attributed to Sexhood. All history of mankind may be appealed to, to show how universally the treatment of Women by Men has been the standing sign of the degree of culture attained to. And the bringing of this result of experience under the present form, of absolute and religious Theory, seems manifestly a confirmation as much demanded in reason as in mere instinctive feeling.

This detail examination—in order to a due supporting of the stated Theory,—will naturally, on the very account of its concern with Sexhood, fall in two parts. And the two sides to the matter—with included reference to a fruit common to both, which indeed counts as a third,—

must be taken separately. The sphere of Feeling, as leading on to its own kind of moral fruitage, belongs mainly to the later stage of development, of which plainly it is the Sexhood that sets the mark. The sphere of Intellect turns alone on the Comparing faculty. And therefore we will begin with the latter.

THE WITNESS

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determining power over its own destiny, such as actually Will implies, it *ought* to be the case, we must infer, that our thinking operations, made visible to our Introspection, should testify to the general creative process by their own conformity with it. The images that our thought creates *ought* naturally to show likeness, in their own *plan* of construction, to the otherwise-seen Divine ones.—Let us then simply look out for this likeness.

Already on the threshold we may discover this, as to that oscillation between outerly expansion and inner condensation which is pervadingly the primal sign of creation being at work:—seeing that obviously Extraspection implies the first and Introspection the second. The first produces differences for the mind's comparing; the second draws the differences together in combination, by the giving to the subject-matter an abstract *form*. And *formation* is the very import of "creation." In proportion as the "form" is adequate,—which depends on its genuine following of Divine plan,—mental organism proceeds in development, no

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otherwise than does that which is bodily.—Nor can we miss to see what has proved to be fitting mental formation.

Mankind has long perceived that the only way of giving "form" to abstract images is the use of *Language*. Abstract images have in fact no means of being held in thought unless by the adapting to them of *words*. Except for this medium for the expression of them, true Intellect could never actually have existed, and the destined "Mind" of the human being would have been arrested at the character of the motor-principle of brutes.—When the latter wish to signify impressions to one another, they make desperate efforts which suggest piteously a helpless striving towards the power of words which is wanting to them, and which indeed suggests also the preparation in course of making way for the due initiating of *Language*. Brutes have only the ability of imitation, aided slightly by an instinct of dramatic invention, by which they act out to one another the actions they wish others to accomplish. And eminently through this narrowness of endowment—associated as it is with a correspondingly defective frame of body,—are brutes left remaining as brutes unlike those which of old developed into being human. But the pre-human defectiveness already points to what *Language* had in store for mankind.—We are told in the noble poetry of *Genesis* that "the Lord God brought to Adam every beast of the field that he might give *names* to them": and here already is notified all that man had thenceforward to do in classifying and ordinating his entire knowledge of lower creatures in the way that *Science* now bids us do. By "names" were his ideas of them duly ticketed for his mental usage of them. And the same happened with trees and herbs, and also

with the stars of heaven (except that here it was "the Lord" that was figured to supply the naming), and with all other kinds of natural objects;—and also truly with the internal objects of reflective contemplation, as soon as these were observantly dwelt upon.—Out of duly-ordered "naming" arose finally all science whatever; but this true naming was extended on as mere "naming" was extended. An entirely-extended agency of Language, words, and nothing less, was the due result for its needful turning severally, as to either Physiology, or Psychology, or Morality, or any possible mode.

The effort towards Language stops short at what we call "interjections." These form the mere vent of self-impulse, of the kind of chiefly-sensual inherent passions: and as such they are still in lingual right among ourselves. But the dramatic ability was the chief legacy of brutes we are enriched with: this indeed has run its course through entire lingual progress. At first it showed its potency in hieroglyphics: so that savages wrote down histories in pictures, and their personal claims to honour in *tattooing*. Hieroglyphics, united with interjections, may be taken as the entire groundwork of Language: and the two elements represent in perpetuity the impulsive and the deliberative sides of mental inventiveness.—A farther term is however called for to express peculiarly the mental *process* of the constructing of verbal coverings for ideas. And that is, the term of *Symbolism*. As soon as we think of man as distinctively apart from brutes, all modes, universally, of the defining of ideas by an outer framework, from that of pantomimic action up to that of grammatic language, have demand to be laid under this one term.

And as to the progressive kind of import that must hence become attached to the term, this needs but be such as will follow closely on our assumed mental plan. The Symbolism that was adapted to early mankind, and that still is so to infants of our own day, is at once explicable as being dominated to a proportionate excess by a merely impulsive selfhood. The Symbolism of women generally, as compared with that of men,—and similarly, the Symbolism of Semitic races of mankind, as compared with the Aryan and Teutonic,—has intrinsically a larger portion of affective than of intellectual ingredient.—And, analogously, the Symbolism acceptable to Religious mentalism of all sorts is as largely tinged with the characterizing feminineness of Introspection, as the Science which has right to be known as such is imbued with the male character of Extraspexion.—All we have now to do, therefore, as to the great analogy in question, is to see how the Symbolic progression we have become aware of responds as it should do in actual detail to God's material handiwork of creation.

Certainly, the final point of our "being aware" of our own manner of progress has depended on the help given us by Science, as to the raising of a general notion of development. It has been Science that has furnished us with *Comparative Anatomy*, and *Comparative Biology*, and *Comparative Astronomy*.—Introspective contemplation must add on its own part, if it can, a commensurate *Comparative Psychology*.

Our Intellect, as already said, is composed entirely of *ideas*. It is so through its very character of being "reflective": that is, through the mental substance within us being diffused as a sort of general "retina," receiving

and combining sense-derived impressions. This mental substance may be considered, if we hold to the present notion as to the native "wax" of the mind, as indeed a coated tablet so prepared as that circumstance might engrave itself on it. And if we also consider, as we are forced to do, that the coating was over-dense in the early stages of Intellect, and was on that account, precisely, as little serviceable as proportionately it was, we have before us the very ground to be now reasoned on.

It is because of the tenacious selfishness in which the lower kind of Intellect is embedded that this has come to be known to us for "*subjective*"—in opposition to the "*objective*" quality which arises from a predominance in the outward office of collecting facts. The habit of a *subjective* contemplation of nature is that which supplies the kind of philosophy which is inadequate for Science, though indeed rightful for Religion—just from its unique power of presenting the great Plan which attests Deity. To begin thus with mind's utmost achievement is indeed an upside-down reading of the true order of development; and yet, truly, we can only read aright the earlier part by such very mode as this is of a carrying about with us that faculty of our own which collectively reflects within itself the main points of antecedent accomplishment. If for a moment we should forget that the existent state of man has been led up to from the first, we should lose the one clue which alone supplies a general or duly-averaged view of general existence, such as rightly belongs, and belongs only, to the recognition of Deity. And thus a *subjective* philosophy is a permanently-desirable accompaniment to the introspective side of mind: though not to the opposed side which must rank ever as the highest province of Intellect.

By the light of this arrangement, then, let us now

consider the imaginative process in our own minds which, in present theory, has the need to be a repetition, or animal-like instinctive imitation, of God's own way of creating.—And a *word* is duly made ready for this occasion: the long-established term of *Anthropomorphism*. This now familiar word has indeed been applied hitherto with exclusiveness to our imagining of Deity:—but, in present view this is only saying that it must apply equally to all generalized conceptions whatever, though less and less in proportion to the limitedness of the connotation.

When we try to gain a general sense of nature with a conscious reference to our own actual standing ground, it is obvious that our research bears the character of a digging downwards into the depths of Past Time. We have to make our way little by little. But if once we have reached the point where developed Man first appeared, as fully raised above mere animalism, it is easy for us to realize how both then and ever after Anthropomorphism must have been necessarily the leading mode of all creative imagination.—As to its application to Deity, this is happily laid out for us in every page of Religious History: but in considering this result, the case of the great Typical Idea is our guide to all inferior idealism, with demand only of our remembering that different kinds of subject have different needs of depth for the “digging” given to them. Of some matters we can get to a sufficient bottom very readily, while the Typical Idea itself has no basis that we can possibly get at:—whence imagination, with Anthropomorphism, must here suffice us.

The first awakening of Mind must have been marked by a separating of environment from the sphere of Selfhood: which is *not* effected by animals. But long after proper Selfhood had begun, the *non-selfhood* of environ-

ment would not have ceased to mix itself up partially with self-experience. We see that it is natural in babies, and may well infer it to have been natural in the infant state of general manhood, to suppose everywhere around a more or less of similarity to self-condition. A baby talks with animals, and is vexed at their not answering. A savage who encountered a savage lion, staring on him, credited the beast with human anger, and only the desirableness of humanly pleasure. In both these two cases we have thus what is as sufficient cause of an inherent Anthropomorphism.—And if Deity represent, as now assumed, the character of entire nature, it is also plain why the idea of Deity should have been, and should partially still remain to us, anthropomorphic of peculiarity.

The primal notion of God among savages appears truly to have rested upon animal forms, and even upon the forms of tree-stocks and of stones: this being the rude worship of fetishism. But this implies simply the baby-mentalism which had no real understanding about stocks and stones, and about animals except as like-charactered with men. And thus, so far as fetishism is concerned, Anthropomorphism was not developed beyond such preparatory condition as was actually the reverse to its true state. The Totem-worship of savages, as we know, involved the practice of men taking upon themselves the names and the personally-stamped images of their several Totems, as a complimentary subordinating of themselves to the worshipped object. This stands as the first type of worship, which came afterwards to be turned into the stamping Divine images with the human form:—which consequence was inevitable in proportion as the gained power of introspection, acting in junction

with increasing outer knowledge, taught men their own superiority in the world of nature.—There was still a sort of remnant of fetishism when it was supposed that “God gave to men His own form”: but the contrary imagination of “man’s making God in his own form” is in the true mould of Anthropomorphism, and was capable from the first of abiding, and of at last ripening into its destined issue of poetic consciousness.

All polytheism is no other than fetishism, except in so far as it is poetic. When streams had their guardian nymphs, or when the Pleiades shone down with celestial influence,—or when the entire life of rustic nature was figured by the goat-footed half-human satyr Pan, breathing music through his reedy pipes,—poetry was already on the upper hand: but originally, it seems apparent that the river, or the star, or general nature, was credited with being intrinsically as human as we are. And this primary superstition, taken as such, was manifestly beneficial:—leading onwards, beyond its end in poetry, to the true knowledge that becomes Science. What now is scientific Botany, or Physiology, or Astronomy, or Geography, or general Cosmogony, had the need to begin in superstition. And so, in fact, must have done what is present science of Selfhood, or Psychology. The human imagining of God is the only possible way to the attaining of the reflective machinery which is our sole means of the understanding of ourselves.

And the reflectional aid to knowledge is continuously and intrinsically needful for our stimulating, by the very force of alternation, to every generalized mode of apprehension. But it is this with a clear difference in regard to the different objects that may be aimed at. In subjects of close human concern Anthropomorphism is more a hindrance than a benefit: since it leads us to consider,

each one of us, that every one of mankind is framed exactly on our own pattern,—which idea, although good to begin with, requires often to be even practically obliterated. Nor would it in social matters be useful to us to look, for instance, at abstract Justice as the ancients did, as itself a human being.—Still more, as to all other things, relating to detail action, as in Chemistry or Manufacturing, is such imagery out of place whenever it is open to philosophic treatment. Astromorphism refuses to be wholly crucified, and will not yield farther than to admit just that position which, here as ever, is a related degree of Self-consciousness. We must betake ourselves entirely to draw avail from the human practice that has spent itself, all through historic ages, on the all-inclusive generalization of Deity.

It is only when we are forced to own to ourselves the *inadequacy* of believing God to be a human creature, and never before this, that our instinctive anthropomorphism falls away from us. And when this happens the re-action is necessarily a strong one, which directs us to seek Deity, instead, in general nature. Religious thought, whether out of rashness or humility, is peculiarly adapted to such re-action. But this inevitably implies a demand to plunge at once into the utmost depths of the apparent mysteries of nature. And under sense of development, this leads to a far retreating from the sphere of Man, into even that which concerns making of Worlds—Worlds of Matter as contrasted with those Worlds of Imagination in which religious subjectivity delights itself.—To this new mode of imagery the name of *Astromorphism* may be applied, as signifying

the kind of counter-action that a conscious *Anthropomorphism* feels requisite. The swaying of mental fact in the large oscillation thus procured serves apparently as the true rectifying, without destroying, of the over-impulsiveness, or feminiueness, of first religion.

Astromorphism means the entering on the study of nature at the right end:—*not* with an assuming at the outset that the human Mind was already present before a Body had been prepared to be fit partner to it; but with a patient seeking for the steps by which finally this crowning junction became realized. It is in this way alone that a true Cosmogony, in regard both to Mind and to Body, can be obtained on the terms of Evolution. And if it be the case, as now supposed, that our thought has no power to read nature except by a reflective repetition of nature's own creative course, the matter of the making of Worlds and Stars ought indeed to precede every other operation, mentally as well as actually.—Nor is there anything strained in this theory, if the basis to it already laid may be relied on.

Let us return to the inferred beginning of any kind of cell-formation, with the view of tracing in what way the framing of such cells may supposedly have occurred in regard to the only kind of matter with which mind is directly associated: that is, in regard to the construction of brain-substance. The *motion* in question is but that of *vibration*, which belongs equally to our apprehension of mind and of matter.—The inference that has been made (at p. 501) is, that every initiation of a cell is owing to some accumulating of ultimate vibrations, pervading space, in consequence of some occurring inequality in the amount and distribution of the molecular atoms imagined by science there to exist: the force of such accumulated vibrations being that which must

intrinsic bring about, in every case of its occurrence, the form a settled vortex of motion, such as must act in a draw towards itself of continually more and more of the diffused thickened particles, and therein the producing of bounding circle of these, lying as an outer wall to the spinning whorls which, by their being such, keep the particles from filling up the inner space. But also as easily imagine a similar initiation of whorls: on the one hand as medullary other as defined ideas. Every idea some casual excitement, generally as speedily into a localized agitation in which is lying open to receive its nutriment from our senses. The agitation quickens these, to draw in more and more of the outward stimulant: while its own motive force, all the time, keeps back the desired notion, till precisely the definition comes to it which allows of its being retained in the mind, and so retained as to be rightfully co-ordinated with fellow-ideas. Can this imply other than that actually some material accompaniment to the mental process is in action, depositing in the brain some real though imperceptible record?—Let us however pass on to where the analogy is more open.

In cases where the inner repellent motion is the stronger of the two concerned, the more will the outer levelling force, with its effect of involved increase and hardening to the encrusting shell, be the one surmounted. And from this should ensue that tendency to interior differentiation, the rather than to outer extension, which signifies a final destiny in prospect towards the character of vegetation.—If, however, the reverse case be supposed, where environment retains the upper hand, the encrusting work may be credited to have been able to go on till

the result should be enormous: such, in fact, as we see actually produced in the World we live in, and in the Planets we see above us. The imprisoned whorl of motion is here what serves at once both to give to our common human habitation the means of human subsistence for us, and, more essentially still, to give to the encrusting shell of our globe, not only its rounded form, but also its means both of rotation and revolution,—causing, as we know, the whole variety of temperature and effect of seasons which has made of human life what it is.

If, in a grossly-anthropomorphic fashion, we image world-existence by our own, our globe is a sort of creature, as we have seen, whose limbs are the rocks piled on its surface, while trees are as hairs embedded in its skin. But we may carry this analogy much deeper, and see here actually the true inner system of self-maintenance which serves as parallel to our own blood-circulation. Namely, in the impulse which makes it turn in mass round and round on itself, giving *to itself* a main *axis*, permanent although fluctuating, and which does this on an in-seated “motive,” alternately centripetal and centrifugal, truly answering to our mental qualities of introspection and extraspection!—By the force of this bold parallel, we seem indeed to gain a palpable insight into a *cause* for that junction of rotation with revolution which is the law of planets.

In the Astronomy which attaches to Astromorphism the *axis* which belongs to planets is the fruit, and not the source, of their two-fold movement: while the cause of the fluctuation in the latter, which induces final Day-and-Night and Summer-and-Winter, is the inclination towards reigning objects in the firmament which in different modes is drawn forth by successive presentation

amidst the matter.—As to any object that is near enough and small enough to treat in a common way, we take it up in our hand and turn it on all sides to effect our purpose with it: or, if the object be an idea, we revolve it round and round. But if the object be too large or too distant to admit of this, we are forced to take the movement on ourselves, of whatever kind be required.—All things are idealized into a living creature, the huge influences above is a true seal of life, of light and warmth which the celestial planet must both turn itself round and also course around its celestial object, keeping alive.

There are several ideals to which this supremely, it applies to the idea of Deity; and secondarily it does so to the ideas of Space and Time. Many smaller ideals are indeed not excluded from the sphere of the astromorphic symbol: seeming sprinkled like minor stars in the heavens, for compass-signs to generalizing thought:—as, for instance, ideals of Life and Death, of Power, or of Spiritual Loveliness:—but the grand triad reigns apart, above all. These three are known of peculiarity as endowed with the dual capability of at once being Stars and Worlds: Stars, for our intellect to delight in; Worlds, for our emotions to live in:—but, with again dual difference between Deity and the other two. Deity is so immensely more emotive than intellectual to us, that rather than a Star it is a dazzling Sun, filling our daily life with active cheer: while Space and Time are in place in our mental night.—The ideal of Space, when it had once been swelled by thought-accretions into the magnitude of a Star-World, became the mental basis of universal conceptions as to contemporaneous contents

of diffused existence: and hence was our informing light to every possible philosophic mode of science. The ideal of Time, when in the ascendant, is philosophic basis to all knowledge whatever concerned with History and Development. But the ideal of Deity, or of Self-existent Beinghood, underlies all imaginable philosophy.

Astromorphism accepts only the true Astronomy which is Copernican, and not Ptolemaic. Being the product of Self-consciousness, it emphasizes as its own the full perception that all *form* given to knowledge is the reflected result of the formation effected in the mind itself. And naturally, in consequence, is the course of outward eventuation, thus repeated, shown always as subject to reversion. Sun and Stars, in the heaven of thought, must inevitably travel deceptively. They must seem to rise in the West, and to set in the East.

The oscillation thus portrayed is however but the feminine one: swaying largely as it does between the extremes of mental habitude. The scientific or masculine side of mind needs a method that shall at once be less rash and more accurate. And this requirement corresponds to the existence in nature of two modes of creation which may aptly be considered as intermediate to the two considered. After Planets had been provided, and before Mental beings had been produced,—idealistically repeated in Astromorphism and Anthropomorphism,—there were created the two classes of Plants and of the low Animal or semi-vegetal type of life, which afford an apt complimentary oscillation: calling forth, as to symbolism, the respective names of *Dendromorphism* and *Chelonormorphism*.—We will now take these two in turn: in view to learn how far actually they are at work in the scientific thought of to-day.

The Tree-image abounds both in abstruse literature and in the commonest speech of mankind. Nor is it difficult to see the reason of this, when we consider the bearing of it. The symbol is the express rendering of the idea of Growth. It signifies the due furnishing of a stock of vegetable substance by the means of spreading branches, like tree-arms and fingers, also qualified as mouths, which grasp at and suck in outlying nutriment: the stock being held fast for the purpose by lower limbs, *not* adapted, like the legs of animals, for locomotion, but only for a firm hold on the ground beneath. It embodies expressly the idea of that production of a stem by the means of successive layers of plant-substance elaborated in leaves, which exactly represents the process of all kinds of development which thought can either fancy or discern. No growth of any kind is rightly such to our ability of conception, except as laid out in this Tree-wise. That is, on the terms of modern science of vegetation.

It was not so indeed formerly. Not far back from the present time, a Tree meant the kind of stock which itself was the source to its own leaves and its own roots. This was the reverse view to the true one which needed here to be undergone, just as in Astronomy the system of Copernicus had to be antedated by that of Ptolemy. But in that first stage, the true "consciousness" of the subject was wanting: and therefore was no adequate comprehension then attainable.

Let us take for our example of the usage of Dendromorphism that most necessary idea, to all of us in present times, of the "human race." Could we reason at all—let us ask ourselves,—about human beings in a general sense if we had not such image in presence?—Obviously, the "race" is the *stock* indeed imaginary, but none the less of most real implication, which is ever

newly supplied by successive layers or generations of human beings, some of which act as leaves and others as mere roots. And obviously, also, has the general stock of the human race been made out by the various "races" that have been formed and have *branched* out from it; and by the renewing fruit that has ever germinated from the branches.—But a better still example, for the purpose of explanation, is that of the manifested growth of Knowledge, in a general sense of the word. Here precisely we may come to an availing *type* as to the action of this mode of symbolism.

The quest of Knowledge implies first an impulsively-sentient basis within us, *desiring* successive items of knowledge; and secondly, the ability of outwardly-turned Observation. But it also implies, as a rightfully consecutive operation, the adjusting of new items to the body of those already stored: which is the effort of assimilation. Nor can this be carried out to any purpose but by the aid of a practical Experimenting with the quality of the supplied matter, which involves the very grasp of attained knowledge which is as truly an act of rootage as is the prior action that of leafage. All gained knowledge must be firmly posited on what previously has been verified by tested Observation and Experience.—But from this we may go on to mark out Growth in especially three departments, inevitably producing themselves, accordantly with the enhancing quality of Leafage. The Tree's primal leaves, which are for seed to it,—connecting the new character of a Tree with that of anterior Plants, and farther every layer of Tree-produce with the layer parent to it,—are but what we call botanically "cotyledons": the first issue of which projects downwards, to take its hold on earth, which being done, an answering issue starts upward in the

proper manner of leaves:—after which, the only leading event is the important one of leaves changing into severally the stamens and pistils which belong to flowers and fruits. This last “crisis” in Tree-life is the filling up of Tree-character; as the lower “crisis” is the real starting of Tree-life. Hence the first stage may be well marked by the title of *pre-metamorphic*; the second by that of “*pre- & post-metamorphic*.”

But let us assume an exemplifying, bound our view to one special knowledge, and let us select that one best which is Religious Knowledge. The first of this is the mere pre-religion of Fear, worked by fear, treating God as no other than an inflictor, and a gloomy Tyrant over men. The second, of *pre-metamorphism*, or the stage of proper leafage, is that where Religion was laid up in relatively barren dogmas, representing God as an Autocrat over-ruling us from an outside station by the means of inflexible laws, which however lean mainly towards beneficence. The third, or *post-metamorphic* stage, is that where Religion has centered itself inwardly in us, giving us the consciousness respecting it of its being wholly, under God's direction, the product of the nature that by God has been planted in us.

It has been just said, as to original cell-formation, that the extent of inwardly-centered force over that which bestows outward casing, marks the destiny of the cell towards the plan of vegetal being as opposed to the planetary destination. But we require now to note that the main stem of plants is still of the very nature of an *axis*, which was produced in rolling worlds on the very account of the spinning vortex there imprisoned. The fact of the tree-axis being held firmly to ground by its

lower branches (or lower limbs) gives to actual trees, and to "trees" produced in symbolism, a safely-positied foundation on the strength of which interior organization is led on to effect itself.—And now an awaiting difference is promoted which is all-important in symbolism, as truly as it is so in physical creation. Namely, that main differentiation which in animals, as cosecutive to vegetables, shows clearly in the character of Sexhood, only hinted at in the earlier state, but still even there with true preparation for what Sex has thenceafter to become.

A Tree that has capacity to bear fruitage has the evident sign of Sexhood which is shown in a respective prevalence of root-and-pistil formation over leaf-and-stamen formation, or the reverse. But it has a farther sign which is more to the present purpose, in the prevailing character of the *stem*, which is the general incorporation of tree-functions. That is, in the distinction of *endogenous* or *exogenous* construction. Here exactly is the vegetable respondent to that sign of true Sexhood of Mind which cousists in the alternative dominance of Introspection and Extraspection. Endogenous plants develop inwardly; and in so doing give pre-eminence to the soft *alburnum*, qualified with rich feminine impulse; the opposed class gains a masculine vigour out of the higher importance of its hardened *liber*: while only as lying between the two can each layer of new wood be produced. And the two-fold effect in general has the same parallelism. The natural character of the minds of women, bending inwards, is such as brings forth cereals and grasses and palms; that of the minds of men, stretching outwards and less restrainedly, has the much more ostensible and more effective kind of growth attached to exogens.

The entering on the plan of animal beinghood is indeed

every way implicated in the matter of Sex-production. The passage out of plant-life into animalism is first marked by the new power of locomotion: or rather, by the return to the planetary power of movement on new and much heightened terms—seeing that the combination of “centrifugal and centripetal” is carried out better, however to a certain extent, in the inward pulse-like or pendulum-like movement of the heart, serving as the in-seated spring of motion. The power of locomotion is seen by science to have the effect of Sex, driving opposites to their proper places. Locomotion, with power of negative attraction, is present in both inner and outer constitution. Whether all that goes to the new type of being is due to Sex, Science has been recently well generalizing on the composite circumstance: the result of which truly is the eminent illustration to be seized on for the type of mentalism now in question. That is, for a rightful counterpart to the symbolic form of *Dendromorphism*. This appears rightly furnished in the type here named *Chelonormorphism*.

The idea here intended to be incorporated is that of Natural Selection: which, as has been shown, does truly work principally through the fact of Sex. The doctrine of “Selection,” if not *crudely* anthropomorphic, is yet such to a sufficient degree to make it serve of right in the place of a *religion* for science. It is far from the gross Pantheism which would identify Deity with Nature. It takes Deity on confessedly the low level by which Deity is simply made to stand for an *average* condition of existent products of nature. That is, it acknowledges for the working principle in creation the mode of agency of the sort of being that lies midway in rank between planets and human beings:—whence the focussed pivot of creative action falls to be amid the lower or semi-

vegetal kind of animals: creatures that creep and grope about for that which they require, alone able to turn away from what they do not want, and defective wholly of any consciousness in the matter. This is truly the sort of motor agency that has to match with the scientific showing of the equal rank given in nature to mind and matter. And hence the supplementing of Dendromorphism by this generalization of "Selection" is eminently the desirable resource of Science:—provided always it be remembered that the large sphere of thought which by Science is left untouched is precisely what Religion has the right and the ability to deal with.

The apprehension of "Natural Selection" in this form of a motive principle, fitted to an averaged state of general beinghood, implies a sort of following of onward progress that, for all its mere reptile-like groping, answers well to the conscious habit of our own intelligence, in its quest after higher and higher knowledge. The matter of the casting of the average-point is also forced into a mould adapted to intellect by the habitual, though commonly ignored, excluding of accounted "spiritual existence." For the chelonomorphic symboling of nature takes heed of nothing else attached to Mind than truly that power of *domination* over nature which is its intellectual distinction. And in this way of ordering our place in nature (unobjectionable on its own ground), human thought looks objectively on Mind as indeed forming a true subject of correlation with Deity as anthropomorphically estimated: namely, as itself—by the very means of those mental processes of its own, which are no other than repetitions of external ones,—a continual *creator* of the mental *forms* which are its means of over-ruling lower beinghood. Every single human being, in this view, is a true creative centre, of

the kind become required. The conscious sense of each human individual is entitled to affiliate itself on Deity as Creative-Centre in general, on the very strength of the ability of imagination which enables himself to interpret with advantage the works of God.

It may perhaps be said, in fit addition to the foregoing symboling, that the effect of human thought on the creeping image of "Selection" in temporary substitution for that of Deity, is the electrical result of bestowing on the world of mind a *magnetic pole*. Intellect may well stand as the *iron* of the mind: and, as such, it needs truly such settled although moveable point as this is, for the power of giving to investigation its guiding compass.

But the other side of mental being must be now attended to: seeing that Intellect in its higher moods runs inevitably into junction with Emotive Feeling. There needs only farther to note again, as attached peculiarly to the domain of Intelligence, the subtle images, on the one hand of *Personality*, on the other of *Identity*. Both of these have respect to the results of Introspection appropriated by pure Intelligence. The first is the Intellect's comment on the emotively-spiritual correlation of conscious Selfhood with Deity. The second is the note preserved by Intellect of individual correlation with, successively and combinedly, all sorts of fellow-beings.

THE WITNESS OF GOD REVEALED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
OUR AFFECTIONS.

We are now come to the concluding portion of our subject which ought also to be conclusive as to our argument. For it is the emotive side of our mental being which even more than the intellectual ought to testify

to the inevitableness and the indestructibleness of the idea of Deity, as implied in the Uniformity of the plan of nature. We have however gained a bearing to our reasoning which is clear and inevasive. It is on the matter of Sexhood that the chief burden now lies, for the adequate filling up of required proof; and all that hitherto has been secured has tended constantly towards a lightening of the burden so laid.

In now confronting fully, as we must, the idea of Sexhood, and giving to it the high rank of importance it appears to hold in nature, we are forced to apply to it an absolute import. And this involves all that is demanded. Here necessarily is included the recognition that Sex belongs to Mind as much as Body:—but when this is granted, though not before, the idea of Sexhood gains the requisite *integralness* which is the same with *religiousness* of character.

In setting before us Feeling in place of Intellect, our uppermost impression is that of a change of character in our subject from the mode of *activeness* into that of *passiveness*. And this answers to the demand of wholeness in our mental being which is met actually as to general humanity by the division of human beings in two sexes: in regard to which division we are surely well taught by experience that the prevalent excess of Intellect in Men and the prevalent excess of Feeling in Women has been that which has led directly to the mutual dependence of the sexes which has been the cause to humanity of its main strength. But a belief in this as natural fact comes to us only as fruit of Religion: just because it is Religion, and this only, that raises in us integral sentiment.

We have been seeing that the highest glory of In-

tellec has to be felt by its possessor as the rendering him to himself a genuine though partial analogue to his Maker, in the sense of being a true creative centre: or, one that has it in him to diffuse substance from himself as if abroad into the universe. And this in the very way implied of old in his being accredited with rightful sovereignty over lower beings, with moreover, as must now be added, a dominion still more absolute over matter not organized at all.—But as soon as we turn to Feeling for our supplying with her own contribution to the attestation of Deity made by Intellect, required for the filling up of the latter, we are forced to see that the form of proof must be cast anew. The sign of creative Uniformity that has appeared as to Intellect as an *active repetition* of Divine agency, appears now as to Feeling in the opposed form of but a *passive recipiency* of Divine action, attended with only such practical subserviency as at least is not more than semi-active.—And the direct cause for this difference starts to view at first sight. Namely, in the presentation of a circumstance in nature with which Intellect has very little to do, and for any *mastery* to be obtained over which our Intellect is entirely incompetent.

This circumstance, unmistakeably, is the great matter of Death: imposed, as if by inherent Law of things, as accompanier of every kind of individualized being. Wherever appears segregated being, cut off from the general aggregate of beinghood, appears also that attendant on the segregation, of a sooner or later dissolution for it, which is Life's shadow in the form of Death.

In what way shall we regard Death?—This is the great problem of nature which, more than any other, it concerns us to deal with satisfactorily. It concerns our *entire beinghood*:—which in fact is the reason that our

merely thinking power must for ever in regard to it be at fault. All else that is contradictory to us shows sign of being removable, more or less: but as yet we have met with nothing that gives to us any valid assurance as to the power of overcoming Death.—We are not indeed called on to suppose that a victory of this sort is absolutely forbidden to us, as a destined far-off consequence of a much higher than our present stage of development, in store for human nature of the future. But certainly, as things are, it is our best kind of wisdom not to place our dependence on this issue, but to leave it in God's hands to fulfil, or not. And here eminently is the meaning of Religion, that it *should* indeed enable us so to leave it. This, at once, is the authoritative reply which is forthcoming, to the pending query of the whole community of human beings.

None the less, however, is there so much still discoverable to us in the state of things as *ought*, apparently, to satisfy each one of us in regard to a second demand of instinct: and that is, that our being given over, as we are, to the power of Death is not evidence of any quality in the Divine ruling of nature inconsistent with assumable beneficence:—our failure of satisfaction as to which point would indeed sap at foundation the very feeling of Religion that bids us *trust*.—Here, therefore, is distinctly laid out the rich matter now before us. We have now to inquire experientially into the grounds which support *trust*, lying actually on that side of our mental nature where Religion is due to reign: in order that we may trace all that naturally bears on the realizing of this assurance of God's beneficence.—We must indeed to this end bring proper Intellect into our counsel. This follows from the present mode of the interpreting of Deity. But Feeling must be always

umpire at the last. Our problem needs be stated as the simple need of ascertaining, in a way that our reason may agree in being contented with, that in spite of the over-mastering rule of Death, there is enough of good left still in nature to compensate us amply, both for Death as an existent fact, and for our actual inability to see an end to it.

Our argument has to turn on the main circumstance that is surely incontestible, of the inherent connectedness of Death with two other ruling principles which manifestly give to Life its source of energy: the principle of *Struggle*, and that of *Sexhood*. According to the manner and the degree in which these existing counteractions to the sway of Death have served as compensation in regard to it, may we account of all development as real progress. And it is to the examination of the truth of this that we are therefore about to come.—But something first must be looked into of the possible explanation that may be given us to an inquiry inevitable here to arise: *why* these two allowable benefits might not have sufficed alone, *without* Death as their counterpoise, to make up the full condition of progress?—Let us see if the basis already laid as to Intellect may not answer us still as to our Emotionalism, in the way of produced secondary causation. Namely, in showing how in fact *except for* conjunction with Death, neither Sexhood nor a state of Struggle would seem—according to, at all events, present knowledge,—to have had the means of existing.

If we consider the present meaning of the Life-Struggle affecting human beings in general, we cannot help seeing that it arises from the inequality in their general conditions. But if we carry back this thought into our reasoned lowest stage of all existence, we may

surely reach a true inference showing *cause* for the Life-Struggle's being partnered as it is with the accompaniment of subjection to Death. In the imagined initiation of the cell-unit of all formative composition, the condition of "inequality" was supposed present as underlying everything of development:—however or whence-ever its presence rose. We cannot, in fact, think of such a thing as development if atoms and primæval waves of motion be supposed to have had nothing of variation among one another. We cannot fancy any aggregation being set up, of particles whether of matter or of motion, except under pressure of some particular inducement, acting as *from* some one particle or set of particles, *on* another particle or set of particles:—which implies domination and compulsion. If there had *not* been variation, they must surely have remained all alike in perpetuity just where they stood at first. The condition would have been—not Death as we know it, but a something incomparably more intolerable to think of, as an *universal deadness*.—Let us pass, then, to consider, as best we may, how primæval inequality, being present, must have worked.

It must surely have worked in producing that limited command over the means of subsistence which is precisely the implication of our actual idea of Death.—And moreover it must obviously have done this in the two-fold manner which again is the implied meaning of Struggle:—seeing that the primary Struggle with environment for the mastering of an inward store of material, must immediately have been followed up by— or perhaps causatively made to attend on—a harder Struggle with rival strugglers.—But is it possible, in such case, that an immense majority of competitors should have failed to be starved off, or more probably

swallowed up into the substance of the few successful?—And if so, where possibly can it be imagined that this office of extermination should have ended, through development's entire course?—An universal liability to extinction, and an universal liability to Struggle, seem indeed but reversed sides to one thing: that is, to a circumstantial inequality.

But shall we say that, on the face of the matter, a state of Struggle does not bear the stamp of blessing?—Why, besides all the energy it has given to us in our course of life, and all the virtues of hardihood and courage it has imparted to us, we have been seeing that it has wrought in us our whole ability of Intellect:—since, what else but struggle, of mental sort, is that action of *comparing* and *contrasting* ideas, which is the life-blood of Intellect!—Man's wrestling with circumstance—not only in the Israel-struggle as with Deity, but also in the human struggle with fellow-beings,—may truly be admitted to have won a blessing; and moreover to have done this in the *only* way conceivable of the blessing's winning.

And still more is this apparent in regard to Sexhood. This third element in beinghood is clearly what has been, ever since its first manifesting in development, our indubitable source of blessing. The turning of general Struggle into this “select” fashion of Struggle, has as much served the Affective side of our nature as the endowing us with mental power of Comparison has served us intellectually.—Originally, it is true, Sexhood was, and was obliged to be, only latent as to its proper character. Nor, it may be said, has it yet arrived at an aspect that may be assumed as the fulfilling of such character. But still, enough of this has been shown all along to warrant us in adjudging it, as is now done,

for a prevailingly beneficent counteraction to the otherwise reigning factor, of a state of Struggle.

The effect thus produced on the general Struggle is that which should prove ultimately to be a sorting of human beings into two equal classes, capable of fair mutual contest, and capable at the same time of mutual concord. And though this effect was far from being such as to be thus thought of through an incalculably long period of development, yet it seems to be even palpably foreshown in the state of virtual origin now supposed. That is, in regard to the two functions of self-maintenance and re-production which are called in question with regard to Sex. Self-maintenance was going on long before any time when we can think of it as a "function"; and so, and on the same account, did re-production precede actually what we may take as its sign of functional beginning:—while the actual premonitory sign as to both lies precisely in the "male" character of the function of self-maintenance, and the "female" character of the function of re-production. A mountain, standing firm on its widened basis, is fit type for the former; a tree, bursting out all over into buds and side-offshoots, is fit type for the other:—while even the mountain, none the less, has the habit when over-piled with material of over-flowing downwards into little hills, settling round it, or extending into a chain. And even the primæval cell has its mark of the same kind: namely, in the encouragement, so to speak, that is given by every one that is once formed to the congregating of others about it. If we think of this fact from the first cell's point of view, surely this might be claimed for a re-producing of itself: though indeed as yet without encroachment on the retained power of maintaining itself. —But when development had advanced to the rightful

term for the great dualism of Sex to begin, which ever after had the destiny to take lead over every other kind of dualism, the event well may be interpreted as that joining of the settled habit of the mountain with the settled habit of the tree which may have caused—as in reason it *ought* to have caused,—a true link of connection for the formal issue as to each and both of the two formative parents. And this is all that evolutionism need demand. The once-attained linking of consecutive individuals in a line that as to the race is indispensably to be kept unbroken, is the true substratum to all whatever that belongs to a sure reading of the course of both the race and the individual.

The general fruit of Sexhood, when this is viewed in the present light of inherent oneness with a state of Struggle and of Death, is at once explicable as the producer of the power of *Love*. And Love is to our nature its proper Chemistry, endowing it with the vital warmth and geniality that are alike necessary to us as to body and as to mind.

Love, as consequent on Sexhood, is evolutionally but the form which the original whorl of motion puts on at the time when organic being has been established. The sacred fire of Love, as it is well called in natural poetry, is that which indeed accounts for our life's being the ever-pulsating oscillation that it is, held in balance by two opposing but harmonious compulsions. The force of Intellect, leading on to proper Science, and adapted more to Men than to Women,—the force of Feeling, ever tending to Religion, and adapted more to Women than Men,—are each of them made by nature the immediate creative action towards the force opposite. Both work in the creative mode of re-action: Intellect being a

constant minister to Feeling, and Feeling a constant motive to Intellect. But Love was the first starter of the alternation: while the primary recognition as to Sexhood has all the world of causative meaning that the interfusing of opposed conditions implies.

The proper action of Intellect, as we have seen, is that of a comparing of objects. And Love also works by comparing. Love also is without action excepting as it acts by selection, out of some number of offered objects: which indeed it has to wait for, owing to its native passiveness of habit, till of themselves they come forward towards it. And Nature herself, who is the agent to bring such forward, may be accredited with the same action of comparison, with view to her own general selection. How else than by as if a human balancing of considerations, or a wavering between oppositely-desirable effects, can we think of her as being finally determined on the different modes of being we find existent? We may as naturally think of Nature as *comparing*, as we do by our own instinct often think of her as *loving* her productions,—or, it may be, as *not* loving them: seeing that many of them are being constantly thrown away by her as worthless, instead of being entered into her ordered plan.

And herein becomes prominent that need of "forms" which has driven Intellect into its practice of Symbolism: showing "forms of thought" to be as indispensable as "forms of being."—A *doctrine of Sexhood* cannot be other than a *doctrine of Forms*. The very meaning of Sexhood, in its present generalized aspect, is that of a realistic provision for precisely the interfusion of elements which is the law of nature's plan. Sex, in regard to Mind as much as Body, is the apparently-inevitable result of the two kinds of inclusive incorporation which the natural

dualisms concerned seem to involve: as in consequence of opposed proportions being taken up of the dualistic elements whose entire interfusion has to go to the making up of a human being. The two-fold assortment thus compelled, in so immensely-complicated an interfusion, should manifestly require on each side a containing limit in physical incorporation. Whole Man and whole Woman are such in being bounded by "*personality*": and the very term of "*persona*" implies a Mind that is well encased in a Body. The mental wholeness of each phase of human nature must be fitted with its own special kind of *mask*, duly moulded for each on the needed side of the always two-fold condition of individuality. And the moulding office is the very process of the giving to our individuality its ideal "form."

Now the interfusion of elements that has been wrought out for the common Intellect of Men and Women has been peculiarly effected by the passing of primal Symbolism into direct forms of Speech. The select instrument of Intellect has been *grammatic language*. What then should have happened with Feeling?—Feeling has required, and in requiring has obtained, a quite different kind of forms. Feeling is led by nature to express itself by movements much more general than those which mould sounds into words. It speaks by soundless movements of the whole body, if called forth suddenly and trivially; but if otherwise induced, and by a deepened incentive, it requires indeed the movement of all general life-action. Here is the point close to our purpose. The *language* that belongs to Feeling is silent practical *conduct*: truly capable of repeating the "dramatic force" of the verbal symbols of the intellectual childhood and also of the rude womanhood of mankind. But this "language of Feeling," in its very being such, demands its own *grammar*: and here

we have the "lead" we are in need of. The lingual parallel brings us straight into that province of *Sociology-and-Morality* where the very "forms" we are seeking are to be obtained.

The regulator of social "conduct" which answers duly to the regulator of speech, is that law over the "manner" of social being which the term "Morality" stands for; while the regulator of the required "form" of society is Sociology, in most intimate relation with Morality. "Sociology" implies a settled ordination of the condition of any State as under an accepted code of laws: the laws themselves being the proceed from a long-enduring *habitude* as to social "manners."—Let us take the related matters in junction, that we may aim to trace how the regulative principle should work.

The principle required seems indeed to be only such as but adapts to present purpose the main law of developmentalism as to the relation between *function* and *organism*. Developmentalism claims, in opposition to all previous acceptance, that it is function which comes first and organism which follows after:—and this with the inevitable implication that the first is proper *cause* to the second; and also with the understanding of a sufficiently-continued *habit* in the exercise of function. The special *doctrine of forms* that should befit at once Sociology and Morality appears to be here supplied, if duly supplemented by the dendromorphic rule of growth. Let us take the course of sociologic formation under tree-figuring, and the growing process shows at once as the following. — Emotion, being the motor agent throughout, is the store of *sap* in the tree, tending ever by native impulse to spread outwards, both upwards and downwards. As to the roots which are

thus produced, the effect of form remains latent, or limited to the tree's self-apprehension. But as to *leaves*, the diffusion of sap-ful substance is the tree's whole ostensible make-up. According as the leaves are little or abundantly filled out, the stem is poorly or amply organized. And as to the tree-stages concerned, the cotyledonous one prior to the first "crisis" means the state of semi-brutal humanity when Struggle was unalleviated by Sexhood;—the pre-metamorphic one was the period of long social experimenting, by internal self-struggling, as to the quality that should be that of the Sex-dualism to come, of which now it had premonition;—the final, or post-metamorphic, is—not yet as truly furnished, but still as set in distinct lineament,—the adequate condition where due assortment can be made for the varying principles of Morality springing severally out of Science and Religion. This is the sexualizing of Morality. And the social forms which are here involved are those of the proper "State," or *State of Nation*, and the *State of Family*.—When sociologic development shall have accommodated itself adequately to this two-fold formation, so essentially accordant with the general plan of nature, then, but not before, social principle can be allowed, by tree-rule, to have come to its ripe maturity.—The Form, all along, precedes progress in Organism. And the enriching of the inner *sap* of Emotion is, both alternatively and coincidentally, the agency both of *cause* and *effect*.

We cannot reach the idea of a "human being," as we have just seen, except by first typesying the "human form"; and neither the one nor the other is accessible except through an effected dualism. Here, accordingly, is the needful genesis of this double moulding of the social status. The interfusion of elements that is called for in the mental aggragation demanded, is forced here,

just as there, to have a duplex limitation. No otherwise than thus could the mingling of functional operations be so needfully supported by an outward fulcrum as to realize the condition of human beinghood.

And by the working of this natural rule,—involving, as it does, at once the spiritualizing and the materializing and the sexualizing of aimed-at “forms,”—Religion’s self shares the benefit of mature idealism, in precisely the due separating of it from Science. Religion’s self is now adequately sexualized, for the first time, through the proper feminineness now involved in the conditionment allotted to her, and in the special *passiveness* of sentiment enforced on her. In the Family the leading moral requirement is to submit to God, and carry out the ordination of natural Providence. Feeling, by her predominance, forbids us to try and imitate Deity as Intellect urges us to do, in the way of a creating of ourselves, but charges us to wait and be created. And the “forms” here required must be such exclusively as only “Providence” can have brought about, and *not* such as the interhuman struggling that belongs to Nationalism can wring out:—which indeed is the lesson all-important to be heeded by sociologists. No action of direct thought can give state-constitution to the Family:—as neither in fact can it do this to any extent to even the Nation. In both cases, though pre-eminently for the former, human passions that have been long propagated from generation to generation are the prime movers. Human thought, only as acting in the same way, raises truly its own “forms,” but they are still such as often Nature makes havoc with; though finally she does select from them what she adopts as her own, and proves that she adopts by fructifying them—which is her only way of authorizing human products.

But still, as we have yet to see, the due integral separation of the two States, as their proper sexualization, has been plainly brought about by an integral struggle between themselves. The more we question human history the more do we see of this conflict, ever in process since first in the remote depths of eventuation we may account of both as originating. And the point here of importance to note is that origin as to both is a thing *common* to both. Only after the stock of both, as a common one, had first branched, and next branched to full sexual sufficiency, could the due integral struggle begin. But now, as to ourselves, we may surely say both that it actually has begun, and that herein have we the means that only we could have had, of interpreting the whole course of Sociologic and Moral Formation.

Let us carry this mingled matter of Statehood to its only true court of appeal. Let us go with it straight to Nature, that she herself may explain to us the reason, at once of the "common origin" for the two forms which is shown in history, and for their having needed to ripen out in division.

We may assuredly hold as truth that all advance of humanity has depended on the extent to which the Affections, now within us, have superseded brutal Passions, in the supplying of needful "motive" to human action. What do we know, then, about the cause of the Affections?—Certainly, we have to find this in the condition of things we live under; which is that of the ordained plan of *generational succession*, following on Death as coincident with Sexhood.

There are no possible other modes of Affection than those which arise out of Sexhood, or *Conjugalitv*, and *Parenthood*: though there must be allowed for a certain

range of variation, according with the point of view the concerned relations are regarded from. The conjugal relation is, obviously, one thing to the Husband, and another to the Wife; the generational relation is one thing to the Parent, and another to the Child. And the same variableness, as at least it concerns sex, is attached also to the relation and to the affection of *Brotherhood*, which the two others involve. But here the distinctiveness ends. No other relations than these three, and therefore no other distinct affections than are here supplied, have had the means of belonging to us. — Still already is there here present such occasion of assortment as we are in quest of. And that is, in regard to the open question of whether Brotherhood should be reckoned, from its secondariness to the primal set of relations, of a lower or a higher character than these.— It has been the demand for a true settling of this question that, in fact, seems to have been working all along towards the originating and developing of at once the Nation and the Family.

To the ripe feeling of the present day Brotherhood is fully stamped as the mode of sentiment alone appropriate to the bond of Nation; just as, contrarily, the prime affective triad of Conjugality and Parenthood and Filiality is owned inseparable from the bond of Family: and this without omission, though with inclusion but contingent, of also Brotherhood. But may we not likewise say, as to modern judgment, that the arrangement as to order of rank must be left purely with Religion and Astromorphism, where “lower and higher” are terms without meaning? Both Religion and Astromorphism treat only of a just Balance.— Let us take it then as settled that a relative equality between the two states, as to intrinsic importance, lies naturally in the inferrible

design of things : while that "relative equality" is such as points truly to the whole difference between Religion and Secularity, as to which indeed is the question "open" to each human individual.

On this basis we must argue, that the raising of each kind of social "form" was from the first a true parallel to the physical creation of the "human form." Without a fitting Body, we are obliged to assume that we are obliged to assume that a Mind could as such have been produced. Further, is it not needful to assume that a substantial incorporate organization, in order to have been produced the mental habits of a union which we account of as defined social matter in present Social morality, that the true result of National congregation is the establishment of a reigning principle in the notable tri-une form of demanded "*Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.*" Here is the true religionism of Secularity. But this doctrine is no older than yesterday. And why so, unless it be for the reason that, until now, mankind have been trying to maintain specially here the incongruous doctrine of Parentalism? Or, let us rather say, from the facts of the case, the doctrine of sole Paternity. Only by the means, precisely, of a fighting of this matter out, between the respective claimant forms, seems the product in social virtue to have been realized.

As to the exclusive right in Parenthood given to Fatherhood, here is sign of the newness of that idea of justice to Women, which again it belongs rather to Religion than Secularity to set on foot. Under the bond of Family, Sex-difference is all-important ; but under bond of Nation it were apparently for the best that it should be entirely ignored. Brotherhood has no need to account of Sex : as actually the term of "fraternity"

passes over it, covering equally Sisters and Brothers. Secularity ought to regulate social beings as simply *male and female men*.—But, none the less, Secularity, on its own account, may and ought to draw advantage out of its intercourse with Domesticity, in that inter-division of its self-government which appoints a *Church*, to afford a feminine response to its own express Statehood.

The state of Family, as the proper soil of the Affections, where alone they are produced and where alone they can be efficiently cultivated, has endowed our emotive nature with the sense of "*home*." The state of Nation gives to us, in return, the sense of "*country*": a parallel integration, but as much weakened as it is widened in its import. "Patriotism" is diluted Love: wholly short, as emotive produce, of the Love that is genuine;—and it is indeed but a poetic version of the latter, however capable, as it yet is, of an intense realism of its own kind. And for both kinds of Love, the anthropomorphic and the real, there exists actually in nature a proper source. That is, a common element of what must count as *pre-affection*.

Such common element appears in that tacit feeling of unconscious and mere level enjoyment which springs out of the very habit of gregariousness which we inherit from brutes. This ability of placid content in nothing else than the companionship of fellows underlies equally the Family and the Nation: and it may even be tracked down to a beginning nearly as early as that of vortices and molecules. For surely, long before any appearing of Sex, or of any state in which Sex could exist, there needs be recognized that *desirableness* in community of mere position which, by nature's rule, had to induce later the *sense* of its being such, in creatures that were destined for sensation: since, already in the first con-

gregating, if not of atoms yet at all events of cells, there must have been afforded some kind of sustaining stability to each one, which well may stand, in our view of nature, as *cause* to the entire development to follow. The beneficial gregariousness we are now accustomed to, as attending on and mildly softening the general struggle of life, is to be taken as resting on such a causative fact, in which the true thread of connection with all the elements of development that has accrued to it: while the result of all the enrichment is before us in the form of *Sympathy*,—root of *Friendship*,—in which is of actual object, but always ready for the enjoyment of any object.

This emotive principle gives reason for both the Nation and the Family. It supplies relatively the internal excitation which by the meeting with external counteraction has successively produced in nature, first cells, then worlds, then trees, creeping things, and freely-moving animals, and lastly, the Mental beings who are fitly furnished with the duplex human form: and the arrival at the latter speaks to reason as an inevitable compulsion on mankind thence to raise, on their own account, the social repetition of their own structure which should, by its own two-fold formation, confess to the common origin of the social forms.—As to the Nation, the almost-level excitation of general *Sympathy* has but drawn around itself a bounding wall at such distance from its mental centre as indeed allows for the inner freedom here desirable: while even this remote bound has served the final end of nationality, in affording to the enclosed strugglers for self-maintenance just the aid that may enable them to draw from the worldly strife its utmost possible amount of good, in eliminating to the utmost its amount of evil.—As to the Family, where

emotive agitation is at its height, and the boundary is almost close upon the centre, the concentration of Sympathy gains the efficacy that may indeed soften down all contentiousness that is domestic into a genial ground for the great work of re-production.—And the two forms in no way hinder, but exactly promote, one another. The bond of Family, if we refer it to the tree-type, is to social beinghood its proper cellular tissue. The bond of Nation is the bark-integument which affords a protective covering to the general mass.

Without National Statehood there could be no such system of legalism as belongs to the Morality that is secular. The very meaning of a "country" is that of a fixed understanding as to the points that are "accounted" as implied: and the chief of these is the accepted mode of self-government, by the means of which alone it can keep on the outside of it all undesired members who might otherwise rush in to share its benefits. The low-affective quality of general Sympathy, and the stable fulcrum to social action afforded in an ordained State-law, give to a "country" as it were a social *will*, empowering it to reject any offered accretions it is indisposed to assimilate. And hence the rightful negativity of social legalism. The morality of Statehood leaves untouched all the inner growth of humanism: supposing always that this has right and has power to proceed in its own way, and that here what makes function of Statehood is but that of the preventing of mutual hindrance as to this among its members:—"keep from this, and keep from that, and then grow and enjoy your beinghood as you best can."—But with the Family, the case is at once the same and quite different. Instead of mere negative restriction, all needs to be positive encouragement: and this, just because it is here that

the immediate human consciousness is addressed. The law of Nation treats men in a mass; the law of Family is set expressly to the moulding of individuals. If the principle of Nationality should ever fail, social freedom would sink down into unbridled licence. If the principle of the legal Family should give way, what must follow would be inherent disintegration. Mankind would become a mere number of men, little moulded and scarcely separable, heaped together. All fine peculiarities of disposition, now derived from all-sided domestic influences, would be speedily toned down to a very poor uniformity. Human beings would at once tend to be nothing more than component parts of society.

But the great regulator of Morality, even in both spheres, is Religion: by the means of its own peculiar "forms." Even as to the secular department, Morality has been engendered not exclusively, though prevailing, by that experience of "utility" which affords its masculine parentage, but also by the motherliness of intuitional idealism. Not else could human beings have learned the way to place trust in one another. But in life domestic the female or ideal parentage is self-evident.

The best mode of religious thought which has ever yet been attained by mankind is that which embodies the idea of Deity under the form of an Universal Father: understood as backed by the supplementary image expressing the human sense of the Motherliness of common Nature:—the inherent feminineness of Religion being that which compels the Divine Parentage into the male aspect.

This being recognized, we see at once how no possible extension of Nationality could erase the barrier which confines worldly Statehood to the sphere of Brotherhood.

No imaginable Nation, laid out on terms of "law," could be so devised as to include all mankind.—But the Family, closely-bounded as it is, does truly bear respect to an ordination of nature which most certainly is universal in its sway, as that of the common law of generation, taken as of equal mental and physical application. There is but wanting as to Family the same human recognition of the need for "terms of law," conventionally agreed on, which has been long acquiesced in as to Nations. A body of domestic legalism is called for just as much, and on just the same account, as is that which gives to Nations their respective "constitutions."

And this brings us straight to the special office of Religion which as to practical life must count as primary. That is, in regard precisely to the power of "trust" in one another required by men when they congregate together. All deliberately-associated numbers of men have felt the need of some certified basis of agreement between the parties or different classes concerned; and the constant mode of the obtaining of this security has lain, from earliest ages to the present day, with a formal appeal to Deity, as recognized at the time. This is the import of the *oath*; which appears to have soon degenerated into becoming so familiar to the lips of men as to be almost a part of common speech when mutual concern was in question, and was at all events indispensable in any direct bargaining. Gradually the oath became reserved for alone such occasions as those where infringement of pledged word was as hard to be prevented as the need of its preventing was imminent. And this must have happened principally with the election or acceptance of rulers, either warlike or civil.—With ourselves, indeed, the "oath" has so far done the

work that belongs to it of the promoting of mutual "trust," by its concrete substantiation of the abstract sense of *truth*, that its use seems limited to the first appointing of any social incorporation, and pre-eminently to the laying down of a legal national constitution.— And this is paralleled, as to the Family, in precisely the form of Marriage, where the connubial oath, softened down into a "vow," is by the essence of it pointed necessarily towards Deity. The more that Divine rule applies for us to the ordering of successive generations, the more must the bond of Marriage absorb into itself, evidently, all practical religious obligation.

The Family has had truly no real institution at all excepting since Marriage was first admitted, by the consent of all civilized mankind, to require a full legal establishment: and this in the rightful dualism of import, uniting sanction of fellow-citizens with an assumable authorizing by Deity. Previously to this very recent ordination, the Family was of right no more than pre-existent. There was no "bargaining" made possible, as is needful, between the subjects of Marriage, because as yet the so-called Family had but *one* head. The Husband bought his Wife of her Father, and having paid for her counted her, and her children with her, as his own.— And even this state of pre-existence lies well within the term of open history: as counting from the time when the Father was first duly admitted to be essential to the formation of a Family. Before this, the domestic life indeed was on the plan of mere animalism; as, also, Religion was mere fetishism.

Only in this way appears to have been ripened for us a real *conscience* respecting Marriage, in the true sense of its binding voluntary agents into an obedient ministration of the Divine "purpose" of bringing con-

stantly into being a better and better order of human beings.

Conscience means the recognizing of *duty*: while *duty* has no meaning except as implying an admitted *debt*, *owed* to God.—And have we not actually in the very matter of the oath-appeal, as thus started, an afforded insight into the real spring of the sense of *duty*, and thus in general of what we know as the *moral sense*?—The case is that of such intrinsic necessity and simplicity as suggests, for its only rightful explanation, a figuring by direct mathematics. The very act of looking up to common authorization on the part of opposed contractors implies the common angle of vision which as to each must have yielded rudiments for the idea of *justice*: and this the more in proportion as the contractors, instead of two, became numerous. The two or many-sided appeal implies intrinsically that for each separate contender there is equal chance of support from the ruling power: and here at once is the image of *perpendicularity* and of *rectangularity* which is at root of all the moral conceptions of *justness* and of *righteousness* and *uprightness* which furnish our moral sense.—Nor could the image thus looked up to be any less than supreme Deity: rendered such by the urgent purpose of the appealers. The recourse to the proper form of the oath is essentially monotheistic; and to this mark of true religiousness it adds the farther one of bearing always on the furnishing of a settled law of moral contract with Deity. This was later made out, in due time, by the Hebrew people. And the cause for its previous absence was the same as that which gave yet no more than *Totems* as the only Godhead yet regarded.

The fetish worship of Totems supplied only such objects of appeal as had no means of drawing to them

common up-turned vision : being, as they were, purely relative to each regarnder. And this is only the same thing for the worshippers as their total destitution of Morality : the adding of which into *pre-religionism* was the needed thing to make the latter Religion. It was the ideal form of *Justice* (or of *accuracy*), when gained by them, that must first have put it into their minds to be *just* to one another :—how else could they have learned to think of this?—We seem driven in fact on the astromorphic analogy of seeing here a true virtual repetition of that joining of “rotation” and “revolution” which alone affords practically to solar planets any advantage out of their Sun !

The idea of God was found *useful* by mankind, in the very best sense of usefulness, from the first dawn of its arising on human thought.—Let us only be convinced of this, and we may see a way through the deepest mazes of theology.

Our clue is become this :—so long as Totem-worship endured, the only sign of any moral incentive was awakened *fear*, entertained on each separate account of worshippers : which was truly but a *pre-existent* conscience.—To this beginning the only adequate counter-action, as we are now aware, was that turning of the dread of personal penalty into a conception of universal advantage which should end in showing God as a common Father of mankind. But as yet the realm of affective impulse of abstract kind was unopened. And hence was needed to be interposed that view of God as a stern Despot which was afforded, representatively, by Hebrew legalism. In no way, in fact, can we really estimate the latter, and feel the grandeur of the world-position of their lawgiver than by a plunging into the gloomy depths of antecedent superstition.

In tribes of earlier date than the Hebrew, and of naturally inferior formation, the stock was furnished by *race* with such exclusiveness that every member of the tribe was supposed lineal descendant of a worshipped founder, in manifest prefigurement of the state of Family. But this implied the grossness of gods living among men on human terms; and the idea was vehemently repudiated by Moses, and the prophets who came after him:—"ye thought that I was altogether such an one as yourselves." Thus, while Abraham was duly honoured as the people's patronymic head, there were joined in the same character also his son and his grandson; as if by already a precocious insight into the modern doctrine of generationism—though indeed with an obvious reference to the excluding from the chosen stock first the children of Ishmael and then those of Esau.—And it was not Abraham himself, even as linked thus with Isaac and Jacob, that was adopted as godlike-Totem by the Israelites, but exclusively the proper "God" that Abraham worshipped:—the "God" of whom Abraham was the servant, and this on the proudly-human terms of a voluntarily-drawn-up contract for just wages, which imported purely an obedience to a moral law that, if not wholly, yet chiefly, was expressly natural.—Still, the God of Hebrews was not more than a mere national Despot, any infringement of whose orders meant *death*. *Death* was the reigning sign in the moral heavens all through the early life of humanity.

Can we imagine the dreamy horror of the Dead Father that over-shrouded the first opening of any abstract or spiritual capacity! The home-ruler, whom his cowering children supposed to have been hidden away under the ground, was fancied to be ever striving to re-appear and snatch back his still coveted possessions!—And when

the object of this backward terror came, its natural course, to be eliminated from its particularity, in a first bringing to man a proper consciousness in regard to Death, as impending generally on mankind, the image of it was still that of but an Evil Monster lying in wait for his prey. Death was the first form of God as an universal ruler.—And it was long before the veil on the face of Deity was cleared away: while only was this effected by, in fact, the very rise into the light of moral law that, as to itself, was as much the work of Nature as the knowledge of Death was.

The great Hebrew lawgiver has the glory of having eminently charged his people in direct command, that they should turn their back on Death, and look forward only on practical life-work. He would suffer them no *name* at all of Deity except such as but asserted that their Jehovah was an ever-present and unchangeable Self-existence:—such as was later explained by the describing Him as *the God not of the dead but of the living, all of whom do continually live to Him.*—We have to think of Moses as one who drew to himself, as a common centre, a wide range of effects of early culture spread over the favoured plot of the world's surface lying in South-Eastern Asia. Abraham had been imbued with Chaldean lore, and perhaps with that of many other peoples now first being unearthed for us, leading on to the important subsidies to flow in later out of Persia. Moses, on the other hand, drew tribute out of Egypt: not slavishly, however, but with masterful discrimination. Naturalized as he was in Egyptian worship, he yet turned away from it, for the most part, with indignant revulsion: and this for the reason, precisely, of its deep root in the fetish sentiment of the fear of Death and of Dead Men. He, Moses, would have none of such. Even in his recognizing,

as he did, the essential value of that principle of *retribution* which was the merit of Egyptian and of so much of contemporary religionism, he, Moses, would have judgment done on earth, without waiting for that of the nether world. And this noble common sense gave indeed to his people a foundation that, once laid, was laid for ever.

When Hebrewism caught the influence of Zoroastrianism, the matter of *Death* became gradually mixed up with a philosophizing of general Evil. That is, with the notion of a ruling principle of Dualism, of which only one side was good, or beneficent, and the other was the reverse. But the followers of Moses resisted bravely the innovation. Isaiah proclaimed steadfastly, on Jehovah's part, *I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil. I the Lord do all these things* (Is. xlv. 7). And what followed that ought not, in reason, to have followed from this? Certainly it should have happened, as it did, that the struggle to understand the case of nature as to Death resulted for Hebrews into a compelled admission that Death, with whatever might come after, did actually hold the sum of appointed *retribution* which Egyptians had assigned to it.—But for Hebrews, all the same, there was still awaiting the other and more acceptable assurance, of the earthly triumph of Good over Evil whose realizing should be the same with that of all the hopes of God's people, as specially the subjects of their own Jehovah. And hence naturally may have been effected the very compromise in the matter which is betokened as the ruling background to the Gospel-doctrine of the New Testament. In the human career of Jesus we see the culminating effort of Hebrewism to bring to pass the reign of God and of perfect righteousness on earth, through the universal extension of the Hebrew Nation.

And those *enemies of God, who refused to have His Son to reign over them* were at the same time identified with those subjects of the "Evil One" who were henceforth to be known as formed into the *kingdom of this world*. It was the Romans who, by eminence, were the instruments of that *Satan* whom the followers of Jesus, in ecstatic rapture, saw : lightning from heaven.— How then, after such a crushing, should it have happened with : in Divine retribution? How, in this : ald a true and rightful philosophy ha : ?

The Apostle : bear on the matter the ripe idealism : being, as he was himself, a Hebrew of th : ed to his inmost depth by the pending overthrow.—Had God then indeed broken faith?—Or was this really the sign that His people's non-fulfilment of His *whole law* had rendered these as little free from the wrath implied in the Death-penalty on *sin* as the outer world of Gentiles plainly were?—The very doubt of such contingency should naturally have been overwhelming to him, if it had not been met on the spot by the idea of the Logos-Christ, which opened logically the perception that both the "penalty" and the "sin" that were concerned belonged truly to the *race* of men, instead of to individual men. If Jesus suffered shamefully on the cross, this meant but that Jesus represented the whole race of mankind—yes, and Gentiles as well as Jews!—while the very notion of the Logos was that of Godhead clothed in flesh. And the Apostle, when the mingled terror and relief burst upon him,—as he journeyed to Damascus with the words of the martyred Stephen still ringing in his ears,—grasped eagerly at all the rumours around that the *Just One* who had been slain was not dead, but had arisen, and

been seen by many. It was not the Divine promise, but the apparent overthrow itself, that was delusive. Paul himself heard the voice of Jesus, calling on him! —If Jesus, after suffering as the paschal substitute for sinners, had really gained this sign of redemption obtained for mankind, assuredly the Death-sentence was repealed. *Thanks be to God, by whose favour are men henceforth indeed born again into a living hope.*

Certainly, there was here a *moral* fact. The belief in the incarnation of Filial Deity, when this was thoroughly amalgamated in Christianity, did actually cancel the antecedent belief in wrathful and despotic Deity. And it did this in the very way of bringing out to the human sense the proper mark of the life of Family in its true distinctness from that of worldly Nationality. The world-kingdom foretold by Hebrew prophets, and pursued to the last extremity by the sealer of Hebrew prophecy, did indeed become duly world-wide, by the very agency of the mythology of Christianity, which for the first time showed God as a true Father, made such by the possession of a Divine Son:—and this carried a due contemning of “Satanic” worldliness. Even while Hebrews still had the nationality they could cleave to, they had already turned ideally their image of a desired *King* into that of a *Divine Spouse* to the chosen people. And it may be said that from that time onwards the very subject of *matrimony* pervades the whole substance of religionism. The New Testament, with peculiarity as to the Apostolic writings, is full of the idea of marriage. And so was the whole history of the Church, from its first forming to its latest modifying. The notion of the second coming of Christ, which held together the first knot of disciples, was at once symbolled as the marrying of the Spirit

with *the Bride*; or, of the sacrificial *Lamb* with the *New Jerusalem*. St. Paul built his theory of salvation and his whole doctrine of *faith and works*, entirely on the image of *wisely honour and obligation*.

And is not now the Apostle's doctrine to this end become itself a clear *rational fact*? That is, by the actual circumstance in reason that "works" stand for general *conduct*, and "faith" for the reigning *motive* to conduct: while the proper organizing of both conduct and motive-principle depends on the attainment of appropriate ideal forms in regard to both, such as truly God's Providence has afforded to mankind in the dogmas that have sprung from Christology. All the heart-rending, brain-tearing, controversy that has raged around the making and the breaking up of the Christian Creed has left behind it, embedded firmly in our mental nature, certain moral convictions and affective habitudes that abide as rightful signs of Divine peace and goodwill come to earth.—If the doctrines of the Trinity, or the tri-une personality of Deity,—of the "resurrection of the body" as ensured to men-in-general by the bodily resurrection of Jesus,—of the "resurrection of the spirit, out of the deathful state of original sin, drawn on us by the first Adam, into the new birth of a promised state of grace to endure for all eternity,"—if all these had appeared to be now passing away without a permanent residue of good for us, we might indeed have been led to feel that Providence had been wronging us—cheating us, as it were, by lying dreams. But Evolutionism meets the occasion. The very matter of a plan of growth being here, as ever, in question, sets the difficulty at rest. All these doctrines, now apparently in dissolution, are shown to be the rather under veil of only transfiguration, such as actually is to

reason their glorifying. Providence is vindicating itself: and this by a kind of "witness" evoked for Deity, that, if wanting in the special favouritism which, in reason's view, is but disparaging to even the doctrine of "grace" taught by Paul, and much more so to the doctrinism of Moses, is addressed truly to a higher province of mental nature than ever yet has been aroused by Religion.

This permanent witness is of two kinds. And yet, in both ways it bears the mark of being presented in a definite form, adapted to a definite requirement. In both ways is provided distinct guidance for *conduct*:—the reference on the one hand being to a functional arrangement of affection; on the other, to an organized provision of emotive ideals.

The definite requirement and the definite form required, which actually have been dealt with providentially in the course taken by Christian controversy, cannot surely be mis-judged if we take them as pointing to the *Religious ordination of the Family*:—the making out of the Family on the intrinsic terms of inward-seated Feeling and Conscience, which Hebrewism, while it really promoted, only falsified for a partial season in the outward mode of identifying the Family with the Nation. We can hardly read Providence wrong in the assuming, as is here assumed, that the precious residue out of Christology still left with us is the sanctifying as well as legalizing of the domestic bond of Marriage.—When Paul had secured the image of the body of disciples being to Christ as his Church-Wife, bought by him from the inferred tyranny of her natural generator; and when farther this was necessarily softened into the recognition of "grace" as dividedly referrible to the Logos-Son and Paternal Deity; the inevitable progress lay in the producing of a *Holy Family*, in which

the Spirit-Dove combined with the natural mother to symbol out a Bride for God Himself. And this absolute identifying of monogamy with monotheism gave instant "form" to the idea of Christian practice of men and women:—however this might long be kept submerged, as it was, by the flood of the first fanaticism of asceticism, which forced men and women into unnatural celibacy. But the Bridal Church held ever safe within her bosom the *marriage-ring* she had received from her Bridegroom—namely, in that subject of her conscious self-elation which was signalled in the mystic formula of supposed *transubstantiation*, imparted to all adopted Church-members, in proportion to their hierarchical dignity in relation to the "succession of Apostleship":—the *Eucharist* being, apparently, the Christian version of the Roman practice of *consubstantiation*, as symbolizing by a rite of eating and drinking together the two points at once needful of being commemorated: as to, on the one hand, the sacrificial purchase; on the other, the entire spiritual union demanded. And hence easy was the natural descent, accomplished in about twelve centuries, of the whole matter to its proper human ground. The supposed words of Christ, *unless ye eat of my flesh and drink of my blood ye are none of mine*, bear in reality the meaning, "except ye carry out in common ordinary affairs the very mode of the great sacrifice on Calvary, ye are not *married* as ye ought to be to his spirit"; and the commemoration of the paschal supper which, as we know, was kept up by Apostles, most appropriately lent itself to the conversion into a marriage-service. The mysticism of the Romish Eucharist is but a poetry of the same kind as that of our own homely George Herbert.

But the idea was far from perfect yet, as even still

it remains so for ourselves. And the providential evidence of this was in the prosperousness of the ensuing "heresy" of Protestantism, splitting in two the whole dominion of churchhood, both as outwardly and inwardly constituted. Here still however actually our clue serves us. The whole dividing of Christendom really did but pre-demonstrate the awakened feeling of the present day as touching the nature of the bond of Marriage. The demand made on the woman by the original *vow* of Marriage, unconditionally to "obey" her husband, was precisely in intention the unconditioned surrender of the religious conscience to some accepted interpreter of Deity, such as for so-called "Catholics" was the rudely-devised seat of infallibility taken as *Father* of the Bridal Church, offering her up to her Divine Spouse,—and for Protestants was the secularly-conceived *body* of church-members, lengthened out in Apostolic succession: which *body*, in regard to its members, was substituted for "Pope" in the same office:—while, in reality, such inferred right of substitution for Deity, by either any single human being or any humanly-appointed body of such, is that against which all true religious instinct rebels. "The "vow" of ecclesiastical ordination, even as it stands in our law of statehood, is in this respect as inimical to religious feeling as the extant "vow" of marriage is, and on the very ground here at issue. Neither the Wife nor the Church can be reasonably bound in conscience to any other obedience than to God Himself. If in common life any married woman should be commanded by her husband to any act in contradiction to her conscience, no person at the present day would doubt a moment that her "vow" was in this respect annulled. And ought not all the "vowed" members of the church,

also, unhesitatingly to allow themselves, and expect to be allowed generally, the same spiritual freedom?—Would that every ordained priest would assume, as does virtually every Christian wife,—and would openly demand to be understood as assuming,—this liberty of purely personal interpretation of words otherwise but a deadly snare upon conscience! The “Spirit” to which really the Bridal Church is allied can be only that *Spirit of Truth and of Truthfulness* of which the Gospel from the first promised that it should guide into all Truth,—and this, not as shown at once, but only as to be given gradually for the “comforting” of men!—One common resource is however at the same time open, in both cases: an effectual one, and the only one. And that is, in the altering of the existing laws of marriage and of ordination into an exclusive reference to *conduct*, and not function. If marrying persons vowed only to tend well all their possible children, without promising what it does not lie with them to fulfil, of an ensured *love* to one another,—and if priests would begin to vow only to attend practically to the wants spiritual and educational of the flocks committed to them, without promising to *believe* other than the doctrine actually revealed to them,—ecclesiastical and domestic life would rejoice together.

It is only the fruits of Marriage that can justify Marriage. But this ripening of a true ideal of Marriage is a moral fruitage of Christianity that includes a mass of associated benefits that witness to themselves. A fixed understanding about Marriage—fixed, in precisely being rational,—is that settled *law of Family* whose attainment first separates duly the life-of-Home from the life-of-Country. It is also a main helper towards the defining of the mental method of Science in its needful form of

harmonious alienation from Religion. It has, besides, created for us, with duly allotted *names*, a group of moral images which are morally all-in-all to us.

The Mythology of Christianity has given to us abstract notions of *Truth* and of *Trust*. It has given us the idea of *Duty*, and of a correlative to *Duty* under the name of *Sin* which expresses in pure religiousness the quality of all moral transgression in *sundering* from us, either temporarily or entirely, the sense of God—or, the sense of being at one with the pervading intention of whole nature. It has given us the idea of *Justice*, as that of a Divine agency committed royally into the exclusive hands of men, as incorporated into social worlds of human making; and, besides, that of *Mercy*, endowed with the special blessedness of making men like unto God, in His best attribute of Fatherliness. And it has given us, above all and all-inclusively, the apprehension of *Humanity*, turning elastically in all directions so as to embrace all the rest:—an apprehension that had not existed, nor had means of existing, before Christianity called it forth.

Humanity expresses equally a personal sentiment, and an imaged condition. As the former, it implies the mood of Pity, infused with Sympathy, which regards objects on a lower stand than the subject's own: it refers entirely to the lower side of the defining barrier attached to the "condition" which is otherwise and more concretely asserted. In the latter treatment, oppositely, the prevailing reference is upward: distinguishing human subjects, taken in mass, from imagined beings of a kind superior, either as Divinely or in some way superhumanly qualified. As to both of these meanings, however, there is involved the demand which Christology alone has supplied and could supply: the demand

of an effective aggregate ideal, at once emotively and concretely applicable. The idea of a common Saviour, bringing men each and all to an universal Father, and thus truly uniting all in a religious Family, does certainly effect this end. And it does so in affording also a supply of means to support the character: since the ideal massing of human beings is the needful step to that inward "forming" of moral virtues which alone makes them personally serviceable. The due effect of Christology is that of causing each of these virtues to pass severally into a subordinate Logos-incarnation of its own, embodying it in the verbal shape which alone enables it to live practically among us.

And the entire progress thus confirms our first assumption. The common intuition of mankind in regard to Deity is found to have had its rightful development not otherwise than in personal concentration within each of us. The common Father is known to us as such by the only possible means to this end, of the immediate relation held to Him by each separate conscious Soul that looks up to Him.

RECAPITULATION.

THE IDEA OF GOD.

Our minds are entirely made up of Ideas; but of all these the Idea of Deity is the greatest and the most valuable.

It is a religious equivalent to that of a Unity of Composition throughout nature, set forth by modern science.

It arose gradually and has improved gradually for mankind; but has been all along a constant blessing, the source of general progress and of individual culture.

It is essentially realistic, though personal to each one of us; and the actual source of our Self-Consciousness.

THE IDEA OF GROWTH, AND OF THE ESSENTIAL RELATION BETWEEN MIND AND MATTER.

Growth, generalized as Evolution, is a rightful supplement to the idea of Deity.

It gives realism to our sense of causation, by showing to us how creation that is gradual involves spiritual and physical interaction.

Interaction of this kind is counter-action: and in this is supplied to nature a true principle of Balance, as an actual breathing pulse, or pendulum spring to all vitality.

Dualism is the pervading rule of nature: showing severally in heat and motion, acid and alkali, positive and negative polarity, organic sexhood, intellect and feeling, science and religion, extraspection and introspection.

All lead to, and culminate in, Conscious Selfhood. And the brain is inclusive index to the whole development.

Primal motion is vibration: and this is common to mind and body.

Primal motion, as such, accounts imaginarily for the first producing of a cell, or unit of composition to all embedment.

And a certain point appears necessary in development, where motion, at first simple, requires naturally to become known as being Mind.

Existing mental structure has a type in the honeycomb.

THE PROOF OF DEITY WHICH IS AFFORDED IN THE ORDERED MODE OF THE GROWTH OF MIND.

The mind of man is itself a creative centre; and it has the need of interpreting all outward existence by itself.

Hence, the idea of Divine Design is inevitable: while the idea of Sex forms expressly the teleological respondent demanded.

Intermediate typical conception is also throughout producible.

THE WITNESS OF GOD REVEALED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR INTELLIGENCE.

The need of form is as inherent to thought as to matter.

Man's rise above brutes is mainly owing to his possession of the verbal symbols of ordered language. But symbolism is of wider range, both beneath and above speech.

Symbolism is, in practice, of fourfold kind. It is always fundamentally Anthropomorphism; but as intellect advances, this lowest mode of symbolism needs and obtains correction by an alterative counter action, such actually as falls in two ways, according as the demand for it is masculine or feminine. If female personality and religion be in question, the answer is made at extremes, by a large oscillating of Anthropomorphism with Astromorphism; if science and male beings are concerned, the case is answered at means, more restrictedly and accurately, by Dendromorphism in alternation with a lowered Anthropomorphism, to be known as Chelonomorphism.

The quadruple progress is shown by tree-imagery to involve two special "crises" in development. The first is the passing from cotyledonous formation into that of proper thought-leafage; the second is the thorough differentiation which is sexual.

The idea of "natural selection" gives virtually to the mind a magnetic pole, barely intellectual and metallic.

THE WITNESS OF GOD REVEALED IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF OUR AFFECTIONS.

Emotive energy is relatively passive. As Intelligence is *repetition* of Divine creation, so Feeling is express *subjection* to Divine moulding.

Emotion is called forth mainly by our invincible subjectedness to the fact of Death.

The existence of Death appears to be a natural necessity. We must not indulge fancy as to its removal. But we may, in true religiousness, ask for a sign of its agreeing with an over-ruling beneficence.

This apparently is afforded by the inherent and causative association of Death with two other things: the state of pervading Struggle, and the perpetually-developing effect of Sexhood.

Love is as chemistry to our affective life. Dendromorphically considered, it has proceeded out of rudest beginning into the subtlest and best of influences promoting happiness.

A *doctrine of Sexhood* is inevitably also a *doctrine of Forms*.

Religion has been constantly the express regulator of Love. And it has been this, in anthropomorphic necessity, by the means of doctrinal forms.

Religion, all throughout its course shown in history, has been tending to produce, differentially, the forms of Family and Nation.

Christianity, as following on Hebrewism, and leading on to Evolutionism, has produced Morality; and it has done this as meeting severally our domestic and our secular requirement. Christianity, as thus led to and led forward, has endowed us with moral images for our practical direction, which must for ever maintain, as they have sprung from, our rational believing and our personal trusting in Deity.

THE END.

A GENERAL INDEX

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CORRIGENDA.

VOL. II.

- Page 32, line 16, for "is," read "it."
,, 110, ,, 12-3, for "mathematic," read "metaphysics."
,, 185, ,, 25, for "in grasp," read "in its grasp."
,, 253, ,, 1-4, for "appears to have been that of Rotation :—so level a mode is this, for a mode of Motion, that truly it shows itself for common to the units that are solitary molecules, and the solitary units which are stars!" read "appears to have been that of an irregular whorl, anticipating planetary Rotation :—that is, with an effect of imprisoned force truly capable of being common to all solitary units whatever, whether molecules or stars!"
,, *ibid*, line 9-11, for "So long as bare Rotation is concerned, it seems nothing whether the rounding mass, so rounding, be of microscopic or world-large dimensions," read "If we think alone of bare Rotation being concerned, it seems nothing whether the rounding mass be of microscopic or world-large dimensions."
,, 289, line 1, for "for," read "as."
,, 548, ,, 34, for "493," read "495."

VOL. III.

- Page 201, line 8, for "than," read "that."
,, 302, ,, 23, for "513," read "531."
,, 390, ,, 26, for "abvolution," read "absolutism."
,, 458, ,, 21, for "ages," read "days."
,, 471, ,, 1, for "object," read "object—."

CONSTRUCTIVE SUMMARY.

- Page 501, line 9, for "proper whorl," read "sort of whorl."
,, ,, ,, 14, for "rather," read "filmy."
,, 524, ,, 2, for "settled," read "centered."
,, ,, ,, 6, for "spinning," read "struggling."
,, 530, ,, 33, for "spinning vortex," read "whirling motion."

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PRIZE ESSAYS—

CHRISTIANITY AND INFIDELITY: an Exposition of Arguments on Both Sides. 8vo., pp. 173. published February, 1857; begun 1854.

THE EARLY CHRISTIAN ANTICIPATION OF AN APPROACHING END OF THE WORLD, and its bearing upon the character of Christianity as a Divine Revelation: including an investigation into the primitive meaning of the Antichrist and the Man of Sin, and an examination of the argument of the Fifteenth Chapter of Gibbon. 12mo., pp. 136. published December, 1860; begun September, 1859.

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